Memorandum submitted by Mr Alastair Campbell[1]
Examination of Witness (Questions 897-899)
MR ALASTAIR
CAMPBELL
25 JUNE 2003
Q897 Chairman: One preliminary announcement,
which I hope will be to the benefit of everyone. We expect a division
at around four o'clock and I then intend to adjourn for a period
of some 15 minutes. Mr Campbell, welcome to what some will see
as the lion's den, but which of the roles you play remains to
be seen. I note that one newspaper talked of "Campbell in
the soup", but we will wait to see. We would prefer to see
your appearance before the Foreign Affairs Committee as one in
which we are carrying out our task of a proper responsibility
to Parliament and the public in a matter of very serious concern,
namely the decision to go to war in Iraq. You know our remit is
to test whether the information presented to Parliament was complete
and accurate in the period leading up to military action in Iraq,
particularly with regard to weapons of mass destruction. You know
the charges which have been made against your role, effectively
that in your zeal to make the case you embellished the evidence
to the point of misleading Parliament and the public at a vital
time relating to peace and war. There are four relevant documents.
In 1998 the late Derek Fatchett and Doug Henderson presented to
Parliament a three page paper. Again, we are told that in March
of last year there was a Joint Intelligence Committee assessment
which the Independent of 9 June claimed was suppressed
after being put up by the JIC as not being sufficiently strong.
The more relevant dossiers are those of 24 September of last year,
based on a Joint Intelligence Committee assessment, and the dossier
published in early February of this year where clearly alterations
were made to enhance the effect, alterations to existing documents
which had been plagiarised, for example "opposition"
changed to "terrorist". Obviously my task is to provide
the platform and I anticipate that my parliamentary colleagues
on the Committee will be ready to question you on all the relevant
matters, particularly on the document of 24 September of last
year and that of 3 February of this year. First, some preliminary
questions. Mr Campbell, looking back now, is there anything that
you did which you regret?
Mr Campbell: In relation to the
briefing paper that was issued in February 2003 I obviously regret
the fact that a mistake was made within the drafting process whereby—
Q898 Chairman: A mistake?
Mr Campbell: It was a mistake,
and I have set out the background to that in my memorandum to
you. If you want I can go through and explain how I believe that
mistake occurred, or I can answer more generally on whether you
think there are more areas where I should regret. From the general
perspective, I believe that we were involved in communicating
on a very, very serious issue why the Prime Minister and the Government
felt as strongly as they did about the issue of Iraq and Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction. At various stages we were communicating
the intense diplomatic activity that was going on as the Prime
Minister and the Government sought to avoid military conflict.
At a further stage we were communicating during what was a military
conflict. Now, during all that time with a media that we are operating
with around the clock, around the world, on an issue like that,
we are involved in and responsible for a huge number of, if you
like, pieces of communication. Within one of them, and I have
explained the background in the memorandum, there was a mistake.
Q899 Chairman: You say "a mistake".
Are you saying you are particularising a single mistake?
Mr Campbell: I am saying that,
yes.
1 Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Session 2002-03, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC
813-II, Ev 7. Back
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