Examination of Witnesses (Questions 40-59)
RT HON
PETER HAIN
MP AND MR
KIM DARROCH
CMG
TUESDAY 1 APRIL 2003
Andrew Mackinlay
40. I understand that what is being explored
is, in terms of national parliamentary oversight, that there should
be, if I say a complicated procedure, I am not saying that critically,
as it were, but just whereby some things can be flagged up and
referred to national parliaments and if two-thirds of the national
parliaments fought a proposal, it could be blocked; is that correct,
can you help me on that?
(Mr Hain) Yes, I will be happy to. There is a proposal
widely agreed, and pretty unanimously agreed, that there should
be an early warning mechanism, that any new proposal from the
Commission would have to be e-mailed to national parliaments,
then, within four weeks perhaps, perhaps six weeks, not finally
negotiated, they would have to declare whether they think that
the principle of subsidiarity, that is to say, that was done at
a European or a nation state level, had been infringed and there
is still an argument about this, but we hope whether proportionality,
that is to say that the issue is too intrusive, the proposal is
too intrusive, and to straightjacket it, whether that has been
infringed. And if a third of the current state of play in the
Convention, though there is still some negotiation to do, if a
third of national parliaments say that those principles have been
infringed then, as it were, a yellow card is issued to the Commission,
that is obliged to reconsider, perhaps withdraw, or completely
redraft its initial proposal in the light of that. So that is
a very important advance for national parliaments, and I think
will empower national parliaments in Europe and give them a real
stake in European policy-making in a way that has not been the
case up to now, except in a retrospective fashion.
Andrew Mackinlay: Indeed; and I welcome that.
But could I put it to you, as a Minister, that complementary to
that situation, let us assume that a proposal along those lines
is going to be adopted, which would be on the face of it a major
addition to the tool-box of national parliaments, that we would
need some institutional arrangements here agreed which meant that
such examination was not done on the purely sort of automatic
whip basis, and perhaps there would have to be the appropriate
committee here do it, otherwise you might as well just leave it
at government level if it is going to come to Westminster and
then be dictated by Government through the traditional party whip
system. I do not mean that disparagingly; it means, if you are
shipping it to Parliament, it has to be meaningful at Westminster.
And I wonder if you have had an opportunity, or would you please
discuss this with your colleagues to see how it could be made
meaningful at Westminster, otherwise there is no point in going
through the charade, you might as well just leave these matters
at government level, at the Council level; it has to be translated
down here, does it not?
Chairman: That will be a challenge obviously
for our House to adjust our procedures, for example, to respond
speedily if the House is in recess.
Andrew Mackinlay
41. And rather than do battle after it has arrived,
it seems to me that some preliminary thinking, it is not unreasonable,
should at least be given both within Government and across the
parties as to how it could be meaningful from day one, rather
than have a big bust-up constitution-wise?
(Mr Hain) I very much agree, and I very much welcome
this; as you imply, Chairman, this is a matter for parliaments
not primarily a matter for governments, but I think that, your
point, this should not just be done on a whip basis, there should
be genuine parliamentary scrutiny and decision over it. And, if
I may, I think there is plenty of time to do this, it is not a
question of a decision we have to make in the next few months,
because we will see what the final outcome is, then there will
be the IGC, Parliament will have a chance to consider it, and
it will take many years before it is ratified and comes into force.
But I would very much welcome this House giving serious consideration
not just in this respect but how European policy and legislation
is treated across the board, because I do not think we take it
seriously enough, speaking personally.
Mr Chidgey
42. Secretary of State, can I bring you back
to the timing of the completion of the Convention and then the
following IGC. I think you said earlier, when you started giving
evidence, you confirmed that the Convention was due to complete
its work this June. I understand that would be followed then by
a period of reflection before discussion of the Convention's findings
at the IGC in the following year, during the Irish and the German
Presidencies of the Union. But it does appear, Secretary of State,
that there are some competing concerns that have arisen which
do put question-marks on the timetable, which I would like to
pursue with you, if I may. For example, Giscard d'Estaing and
some other members of the Convention have already argued that
they cannot finish their work by June and need more time, the
Italians and some other Member States see no reason for a long
period of reflection and would like to see the IGC completed during
the Italian Presidency, leading no doubt to a new Treaty of Rome,
and then we have the fact that the IGC in 2004, if that was the
time, could well face complications arising from the European
Parliament elections in the May of that year. So, all in all,
there seems to be quite a host of competing complications here.
I recall, Secretary of State, that recently in a debate in Westminster
Hall you yourself said that the June deadline has been a spur
to progress in the Convention, so you see no sense in delaying
the conclusion of the Convention itself, and you would not want
simply, at the end of the day, just to rubber-stamp the Convention's
work, so clearly you want time in the IGC. So, all in all, do
you believe that it is right, under the present circumstances,
that we should be in a situation where a new treaty could be agreed
at the IGC before the anticipated enlargement to 25 nations takes
place; should not that agreement wait until their full succession,
so they are part of what is going to be a very significant treaty?
(Mr Hain) If I pick up your last point first, there
is no question that the new Member States should be excluded from
the decision-making process, it is going to be their European
Union just as much as it is ours, so they have to be in the IGC
in some form or other, either as fully, legally Member States
or, as it were, a de facto part of the IGC. There is an
aspiration from Italy to have another Treaty of Rome, but that
would be December, and if we stick to the deadline, as we are
determined to do, and want to see, of the end of June, because
I think that otherwise a kind of Parkinson's Law syndrome takes
over here that will keep me there for ever.
43. So do you view this as a Treaty of Rome,
a Treaty of Dublin or a Treaty of Berlin?
(Mr Hain) We will have to see about that. Some people
might think it is a good idea to keep me there for ever, but I
cannot see that happening, Chairman. But I think what is likely
to happen is that the report will be made to a Special European
Council on June 30, unless there is some sort of major disruption
of that timetable, then there will be a period of reflection,
including I hope by national parliaments, and then the IGC process
will start some time in the autumn or early winter. So it could
well start under the Italian Presidency, and I think there is
a lot to be said for that; whether it will be completed under
the Italian Presidency who knows, I would have thought that is
unlikely, and so it is more likely to be the case that it will
be completed under the Irish Presidency, I would have thought,
as we are seeing things unfold at the present time. But really
it depends on how possible it is to get a consensus at each of
these different stages.
44. How have you coped with your responsibilities
as the UK Government's Representative to the Convention and the
Secretary of State for Wales?
(Mr Hain) By getting less sleep.
45. Will you be the Government's representative
at the IGC?
(Mr Hain) No; not as far as I know.
Mr Illsley
46. Will you be invited to be?
(Mr Hain) No; that will probably fall to the Minister
for Europe, I would have thought.
Mr Chidgey: I see. That is very interesting,
very helpful. It is actually very refreshing to get such a direct
answer.
Chairman: I would like to move on now to the
external action and defence; Mr Chidgey to begin, please.
Mr Chidgey
47. Secretary of State, do you see the report
of the Working Group on External Action as a sensible basis for
discussion on this issue? To what extent does it reflect the UK's
contribution to that Group?
(Mr Hain) Yes, I do see it as a sensible basis, but
then perhaps I would do since I was on the Group and helped to
achieve the consensus there. I think we were very clear, it comes
through very clearly through the Group's report and its endorsement
by the Convention, that Common Foreign and Security Policy is
a matter for governments, that it will not be communitised, that
unanimity is the principle by which a CFSP operates, and those
essential principles are ones that we argued for strongly, with
a lot of support, and achieved.
48. When the Working Group presented its final
report in December, I believe that you yourself expressed concern
over the practical implications of `double-hatting' the High Representative
role.
(Mr Hain) Indeed.
49. Can you tell the Committee how this proposal
has evolved since then; do you remain concerned that it is a back-door
attempt to communitise the CFSP?
(Mr Hain) It could be, and some members of the Convention
have that ambition, European Parliamentarians in particular, because
that would give them an arm-lock on Common Foreign and Security
Policy; but that is not going to be the outcome.
50. Will it go down to a veto at the IGC, in
Britain?
(Mr Hain) If there was any threat to Common Foreign
and Security Policy being the propriety of governments, yes, then
that would put us in veto territory, but we would not be alone,
France would be alongside us, Spain and many, many other countries.
But, on the question of double-hatting, this is the merging of
the High Representative and the External Commissioner roles, as
it were, Javier Solana and Chris Patten, in current sort of positioning,
I did express concerns, because I thought the proposal was not
thought through. There is a great logic to better co-ordination,
and on the one hand giving the Solana figure access to the Commission's
resources, and on the other bringing in the Commission's external
relations work, which is crucial, the overseas aid and development
budgets and the association agreements' work, and so forth, under
the High Representative too. I think there is a great logic to
that, but the detail has not been negotiated or thought through.
So I think that we would have to ensure that the new single person,
the double-hatted individual, the new High Representative, was
appointed by and under the control of the Council, that the Council
was the master, rather than the College of Commissioners. There
is then an issue and a discussion and a negotiation to be had
as to could the new High Representative, for example, sit in the
Commission and have his, or her, voice part of the Commission's
debate, without being subject to Commissioner College decisions,
and, therefore, as it were, a back-door communitisation of foreign
policy. We are concerned about that, the French are concerned
about that, the Spanish are concerned about that, as are very
many others, and until we get to a position where we can negotiate
really strong barriers to communitisation in that form then we
will not be in a position even to get towards thinking whether
we can agree this proposal, and nor would, I suspect, the Convention
veto itself on the issue, let alone requiring any Member States
to do so.
Mr Illsley
51. Just to follow on from that, Chairman; given
the stature of this individual, who will have this new office,
this merged role, and obviously it is going to be someone with
considerable stature, and given the fact that the Working Group
went on to suggest that there should be a European External Action
Service, which could suggest the whole Civil Service, I think,
representatives behind this particular individual, it would just
seem to be difficult to stop some communitisation of the central
foreign policy by that individual, given the stature of the resources
that are going to be available to them, probably?
(Mr Hain) I understand the concern, but let us look
at what happens at the present time.
52. Do you agree that there should be that Civil
Service aspect behind this enhanced Action Service?
(Mr Hain) If I can explain how I come to the position
that we have. Javier Solana explained in exasperation to the Working
Group that he did not have the resources even to get a vehicle,
if I recall, a four-wheel-drive vehicle, into Bosnia, where the
EU had a peace-keeping capability, or Kosovo, it might have been,
because it did not have the resources; so he actually had to go
to a car manufacturer and persuade them to donate it. Now this
is a European Union which is supposed to have a Common Foreign
and Security Policy that is operational; well, clearly, this is
ludicrous. Equally, he has explained how if he went to New York,
for example, or Washington, the Commission officials there were
unable to assist him, because they were serving the Commission,
or provide him with even the elementary resources that his job
needed. So he has been an incredibly effective operator and influential
figure by his sheer ability and drive and persuasiveness, but
he has got no resources at all; so we want to see that newly-constructed
figure have the resources. Now the issue is, do you have a whole
kind of European embassy sort of structure, which is I think what
concerns you; and, no, the External Action Working Group did not
propose that, it said there should be European Union delegations
alongside those of Member States. And, of course, the Commission
already has 138 bilateral and five multilateral Commission delegations
overseas, that is to say, staff overseas, so the issue actually
is to make sensible use of these people on behalf of the Council
and its representative, its foreign policy external relations
representative, rather than leaving that individual without any
serious resource base.
53. I was just thinking that is probably another
argument that we are going to have to contend with later this
year, or next, or whatever; is there going to be an argument as
to whether the new officer, the new office, should have more resources
than perhaps Javier Solana has had in the past, is it going to
come down to an argument on, purely and simply, financing?
(Mr Hain) I do not think so, no, because the Commission
itself has plenty of resources, the issue is that the Council,
through its foreign policy representative, has not had access
to those, creating the sort of ridiculous situations that I have
described, and acting as a barrier to any effective implementation
of European influence abroad.
Sir John Stanley
54. Secretary of State, can you tell us the
Government's view of the proposal to establish a European Armaments
and Strategic Research Agency?
(Mr Hain) Yes, I can. We are not in favour of some
kind of centralised procurement agency, obviously, but we are
in favour of a flexible agency that develops on the good practice
that there has been in existing mechanisms, such as OCCAR, WEAG,
and the Letter of Intent (LoI); we would need very strict entry
criteria for participation and more technically difficult forms
of co-operation, such as joint procurement, if those were to be
considered and if the whole idea were to be successful. But we
came to quite a good agreement, in fact, negotiated principally
with the French in the Convention, and it is a matter of seeing
whether we can translate that into constitutional text in a way
that satisfies us.
55. Can you assure the Committee that the Government
will resist any introduction through this particular mechanism
of an obligation on our Armed Services to procure European in
all available circumstances?
(Mr Hain) Yes; that was a point of resistance, a very
important point of resistance, precisely to that proposition.
Ironically, the proposition was often put by countries that had
virtually no proper defence forces themselves, in the debate;
which is one of the ironic features of this discussion, that some
of the countries that seem most anxious to communitise not just
foreign policy but defence policy actually cannot put any soldiers
in the field that count anywhere.
Chairman
56. Do they want to centre their GDP on defence?
(Mr Hain) Indeed; they seem to think—anyway,
I have said what I wanted to say.
Sir John Stanley
57. I hasten to say, Secretary of State, we
have had some successful collaborative projects with European
Member States in the defence field, but also we have absolutely
critically important collaborative projects with the United States,
and, given the lead of the United States in so many military technology
areas, it would be unthinkable for our Armed Forces to be locked
into this process in some form by European policy?
(Mr Hain) I agree, Sir John, and you will be very
happy that that position is being adhered to very firmly in the
Convention process.
Chairman
58. The interesting one; the Defence Working
Group's report, Secretary of State, made various suggestions.
At the plenary session, you said those suggestions represented
the "limit" of the UK's ambitions in this area. So which
of the recommendations of the Working Group are within those limits,
which are without?
(Mr Hain) I think they are all within the limits,
but we have negotiated a consensus on that, within that Group,
and we have resisted others taking us beyond our limits.
Mr Olner
59. Given that the weaknesses that the Working
Group recognised in much of the European defence expenditure,
and you yourself, Peter, have alluded to it as well, by some companies,
do you think this suggestion of a European Armaments and Strategic
Research Agency would help, or would that be just another talking
shop?
(Mr Hain) I think it would help, because there would
be increased co-operation on armaments, we would be able to look
more analytically at spending on capabilities, which is the weakness
that many other Member States have, and we look at ways of spending
more effectively and exploit synergies to give the European Security
and Defence Policy the tools that it needs. Also, as part of the
Working Group recommendations, for example, we wanted to update
the Petersberg Tasks to make them more relevant to some of the
challenges we face today than when they were drafted originally.
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