Further memorandum from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
Letter from the Chairman of the Committee to Mr
O'Brien, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 1 May 2003
Yesterday I met Ambassador Sarmadi at his request
to discuss a range of issues affecting UK-Iranian relations.
With the Ambassador's agreement, I enclose a
summary note of that meeting. I would be grateful to receive your
observations on the various points raised by the Ambassador.
In particular, I would welcome a full statement
on the current status of the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MKO), on the relationship
between coalition authorities and MKO forces and members on the
ground in Iraq, and whether this has changed recently. I would
also hope that you will be able to expand on the remarks attributed
to the Prime Minister by the Ambassador, and to comment on current
and planned high-level contacts with Iran.
As you know, the Committee was disappointed
to have to postpone the visit it had planned to make to Iran in
March. I am pleased to report that the Ambassador confirmed that
arrangements are being made for the visit to take place in October.
Chairman of the Committee
1 May 2003
Letter from the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution
Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office to the Chairman of
the Committee, 1 July 2003
In the Chairman's letter of 1 May to Mike O'Brien
about the Chairman's meeting with Ambassador Sarmadi on 30 April,
he specifically asked about coalition policy towards the Mujahedin-e-Khalq
Organisation (MKO). It is just not true for the Ambassador to
claim that the MKO are a tool of the coalition. As you will know,
both we and the US regard the MKO as a terrorist organisation;
it is on the list of groups proscribed by the Home Secretary under
the Terrorism Act 2000. Furthermore, we firmly believe that the
MKO had been fully integrated into Saddam Hussein's security apparatus.
As such, during the conflict hostile MKO operatives were targeted
like other Iraqi forces. After the cessation of hostilities US
forces were not able to take on such a complex organisation immediately.
But I can confirm that on 8 May US forces surrounded the main
body of MKO forces and gave them an ultimatum. They are now systematically
detaining and disarming them. We appreciated Iran's restraint
in not intervening during the conflict. In turn, the coalition
has ensured that one of Iran's bitterest enemies is no longer
a threat.
It may be that one or two US army commanders
in theatre made ad hoc arrangements with factions of the
MKO. Added to this is MKO propaganda about a secret deal between
the US and MKO. And the coalition has not yet decided how to treat
surrendering MKO forces. Taken together, these may help explain
the Ambassador's comments, but his concerns are not warranted.
We have explained the position fully in Tehran as well as to the
Ambassador himself.
The Chairman also raised the Ambassador's question
about the Prime Minister's comment on high level visits. As far
as we are aware, he did not have a particular visit in mind. Rather,
he expressed the wish (which we share) that we should thicken
the bilateral relationship with further senior visits. The FAC
visit in October is a case in point.
The Ambassador also mentioned the formation
of a new administration. The coalition does not wish to stay in
Iraq longer than is absolutely necessary. But we cannot leave
until lasting stability has been achieved, and Iran has an important
role in this. In setting up an interim administration in Iraq,
we wish to ensure that all Iraqis have a voice in the process.
We assume the Ambassador's remark about groups choosing not to
be a part of the process refers to the Supreme Council for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). We have done all we can to
encourage SCIRI to join the process, and secured their participation
at the Central Iraq (Baghdad) Conference on 28 April. Furthermore,
with coalition assistance the leader of SCIRI, Ayatollah Al-Hakim,
was able to return to Iraq in person on 10 May.
The Ambassador was concerned that media coverage
of Shia religious fervour was being used to misrepresent Iranian
intentions. I cannot answer for spin the media may or may not
have put on events, though I think reasoned observers viewed them
as nothing more than legitimate religious events involving Iraqi
Shia who are Iraqi first and Shia second. But Iranian meddling
in Iraq is a separate issue, and the Ambassador is well aware
of our views.
Finally, the Ambassador's readout on UK/Iranian
relations interested me. But as seen from here, there are some
significant plus points. Afghanistan is certainly one. The UK
and Iran have similar views on the future of the country, and
our co-operation is benefiting Afghanistan and regional stability.
Bilaterally, there have been more ministerial visits in the last
couple of years than at any time since the revolution. Jack Straw
has visited four times. Mike O'Brien visited Iran in May and was
very well received, while Foreign Minister Kharrazi visited the
UK in early February and, as you know, saw the Prime Minister
and Jack Straw as well as yourself. A second round of negotiations
on a Trade Co-operation Agreement took place in Brussels last
month, and an FCO team visited Tehran to continue negotiations
on an Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement in February.
Difficult issues remain in the relationship. But we have made
progress since Mohamed Khatami became President.
Parliamentary Relations & Devolution Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1 July 2003
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