Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness (Questions 940-959)

MR ALASTAIR CAMPBELL

25 JUNE 2003

  Q940  Sir John Stanley: Mr Campbell, do you not recognise that a hugely greater area of mistake resulted than simply the indefensible plagiarisation of material off the Internet? The hugely greater mistake that resulted in parliamentary and constitutional terms was your total failure to brief the Prime Minister correctly as to the process that had been used, the fact that none of this material had come through with the Joint Intelligence Committee Chairman's approval, and the House of Commons was left under the illusion, as indeed was the Prime Minister, that in terms of the authenticity and reliability of this information it came with the JIC seal of approval on it when that was not the case?

  Mr Campbell: The Prime Minister did not say it was with the JIC seal of approval and as the Prime Minister made clear in the—

  Q941  Sir John Stanley: ". . . issued further intelligence over the weekend"; did any Member of Parliament think that did not mean something with JIC approval?

  Mr Campbell: I think any Member of Parliament would recognise the difference between a document such as that one, with the detail that is in it and the kind of production that it is and the way that it was put out at the time, as I say, as part of a massive, global communications exercise, and this paper that was given to a few Sunday journalists travelling with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister, as he made clear again in the House today, was content with the paper as it was. What he is not content with, and nor am I, is the fact that in its production a mistake was made. We have acknowledged that mistake, we have apologised for that mistake and we have put forward these new procedures to make sure it does not happen again, and I do not honestly see there is much more that we can do than that.

  Q942  Sir John Stanley: Mr Campbell, I have to put it to you the contrast between the covers makes it absolutely—

  Mr Campbell: —I think the contrast is far greater than that.

  Q943  Sir John Stanley: The contrast between the covers makes it absolutely clear that you should have alerted the Prime Minister unmistakably to the fact that the preparation of these two documents was quite different—

  Mr Campbell: He knows that—

  Q944  Sir John Stanley: —That the second document had no JIC approval and that he, I am quite certain, if he had known that and had been told that there is no way he would have said what he did to the House of Commons when he made his statement on 3 February. That statement suggested that this was intelligence of veracity coming from intelligence sources with intelligence approval; we now know that to be false.

  Mr Campbell: Had the Prime Minister had those concerns he would have raised them directly with me; he has not. Equally, I have had many, many discussions with the intelligence agencies, and the intelligence material that was in that document was accurate. The reason I keep coming back to the difference in these documents is the fact that that first document of September 2002 was hugely important; it was a huge break of precedent for the intelligence agencies to be sharing so much information like that with Parliament and the public. The second document was a different sort of communication, and the Prime Minister has not said to me, "I should have been told that this had not gone through the JIC clearance", because he knew that where there was intelligence material in that document it had been cleared for use by the issuing agency, and that was the procedure at the time.

  Q945  Sir John Stanley: Yes, but I am sure the Prime Minister is sufficiently aware of the huge dangers of mixing intelligence material with material taken off the internet and I am sure the Prime Minister is also aware that if he had been properly briefed on those dangers the first thing he would have said to you is, "Mr Campbell, make certain this is cleared by the Chairman of the JIC before it is put in the Library."

  Mr Campbell: All I can do is refer you to what the Prime Minister said in the House of Commons today where he makes clear—

  Q946  Sir John Stanley: He made the statement today, absolutely rightly, that he was left completely in the dark at the time he made his statement on 3 February that the greater part of this document had been culled off the internet and there were these two significant inaccuracies in it.

  Mr Campbell: Can I just say on that at that point, neither he nor I nor anybody in a senior position on my Iraq Communications Group was aware that that was the case. That is the point I keep coming back to. In relation to the changes, I have explained those changes were made by experts within the government commenting upon what they did not know to be Mr al-Marashi's work. It is only, for example, where "hostile groups" became "terrorist organisations", and it was because they said, "Hold on a minute, you are not talking about hostile groups, you are talking about terrorist organisations, you are talking about Islamic Jihad, you are talking about Hamas, you are talking about some of the groups that are trying to destabilise the Iranian regime."

  Q947  Sir John Stanley: Is it not a fact that the Prime Minister has, rightly, instructed that all published material that contains intelligence material must in future be cleared by the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee? Does that not of itself make it self-evident that the procedures you were following and the briefing of the Prime Minister were grossly inadequate?

  Mr Campbell: No it does not because it was not initially the Prime Minister who got in place these new procedures, it was me with the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator, and the Prime Minister is content with the decisions that we came to.

  Q948  Sir John Stanley: I am fascinated to know that in this matter apparently you seem to determine the Government's procedures.

  Mr Campbell: I do not determine the Government's procedures and that totally misrepresents what I said. I entered into a discussion with the Head of the Secret Intelligence Service, the Chairman of the JIC and the Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator, Sir David Omand. The procedures were agreed in an exchange of correspondence between me and Sir David, having been discussed with the agencies, and they were signed off by the Prime Minister. Those procedures are now in place.

  Chairman: Thank you. Mr Mackinlay please?

  Q949  Andrew Mackinlay: Mr Campbell, on page 4 of your statement you make it clear, as you have over the past few minutes, and you say: "When new SIS intelligence came to light, which was authorised for use in the public domain, which revealed the scale of the regime's programme of deception and concealment, it was my idea to base a briefing paper for the media upon it." You also went on a few moments ago to explain on 3 February and you said: "I explained"—that is to the Prime Minister—"where there was new intelligence." Would you be able this afternoon to take us through those paragraphs or sections of this document which were the new intelligence material?

  Mr Campbell: The bulk of any new intelligence material was principally in sections one and three. It related to the activities of the Iraqi regime. It is the material about the bugging of hotels, about the monitoring of the movements of officials; it is the material about the organisation of car crashes and the like.

  Q950  Andrew Mackinlay: Indeed, it is very precise, and therefore it would be possible for you overnight, would it not, with a highlighter to highlight precisely that which is above the line in terms of this intelligence material and that which is "other sources"?

  Mr Campbell: It would be but I would also have to check if the agencies were happy for that to be done.

  Q951  Andrew Mackinlay: You overlook the chasm you are falling into. You have said repeatedly that they have signed this information off.

  Mr Campbell: There may be information within that paper which is intelligence information but not necessarily identified as such.

  Q952  Andrew Mackinlay: You have confused me because the way I was following you, you said that new information came to light which was authorised for use in the public domain. That is all I am asking for, that category which was authorised for use in the public domain.

  Mr Campbell: I have referred to some of that in the answer that I gave to you earlier.

  Q953  Andrew Mackinlay: You understand the category I am asking about. Overnight would you highlight, or however way you want to indicate that which is in that category?

  Mr Campbell: I think it would probably take longer than that.

  Q954  Andrew Mackinlay: Why?

  Mr Campbell: Because I would have to go through the kind of processes that Sir John has just been talking about.

  Q955  Andrew Mackinlay: By Friday morning?

  Mr Campbell: I would hope to be able to do that and the Foreign Secretary could perhaps bring it, but that is something that would have to be agreed by probably all of the intelligence agencies[3]

  Q956  Andrew Mackinlay: If it was not, I think you would need to come up with an explanation as to why because I just cannot understand the logic of it. I do not want to labour the point. It was only when the "plagiarism" issue came to light that media attention grew, you say. When did you have that awful moment when you discovered now what has become known as the "Horlicks"? When was that moment, that sinking feeling (we have all had it) of "whoops"?

  Mr Campbell: As I recall, that moment was on the way back from an interview the Prime Minister had done with Jeremy Paxman and I think—this is from memory, dredging my memory here—when we were going through what we described as our "masochism" strategy whereby the Prime Minister basically went out and was getting beaten up by the public in interviews. I think I am right in saying Channel 4 made a reference to this story on the 7 o'clock news and Newsnight did a very brief interview with Mr al-Marashi in the evening.

  Q957  Andrew Mackinlay: Approximately, which day was that then?

  Mr Campbell: That was the day—

  Q958  Andrew Mackinlay: It is beyond 3 February, is it not?

  Mr Campbell: I think it was the 7th. I think it may be in my note.

  Q959  Andrew Mackinlay: Okay, can I assume that within an hour or two the Prime Minister was told?

  Mr Campbell: It may have been the 6th. The Prime Minister was told pretty quickly, yes. He by then, I think from memory, had gone on to his constituency and I was on the way back to London.


3   Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-03, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC 813-II, Ev 10. Back


 
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