Examination of Witness (Questions 960-979)
MR ALASTAIR
CAMPBELL
25 JUNE 2003
Q960 Andrew Mackinlay: I have to
say to you I have been reading this afternoon and I have listened
carefully to Sir John Stanley reading out the precise words of
the Prime Minister's statement of 3 February. You might think
me stupid—
Mr Campbell: —no.
Q961 Andrew Mackinlay: —but
I cannot conclude any other reason, reading those words again
and again, than that this document was an intelligence document.
It is not conditional. In fairness to you, it says the document
draws upon a number of sources including intelligence sources,
but did you and the Prime Minister discuss him making a formal
statement or using a parliamentary occasion (taking the initiative
rather than responding to questions) to clarify that point?
Mr Campbell: The briefing paper
that had been given to the Sunday papers on the trip to Washington
was put in the Library in the House on the Monday in advance of
the Prime Minister's statement on his talks with President Bush.
Q962 Andrew Mackinlay: I have told
you on the receiving end of his statement what I interpreted it
to be.
Mr Campbell: All I can say on
that is if you look at the first dossier, the 2002 dossier, it
actually makes a very big point of the fact that this is an unprecedented
development. It explains what the JIC is, who is on it and how
it works. I think if you do look at the other one, particularly,
as I say, the way it was used, this is a huge communications exercise,
I think all I can do is point to the front of the paper which
says it draws upon a number of sources including intelligence.
Q963 Andrew Mackinlay: By the time
it has gone beyond this awful moment, what I cannot understand
is, bearing in mind it is not just Andrew Mackinlay who is confused,
clearly it is a lot of other people, probably 650-odd MPs, why
did the Prime Minister and/or yourself (you counsel him legitimately)
not say we really ought to clarify this in a formal statement
or even a written statement to the House?
Mr Campbell: The Prime Minister
was asked about it, again from memory, in the House and has also
had a number of written questions about the issue.
Q964 Andrew Mackinlay: But he was
never proactive on it, was he?
Mr Campbell: On the day Channel
4 and the BBC exposed the fact that some of this material had
come from Mr al-Marashi's article in September 2002, the Prime
Minister's spokesman in the very next briefing said, "Something
has gone wrong here, it should not have happened, mistakes have
been made and we will have to look at it." It did not take
us that long to establish what had happened. Those in the CIC
responsible admitted what had happened and it was as a result
of that we then discussed and put in place the new procedures.
Q965 Andrew Mackinlay: Who represents
the Cabinet Office on the CIC? You said they are represented;
who is he or she?
Mr Campbell: From time to time
it is the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, it is
sometimes his deputy, and that is who it usually is.
Q966 Andrew Mackinlay: So the Joint
Intelligence Committee were privy to the document of 3 February?
Mr Campbell: They were part of
the discussions about the deployment of the paper. Ultimately
the decision finally to use the paper in the way that we did was
made as part of our media strategy for the trip to the States.
To go back to the point that I was discussing with Sir John, the
issuing agency, the Secret Intelligence Service, had already authorised
us to use the intelligence material in the public domain.
Q967 Andrew Mackinlay: Yes, but presumably
the Cabinet Office Secretary was represented at the critical moment
when it was decided to go with this information, albeit it might
have been delegated to you to sign it off?
Mr Campbell: There was a process
that went on over a period of weeks. I think I am right in saying
it was 7 January that the SIS said there was this new material
which could be deployed in the public domain. Over the next three
weeks there were three different meetings discussing all sorts
of other—
Q968 Andrew Mackinlay: —Would
the Cabinet Secretary be privy to the fact, to use the term, that
there were other sources other than the intelligence material
going to be drawn into this document?
Mr Campbell: I am not aware that
the Cabinet Secretary himself was involved at all.
Q969 Andrew Mackinlay: No, but his
representative.
Mr Campbell: Certainly because
what my group did was commission—
Q970 Andrew Mackinlay: Who is that
person?
Mr Campbell: I cannot remember
who for sure was around the table at that time.
Q971 Andrew Mackinlay: It is minuted
so you could let us know, please.
Mr Campbell: On 7 January?
Q972 Andrew Mackinlay: Or if you
think there are a number of meetings you could say Joe Bloggs
on that day and so-and-so on that day.
Mr Campbell: In relation to this
particular document there were four meetings.
Q973 Andrew Mackinlay: Let's have
whoever is privy to, present or the circulation, please?
Mr Campbell: Yes[4]
Q974 Andrew Mackinlay: On the September
document, on page 2 of your statement you say discussions with
the Chairman of the JIC on presentational issues, which is your
job as a journalist.
Mr Campbell: Former!
Q975 Andrew Mackinlay: Very good.
The point is presentational issues, drafting suggestions and PM's
suggestions. Those were your words. Did he accept your suggestions?
Mr Campbell: Some he did and some
he did not.
Q976 Andrew Mackinlay: Okay, would
you be able to tell us which ones (not now) were included in,
even if you cannot tell us the ones which were excluded out?
Mr Campbell: I can probably say
some of both.
Q977 Andrew Mackinlay: Overnight
perhaps?
Mr Campbell: I think, for example,
the first draft was put forward by the Chairman of the JIC and
I looked at it. For example, there was a paragraph about Saddam
Hussein's illicit earnings and it said about £3 billion of
earnings, the bulk of which was illicit. I asked whether it is
possible to quantify just how much of that was illicit and the
answer came back from John Scarlett 100%, that kind of thing.
In another area—and I know the accusation is I sexed it
up, I think this is sexing it down—in the passage on human
rights, for example, there were some very graphic descriptions
of the nature of the regime which the draft described as "vivid
and horrifying". I felt we should let it speak for itself.
Do you need to say that? The Prime Minister also made suggestions.
Q978 Andrew Mackinlay: Do you know
which they were?
Mr Campbell: He made suggestions
about the structure of the document at quite a late stage in the
drafting and the Chairman of the JIC, as it happened, said he
did not think that was a better structure than his and stuck with
his.
Q979 Andrew Mackinlay: Did you write
the Executive Summary?
Mr Campbell: No.
4 Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee,
Session 2002-03, The Decision to go to War in Iraq, HC
813-II, Ev 10. Back
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