The draft verification protocol
3. We are less satisfied with one aspect of the Response,
and of the written ministerial statement which preceded both it
and our own Report. As we noted in our Report, efforts in 2001
to agree a verification protocol to the Convention failed—largely
because the measures proposed were unacceptable to the United
States.[7] In its Response,
the Government reiterated its position that:
"this was one of the major losses when the Protocol
negotiations ended in failure. Unfortunately, the Protocol could
not command international consensus when it came up for consideration
in 2001. Nothing has changed since then regarding the international
acceptability of the Protocol, or this particular element of it.
However, if as a result of the work undertaken in the Review Conference
followup meetings over the next two to three years, it became
apparent that such a proposal had the necessary support, then
HMG would wish to explore with other States Parties the option
of more permanent institutional arrangements as a practical proposition."[8]
4. We were surprised, therefore, that in his December
statement the Secretary of State announced "a successful
outcome to the recent 5th Review Conference." The basis for
this assertion by the Secretary of State was that unanimous agreement
had been reached at the Review Conference on a programme of work
on strengthening the Convention. Over the next few years, discussions
will take place on: penal legislation; regulations on the handling
of dangerous pathogens; investigations into use of biological
weapons; improving surveillance of disease; and a code of conduct
for scientists.[9] However,
this work is not expected to lead to agreement on a verification
protocol. In so far as the Review Conference did not produce agreement
on a protocol, we regard it as a failure, not as a success.
5. No list has been published of those States Parties
which supported the draft verification protocol. In its Green
Paper the Government stated that when the debate on the protocol
took place at the 24th Ad Hoc Group session in July 2001, "some
fifty States Parties indicated that, on balance, they were prepared
to accept the text or see it as a basis for the final compromise."[10]
We recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
list the "some 50" countries to which it was referring
and state clearly whether or not those countries included the
United Kingdom.
6. The Government has concluded that the draft protocol
"could not command international consensus" in 2001,
but it apparently believes that over the next few years it might
be possible for a similar proposal to attract "the necessary
support". It is not clear whether the Government believes
that a consensus can be achieved only if it includes the United
States, or whether the necessary support could be gathered among
other parties, notwithstanding US opposition. We recommend
that the Government in its response to this Report clarifies whether
or not it will support the addition of a verification protocol
to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention only if the protocol
in question is agreed by the US.
7. In its Green Paper the Government stated: "Compliance
with the BTWC is an issue the international community cannot avoid;
if the Convention is to remain credible, there needs to be concerted
determination to deal with the problem of noncompliance
in an effective and sustainable manner. The UK and other BTWC
States Parties cannot shirk their responsibilities on this matter."[11]
The Committee entirely agrees. However, it is unclear to the Committee
why the Government believes it is better to have no verification
protocol to the BTWC at all than one agreed by at least a sizeable
number of BTWC States Parties even if those States Parties do
not include the USA. After all, in other important international
agreements, for example the Land Mines Convention and the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the Government has given its strong support
to their implementation notwithstanding US opposition. Moreover,
if a verification protocol to the BTWC was put in place, it would
provide a valuable internationally-agreed benchmark against which
compliance with the BTWC could be assessed, and to which states
suspected of having biological weapons programme could be kept
under pressure to become party.
8. Though the Foreign Secretary said in his written
statement of 10 December 2002 that "It was of crucial importance
that there should be unanimous agreement on the way ahead in meeting
the pervasive threat from biological warfare, particularly in
the light of the growing menace of international terrorism",
he failed to explain the reasons why the Government regard unanimity
as paramount. We recommend that the Government sets out fully
in its response to this Report why the Government believes that
no verification protocol to the BTWC is better than having one
in place and agreed by a significant number of States Parties
to the Convention.
9. We conclude that, welcome though the measures
agreed at the Fifth BTWC Review Conference are, they fall well
short of the measures which would have been implemented, had the
draft verification protocol been agreed. We further conclude that
the absence of a verification protocol will perpetuate the highly
dangerous position which has existed now for many years whereby
biological weapons programmes continue to be developed in certain
countries, and may leave regime change as the only certain means
of ending such programmes. We recommend that the Government redouble
its efforts to secure the international consensus necessary to
allow a verification protocol to be agreed, with or without the
support of the United States.
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