Examination of Witnesses(Questions 1-19)
THURSDAY 14TH NOVEMBER
MR JACK
STRAW, MR
PETER RICKETTS
CMG AND AIR
COMMODORE DICK
LACEY
Chairman
1. Foreign Secretary, I understand that you
have official problems and you must leave at 3 o'clock, therefore
I think it is important for all of us to have crisp questions
and crisp answers. Contrary to that injunction to myself, let
me begin in this way and welcome you, as always, and your two
colleagues. We have an exciting time in terms of the evolution
of both the political and the security structures in Europe with
the Prague Summit on November 21/22 and the EU enlargement in
the Copenhagen Council in December. The NATO enlargement will
impose major problems on interoperability and streamlining of
the organisation, and so on, and you will, no doubt, have heard
many say that NATO will inevitably be changed from its original
concept. Yes, it is important because the US and Canada must be
engaged in the defence of Europe but increasingly the US is showing,
because of the gap in capabilities, because of its reliance on
a small number of countries that share its reluctance or otherwise,
that it views NATO no longer as a military organisation but increasingly
as one which is essentially political, bringing together like-minded
countries. You may reject this, but do you understand why some
commentators are suggesting that NATO is fundamentally changing?
(Mr Straw) NATO is certainly changing. I think I would
leave the adverb off. It plainly has changed and is changing in
response to different objective circumstances. I will be very
brief about this, it was established in different circumstances
to deal with what was seen and what was the possibility of a serious
threat by the Soviet bloc to the security and integrity of western
Europe, particularly in the post war reconstruction period. Since
the collapse of the Berlin Wall and perhaps the Soviet Union NATO's
role has self-evidently changed and that is best illustrated by
what we decided in Reykjavik this year with the NATO 20, the NATO/Russia
Council, which then held its first meeting in Rome. Do we need
it? There is a separate question about whether NATO would have
been invented now had we been starting. I do not know, is the
answer to that. Do we need NATO today? It being there my answer
to that is an emphatic yes. It has to change to respond to the
change. NATO is both a political and a military alliance.
2. Is the balance changing?
(Mr Straw) You cannot have an effective military alliance
unless it has a clear political purpose, it could not exist because
the purpose of any military alliance is not to use force for its
own sake but to pursue political objectives. You could have a
loose political alliance which did not have access to military
forces, indeed the European Union is one such, but it has developed
in that way partly because it has been paralleled by NATO. Is
the balance shifting? Yes, I think it probably is, to a degree,
more towards it as a political alliance. You may ask me the question,
of the seven countries which have applied to join,[1]
and for which there is an emerging consensus that they may well
be invited to join, what do they bring to the party? They do bring
some increase in capabilities, but it is small. They certainly
bring an important element of increased political cooperation.
A combination of both the political and military functions of
NATO have been drivers of change for the better in the individual
countries that are applying and those that have come in.
3. In narrow security terms are they more consumers
than contributors?
(Mr Straw) I think it is both, really. The process
of that has been to begin a period of reform and strengthening
of their own military forces. In the case of forces the development
from scratch of their military forces, they did not exist before.
In the case of the other countries very substantial modernisation.
This is where there is a link with the political. If, for example,
part of your objective is to secure greater transparency and greater
civilian control that runs straight into the good governance agenda,
which is the way the country operates in respect of its voters
and citizens as well as simply its military.
Chairman: We will be coming back to the links
with the EU.
Sir Patrick McCormack
4. Foreign Secretary, do I infer from what you
have just said that you are yourself an enthusiast with a so-called
big bang approach of certain countries joining as a result of
the Prague Summit?
(Mr Straw) I have to be careful here, as ever. The
decision is one for heads of government.
5. Yes, of course, but you must have an opinion.
(Mr Straw) Of course I have an opinion, I have never
been short of opinions. One of my opinions is respect for heads
of government. I do not want to pre-empt the decision but the
candidates are well placed for an invitation to come in and we
should show respect for the way it operates. None of the candidates
are blocked from being invited. I think it makes sense, other
things being equal, for them all to be invited at the same time.
6. What sort of time scale do you envisage?
(Mr Straw) There is a decision at Prague next week.
7. The time scale for full admission.
(Air Commodore Lacey) I believe we are looking at
May 2004 for full accession.
8. Full accession, yes. Do you think any of
the countries are likely to be rejected?
(Mr Straw) I doubt it, if you ask me to place a bet.
9. When this process is accomplished in Prague,
assuming that it is, do you think NATO will then have reached
its absolute size or would you hope for further additions?
(Mr Straw) Not necessarily. There are other countries
which are in the early stages of the process, Albania, Macedonia
and Croatia. I think it is a similar sort of position to European
Union, where we will almost certainly have the admission by a
different process of the ten at the Copenhagen Summit, three lined
up behind but then a number of the Balkan states wanting to join.
There is no doubt about that that both the possibility of both
joining the EU and joining NATO really is a very important engine
of change for those countries.
10. When you were answering the Chairman's question
he asked about consumers and contributors. What particular things
do you think that the seven applicant countries will bring? Would
you like to give some specific examples?
(Mr Straw) First of all they bring additional countries
to the political alliance, and that is important. Given the fragile
history of the Baltic states, for example, I think it is important
for them and for their development and for their sense of themselves
they are within NATO, a larger alliance. It is also a matter of
some wonder that this process is likely to take place without
the 9 oppositions by the Russian Federation. I am reflecting on
the fact that 17 months ago, when I took this job on, one of the
first briefs I read was about all of the difficulties we were
going to face in relation to Russia over the admission of the
Baltics. For a variety of reasons that has not happened. All credit
to President Putin for the foresight and statesmanship he has
shown. I have a list of things that the aspirants will bring to
the party in terms of their capabilities and I am happy for it
to be shared with you, some of it is confidential but I am happy
for it to be shown to you on a confidential basis. Quite a number
of the applicants have already contributed to peacekeeping forces
in the Balkans and/or in Afghanistan, almost all of them have
experience of some kind, and they bring their troops literally
to the party.
Sir John Stanley
11. Foreign Secretary, you will be aware that
within the EU Convention, and indeed else where, there are some
far-reaching proposals to extend the involvement of the EU in
both foreign policy and defence policy. I would like to ask you
whether you can give the Committee a clear, unequivocal assurance
that the British government would not accept, ie would veto, any
proposal to amend the EU Treaty that would give the EU a competence
in the area of foreign policy and defence policy and would make
those areas of policy part of the acquis?
(Mr Straw) Are we opposed to the communitisation of
foreign policy, yes we are. Foreign policy competence, with a
small c, is already within the Treaty of the European Union but
not within the treaties of the European communities, the so-called
Pillar 2. I have said often enough, just as has the Prime Minister,
that we regard foreign policy, and therefore defence policy, because
the two are intrinsically linked, as intergovernmental matters.
What we are looking at, and I have written about this, is whether
it is possible within a single constitutional text for there to
be distinction made between that area of policy, which is subject
essentially to QMV, to the community institutions as we now know
them, and those areas of policy and competence which are subject
to Pillar 2. It is perfectly possible as a draftsman to work these
two things into a single text, because when people join the EU
they join both sets of institutions. Most of our voters do not
have a clue that there is a difference between them. There is
a good argument there. On your first question I can give you satisfaction,
I do not think we can come to a veto because there are other countries
as well which are wholly against the idea of a communitisation
foreign defence policy.
12. This proposal you are making, to provide
some sort of demarcation line between one area of foreign policy
and defence policy, surely that is going to make it almost certain
that there is going to be endless grounds for lack of clarity
in the foreign policy situations as to where particular issues
should lie. This may open up some very, very difficult potential,
jurisdictional and litigation issues.
(Mr Straw) I do not think so, is the answer. Over
the last few years the British government, along with others,
have worked hard to strengthen the intergovernmental arrangements
for foreign and defence policy through the establishment of the
high representative through Mr Solana. We want to see his role
strengthen, there is an issue of double-hatting of his role and
the position of the foreign policy commissioner, Chris Patten.
As it happens they work pretty well together. I was not suggesting,
as it were, the foreign and defence policy roles were somehow
divided and became communitised and a bit stayed intergovernmental,
I simply say that I think there is a good argument for having
a single text for the european union with a small "e"
and a small "u" and for us finding the words which says,
"in these areas, for example, trade policy, we need to work
under what is currently call the community method, which includes
the power of initiative to the Commission, the involvement of
the European Parliament, co-decision where appropriate, the jurisdiction
of the European Court of Justice. There are these areas which
are covered paradoxically by the European Union and different
treaty arrangements which are intergovernmental or have the characteristics
of being intergovernmental.
13. This is a very crucial area, and I wonder
whether it is possible to give us a further note elaborating on
that?
(Mr Straw) I am very happy to do just. One of the
notes I will give you is a lengthy article I wrote in The
Economist[2]
14. When it comes down to the actual allocation
of forces as between NATO and the EU can you give us your present
views as to how the NATO proposal for the 20,000 Rapid Reaction
Force is going to sit alongside the proposal for the EU 60,000
force? That does seem to me absolutely tailored for duplication,
overlap and uncertainty about command and control, and so on.
(Mr Ricketts) The answer is, of course, there are
not going to be separate standing forces devoted to the European
Union for the 60,000 headline goal and NATO Rapid Response Force.
Each Member State is only keeping one set of forces and they are
for use in these different contexts, where we are operating under
the double-hatting principle. The EU headline goal was the pool
of forces from which we could draw the various configuration we
needed. The NATO Rapid Response Force is equally a collection
of forces who are trained and who are ready to be used at high
states of readiness, but they are not standing forces dedicated
only to that task.
15. Foreign Secretary, do you accept the proposition
that in this double-hatted situation the NATO requirement comes
first?
(Mr Straw) Almost certainly, yes, it would do. It
would come first. The truth is, as is currently under discussion,
in practice the issue of the EU moving will only arise if NATO
for one reason or another decided not to be directly involved
or wishes to withdraw from involvement. It is still in dispute
because they have still not finally resolved under the Berlin
Plus how the availability of any forces for the European Rapid
Reaction Force fit in with NATO structures, which is the whole
point of the so-called Ankara text and the Nice text.
16. Do you think the French Government accepts
what you say that there is only going to be involvement by the
EU forces after NATO has decided not to take up a particular operation?
(Mr Ricketts) The European defence capability has
been built on the provision that the ESDP[3]is
there to be used when the alliance as a whole is not engaged,
so it presupposes that it will be in discussion with the alliance
as well as discussion in the EU, since after enlargement 19 countries
will be common between the EU and NATO and the discussions between
those two bodies ought to resolve any possible conflicts.
Mr Maples
17. One of the ways that the Prime Minister
essentially suggested and agreed with President Bush the remit
of potential conflict between double hatting forces and conflicting
arrangements is that in most circumstances, when NATO assets were
used, the planning headquarters would be within NATO. That has
not yet, as I understand it, been agreed.
(Mr Straw) That is the issue. We regard that as important
because otherwise you get duplication in all sorts of things.
That is why a lot of effort has been put into negotiating these
texts for instance about the relationship between the EU and NATO.
As you may know, Mr Maples these texts, altogether there are 5
of them which fit together, are currently the subject of detailed
discussions with the government of Turkey and the government of
Greece. These discussions have been open now for a good 18 to
20 months and we are hoping to bring them to a satisfactory conclusion
before the Copenhagen Summit in the middle of December, however
we cannot be certain.
18. You say yourself that it has been going
on a very long time; about a year ago it was thought that it was
settled, clearly it is not settled to Turkey's satisfaction. I
am interested in your optimism, it seems a very fundamental Turkish
objection that these sort of conflicts are likely to arise on
their borders and they will be in a position where the EU will
have access to NATO headquarters without having any say in the
decision at all.
(Mr Straw) I think that is an overstatement of what
would actually happen. I understand both the Turkish anxieties
and the Greek anxieties. Mr Ricketts and I have been involved
in endless and continuing discussions in all of this. I saw the
Greek Foreign Minister here in Britain a week ago and I will see
him again on Monday and the discussions I had with him were all
about this and when I see him on Monday at the General Affairs
Council I will be talking about this. We are also able to engage
in active discussion with the Turkish government early next week.
19. I understand that you are in discussions.
(Mr Straw) I aim to visit Ankara in early December
and we will try to work hard to resolve the matter.
1 Note by witness: Seven countries have applied
to join. Nine have been going through the Membership Action plan
process since 1999, and Croatia since May 2002. So there are ten
applicants, of whom seven will be invited at Prague. Back
2
"A Constitution for Europe", The Economist, 12
October 2002. See also Ev 13-14. Back
3
European Security and Defence Policy. Back
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