Memorandum from the Foreign Policy Centre
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TRAVEL ADVICE
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. In light of the continuing threat of
terrorist attacks to Britons around the world, it is vital that
British travellers are well briefed on the risks they face and
that Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) advice contains, wherever
possible, actionable advice on ways for Britons to reduce their
risks. The FCO must also ensure there are structures in place
to respond as effectively as possible in the event of an attack
or other travel crisis. This evidence considers travel advice
within the context of all travel risks and is not restricted to
terrorist threats.
2. More Britons than ever before are travelling
overseas, and this trend—especially to higher risk countries—is
estimated to continue for the foreseeable future.
3. More of these travellers are getting
into trouble overseas, and many of the problems they face are
ones that could be prevented by sound, timely and actionable travel
advice.
4. There is evidence that FCO travel advice
is reaching only a tiny fraction of those travelling overseas,
though. With demand likely to increase—both through an absolute
rise in travel figures and rising concerns among the travelling
public about safety—and FCO funding for this service unlikely
to keep pace, the FCO should reassess its role with regard to
travel advice.
5. There are many different target audiences
for travel advice, each of which will have different scales of
need and for the advice to be effective it will need to be communicated
in a variety of different ways. Travellers vary according to a
number of factors, such as reason for travel or personal factors.
Rather than seeking to be the public interface for the travel
advice it provides, the FCO should capitalize upon its strength
as an information source but use other organizations to do the
majority of the dissemination work. Other organizations, such
as employers or the travel industry, have a direct interest in
ensuring their employees and customers remain safe, have established
networks for disseminating travel advice, and are best placed
to communicate this in the most relevant way for each target group
(package tourists, individual and business travellers and aid
workers, see paragraphs 16-25).
6. More specific recommendations are made
in the final section, but broadly speaking the FCO should:
— Expand its partnership networks and
work much harder with these networks to disseminate this information
to each of the target groups.
— Expand its capacity to deliver advice
on the ground, either directly or through partner organizations
and should also work with partners to develop shared capacity.
— Find ways to monitor the effectiveness
of its travel advice in reaching the people who need it and helping
them to keep themselves safe.
Introduction
7. The Foreign Policy Centre welcomes this
opportunity to contribute to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs
Select Committee's work into the war on terrorism and in particular
its decision to extend the inquiry to the provision of Travel
Advice by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).
8. The following submission is largely based
on a report published by The Foreign Policy Centre in 2002 titled
"Travel Advice: Getting Information to those that need it".
The report analysed the travel advice needs of Britons travelling
and working overseas and argued that the FCO needs to do more
to ensure its travel advice reaches those travellers who need
it most and is disseminated and presented in such a way that it
positively impacts on the behaviour of Britons and thus keeps
them out of danger. The submission is also based on continuing
work into travel safety overseas for company workers and their
dependents and is more concerned with the overall framework of
advice provision rather than the specific content.
9. The bulk of the population is only aware
of the FCO's travel advice during periods of specific concern
such as the increase in tension between India and Pakistan or
the aftermath of the Bali nightclub bombings. It is therefore
rarely sought before departing to many destinations when there
is no perceived risk, the assumption being made that such advice
will not apply to them.
10. Britons are increasingly getting into
trouble abroad. This trend is only likely to continue as all travel
is expected to rise by 10% in the next two years, with adventure
tourism continuing to be one of the fastest growing areas of the
market, and the number of British personnel and investments based
overseas rises. Some of the risks (including those posed by terrorism)
cannot be predicted, but many can be prevented, minimised or avoided
with the provision of sound, timely, and actionable advice.
11. Increased exposure to travel and the
familiarity it breeds is generally a positive phenomenon but it
can also lead to complacency and the establishment of a false
sense of security. Equally disproportionate fears about safety
and terrorism could prevent Britons from travelling even where
the real risks are minimal.
12. Tackling this problem requires clarification
on who exactly is responsible for the safety of British citizens
abroad. Most holidaymakers assume that tour operators or travel
agents will warn them if they face any risks; business travellers
assume their company would not send them to dangerous destinations;
and aid workers may assume either that their standing in the local
community will prevent them from being targeted or that risks
are an inevitable part of the job that cannot be prevented.
13. Information is not getting through to
those who need it. Only a small minority (10%) of travellers regularly
access the FCO website and the uniform manner of dissemination
and the language used cannot meet the specific needs of various
travelling groups such as package holiday makers, independent
and business travellers and aid workers.
14. The goal for the FCO should be that
checking travel advice should become part of the travel process.
In the same way that we check for tickets, passports and money,
we should all ensure that before leaving, we know the risks associated
with our destination and understand the steps we can take to mitigate
those risks. It is also desirable to have ways in which travellers
are able to receive up dates about changing security conditions
during their visit. Achieving this goal will require institutional
energy and coordination from the FCO as well as the commitment
of partner organizations and the travelling public. But if the
safety of British subjects abroad is the paramount aim, especially
in times of increased real or perceived danger, it is worth striving
for and should be regarded as an important priority for the Government
and the FCO in particular.
The barriers to getting information to those who
need it
15. British travellers would appear to have
a very poor appreciation the dangers they face abroad. In research
commissioned by the FCO, just nine percent were able to name a
risk associated with their last overseas trip while just two per
cent had consulted the FCO in London or a consulate overseas.
16. There are barriers specific to each
of the travel groups that prevent information getting through
to them: holiday-makers may prefer to shut themselves off from
negative messages precisely at the time when they are supposed
to be having fun; business travellers away for just a matter of
nights may assume this means they are not at risk; young people
may respond more less readily to official government sources;
gay or lesbian, ethnic groups or older travellers may be better
reached through niche publications.
17. Package holidaymakers, generally the
group at least risk because of the places they visit, need to
be convinced that they require more information than simply what
they are told by their tour guides and representatives. The travel
industry has a self-interest in ensuring their clients enjoy a
safe holiday and are well-placed to disseminate and repackage
the FCO's information via brochures and in introductory meetings
in resorts.
18. Independent travellers face greater
risk as they frequent more diverse and far-flung destinations.
There is often no single organization responsible for their safety,
and this creates a barrier to information getting through to them
especially during an emergency.
19. Sources of information for this group
include guide books, such as Lonely Planet and Rough Guide which
provide information on security along side more practical information
on what to see and do. They are in contact with organizations
such as airlines and insurers but don't always have a direct interest
in ensuring individuals return home safely.
20. Individual travellers are often more
reliant on the FCO in the event of a crisis than many other groups
as they lack the support structure available to package holidaymakers
or business travellers.
21. The level and type of risks faced by
Business travellers largely depends on their destination. The
majority of trips are within the United States or Europe but over
a quarter of trips in 2000 were outside Western Europe.
22. Many business travellers will have limited
contact with the local people and culture, restricting their movements
to major hotels and corporate officers. For those who venture
beyond, it is vital to be aware of local customs relating to dress,
sexual relations, drugs and alcohol.
23. Companies have a "duty of care"
to their employees but there are no agreed standards of practice
to outline what this might mean. There is even more ambiguity
for sub contractors or work on consortiums.
24. Unlike other groups, many business travellers—especially
those working for large multi-nationals or experienced overseas
investors—have access to a wider range of sources of information.
There are numerous non-state providers of advice on personnel
security and general safety who are often retained by major corporations.
Services often include a crisis response capability. It is important
to note, though, that the business community is far from homogenous,
and some companies do not even have a corporate security manager,
let alone a comprehensive personnel travel safety policy.
25. The frequent dispatch of advice to employees
can have the unintended effect of inuring them to the risks they
face. Such information overload can ensure that eventually the
majority of advisories go unread. Many incidents involving business
travellers and workers could have been prevented by the victims
paying greater attention to the advice they received.
26. Aid and Humanitarian workers face the
greatest risk as they often work in the most remote and unstable
areas of the world. This requires an acceptance of risk that sets
them apart from business travellers and tourists.
27. As with commercial organizations, aid
agencies have a duty of care to their employees and a direct interest
in ensuring their well-being. The sector has had to professionalise
its approach to security, which includes the dissemination of
travel advice and safety concerns. Koenrad Van Brabant at the
Overseas Development Institute has carried out excellent work
on this issue.
28. Individuals working in this sector still
cling to assumptions about their immunity from local a conflict,
which stands in the way of effective delivery of advice. Overcoming
this position is essential to ensuring staff take reasonable precautions
about their personal safety and understand what they can reasonably
expect from their employers.
How can the existing system be improved?
Information Sources
29. The Consular Division has launched a
world-class travel advice website, which is part of the FCO's
overall site. The Internet represents an ideal method of disseminating
information to a wide audience but the figures suggest that the
potential is not being realized. The FCO estimates that its entire
website receives 6.5 million users per year, with those visiting
the travel pages being a proportion of these users. Even if each
of these visitors did access the travel pages and represented
one trip overseas this would mean the site was being accessed
in just 10% of trips.
30. The FCO must strengthen its online marketing
policy. The site must not only be found by those looking specifically
for advice, it must also be found by those who are not looking
for advice but are using the Internet to find other information
relating to travel.
31. The use of mediums such as television
is restricted, largely due to the cost implications. The Consular
Division sensibly seeks to promote the site through having its
staff interviewed for travel articles and its web link is often
displayed next to these articles and across the travel pages more
broadly. The FCO must ensure it keeps pace with the opportunities
presented by advances in technology, such as mobile phones, text
messaging and Palm Pilot personal organizers. Partnerships with
technology companies could facilitate this. Such mediums can be
incredibly useful in ensuring travellers are kept up to date about
changing threats levels during their trip.
Target Audiences
32. One of the main challenges for the FCO
is that it must be all things to all people—its target audience
is the whole of the British travelling public.
33. The FCO has begun to respond to this
challenge, and in recent years has targeted niche groups, such
as lesbian and gay travellers and young people in the 18-30 age
bracket.
Building Networks
34. The FCO's "Know Before You Go"
campaign uses a simple message that applies to all travellers—know
your risks before you travel and take advice to prevent them.
It has signed up partner organizations that commit to help disseminate
this message and promote the FCO's travel advice. This is a welcome
development in line with the direction advocated with this report,
but the majority of partners are at present limited to the holidaymaker
and independent traveller groups rather than the business and
aid workers categories. The FCO should redress this balance as
a matter of urgent priority.
35. The FCO should then work with partner
organizations to develop literature targeted at the content and
communication needs of the individual audiences.
36. Information received during the visit
is often more effective in drawing travellers' attention to problems
they might face abroad. While the larger tour operators have frequent
briefings in hotels or resorts, and some employers have the same
practice for workers overseas, this practice is by no means universal.
Coordination between the FCO and its partners could facilitate
the provision of materials that could be distributed at such events.
Services on the Ground
37. The FCO should investigate other opportunities
for disseminating information, such as business-specific advice
in executive lounges at airports or the inclusion of leaflets
with travel tickets and documents.
38. US embassies have a Regional Security
Office (RSO), responsible for liaising with the US business community
on issues relating to their security. Many of the US embassies
studied in the report also offered a "warden scheme",
which provides an interface between the embassy and US citizens.
39. British embassies contain the staff
capable of providing this function but knowledge of their existence
is conspicuous by its absence among British business travellers
and tourists. Improving and formalizing this system would greatly
enhance the role of UK embassies. The same process should be undertaken
with regard to crisis response scenarios, outlining the steps
British travellers can take and the services available to them.
Lessons Learned
40. If the aim of travel advice is to reduce
the number of Britons getting into trouble overseas, and given
the fact that prevention is better than picking up the pieces
after the event, especially after a terrorist outrage such as
the Bali nightclub bombing, it is vital that lessons from past
cases are learnt and improvements implemented on a regular basis.
Funding
41. It is also vital that the issue of funding
be addressed. One result of a more successful process of information
dissemination would be an increase in demand for the service and
therefore the workload of the FCO (as well as partner organizations).
Allocating sufficient funds to ensure that there is always capacity
to meet existing and future demand will ensure that the level
of service is maintained and improved. At a time of increasing
security risks and rising fear among Britons travelling overseas,
this should be a key priority for the FCO for the foreseeable
future.
Recommendations for action:
Information Sources
42. The FCO should continue to maintain
its free information service and seek to expand further its partner
organizations. Ensuring that the website is well connected to
search engines and as many relevant partner sites as possible
will help to proactively seek out visitors as opposed to relying
on them finding the FCO site for themselves. The role of the FCO
should be expansion of audience as well as provision to those
already convinced by the value of travel advice.
Networks for Dissemination
43. The type of partner organizations should
be expanded to include employers, DFID, risk consultancies and
a broader range of specialist insurers and niche travel publications.
44. Partner organizations should be held
to their pledge to actively disseminate FCO information at all
stages of the holiday or business trip process.
45. The FCO and its partners should produce
more literature aimed at specific travel groups with information
on the risks they face, eg travelling with a laptop for business
travellers, or local approaches to alcohol and drugs. This advice
should be prevented in ways relevant to the target audience. With
regard to crisis information, there should be a clear and effective
way of ensuring next of kin receive timely and useful advice and
assistance.
Delivering on the Ground
46. Travellers are most receptive to advice
at the point of departure. Therefore the FCO should investigate
ways of including its information with tickets or other travel
documents.
47. The FCO must also keep up-to-speed with
technological developments that would allow it to reach individuals
in real time during their visits through new means, such as mobile
phones or Palm Pilot personal organizers.
48. In destination countries, the FCO should
work harder to ensure that travellers are aware not only of the
specific risks they face in country but also the services available
to them at British embassies and consulates. Greater liaison with
tour guides and business on the model of the US RSO model would
facilitate travel safety.
Monitoring Effectiveness
49. The FCO should compile as much information
as possible from cases in order to establish the strengths and
weaknesses of the travel advice system.
50. Partner organizations should be responsible
for delivering similar information to the FCO for cases they have
handled.
The Foreign Policy Centre
January 2003
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