Examination of Witnesses(Questions
60-79)
THURSDAY 14TH NOVEMBER
MR JACK
STRAW, MR
PETER RICKETTS
CMG AND AIR
COMMODORE DICK
LACEY
60. Which is unlikely. Do you think the United
States is looking for a commitment from its NATO partners for
missile defence at this Summit?
(Mr Straw) At this Summit—Mr Hoon made the position
clear in the House of Commons.
(Mr Ricketts) I think what they are looking for is
commitment by NATO allies to continue the work going on in NATO
on missile defence to see the relevant missile defence to the
European allies. It is not a time for decisions, even the United
States has not yet made decisions on its own missile defence programme
but they are looking for consultations and contributions in terms
of thinking from the European allies and that will be fine.
61. Can I just come to what seems to me to be
at the heart of these difficulties, Foreign Secretary, that we
have articulated to you and they must worry you quite a bit as
much as they worry us. I understand what the United States' strategic
concept is, strategic defence at one level and willingness to
go and sort out the problems of another. I understand what our
concept is, it is set out very clearly in the Strategic Defence
Review and it is basically, apart from the defence of our own
country and providing our part of the strategic defence, to play
a junior part in this role of the United States, so sorting out
some of the problems of the world. We have seen us in action in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
(Mr Straw) I must say sometimes, as it were, on our
own account as in Sierra Leone.
62. Yes.
(Mr Straw) In many countries of the world through
military advice we are doing a great deal.
63. What I was going to say was our strategic
concepts and the United States' strategic concepts fit together
very neatly, I have no doubt they are designed to do so. The problem
it seems to me at the heart of all this debate about European
defence is the French do not have a similar strategic concept.
They have a different strategic concept; they are unwilling to
see themselves as a junior partner of the United States in international
operations in the way that we are willing to do so and they are
unwilling to the point of being obstructive over missile defence.
For example, they objected to getting the Iraq resolutions through
the United Nations. It is almost gratuitous, it does not actually
achieve anything at the end of the day. At the end of the day
they have not got much alternative but to go along. It is as though
there is an effort here to develop a sort of independent strategic
concept but it is not actually there. I suggest to you that this
is at the heart of the difficulties over carrying NATO forward,
the difficulties of keeping the Americans enthusiastic about NATO,
the difficulties of ESDP. I wonder if you can tell me whether
you think the French have a strategic concept which fits with
ours and the Americans in a way which makes NATO a really viable
vehicle for our security for the next 20 years or so?
(Mr Straw) First of all I confess not to have been
a student of the French equivalent of our Strategic Defence White
Paper, I will have to look it up for my prep. Secondly, of course
I am aware of some of the history here although one of the curiosities
about the relationship with the French is that on an awful lot
of specific issues relationships in my experience—getting
on for seven years now—have never been better. That is partly
to do with the fact that their cohabitation has ended and
there is, as it were, a single government rather than facing the
difficulties of having a president from one party and a prime
minister from a different party. The foreign defence policy I
think they navigated themselves very well through it but it was
difficult. They have a stronger government and typically stronger
governments are more straight forward to deal with. There is good
co-operation in the justice and home affairs field between Dominique
de Villepin, my opposite number, myself and officials in the Foreign
Office in the UK and so on. We are developing good agendas. There
is an issue for France about how they see themselves, it goes
back a very long way, it goes back 65 years. Anyway, that issue
is there for them and it is for them to sort it through. I do
not know whether you have any observations you wish to make?
(Mr Ricketts) The French have had a different approach
to NATO's integrated forces since the 1960s and we have lived
with that. I think when it comes to practical working together,
the two sets of armed forces, I think the Air Commodore would
agree, we are closer to the French than any other European nations.
In the Balkans since the mid 1990s we have been literally alongside
each other and working together. So in peacekeeping and in the
kind of prevention conflict management deployments we and the
French are very natural allies and work together very effectively.
It is when you look at the sort of issues which took France to
take a different position in the NATO integrated military structure
that there are differences.
64. Yes. I suggest to you before 1989-90, when
the Cold War was on, we did share a strategic concept even if
we approached it in a slightly different way. I fully understand
the very close relationships between particularly our navies but
also a joint air operation out of High Wycombe and our armed forces
know each other and operate together very well. It is on the strategic
concept level that I am concerned.
(Mr Straw) So far as that is concerned, at the strategic
level there are signs of some positive engagement. Let me take
Africa, for example, where an initiative which was developed by
my predecessor, Robin Cook, which I followed through both under
the previous administration and now the present one, is that we
develop a joint policy and strategy for dealing with Africa, in
particular in the crucible in the Great Lakes where it is part
Francophone and part Anglophone. The different parties to the
Great Lake Dispute, the DRC, have traditionally tried to play
off France and the United Kingdom. Robin started this in respect
of West Africa but I went with the former Foreign Minister when
he was Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine, in a French aeroplane
around the Great Lakes region and we saw the key people who had
been involved in and had responsibility for putting together the
peace process.
Chairman
65. That is on a political level.
(Mr Straw) You cannot separate politics and defence,
they are two sides of the same coin. Any strategy for defence
is a political one, although I do say that is one continent, a
very important continent.
Mr Maples
66. You have proved my point because the best
example you can think of is co-operation over the Great Lakes
region of Africa, when actually I mentioned some really serious
strategic issues like stability in the Middle East and international
terrorism.
(Mr Straw) On international terrorism they are in
the same place as us. The French have a different point of view,
they are entitled to a different point of view. It is not for
us to tell them how they should think.
67. Absolutely.
(Mr Straw) I think part of the problem about the relationship
between France and the United Kingdom is both sides seek to parody
the tradition of the other side without recognising any of the
history or subtleties in the relationship.
68. If I am right and there is this very, I
would suggest, almost fundamental difference in our strategic
approach to the world's problems, then given that France and the
United Kingdom are really the only two serious players in Europe
in this regard, the only two with serious armed forces, if we
cannot agree on these things, if we cannot form the core of European
Defence and Strategic Policy, whether it is in the context of
the EU or NATO, it seems to me that these American fears are going
to be borne out.
(Mr Straw) You might just say we have to work closer
together and to reach common understandings on this, which is
what we are trying to do as it happens.
69. It will take more than that. Essentially
it is not just a question of trying to work together, there is
a fundamental difference of interest which creates instability
in European defence.
(Mr Straw) I do not think the difference is as fundamental
as you suggest.
Chairman
70. Even on the best example you could give
of Africa, in Sierra Leone the French did not intervene and in
the Ivory Coast we have not intervened.
(Mr Straw) Hang on a second. The French have been
extremely helpful to us in the Ivory Coast. It would not have
made sense for us to have intervened in the Ivory Coast, the French
have forces there, they know the country and we do not, but we
did have civilians who were there who needed rescuing and the
French were phenomenally helpful in securing their rescue. In
respect of Sierra Leone I do not doubt that we sought to be co-operative
in the opposite way.
71. That was not military co-operation, that
was normal help between allies.
(Mr Straw) It would be a waste of resources for us
to be in the Ivory Coast. It is a matter for France but I would
have thought it would have been a waste of resources for them
to have been involved in Sierra Leone.
Sir John Stanley
72. Foreign Secretary, will you set out in succinct
and clear terms what are the objectives that the British Government
seeks to achieve at Prague?
(Mr Straw) At Prague we are seeking to achieve a sensible
expansion of NATO and to allow in all those countries which are
properly qualified. We are seeking to achieve major change in
capabilities and agreement on the transformation of NATO as an
effective organisation.
73. Could you just elaborate on those?
(Mr Straw) I thought I had been.
74. No, no.
(Mr Straw) On enlargement—
75. For example, on capabilities what are you
actually seeking?
(Air Commodore Lacey) There are these capabilities
commitments which Lord Robertson is proposing about how capabilities
of individual member states, particularly those that have got
a long way to go, need to raise them.
76. The British Government will be giving unequivocal
and unqualified support to the package put forward by Lord Robertson?
(Mr Straw) Always unequivocal, rarely unqualified.
Chairman
77. Otherwise yes.
(Mr Straw) Otherwise yes.
Sir John Stanley
78. In specific terms, you talk about the transformation
of NATO as an effective organisation but in actual precise terms
what changes are you going to be advocating?
(Mr Straw) Again, I thought I had dealt with that.
It is about interoperability, the changes that have already started.
It is about meeting new challenges, particularly so-called out
of area, responding to those, securing the modernisation of forces.
(Mr Ricketts) It is the command arrangements, the
NATO response force, which are all part of the transformation
agenda.
(Air Commodore Lacey) And the restructuring of NATO
headquarters itself and the staffs who work there.
Sir John Stanley: I think it would be very helpful
for the Committee if we could have a more detailed paper from
the Foreign Secretary[8]
Chairman: The corollary of that is you set out
in response to Sir John—
Sir John Stanley: And the objectives in more
precise terms.
Chairman
79. You will set out in your response to Sir
John the objectives we have of the current Summit but could you
also set out after that Summit the extent to which you believe
those objectives will be achieved?
(Mr Straw) Do not forget that the Prime Minister,
subject to Mr Speaker, will be due to make a statement in the
House about what happened at the Prague Summit on the Monday following
the Summit, so not this Monday but next Monday, so there will
be a lot of opportunity to question him.
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