Nepal
80. Since 1996 the Nepalese Government has been fighting
a Maoist insurgency, which has led to thousands of deaths. In
this section, we look at the Government's policy in relation to
two types of export to Nepal: the licensing of small arms in 2000
and 2001, and the more recent presentation of military helicopters
and other equipment as a gift from the British Government.
Small arms
81. In 2001, the Government licensed the export of
6,780 assault rifles and other small arms including grenade launchers
to Nepal.[101]
This followed the licensing in 2000 of the export of 320 semi-automatic
pistols.[102]
In his evidence to us, the Foreign Secretary gave a forthright
defence of the Government's policy on exporting military equipment
to Nepal:
you have there a very, very serious terrorist
insurgency. You also have a fragile government which is the subject
of considerable criticism. We have had to take a strategic decision
about how best we can support Nepal, against a background, number
one, that it is important that we should not allow countries,
where we can, to descend into insurgency and terrorism—and
we all know what can happen there—but number two, that if
we do, the consequences are not only pretty grave for that country,
but also for surrounding countries, including in this case India
which has a very natural regional interest in the stability of
its neighbours … in order sometimes to prevent wider conflict,
you have to arm armed forces and make sure they are effective,
because one of the major problems leading to the insurgency has
been the lack of equipment, some lost through accident and others
through lack of training by the Royal Nepalese Army.[103]
82. We have no hesitation in agreeing with the Foreign
Secretary that the Maoist rebels fighting in Nepal are "vicious
beyond belief".[104]
We also consider the Government to be right in stating in its
interpretation of the consolidated criteria that "in some
cases the use of force by a Government within its own borders,
for example to preserve law and order against terrorists or other
criminals, is legitimate". We note, however, that this is
only so "as long as force is used in accordance with …
international human rights standards".
83. There have been numerous reports of human rights
violations by the Nepalese authorities. Amnesty International,
for example, has reported that since the deployment of the army
in November 2001:
the people of Nepal have experienced unprecedented
levels of political violence. By the end of October 2002, according
to figures made public by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the
Royal Nepal Army, the number of people killed in the conflict
since November 2001 had reached 4,366 … at least half of
these killings may have been unlawful. The vast majority of the
victims were civilians targeted for their real or perceived support
to the CPN (Maoist); others were Maoists deliberately killed after
they were taken prisoner or killed instead of being arrested.
In addition, torture is widespread and at least 66 people are
reported to have 'disappeared' since November 2001 after they
were seen being taken into custody by the security forces. The
total number of 'disappearances' reported to Amnesty International
in the context of the 'people's war' is over 200.[105]
In its own Annual Report on Human Rights for 2002,
the Government has commented that "in addition to concerns
about civilian casualties from crossfire, there is now widespread
anxiety about the level and brutality of abuses and violations
by both sides to the conflict".[106]
84. Another, more practical concern is the security
arrangements for stocks of small arms held by the Nepalese authorities.
Small arms are, by their nature, particularly easy to hide, transport
and use. Maoist rebels have made army barracks a priority target,
with the aim of seizing weapons during their attacks.[107]
As the Foreign Secretary has told us, the Royal Nepalese Army
has suffered from a "lack of equipment, some lost through
accident and others through lack of training".[108]
It would be unfortunate to say the least if small arms intended
to support the Nepalese authorities ended up in the hands of rebel
forces owing to inadequate security.
Gifts: military helicopters
85. On 22 July 2002,[109]
the Government presented to the House of Commons a Ministry of
Defence Departmental Minute proposing to make a number of gifts
to the Government of Nepal at a total cost of £4.077 million,
including two MI 17 support helicopters at a cost of £2.6
million. All of the items were to be purchased using funds from
the Global Conflict Prevention Pool.[110]
86. The normal practice when the Government proposes
to make a gift of an unusual nature or of a value exceeding £100,000
is for a Minute to be presented to the House of Commons, and for
the Government to wait 14 working days after the issue of the
Minute before making the gift. In this case, however, owing to
an oversight, a number of gifts described in the Minute—not
including the helicopters—had already been made before the
Minute was presented to Parliament. We asked the Government for
an explanation of this oversight, and were told that it had "occurred
because of confusion over whether equipment funded from the Global
Conflict Prevention Pool needed to be treated as a gift".[111]
We regret that gifts of military equipment were made to Nepal
without Parliament having been informed beforehand. We trust that
procedures are now in place to ensure that this oversight does
not recur.
87. An unusual aspect of this gift is its source
of funding: the Global Conflict Prevention Pool. This fund was
established in April 2001 as a pooled resource between the FCO,
Department for International Development and Ministry of Defence
"to improve the effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict
prevention and management, leading to a reduction in the number
of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction
in the potential sources of future conflict".[112]
It funds projects across the world, except for sub-Saharan Africa,
which is funded from a separate pool. Its stated goal for South
Asia is "to contribute to the resolution of civil conflicts
in the region and the prevention of international conflict by
engaging with governments, the military and civil society".[113]
88. We do not object to the gifting of the helicopters
and other equipment per se. An agreement "restricts
the use of the helicopters exclusively to logistical, medical
and ongoing humanitarian tasks" and "combat or attack
roles are excluded for the lifetime of the aircraft, including
the fitting of weapons, allowing soldiers to fire from the doorways
whilst airborne or the dropping of ordnance".[114]
The gifts seem to us to be an appropriate and useful token of
the Government's support for the Nepalese authorities.
89. We are concerned, however, that the Conflict
Prevention Pool was used to fund the purchase of the equipment.
These are gifts which will, by the Foreign Secretary's own admission,
assist the combat capabilities of an army which is currently involved
in combat operations.[115]
When we pressed the Foreign Secretary on this point, he told us
that "in order to prevent conflict, you have to use force
in many circumstances, and that is certainly true in Nepal".[116]
Such an argument stretches the sense of the term "conflict
prevention" to breaking point. Using the same logic, it could
be argued that any justifiable arms sale is an exercise in conflict
prevention. The fact that a gift of military equipment is desirable
does not justify paying for it from a fund specifically devoted
to conflict prevention, any more than building a new road should
be paid for from a fund for the protection of the environment.
90. It is not in our view always unacceptable to
fund the gifting of military equipment from the Conflict Prevention
Pools. We believe that a recent gift to Kenya of de-mining equipment
was a proper use of these funds,[117]
as was the use of the Pools to supply explosive ordnance disposal
equipment to Nepal. This is equipment which has a clear role in
preventing death and injury, rather than equipment which is likely
to be used in logistical support for combat operations, albeit
in the pursuit of longer term stability and peace. While we
support the Government's decision to provide military support
helicopters and other equipment to Nepal, and the conditions attached
to the use of the helicopters, we conclude that the Global Conflict
Prevention Pool should not have been used to fund the gifting
of this equipment.
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