Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Written Evidence


Further memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Letter from the Chairman of the Committee to Mr O'Brien, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1 May 2003

  Yesterday I met Ambassador Sarmadi at his request to discuss a range of issues affecting UK-Iranian relations.

  With the Ambassador's agreement, I enclose a summary note of that meeting. I would be grateful to receive your observations on the various points raised by the Ambassador.

  In particular, I would welcome a full statement on the current status of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO), on the relationship between coalition authorities and MKO forces and members on the ground in Iraq, and whether this has changed recently. I would also hope that you will be able to expand on the remarks attributed to the Prime Minister by the Ambassador, and to comment on current and planned high-level contacts with Iran.

  As you know, the Committee was disappointed to have to postpone the visit it had planned to make to Iran in March. I am pleased to report that the Ambassador confirmed that arrangements are being made for the visit to take place in October.

Chairman of the Committee

1 May 2003

Letter from the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Chairman of the Committee, 1 July 2003

  In the Chairman's letter of 1 May to Mike O'Brien about the Chairman's meeting with Ambassador Sarmadi on 30 April, he specifically asked about coalition policy towards the Mujahedin-e-Khalq Organisation (MKO). It is just not true for the Ambassador to claim that the MKO are a tool of the coalition. As you will know, both we and the US regard the MKO as a terrorist organisation; it is on the list of groups proscribed by the Home Secretary under the Terrorism Act 2000. Furthermore, we firmly believe that the MKO had been fully integrated into Saddam Hussein's security apparatus. As such, during the conflict hostile MKO operatives were targeted like other Iraqi forces. After the cessation of hostilities US forces were not able to take on such a complex organisation immediately. But I can confirm that on 8 May US forces surrounded the main body of MKO forces and gave them an ultimatum. They are now systematically detaining and disarming them. We appreciated Iran's restraint in not intervening during the conflict. In turn, the coalition has ensured that one of Iran's bitterest enemies is no longer a threat.

  It may be that one or two US army commanders in theatre made ad hoc arrangements with factions of the MKO. Added to this is MKO propaganda about a secret deal between the US and MKO. And the coalition has not yet decided how to treat surrendering MKO forces. Taken together, these may help explain the Ambassador's comments, but his concerns are not warranted. We have explained the position fully in Tehran as well as to the Ambassador himself.

  The Chairman also raised the Ambassador's question about the Prime Minister's comment on high level visits. As far as we are aware, he did not have a particular visit in mind. Rather, he expressed the wish (which we share) that we should thicken the bilateral relationship with further senior visits. The FAC visit in October is a case in point.

  The Ambassador also mentioned the formation of a new administration. The coalition does not wish to stay in Iraq longer than is absolutely necessary. But we cannot leave until lasting stability has been achieved, and Iran has an important role in this. In setting up an interim administration in Iraq, we wish to ensure that all Iraqis have a voice in the process. We assume the Ambassador's remark about groups choosing not to be a part of the process refers to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). We have done all we can to encourage SCIRI to join the process, and secured their participation at the Central Iraq (Baghdad) Conference on 28 April. Furthermore, with coalition assistance the leader of SCIRI, Ayatollah Al-Hakim, was able to return to Iraq in person on 10 May.

  The Ambassador was concerned that media coverage of Shia religious fervour was being used to misrepresent Iranian intentions. I cannot answer for spin the media may or may not have put on events, though I think reasoned observers viewed them as nothing more than legitimate religious events involving Iraqi Shia who are Iraqi first and Shia second. But Iranian meddling in Iraq is a separate issue, and the Ambassador is well aware of our views.

  Finally, the Ambassador's readout on UK/Iranian relations interested me. But as seen from here, there are some significant plus points. Afghanistan is certainly one. The UK and Iran have similar views on the future of the country, and our co-operation is benefiting Afghanistan and regional stability. Bilaterally, there have been more ministerial visits in the last couple of years than at any time since the revolution. Jack Straw has visited four times. Mike O'Brien visited Iran in May and was very well received, while Foreign Minister Kharrazi visited the UK in early February and, as you know, saw the Prime Minister and Jack Straw as well as yourself. A second round of negotiations on a Trade Co-operation Agreement took place in Brussels last month, and an FCO team visited Tehran to continue negotiations on an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement in February. Difficult issues remain in the relationship. But we have made progress since Mohamed Khatami became President.

Parliamentary Relations & Devolution Department

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1 July 2003


 
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