Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1180-1199)
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR PETER
RICKETTS, CMG AND
MR WILLIAM
EHRMAN, CMG
27 JUNE 2003
Q1180 Chairman: When he reported
to Parliament immediately afterwards?
Mr Straw: The point of my remarks,
this was also made clear by Mr Campbell, is that we accept that
the process was unsatisfactory and the result of that, so far
as the 3 February document was concerned, is that there was not
a proper provenance for some of the material in the document,
and that includes now, as everyone knows, the fact that a large
part of part two was taken from this PhD thesis and was not properly
attributed. That is accepted. However, I hope that you in return
will accept that in every material particular the February 3 document
was and is accurate. Even where there were changes made in the
text from the PhD thesis to the text that was issued those changes
accurately reflected the reality. For example there was a change
made from "opposition groups", from "Saddam Hussein
was supporting opposition groups" to "Saddam Hussein
was supporting terrorist organisations". Saddam Hussein was
supporting terrorist organisations, every member of this Committee
knows that and all but one member of this Committee voted to proscribe
the terrorist organisations, MEK, Islamic Jihad, Hamas and Hezbollah,
whom Saddam Hussein was supporting.
Q1181 Chairman: The effect of that
change was to dramatise the words used and that it part of the
charge that it was "sexed-up".
Mr Straw: There has never been
any claim that I have been aware of that the document issued on
February 3 was on "sexed-up". The only reference to
"sexed-up" was made by Mr Gilligan on the Today
programme on 29 May in respect of the first document and the 45
minutes, so it is very important that we do not conflate these
two. For reasons that have now been explained at very great length
the attribution of part two of February 3 document was dropped
out as it went through processes, literally through word-processing.
When others came to go through the document they thought, and
maybe quite correctly, that saying that Saddam Hussein was supporting
opposition groups was not actually giving the full picture. He
was indeed supporting the opposition groups but the serious charge
against him was that he was supporting terrorist organisations.
I say again, with respect, everybody knows that. There was no
"sexing-up" of that document. What happened to that
document was that the process by which it came to be produced
was not satisfactory and therefore we have faced, what I have
said to everybody and accept it is an embarrassment of having
to explain that part of it came from a PhD thesis and from a Jane
document and that was not properly attributed. It does not affect
the veracity of the document. My last point on February 3 document
is this, in the hearing on Tuesday I asked your colleagues if
they could name or point to any part of the February 3 document
which was inaccurate and as I recall the only inaccuracy that
could be pointed to, substantive inaccuracy, was that at one point
military security services was confused for general security services.
Whatever else was the reason for making a decision to go to war
it was not that.
Chairman: I am going to continue with
the point of where we are. Mr Illsley on this.
Q1182 Mr Illsley: I have to challenge
that because I challenged it with Alastair Campbell as well when
he said that the accuracy of the document has never been challenged.
Almost every page has been challenged in evidence given to the
Committee, and whether it is inaccurate or out of date or whatever
we can debate but some of the intelligence material contained
within the document, and I think it is on page three where there
are two references to the weapons inspectors having been prevented
from visiting sites, having their movements known, their whereabouts
monitored, having been interrupted by arguments with officials
to prevent them getting to sites that was released in the document
on 30 January and on 14 February, granted it is two weeks later,
Hans Blix contradicted that in his evidence to the United Nations.
He said: "We have not had any problems visiting sites".
Either that evidence is out of date or it is wrong?
Mr Straw: With great respect,
first of all, Mr Illsley, if the basis of you claiming that this
was out of date was evidence which arose after date of publication
it could not conceivably be out of date. Secondly, I am familiar
with what Dr Blix said in a whole series of reports on 27 January,
again on 14 February I was in the Security Council when he issued
that report and again on 28 February and 7 March, and subsequently.
What Dr Blix said, and I can look up what he said here and come
back to it in a moment, first of all on 27 January, which was
after all the most current report that we had when this was put
together, Dr Blix was critical of the co-operation which he had
received from the Iraqis. I will see if I can turn it up. He talked
about a degree of co-operation on process but he then criticised
the co-operation on substance. He said notably, this is paragraph
69 of the Command Paper I put before Parliament. He said: "Paragraph
9, the Resolution 1441, 2002 states that this co-operation shall
be active; it is not enough to open doors. Inspection is not a
game of catch as catch can". Let me also make it clear that
our assessment backed up by repeated evidence put before the Security
Council by the inspectors was, yes, the tactics of the Iraqis
was to appear to co-operate on process but still to interfere
on substance. Until quite late into the inspection process they
are insisting that five Iraqi minders should accompany any Iraqi
scientist who was interviewed. They refused at every stage to
allow any Iraqi scientist to be interviewed outside Iraq and told
those scientists if they co-operated in that way their families
would be at risk. We were as certain as we could be that the premises
in which the scientists were to be interviewed were bugged. There
was also significant evidence of the Iraqis seeking to bug UNMOVIC's
headquarters to gain advance information about sites to be visited,
and of course they were always followed. There is nothing here,
certainly nothing to which you have drawn my attention, which
would suggest what was said here is inaccurate.
Q1183 Mr Illsley: We are talking
about the document being inaccurate. On page three of the document
the quote is: "Journeys are monitored by security officers
stationed on the route if they have prior intelligence. Any changes
of destination are notified ahead by telephone or radio so that
arrival is anticipated. The welcoming party is a give away".
Mr Straw: That was absolutely
true all of the way through the inspection process.
Q1184 Mr Illsley: That was published
on 13 January. On 14 February Hans Blix said: "Since we arrived
in Iraq we have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more
than 300 sites, all inspections were performed without notice
and access was almost always provided promptly. In no case have
we seen convincing evidence that the Iraq side knew in advance
that the inspectors were coming". The two do not stand together
there, do they? There is a two week gap between the publication
of the dossier on 30 January and Blix's statement on 14 February.
What I am saying is I am challenging the assertion that nothing
in the second document is untrue or misleading?
Mr Straw: What Dr Blix said, and
I will go through other aspects of what Dr Blix said on 14 February.
What he said here is entirely consistent. I also have to say to
you, Mr Illsley, if the only inaccuracy you are pointing to is
something which was known and was never challenged in the Security
Council by any partner, that the Iraqis had an immense security
apparatus monitoring UNMOVIC then again I am confident in saying
there is no material fact in 3 February document that is challengeable,
and it has not been.
Chairman: On those material facts the
Committee will draw its own conclusions. I am just aware that
there is a danger in this public session of going round and covering
the same ground as last time. I hope we can all discipline ourselves
to that extent to try and answer questions which have arisen from
Alastair Campbell. Sir John, I think you have a point of order.
Q1185 Sir John Stanley: I do have
a point of order; my point of order is that the Foreign Secretary
is here to answer questions as a witness to this Committee. The
Foreign Secretary is not here to pose questions himself to the
Committee. Most certainly the Foreign Secretary is not entitled
to deduce from the fact that the Committee choose not to answer
his particular question agreement with his statement. On the specific
change to which we referred, the change from "opposition
groups" to "terrorist organisations" I just want
to place on the record that as far as Members of Parliament are
concerned the significance that was attached to the reference
to support by Saddam Hussein's regime of terrorist organisations
did not relate to organisations such as Hamas it related to the
Government signing up to linkage between the Saddam Hussein regime
and al-Qaeda. That was a materially significant change in the
document. I just want to put that on the record.
Mr Straw: I may be wrong but I
do not recall that 3 February document mentions al-Qaeda.
Sir John Stanley: It referred to "terrorist
organisations" and was taken by most people in the House
to suggest linkage between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda.
Q1186 Chairman: We will draw our
own conclusions.
Mr Straw: Just allow me to make
this point, I never claimed, neither did the Prime Minister that
there was any direct linkage between al-Qaeda and the Iraqi regime.
Indeed we were both extremely careful when such claims and charges
were put. It was never part of the decision to go to war, full
stop. I am very happy to supply the Committee with extracts of
the statements that both the Prime Minister and I made when we
were repeatedly asked about whether there was any connection.
I said in November 2002: "I have seen no direct evidence
of the Iraqi regimes involvement in the al-Qaeda operation before
September 11". The Prime Minister gave a more detailed but
similar response to the Liaison Committee, you will recall this
Mr Anderson, in January 2003. Mike O'Brien gave a number of such
replies. We do not have to speculate about al-Qaeda, what is incontrovertible
is that this statement on page nine that the Iraqi regime's external
activities include, "supporting terrorist organisations and
hostile regimes" is true. The hostile regimes were one, Iran,
where Iraq continued to support MEK, an extremely unpleasant terrorist
organisation. Ask the Iranian Government about MEK. Secondly,
the Iraqi regime was supporting three terrorist organisations
operating under the territory of Israel and the occupied territories,
and ask the Palestinian authorities or the Government of Israel
if you do not believe me really that the Iraqis were actively
supporting those organisations.
Q1187 Chairman: I am now moving to
the charge in respect of the accuracy of information. This is
from Mr Gilligan who met, apparently, at least he claims, a man
from the services in an office and claims that the document published
on 24 September was transformed in the last few weeks. We have
heard evidence from Mr Campbell to the effect that the document
was that of the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and
remained his throughout. Do you agree that the best evidence to
help this Committee in trying to ascertain whether that document
was changed now we have the document itself is for us to see the
original document and to see the extent to which it was changed?
Mr Straw: Chairman, we are going
into private session and I am happy to share with you the details
of what was in the key JIC assessment when we go into private
session. You will also be aware that the Parliamentary Intelligence
and Security Committee has a complete remit on behalf of Parliament
to go in and analyse all of the background intelligence documents.
We have discussed that. We have been extremely forthcoming with
this Committee, as is quite right, and in the private session
that we are going to go into I intend to be more forthcoming.
I am confident that I will be able to satisfy any questions that
you have. Could I just also make this point about this claim,
what Mr Gilligan claimed on 29 May was, and I quote directly from
the transcript, "The Government probably knew that the 45
minute figure was wrong even before it decided to put it in [the
dossier]". He then went on to say, "our source says
that Downing Street a week before publication ordered the dossier
to be `sexed-up', to be made more exciting and ordered more facts
to be discovered". None of those claims is true. They are
all simple and straightforward falsehoods. The September dossier
was written by the Chairman of the JIC and his staff. At no time
did anyone wish to seek nor sought to override his judgments.
There was no ordering by Downing Street or by myself or anybody
in the Foreign Office for more facts to be discovered. The claim
that the Government probably knew that the 45 minute figure was
wrong is totally incorrect. The idea that uncorroborated evidence
of a 45 minute threat was given undue prominence in the dossier
at the behest of the Prime Minister.
Q1188 Chairman: That is a case which
we have to examine. Would you agree that again the best evidence
in terms of whether that was at the beginning the property of
Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee and remained his
throughout is to see the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee?
Mr Straw: We have been through
that and as I have said to you in private sessions, and I thought
you and your colleagues had accepted this, what is unfair—
Q1189 Chairman: We had not accepted
it.
Mr Straw: This Committee is looking
at the decision to go to war. I am going to make one other comment
about the 45 minute claim.
Q1190 Chairman: Briefly, because
we want to make progress.
Mr Straw: The simple fact of the
matter is apart from anything else the 45 minute claim was a supporting
fact in the decision to go to war but it was not remotely a central
fact in the decision to go to war, and that is shown very, very
clearly by any analysis of all the discussions and debates on
whether we went to war. Yes, of course, there was some attention
paid to this claim and others in September when the document was
published but as the process evolved that fell way.
Q1191 Chairman: We have heard you
on that. I just want to centre on this point, on the key charge
of that document being transformed within the past weeks we are
not going to see the various amendments to the document?
Mr Straw: Mr Campbell is also
seeking to put together a very detailed letter to you. He promised
you a detailed letter of the exchanges between him and the JIC.
It is a very substantial piece of work, it is still being prepared.
The combination of that and what I say in private session should
satisfy you.
Q1192 Chairman: We are not going
see the various amendments to the document. You do not think Mr
Campbell's letter will answer that.
Mr Straw: What you will see is
what I am able to help you with in the private session. We can
get on to that in a moment. As you know, Chairman, time and again
where further information is sought I have been happy to provide
that. I just wanted to say about this point in the public session,
about the 45 minute claim—
Q1193 Chairman: We can come on to
that and our colleagues may want to visit that. I am centring
on a different point, if it be the case, and this would be very
powerful argument, that the Chairman of the JIC produced the document,
kept control of the document, was wholly satisfied with the end
product why cannot the Committee see the Chairman of the Joint
Intelligence Committee to hear that?
Mr Straw: Because, Chairman, what
you are seeking to do is embroil me in a turf war between the
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee.
You know as well as I do the appropriate body to deal with the
details of intelligence is the ISC, they are set up by Parliament,
they are colleagues of people in this room from all parties. I
say to Mr Mackinlay that Mr Mackinlay also knows that the process
by which members of the ISC are chosen is a very similar process
in practice.
Andrew Mackinlay: It is not, it is not,
it is not.
Q1194 Chairman: What you are saying
in effect is you are using this jurisdictional point to stop the
Committee having what can be absolutely decisive evidence?
Mr Straw: No. I will be producing
decisive evidence to you in any event, Mr Anderson. Unless you
are saying that I have come here not to tell the truth but to
tell other than the truth it ought to be believed.
Q1195 Chairman: I am making the simple
point that the best evidence which could be before this Committee
in respect of that simple point on the role of the JIC and the
views of the Chairman of the JIC would be to allow us to see the
Chairman. You are saying that you are not going to allow that.
Mr Straw: The key evidence, which
I shall be reading to the Committee, is to compare what was said
in the JIC assessment with what was in the final document.
Andrew Mackinlay: Presumably we reserve
our right, sometime during these proceedings it open to us, notwithstanding
what the Foreign Secretary has said, you would if motioned for
us to request, or summons—I am sure of the terminology—the
ball would be lobbed back into his court or the foreign secretary
to either deny Parliament that opportunity or to acquiesce. I
do not want to prejudge it. Am I correct in saying that is an
option open to us?
Q1196 Chairman: Nothing is prejudged
I just wanted to ascertain that on the face of it the Committee
is being denied the best evidence because of your insistence on
this jurisdictional point.
Mr Straw: Mr Anderson, it is not
just a jurisdictional point, it is about which is the appropriate
body to examine the Chairman of the JIC and also the heads of
the agencies. I have discussed this perfectly amicably with you
and your colleagues in the past.
Q1197 Chairman: We have never accepted
your position.
Mr Straw: I thought we had reached
a common understanding about this. We have been more open with
the FAC on this inquiry than any other.
Andrew Mackinlay: You have been more
open. That is an entirely different issue. Mr Straw is right;
to his credit he has been more open with this Committee than any
other committee. I have to say we had to have two requests to
see Mr Campbell, do not forget, but nevertheless those who repent
at the gates of heaven. . . What we never conceded, and I never
shall, is that the Security Intelligence Committee is an alternative
to this Committee, it is a Parliamentary committee, it is created
by statute, it is not a Parliamentary committee, its selection
is fundamentally different to how I got on this Committee and
I shall never concede that, ever.
Q1198 Mr Pope: I cannot be alone
in feeling really frustrated about this, the charge that is being
made by Mr Gilligan is essentially uncorroborated, we are having
to take his word he has a credible source who has alleged firstly
that Alastair Campbell "sexed-up" the document and it
was transformed in the week prior to publication. You are saying
that it is not. Are you saying in the private session we will
be allowed to see the last JIC assessments prior to the publication
of the documents so that we can compare and contrast the two?
Mr Straw: I will read out to you
the relevant sections of that. In addition to that what Mr Campbell
is preparing, and he was working very late on this last night
and again very early this morning, and hopes to try and have this
with you before the session is through today, is a detailed summary
of the exchanges between him and the JIC, saying: Can I suggest
this? What about that? And the response from the JIC, which will
give you, as it were, the most complete and accurate running commentary
on that process. I wonder if I can just say this, I think in making
judgments about the credibility of this source of Mr Gilligan's,
I have no idea who it is, I think it is worth bearing in mind
how far the senior people in the BBC are now palpably shifting
from Mr Gilligan in an apparent defence of Mr Gilligan.
Richard Ottaway: You are using the Committee
for propaganda.
Chairman: I end on this point, as far
as I am concerned we have never yielded in respect of the fact
that we should be entitled to have intelligence material which
is germane to our inquiries. When the Intelligence and Security
Committee was established it was said in terms by the then minister
that it would not cut across the work of existing select committees.
Q1199 Mr Pope: In some sense this
is a political fiasco at the moment and it is all over today's
papers. There is a serious point here , which is not a party political
point at all, the source Mr Gilligan quoted to us, I wanted to
get to the bottom of this about Mr Gilligan's source, it seems
to me that his source must be somebody fairly senior, either somebody
in an intelligence agency or in another department. I just put
it to you, Secretary of State, as the minister responsible for
some of these agencies, it must be in the public interest to find
out who the source is and get the source to either put up or shut
up. At the moment there is no evidence before the Committee that
is corroborated about the "sexing-up" of the evidence.
I think this is right at the root of the charges that the Government
have to face. I want to get to the bottom of this, it is not about
scoring party political points I want to know what the truth is:
Was the evidence "sexed-up"? How credible is that source?
Mr Straw: We do not believe the
source is credible. I will say this, what I note is that I think
Mr Richard Sambrook also now has doubts about the credibility
of the source because when he did an interview yesterday on the
Today programme—
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