Memorandum from the Ambassador, The Embassy
of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Letter to the Chairman of the Committee
from the Ambassador, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
IN THE NAME OF THE ALMIGHTY
As you are aware the Islamic Republic of Iran
has been the target of a massive propaganda onslaught directed
at its peaceful nuclear programme during recent weeks. This political-propaganda
attack is primarily launched by war-monger circles in Washington
and duplicated and amplified by some politicians in other western
countries.
The Islamic Republic of Iran has done its utmost
to have transparent and open cooperation with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). I remind you that in addition to
the regular inspections in recent years by IAEA, within a very
short period after the visit by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohammed
El-Baradei we have had six delegations from the Agency inspecting
nuclear facilities of Iran. The latest of such visits was just
a few days ago.
For the purpose of shedding greater light on
the true nature of Iran's nuclear programme and clearing up the
positions of my government on nuclear energy I have attached to
this letter a copy of a brochure entitled Peaceful Nuclear Activities
of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this brochure an attempt is
made to clear up some ambiguities concerning Iranian nuclear programme
under following titles:
— The nature and scope of Iranian nuclear
programme.
— Economic feasibility of nuclear programme
for oil and gas rich country.
— Fuel cycle and heavy water reactors.
— Iran's transparency and compliance
with IAEA safeguards.
I hope by carefully reading this brochure you
will be able to have a more balanced and impartial picture of
the legitimate activities of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the
field of nuclear energy.
Should you require more information or have
any enquiries, please contact our embassy.
Ambassador
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
14 June 2003
PEACEFUL NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF IRAN POLICY
1. Weapons of mass destruction have no place
in the defensive doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
— Iran believes that WMD will not augment
its security, and would in fact increase its vulnerability.
— Iran believes that an arms race in
the region, particularly in the area of WMD, is dangerous and
must be addressed through universal non-proliferation.
— Iran firmly pursues the goal of a
region and a world free from WMD through their total elimination.
— In 1974, Iran proposed the establishment
of a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East in the
United Nations and has actively pursued it ever since.
2. The Islamic Republic of Iran is a party
to NPT, CWC and BWC, and has signed CTBT.
3. Iran signed the statute of IAEA in 1958,
and signed Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA in
1973 to facilitate the inspection of Iran's nuclear activities
by the IAEA. It also accepted the Subsidiary Arrangements to IAEA
Safeguards in February 2003.
4. Iran has rendered full cooperation as
requested by the IAEA, and all official reports of the Agency
inspection teams have verified the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear
activities. The visit of the Director-General of the Agency to
the Islamic Republic of Iran in February 2003 confirmed the intention
of Iranian authorities to cooperate with the Agency, even going
beyond their legal obligations which did not bind Iran to declare
its facilities until 180 days prior to introduction of Uranium
for enrichment.
5. Iran believes that nothing should be
done to undermine the integrity of the IAEA in discharging its
functions in non-proliferation regime as well as promotion of
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
6. Iran intends to vigorously and fully
pursue its right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.
7. Iran has no problem with even further
transparency, provided that it receives reciprocal guarantees
that its acceptance of the Additional Protocol would bring to
an end all propaganda about Iran's nuclear program and restrictions
against Iran's full access to nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes and lead to recognition of its peaceful capabilities
through relevant international frameworks.
THE NATURE
AND SCOPE
OF IRANIAN
NUCLEAR PROGRAM
8. The primary priority of Iranian nuclear
program is generation of nuclear electricity.
9. Due to the rapid socio-economic development
of Iran during the past three decades, Iran's strategy for use
of fossil resources has been affected by two restrictive elements.
— Rising living standards and improvement
of economic indicators have prompted an increase in the demand
for energy in domestic and industrial sectors;
— While the supply of primary energy
has registered an average growth rate of 6.03% since 1977, energy
consumption rate has increased from 180.9 million barrels of crude
oil in 1977 to 661.7 million in 2001. Electricity production rate
has increased from 19847 million KWh in 1977 to 130082.3 million
KWh in 2001, registering an annual average growth rate of 8.52%.
The consumption of energy for electricity generation in fossil
power plants has increased from 29.6 million barrels of crude
oil in 1977 to 225.7 million barrels in 2001, registering a consumption
growth rate of 8.8%.
— Iran's national economy is dependent
on oil revenues.
— To dispose of these two contradictory
and restrictive elements, Iran needs to develop a long term strategy
to reverse the trend of unrestrained use of fossil resources.
ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY OF NUCLEAR PROGRAM FOR
OIL AND GAS RICH COUNTRY
10. Iran can not merely rely on fossil fuel
for its energy for the following considerations:
— Continued use of energy in its present
form is bound to turn Iran into a net importer of crude oil and
some of its by-products in the coming decades.
— Local use of these resources as fuel
will drastically affect Iran's foreign exchange earnings from
export of crude oil and natural gas.
— The utilization of these resources
in processing industries such as petrochemicals will generate
much greater added value.
— The environmental impact of increased
reliance on fossil fuel is a serious concern of the entire international
community.
11. Based on the WASP model—a widely
known model for optimization of energy supply, by the year 2020,
the share of nuclear power plants in the supply of energy in low,
medium and high growth rate scenarios will be respectively 4,000,
7,000 and 11,000 megawatts. Iran has chosen the medium scenario.
12. In the projected 7,000 megawatt scenario,
Iran will annually save 190 million barrels of crude oil based
on 60% EAF (Energy Availability Factor).
— The economic value of such savings
is estimated to be over US $5 billion per year.
— The environmental value will amount
to preventing the release into the atmosphere of over 157,000
tons of carbon dioxide, 1,150 tons of suspending particles, 130
tons of sulfur and 50 tons of nitrous oxide.
— With any increase of EAF, the economic
and environmental advantage of nuclear power plants would be greater.
13. The advisability of a nuclear energy
program for Iran was even endorsed by the US State Department,
which in a memo of 20 October 1978, expressed that the US is encouraged
by Iran's efforts to expand its non-oil energy base, and is hopeful
that the US-Iran Nuclear Energy Agreement will be concluded soon
and that American companies will be able to play a role in Iran's
nuclear energy projects. (Digital National Security Archive)
FUEL CYCLE AND HEAVY WATER REACTORS
14. To achieve the objective of producing
7,000 megawatts of nuclear electricity by 2020, Iran needs plans
in various advanced fields of nuclear technology such as nuclear
fuel cycle, nuclear safety and nuclear wastes.
15. The volume of nuclear fuel needed for
power plants with the total capacity of 7,000 megawatts requires
a long-term plan for the provision of the needed fuel by 2020.
— The Russian Federation is committed
to provide nuclear fuel only for the Bushehr power plant and has
no commitment to meet Iranian needs for nuclear fuel in other
planned nuclear power plants.
— Even with respect to the Bushehr
power plant, the Russian Federation has committed itself only
to provide nuclear fuel for a limited period of time.
16. Iran has consistently sought assistance
from Western countries and called for joint cooperation in the
above-mentioned areas.
— Iran's offer met with a cool reception.
— Under the current undue restrictions,
Iran has not yet been able to recover inter alia its approximately
100 tones enriched uranium and 390 tones tails uranium currently
stored in Lingen, Germany.
17. Having been deprived of Western cooperation
in this field, Iran turned to the policy of self-sufficiency.
18. Iran had to concurrently focus on the
production of heavy water for HWR and Uranium enrichment for LWR
because it was not certain as to which of these two endeavors
shall embrace success.
19. To be able to produce nuclear fuel indigenously,
Iran will have to put into place a system for mining and processing
of uranium ores and also for its conversion and enrichment.
— Yazd Saghand project is designed
to recover Uranium from natural deposits. In this facility, uranium
is extracted from a depth of 350 meters and transported to Ardakan
facility to go through various physical and chemical processes
to produce uranium hexa flouride, metallic uranium and uranium
dioxide.
— A UCF facility in Isfahan has been
built in order to produce UF6.
— UF6 is the main feedstock for the
Natanz enrichment facility.
— The Natanz facility is designed for
production of nuclear fuel for power plants using low enriched
uranium of around 3% to 5% U-235.
— A Zirconium Production Plant (ZPP)
is now under construction in Isfahan for production of fuel cladding.
— A facility in Arak is under construction
to produce heavy water which is an essential constituent of HWR
reactors.
20. Iran plans to utilize HWR and specially
CANDU in addition to LWR, because
— CANDU-type reactors are more amenable
to indigenous development.
— These reactors use natural uranium
recovered from local resources for production of nuclear fuel.
21. The argument that fuel cycle program
or heavy water plants are designed to produce nuclear weapons
is not tenable, because at present over 12 countries are engaged
in uranium enrichment activity on either industrial or semi-industrial
scales, and many are utilizing HWR. Can one then claim that all
these countries are working to develop nuclear weapons?
IRAN'S TRANSPARENCY AND COMPLIANCE WITH IAEA
SAFEGUARDS
22. Iran has been fully transparent with
regard to its intention to acquire nuclear fuel cycle technology.
— Iran officially sought the assistance
of western and other countries in developing nuclear fuel cycle.
— Iran informed the IAEA in 2000 of
its program to build the UCF project in Isfahan. Its product,
UF6, can only be used as the feedstock of a Uranium enrichment
project, such as the one in Natanz.
— Before accepting the subsidiary arrangements
in February 2003, Iran was under no obligation to declare its
Natanz facility, until 180 days prior to introduction of Uranium
to the facility for enrichment.
23. In June 2002, the Permanent Representative
of Iran to the IAEA informed the Secretariat of Iran's involvement
in various fields of nuclear fuel cycle.
24. In September 2002, IAEA was officially
informed about the construction of the Natanz enrichment facility,
although Iran was not legally obliged to do so.
— While not legally obliged, Iran invited
and received IAEA Director General and his colleagues to visit
Natanz along with the UCF project.
— IAEA's technical inspection teams
have since made several visits to Iranian nuclear-related facilities.
The Iranian Atomic Energy Organization staff is working closely
with the IAEA technical inspection teams so as to enable them
to prepare a report on Iran's nuclear program for the Board of
Governors of the IAEA.
25. The Arak facility is designed to produce
heavy water which does not fall under the IAEA safeguards. Therefore,
Iran was not legally bound to declare it. Yet, Iran voluntarily
invited IAEA Director General to visit Arak, which he postponed
to a later visit.
26. Contentions about the secrecy of the
Arak and Natanz projects are fictitious.
— Given the huge installations and
distillation towers erected on the ground in Arak, it is practically
impossible to keep the construction of such a facility secret.
— The underground construction of parts
of the Natanz project is motivated by the requirement of defending
the facility against aerial attacks, which were experienced against
the Bushehr facility in the course of Iran-Iraq war and not by
an unachievable illusion of keeping such a project secret.
27. Nuclear transparency has its own criteria
and standards set forth in the relevant international treaties
and the decisions of the IAEA. Under these treaties and decisions,
any country which has fulfilled its international commitments
on nuclear activities has observed the criteria and standards
of nuclear transparency. Reports by the IAEA after their visits
to Iran have confirmed Iran's full compliance and transparency.
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
1. Iran's pursuit of nuclear technology
is exclusively for peaceful purposes. This has and continues to
be the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
2. Iran has absolutely nothing to hide with
regard to its nuclear program.
3. Iran's compliance with its obligations,
and even beyond its commitments, is and will remain unquestionable.
As regards "the issue of intentions", it is prepared
to enter reciprocal confidence-building measures.
4. Iran's policy towards the Additional
Protocol is both clear and rational.
5. Iran has no difficulty to accept this
Protocol and is approaching it positively.
6. At the same time, it cannot achieve the
ratification and enforcement of the provisions of this Protocol
without reciprocal guarantees.
7. While Iran has complied fully with different
nuclear treaties and safeguard agreements and has rendered full
cooperation as demanded by the IAEA, other parties have failed
to comply with NPT provisions on peaceful use.
8. Iran still remains subject to various
international pressures and restrictions, while countries which
possess weapons of mass destruction and refuse to accede to treaties
such as NPT are not held accountable for their nuclear conduct.
9. Iran expects official reciprocal guarantees
that its acceptance of the Additional Protocol would bring to
an end all propaganda about Iran's nuclear program and restrictions
against Iran's full access to nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes and lead to recognition of its peaceful capabilities
through relevant international frameworks.
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