Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1260-1279)
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR PETER
RICKETTS, CMG AND
MR WILLIAM
EHRMAN, CMG
27 JUNE 2003
Q1260 Sir John Stanley: Foreign Secretary,
there are three issues I wish to pursue with you and your colleagues.
The first relates to the whole issue of the uranium from Africa.
That is a central issue and was a central element in the Government's
September 2002 dossier and the Government on page 27 of the dossier
said, for example: "We therefore judge that if Iraq obtained
fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources
the timeline for production of a nuclear weapon would be shortened
and Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two
years." Can you confirm what has appeared extensively, and
this may be one for your officials, in both the British and the
American press that in February 2002—I stress 2002—the
American administration sent a retired US ambassador who had had
experience of serving in Africa to Niger to investigate allegations,
documents, that Niger was involved in the supply of uranium to
Iraq?
Mr Straw: I am sorry, I have got
no knowledge of that claim one way or the other.
Q1261 Chairman: Would one of your
officials?
Mr Ehrman: I am not aware of that.
Q1262 Sir John Stanley: I find that
a very, very surprising answer and it suggests to me that we do
not have the appropriate officials. This is important information
that has been shown extensively in the American press and also
in the British press. Only as recently as June 12 in the Washington
Post, this public source, it is stated: "Armed with information
reportedly showing that Iraqi officials had been seeking to buy
uranium in Niger one or two years earlier, the CIA in early February
2002 despatched a retired US ambassador to the country to investigate
the claims". Indeed, that was further confirmed by Dr Glen
Rangwala in the Independent on 22 June who said that he
himself had met the particular former US ambassador a few days
ago, and I myself have spoken to Dr Rangwala about the conversation
he had. The ambassador returned to the United States in a matter
of three weeks, as was reported in the Washington Post,
and the article says: "After returning to the United States,
the envoy reported to the CIA that the uranium purchase story
was false." Can you, or your officials, tell this Committee
at what point, given the closeness of the intelligence relationship
between Britain and the United States, the British intelligence
community, presumably in the United States, was informed that
the CIA had made this investigation and had reported that the
conclusion of the former US ambassador was that the documentation
and the allegations were false? At what point was that reported
to the British intelligence community?
Mr Ricketts: I cannot answer that,
Sir John. I would recall that the fact that uranium—yellow
cake—had been supplied from Niger to Iraq in the 1980s is
a confirmed fact, so reports of continued Iraqi interest in sourcing
uranium from Niger did not seem to us to be implausible.
Q1263 Sir John Stanley: That is not
the point I am putting to you at all. The point I am putting to
you is a very simple factual point. The former US ambassador made
the visit to Africa, returned in early March after three weeks
and reported to the CIA that the uranium purchase story was false.
I would find it inexplicable if that particular result of the
envoy's visit was not reported to British defence liaison staff
in Washington. As you are not able to give me the answer to this
question, which is a very material question for reasons I shall
come on to, Foreign Secretary, please could you very, very quickly
tell us the answer to my question, when did the CIA report to
the British intelligence community the result of the former US
ambassador's visit to Niger?
Mr Straw: I will seek to get you
an answer as quickly as possible, Sir John, as I always do. I
would like to say this: number one, I have learned that the IAEA—
Q1264 Sir John Stanley: I am sorry.
Mr Straw: Allow me to say this
because it is rather important. I learned that they had judged
that the documentation relating to Iraq having bought yellow cake
were forgeries at the Security Council when the IAEA published
them.
Q1265 Sir John Stanley: I am coming
on to these issues, Foreign Secretary, and please at that point
give me the answers to those questions. I just want to take this
issue through chronologically in my own order, if I may. That
was a report made by the former US ambassador and I would find
it wholly inexplicable if that was not shared very promptly with
the British defence liaison staff in Washington. The question
I now want to come to is what was said in the September 2002 dossier.
On that particular issue, as we know, in the foreword under the
name of the Prime Minister there is a reference to the fact that
Saddam Hussein is continuing in his efforts to develop nuclear
weapons, and in the bullet points: "Saddam Hussein sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having
no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it".
Given the fact that the Niger documents were certainly at that
time known to the Americans, and I believe also to British intelligence,
to be forgeries, it is clear that the statement made in the September
2002 dossier was clearly based on separate intelligence in which
the British Government had confidence. The point I want to put
to you is that when the Prime Minister came to the House on September
24 at the time when the September 2002 dossier was published,
he said: "In addition, we know that Saddam has been trying
to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa, although
we do not know whether he has been successful". The question
I have in my mind is why did the Government, either in the document
or in what the Prime Minister said in the House, at least not
put some degree of health warning over the statements that appeared
in the September 2002 dossier to the effect that alongside intelligence
in which the British Government clearly had confidence there were
already, and had been known for some six months previously, forged
documents in circulation? I have to say I am somewhat surprised
that no reference was made to those forged documents in the very
self-same area in which the Prime Minister was saying without
qualification, without ambiguity, "we know that Saddam has
been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa,
although we do not know whether he has been successful or not".
Why was there not any sort of health warning?
Mr Straw: Sir John, we will find
out what the state of knowledge was about the story that you gave
in your previous question. What I can say, however, as far as
I am concerned is that I had absolutely no knowledge of any documents
relating to this area being forged until the IAEA said that in
one of their reports in February or March 2003. I am confident
in saying that that I also speak for the Prime Minister.
Q1266 Sir John Stanley: I am not
suggesting, Foreign Secretary, that you did have any knowledge
but I think you will be quite interested, therefore, in the answer
to the earlier question which I put to you. I am quite interested
to know what was the date on which the British intelligence community
were informed by the CIA that this forged documentation existed.
Mr Straw: We will find out.
Q1267 Sir John Stanley: And why,
perhaps, so very, very many months elapsed even after the publication
of the September 2002 dossier with these very emphatic statements
when neither the Prime Minister nor yourself were informed as
to the existence of the forgeries. Can I go on now beyond the
September 2002 document. This issue is one which Mr Mackinlay
did raise in the last session and I would like to carry it on.
As you well know, the British Government was under direct United
Nations obligations on Security Council resolutions to provide
information that was going to be of value to the IAEA in investigating
the compliance or non-compliance by Saddam Hussein with the issue
of the procurement of fissile materials and materials that would
be relevant to the Iraqi regime's nuclear production. I would
like to point out to you, and I have the detailed texts of the
various resolutions, that not merely was the British Government
under an obligation to provide that information under Security
Council Resolution 1441, which of course was only passed on 8
November 2002, but the British Government was under an even stronger
obligation, an even more mandatory obligation, under Security
Council Resolution 1051 of 27 March 1996 in paragraph 12. The
British Government clearly had strong intelligence, in its view,
supporting the Prime Minister's statement that Saddam Hussein
was in the market for procuring uranium from Africa. What was
the date, Foreign Secretary, on which the British Government complied
with its obligations under the two Security Council resolutions
and passed the firm intelligence that it had, which underpinned
what was in the September 2002 document, to the IAEA?
Mr Straw: I will ask Mr Ricketts
and Mr Ehrman to give more detail, but—
Q1268 Sir John Stanley: I just want
the date, I do not want a long response. I am just asking a very
simple question. I am asking your officials if you cannot give
the answer. I want to know, please, the date, that is all I am
asking for. What was the date on which the British Government
complied with its Security Council obligations to pass information
on to the IAEA?
Mr Straw: I am going to give an
answer and, if I may, I will give the answer in my own way. Resolution
1051, to which you referred, was passed before we came into office
in March 1996, so I cannot give you the exact date. I assume,
that as with every other kind of obligation, the previous government,
of which I was not a member but you were, was co-operating fully
with the United Nations in this particular as in others. What
I also know—
Q1269 Sir John Stanley: I am sorry,
Security Council Resolution 1051 was ongoing at the time we are
talking about. We are talking about fresh intelligence which came
to your Government and which underpinned putting into the September
2002 dossier the detailed statements that were made in emphatic
terms about uranium supplies to Africa. That intelligence was
under the obligation of your Government to pass on to the IAEA.
When was it done?
Mr Ehrman: The intelligence came
from a foreign service and we understand that it was briefed to
the IAEA in 2003.
Q1270 Sir John Stanley: What date
in 2003?
Mr Ehrman: I would have to check.
Mr Straw: We will have to give
it to you later.
Q1271 Sir John Stanley: That is a
very, very important date, extremely important, because the dossier
became available in September 2002, so how long did it take the
British Government to comply with their UN obligations?
Mr Straw: We were complying with
those obligations and co-operating to a very high degree, as both
the IAEA, UNMOVIC and its predecessor, UNSCOM, always accepted.
Q1272 Sir John Stanley: Can I come
back to you, Mr Ehrman. You said in 2003. If you know the year,
surely you must know the month, Mr Ehrman.
Mr Ehrman: I would have to check
the exact month.
Q1273 Sir John Stanley: If you would
let us know the exact month very precisely and very quickly. This
brings me to the last point I want to make on this which is that
if the British Government were complying with their obligations
under the United Nations Security Council resolutions then I have
to say I am exceedingly surprised by the wording of Dr Mohammed
El-Baradei's statement to the United Nations Security Council
on 7 March 2003. I am very surprised by the final sentence. These
are the three sentences, but the final one is the significant
one: "Based on thorough analysis the IAEA has concluded with
the concurrence of outside experts that these documents which
form the basis for the reports of recent uranium transactions
between Iraq and Niger are in fact not authentic. We have therefore
concluded that these specific allegations are unfounded."
This is the key sentence which puzzles me hugely: "However,
we will continue to follow up any additional evidence, if it emerges,
relevant to efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials."
It would appear to me, therefore, that at the time when Dr El-Baradei
made that statement to the UN Security Council on 7 March the
British Government at that point had still not provided the intelligence
which it had, which underpinned what appeared in the September
2002 document, to the IAEA. Why not?
Mr Ehrman: I was saying that my
understanding was that the intelligence was passed to the IAEA
in 2003, I did not say by the British Government. My understanding
is that it was by the country which had that intelligence.
Mr Straw: I make clear, Sir John,
as far as—
Q1274 Sir John Stanley: I am sorry,
Mr Ehrman, if we are at cross-purposes let us just sort it out.
The British Government's statement—I quoted what the Prime
Minister said in the House—"We know that Saddam has
been trying to buy significant quantities of uranium from Africa,
although we do not know whether he has been successful",
and repeated in the dossier, in the bullet points, "sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having
no active civil nuclear power programme that could require it.
. .", that was clearly British information based on British
intelligence. Anyway, it is information for which the British
Government is responsible.
Mr Straw: But, Sir John,—
Q1275 Sir John Stanley: I am just
asking why was that information apparently not passed on straight
away to the IAEA?
Mr Straw: We will have to get
you a detailed answer but may I say that my understanding throughout
this, and it is something that the IAEA and UNMOVIC themselves
acknowledged, was that we were indeed co-operating actively with
both agencies of the United Nations. You understand the distinction,
but I think people may be forgiven for thinking there has been
a conflation here of the intelligence relating to yellow cake,
which was the subject of the forgeries, which as I said in the
session on Tuesday did not come from British intelligence. There
was some inadvertent reporting that it did, but it did not. That
is just a fact. We can go into more detail in private session.
Q1276 Sir John Stanley: If I may
say so, that is a red herring.
Mr Straw: That is not a red herring
at all.
Q1277 Sir John Stanley: I am not
talking about the forged documents. The Minister has already stated
that that particular documentation, that particular source material,
did not come from the UK. It has been widely reported in the press
that it came from Italy, I have no means of knowing whether that
is the case or not. I am talking about the intelligence which
underpinned the statement in the September 2002 dossier and which
obviously underpinned the statement made by the British Prime
Minister. Foreign Secretary, you say in your public document to
us in relation to the statement on page 25 of the dossier that
"There is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of
significant quantities of uranium from Africa" and you go
on to say: "This reference drew on intelligence reporting
from more than one source". Fine. I am simply asking why
that intelligence reporting drawing from more than one source,
for which the British Government took responsibility, which the
British Government used, which when the President of the United
States referred to it in his State of the Union address referred
specifically to the fact that it came from Britain, did not claim
it came from America, that intelligence reporting was not forthwith
passed to the IAEA because if it had Dr El-Baradei in his statement
on 7 March could not have been referring to "continuing to
follow up any additional evidence, if it emerges, relevant to
efforts by Iraq to illicitly import nuclear materials". Foreign
Secretary, we want to know when was this substantial intelligence
information that underpinning the document passed on and why was
there such a delay?
Mr Straw: We will get you an answer
and you will then be able to assess whether there was a delay,
Sir John.
Sir John Stanley: Can I now come to—
Q1278 Richard Ottaway: Can I ask
one quick question. Are you still standing by the uranium claim?
Mr Straw: What was in the document,
yes.
Q1279 Richard Ottaway: What is the
source of that?
Mr Straw: We will come to that
in private session, Mr Ottaway.
| 
