Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-98)
THURSDAY 27 FEBRUARY 2003
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR EDWARD
OAKDEN AND
MR TIM
DOWSE
Mr Lansley
80. Foreign Secretary, perhaps I can start with
reference to India again. As we previously discussed, you sent
a letter to our Chairman about the oversight in relation to a
licence that had been granted in relation to components and production
equipment?
(Mr Straw) The Hawk, yes.
81. But there were single licences granted in
January 2001. Why were we not informed of those licences at the
same time?
(Mr Dowse) They were temporary export licences. All
of them related to the export of items of Hawk components and,
I think, a demonstration aircraft, which were for display at the
*** air show in ***. Most of these licences were returned unused,
the equipment was never exported. In the other cases the goods
were returned to the UK, they did not represent a permanent export
to India.
82. That being the case, one of the licences
in particular—that related to numbers 19638 and 19639—referred
in its description to *** which presumably would not be appropriate
for the purpose for which the licence was granted?
(Mr Dowse) *** are frequently displayed at international
events and air exhibitions of this sort. In both those cases,
however, a temporary licence was returned unused.
83. Was that the same in relation to 19640 which
appears to be for a complete Hawk *** aircraft?
(Mr Dowse) True. That is a Hawk *** aircraft registered
***, which is *** demonstrator aircraft. Again, the licence was
returned unused.
Mr Khabra
84. The equipment permitted for export under
licence 19640, which was issued on 9 January 2001, also appears
to include ***. Were these *** intended for fitment to the Hawk
aircraft also permitted for export under the same licence?
(Mr Dowse) We shall have to write to you on that point.
It is a level of detail that I do not think we would have gone
into. Since they are covered by the same licence, I assume they
were associated with the aircraft. Again, this equipment was all
intended for display at an air trade exhibition in India. In the
case of this particular licence—19640—the licence
was returned unused.
Mr Lansley
85. Can I move to Pakistan for a moment? Among
the licences granted were licences for production equipment and
components for large-calibre artillery. In the course of your
response to us you told us that you took the view that there was
no clear risk of aggressive use. This is in relation to the criterion
for regional stability. Can you give us some indication as to
why you should take what, on the face of it, looks to be an unlikely
decision?
(Mr Straw) I looked at these all very carefully on
both sides. We did not approve any licences for export where we
judged there would have been clear risk that either country would
use such exports aggressively against each other. Although there
was obviously a high degree of tension in the India/Pakistan circumstances,
my own judgment was that approving these exports was not going
to make any difference at all to the degree of tension or the
resolution of dispute, and neither have they, they have been resolved
politically. So I would have to write to you with detail about
that particular application, because I remember going into it.
(Mr Dowse) What we were talking about in this case
was an application for, I think, production equipment for artillery
ammunition, rather than the finished product itself, but the judgment
was made against the criteria and the circumstances at the time.
Chairman
86. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office said
the issue was that there was "no clear risk of aggressive
use". That is different, Foreign Secretary, to what you have
just said which is that more artillery to Pakistan would not make
any difference to the regional tension.
(Mr Straw) Sorry, it comes within the same heading.
87.Is it no risk of aggressive use, or is it
that there might be aggressive use, but it is going to be so terrible
anyway, what do a few more matter?
(Mr Straw) This is about at the time ***. There is
a sine qua non which is often forgotten in the whole issue
of arms licensing, which is a problem *** That is the reality.
So on some initial reading of the criteria, you could refuse every
single application from every single country, unless the idea
of the sale was that the equipment should be purchased at very
great cost but should never ever be used for the use which it
is contemplated. So that is the problem. That is why I am saying
that sometimes the judgments are quite difficult, but that was
the judgment I made.
(Mr Dowse) The judgment in the circumstances
of the time, we would emphasise, was before the rise in tension
following the attack on the Indian Parliament.
(Mr Straw) That is also a good point
which I forgot.
(Mr Dowse) The circumstances across the
line of control, where exchanges of fire were taking place, were
involving at that time small arms rather than artillery.
Chairman: We shall move on.
Mr Chidgey
88. Quickly going back to handcuffs, but rather
more specifically on export licences, in a further memorandum
to the Committee the Government says that "Handcuffs were
licensed for export to reputable organisations akin to" our
own UK Prison Service, for example, in Canada, New Zealand, Australia
and America. They were "for use either in escorting or transporting
prisoners. There was no clear risk of use for internal repression
in any of these cases. Handcuffs licensed to the *** were also
for use in escorting prisoners." I want to ask you, Foreign
Secretary, was there a clear risk of use for internal repression
in the case of the handcuffs permitted for export to ***?
(Mr Dowse) I think that in terms of the licences that
you are referring to—and we approved one and I think refused
two—the cases involved different types of handcuffs in each
case. To run through them, in the case of licence 28374, which
we approved, the goods involved were normal over-sized handcuffs.
We did not believe that there was a clear risk that the *** would
use them in any way other than as over-sized handcuffs. In the
case of licence 17084, ***. We have no particular grounds for
concern that the *** would misuse the equipment, but we did nevertheless
judge that there was a clear risk that it could clearly easily
be disassembled and reassembled in the form of leg-irons and therefore
was covered by the scope of our export ban. A similar consideration
was applied in the case of licence 21003. So I think it is an
example, if you like, of the really rather detailed care that
we do give in assessing individual licences case by case.
89. I will shorten this, but I would just make
the point that the concern that we have is that the export licence
that was granted was granted to escort handcuffs that in fact
could be converted to shackles or leg-irons by virtue of a steel
chain. I just make the point, rather than ask for an answer. There
is a further point, if I may very quickly. This again refers to
a specified end-use of a licence issued for the export of over-sized
*** handcuffs which were the same mark and model as you have just
referred to from ***. This was to ***. According to their own
directives, leg-irons must be used for all inmates deemed to be
a security risk and so on, but in this specification at their
own direction they are saying that "*** cuffs shall be used".
The end-user of the over-sized handcuffs licensed for export to
*** requires the use of leg-irons whenever a prisoner is deemed
a security risk. My concern, and the Committee's concern, is that
in this case, where they prescribed that this should be used,
they are actually specifying that they should use *** cuffs with
"minimum one arm and one leg cuffed to secured bed or examining
table". So what we are really seeking is, what assurances
has the Government received that the *** cuffs licensed for export
to the *** will not be used as shackles or leg-irons? How can
we have any confidence about that, when they are actually specifying
how they should be used?
(Mr Dowse) The short answer is that we did not seek
assurances. When the assessment of the risk was made, we judged
that we had no end-user concerns. We will obviously be interested
in any information you can pass to us.
Mr Chidgey: I am sure that can be arranged.
Mr Colman
90. I have a quick question about Iran***
(Mr Straw) ***.
91. ***
(Mr Straw) ***
(Mr Dowse) ***
92. ***
(Mr Dowse) ***
93. ***
(Mr Straw) ***
(Mr Dowse) ***
94. ***
(Mr Dowse) ***
(Mr Straw) ***
Sir John Stanley
95. ***
(Mr Straw) ***
Rachel Squire
96. On Yemen, that is a country that I think
you would agree gives cause for concern. In 2000 we had the USS
Cole incident, and there have been other examples of terrorist
activity. *** Most recently, of course, it is clear that Yemen
purchases missiles from North Korea. So can I ask you whether
it is your understanding that the Government of Yemen is known
to be involved in the diversion of arms to undesirable end-users?
(Mr Straw) *** There are obvious security and terrorism
issues in Yemen. What we are seeking to do is to build a reasonable
relationship with the Yemeni Government in their fight against
terrorism, and to do what we can to strengthen that government.
(Mr Dowse) ***
97. So you seem confident that some of the larger
items that Yemen has recently received will not end up somewhere
else?
(Mr Straw) On this, we did not licence the export
of the missiles from North Korea, but I do happen to know quite
a lot about it. ***. I think it was a Spanish vessel which interdicted
them before, because in international law the export was entirely
legitimate.
(Mr Dowse) If I could just add, in terms of our own
exports to Yemen, in terms of military equipment, in the year
in question licences were issued for components for communications
equipment and for military ambulances neither of which seemed
particularly likely to be diverted. But we do take the risk of
diversion into very careful consideration.
Chairman
98. Thank you very much, Foreign Secretary,
Mr Dowse and Mr Oakden and your other officials. We are very grateful
for the time you have given us this afternoon and for the answers
to the questions we have had both today and previously.
(Mr Straw) And arising!
Chairman: And in preparation to be given, indeed.
We will take up your kind offer that if there are any further
questions that are essential to completing our report, we will
drop you a note, if that is all right. Thank you very much indeed.
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