Memorandum from Sir Archie Lamb
INFORMATION, INTELLIGENCE AND KNOWLEDGE
1. The Foreign Affairs Committee of the
House of Commons is inquiring into the Foreign Policy Aspects
of the War against Terrorism and the Decision to go to War in
Iraq.
2. In the context of the war in Iraq, reports
in the media and statements by Members of Parliament and others
connected with the government of the United Kingdom suggest that
the Committee's inquiry and the parallel inquiry by the Committee
on Security and Intelligence will concentrate on the value of
the intelligence available to Her Majesty's Government in that
context, "intelligence" being interpreted to mean "secret
intelligence".
3. The stock-in-trade of the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, which, under the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs and through Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service, is responsible
for advising HMG on the formulation and execution of foreign policy,
is "knowledge". This knowledge is acquired from reports
by HM Diplomatic Missions, contacts with foreign diplomatic representatives
in London and at international organisations, travellers tales
reported in the media and/or at learned societies with an interest
in foreign affairs, and secret intelligence. Secret intelligence
from human, electronic and satellite sources is beyond the scope
of this paper; but it may be unreliable if not corroborated in
whole or in part by information acquired in the normal course
of international relations. Reliable travellers tales which have
added to our knowledge have been few.
4. Since 1991 HMG have not had diplomatic
relations with the Government of Iraq and have therefore deprived
themselves of their own eyes and ears on the ground. For 12 years
there has been no regular flow of information from an Embassy
in Baghdad shaping the knowledge of the policy and practice of
the Iraqi Government essential to the formulation of British foreign
policy towards that country based on a full understanding of bilateral,
multilateral and international mutual interests and antagonisms.
Without accurate and adequate knowledge it is impossible for HMG
to frame a foreign policy which would contribute positively and
substantially to the promotion and protection of British interests.
5. An example of how a British Diplomatic
Mission may be organised to ensure a comprehensive flow of essential
information to the FCO and other relevant Government Departments
is described in Chapter 12 of my Memoir "A Long Way From
Swansea". When I was HM Ambassador in Kuwait my colleagues
and I practised what I called "total diplomacy": we
interested ourselves in everything that was going on. In short,
we "nursed the constituency" and as a result thereof,
I am proud to believe, kept HMG informed of all matters relevant
to our relations with that Emirate. Again, when I was HM Ambassador
to Norway in the late 1970s, I stressed the importance of the
British and Norwegian Governments sharing a continuing political
overview of the (then) new offshore oil industry and where it
was leading the two countries bilaterally, multilaterally and
internationally. An Ambassador in Baghdad from 1991 would have
done no less but much more to ensure that HMG were in full possession
of the facts of Iraqi policy and practice than appears to have
been available to them.
NOTE: Sir Archie Lamb KBE CMG DFC served
in the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service from 1938-80, serving
in senior posts as Chief Inspector of the Diplomatic Service,
British Political Agent in Abu Dhabi and HM Ambassador to Kuwait
and to Norway.
Sir Archie Lamb
24 June 2003
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