Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1280-1299)
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR PETER
RICKETTS, CMG AND
MR WILLIAM
EHRMAN, CMG
27 JUNE 2003
Q1280 Richard Ottaway: Are you verifying
the claim? Are you continuing to verify it?
Mr Straw: We will talk about sources
in the private session.
Chairman: Sir John will continue. I want
to move on to the private session very soon.
Q1281 Sir John Stanley: I have got
just two more issues. The next issue I want to come to is a very
crucial dimension to the 45 minute claim and it emerged in the
evidence we took previously from Mr Andrew Gilligan and in answer
to a question which Mr Pope posed. Mr Gilligan revealed to us
that his source had said that the Iraqi intelligence source in
turn from which he got his information, which was the single uncorroborated
source which the Government has acknowledged underpinned the 45
minute claim rested the 45 minute claim on the use of missiles
to launch WMD at a 45 minute state of readiness. Foreign Secretary,
as you have clearly read the transcript, and as my colleagues
will know, I came in very shortly afterwards and said if the 45
minuted claim rested on the capability of Iraq, from what I knew
about this particular business that would almost certainly invalidate
the 45 minute claim if it was based on delivery and 45 minute
activation of missiles with a WMD capability. Foreign Secretary,
when you came before us you picked up that point and you said
in one of the answers you gave to me: "No reference to missiles,
by the way, as some of your evidence givers have suggested, none
whatever". In the dossier there is no reference to missiles
in conjunction with the 45 minute claim, it is all in relation
to weapons. That is something that could be credible if the intelligence
is there. It refers, by implication, to artillery pieces and if
chemical weapons are held forward that makes a 45 minute claim
credible. The question I want to put to you is, therefore, there
is a very, very significant word change that may or may not have
taken place. The word change from "missiles" as alleged
was the intelligence information that came in from Mr Gilligan's
source, which makes the 45 minute claim non-credible, to "weapons",
as used by the Government, which providing the intelligence is
there makes the 45 minute claim credible. The question I want
to put to you is, and again it may be one for your officials who
may know the background in more detail, when the intelligence
came in, and we have just heard in response to Mr Ottaway's questioning
that it came in in September 2002 shortly before this document
was published, allegedly from an Iraqi general, as Mr Gilligan's
source said, was the wording that came in in relation to "missiles"
or not?
Mr Straw: As far as I am aware
no, the intelligence related to other delivery systems.
Q1282 Sir John Stanley: I am afraid
it cannot be "as far as I am aware . . ."
Mr Straw: Not missiles.
Mr Ehrman: The intelligence related
to "weapons".
Q1283 Sir John Stanley: It did. From
the very beginning it related to "weapons"?
Mr Straw: Yes.
Q1284 Sir John Stanley: So you are
saying that on this particular point Mr Gilligan's source is wrong
in saying that the intelligence that came in related to "missiles"?
Mr Ehrman: The intelligence related
to "weapons".
Q1285 Sir John Stanley: Thank you
very much, that is a very important point that I wanted to establish.
So there was no word changing that went on between when the intelligence
first came in and when the dossier was published. Thank you. The
final point I want to raise, Foreign Secretary, is this very important
policy point. You will remember that in our earlier evidence session
this week I said that "one of the central issues is whether
the degree of immediacy of the threat from Saddam Hussein's regime
that was conveyed to Parliament and to the wider public was justified
on the basis of the intelligence information that was available
to the Government" and you somewhat rode off with an answer
to a question that I did not put to you. I never suggested at
any point that the Government had used the word "immediate".
If I can just put it in your own words. You said in your answer:
"I wonder if I may be allowed to make this point in response
to Sir John, so far as we can ascertain by word searches and so
on, neither the Prime Minister nor I or anybody acting on our
behalf has ever used the words `immediate or imminent' threat,
never used those words, in relation to the threat posed by Saddam
Hussein. What we talked about in the dossier was a current and
serious threat, which is very different." We can debate whether
it is very different or not, but that was what you said. Then
you went on to say: "The Prime Minister said on 24 September,
the day the dossier was published in the House: `I cannot say
that this month or next, even this year or next, Saddam will use
his weapons'." The point I want to put to you, Foreign Secretary,
is that it is true to say that the Government used the words "current
threat", sometimes the Government used the words "present
threat", but that was coupled on a number of occasions, including
by you at one of the speeches you made outside the House and by
the Prime Minister in the House and in the dossier itself, with
a reference to the 45 minutes. A current threat but coupled with
a 45 minutes timescale for the activation of weapons of mass destruction.
If I can just quote what the Prime Minister did say, also on 24
September, in relation to the document: "It concludes that
Iraq has chemical and biological weapons; that Saddam has continued
to produce them; that he has existing and active military plans
for the use of chemical and biological weapons which could be
activated within 45 minutes". I think all of us who were
in the House hearing the Prime Minister saying that, hearing the
references to "serious and current threat" were certainly
charged with the view that this was a threat of some considerable
near-term risk, even though the Prime Minister made it clear that
he was not predicting when such use might be made. What I want
to ask you, Foreign Secretary, is in the reply you gave to me
earlier this week, I was not clear whether you were trying to
row back from what the Government had said previously about the
degree of immediacy of the threat following the publication of
the dossier and up to the start of the war or whether your position,
and therefore the Government's position, is that you stand by
exactly the terms which you expressed to the House and in the
dossier as to the degree of immediacy of threat prior to the war
taking place?
Mr Straw: The latter, Sir John.
I would say this: of course I stand by it and I also stand by
it in the context in which this was made. It is only, and the
Chairman acknowledged this in his opening statement, since Mr
Gilligan made these claims on May 29, which are false, that the
45 minutes has assumed any great significance at all. Of course
it was part of the argument. Far from resiling from it, it was
part of the argument, but it was not absolutely central in the
way Mr Gilligan has claimed. The reason I did make the point I
made about imminence was because the claim made, which this Committee
subsequently responded to, from Mr Gilligan was that the 45 minutes
was not just a detail, it went to the heart of the Government's
case that Saddam was "an imminent threat". There is
a difference, everybody understands that, and I am grateful to
you for acknowledging this, between an "imminent and immediate
threat" and the kind of threat which we described in a balanced
and accurate way.
Q1286 Sir John Stanley: I did not
acknowledge any substantial difference between a current threat
coupled with a statement by the Prime Minister of 45 minutes away
from activation of weapons of mass destruction. I just put this
final point to you, Foreign Secretary. You are downplaying the
significance of the 45 minutes. I put it to you as a question
that it was actually very significant, not least for every Member
of the British Parliament when they came to vote on March 18.
I can tell you that it was a significant issue for me for this
reason: every Member of the British Parliament knew when they
came to vote to decide whether or not to support the Government
on March 18 that if they did not support the Government and Saddam
Hussein used those weapons of mass destruction held at 45 minutes
readiness of activation then they would have to face their constituents
as people who had not supported the Government when the Government
was trying to remove those weapons of mass destruction which at
that time could have caused massive casualties. I believe that
was a very, very significant influence on a lot of Members of
Parliament, the 45 minutes, when they came to vote.
Mr Straw: Sir John, I respect
what you say. I was not downplaying it, I am just anxious that
it should be put in context. I do say that it is of some interest—it
will be to historians—that in the debate on 18 March and
also in the 80 or 90 minute statement which I handled on 17 March
I do not believe that 45 minutes claim was referred to on one
occasion.
Q1287 Sir John Stanley: Can I just
say why it was not referred to, Foreign Secretary. It was not
referred to for the very simple reason that Members of Parliament
of all sides accepted that this came from a reliable intelligence
source and regarded it as not being an issue for debate. They
took the Government's word for it.
Mr Straw: By that stage, Sir John,
speaking for myself, and as you will recall I made the statement
on 17 March and wound up on 18 March and made a number of Speeches
in the Security Council, the argument for me was based on profound
concern about Saddam Hussein's intent and capability, not least
on his record of defiance following 1441. Chairman, can I just
crave your indulgence now that Mr Ottaway is back in the room
to give you some clarification on something he asked.
Chairman: Finish with Sir John and then
you can clarify it.
Q1288 Sir John Stanley: I want to
return to one question I put to you earlier this week. Can you
produce any reason, other than American doubts about the credibility
of the 45 minutes, why the Americans at no point ever used the
45 minutes?
Mr Straw: I do not know why they
did not happen to use it. We do not have any doubt about the credibility
of the assessment made by the JIC in September reflected in the
dossier.
Q1289 Chairman: Can we have your
response to Mr Ottaway?
Mr Straw: I have been passed a
note. This is about whether the drafts were first, second or third.
I have been passed a note to this effect, "I understand Mr
Campbell will make it clear in the written material that he is
going to provide to the Committee that the 45 minutes point was
included in the first draft of the dossier which was presented
to him by the Joint Intelligence Committee." I hope that
is helpful.
Q1290 Richard Ottaway: This draft
presented to him was not necessarily the first draft?
Mr Straw: That was why I was having
to be conditional, because as I was seeking to explain, to be
as accurate as possible, there was a whole series of draft, but
it was the first draft presented to him.
Q1291 Mr Pope: I have got two really
quick questions. The first one is did anybody in the SIS or the
JIC object to the 45 minute claim?
Mr Straw: No.
Q1292 Mr Pope: The second question
is Alastair Campbell, when he came before us earlier in the week,
said that the head of SIS, the intelligence and security co-ordinator
and the Chairman of JIC all authorised him—Campbell—to
say that it is not true that he exaggerated or "sexed-up"
that September dossier. As the Minister responsible for those
services, do you stand by that?
Mr Straw: Absolutely, 100%. Let
me make clear, nobody "sexed-up" or exaggerated that
September dossier, no-one at all, and that includes Alastair Campbell.
Q1293 Chairman: One point of clarification.
The point was made about the delays in passing the possible information
to UNMOVIC and to IAEA. I recall in the evidence of Mr Taylor
he expressed certain doubts about the security procedures and
leakability of those organisations. Did you share any of those
doubts?
Mr Straw: For sure. Mr Taylor,
I thought, was very compelling in the evidence that he gave explaining
that there is an inherent problem with United Nations agencies.
They are not run by a single nation state, they are run by an
international organisation, so the security problems are much
greater. That is acknowledged by the UN. The senior people take
a great deal of care to try and ensure that the information that
is passed is kept secure but there are inherently greater problems
and that was recognised both by UNSCOM when it was operating up
to the end of 1998 and by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. That said, Chairman,
I repeat the point because it is very important, I think you will
find if you ask the IAEA and UNMOVIC whether they had good intelligence
co-operation from the United Kingdom, they would say yes and would
compliment both the quality and the range of the material they
received.
Chairman: Foreign Secretary, we have
covered substantial ground. I think it is now appropriate for
us to move into private session and I would propose that we have
a five minute break.
[The following evidence was taken in private.
Material not published at the request of the witness is indicated
by the notation ***]
Q1294 Chairman: Foreign Secretary,
we are now on the transcript in private session and anything which
is said will be negotiated between the two sides as to what can
and cannot be disclosed. Foreign Secretary, you are a very busy
person and we have also all got things to do, let us try and come
straight to the point. You know the allegation which is made:
the "sexed-up" dossier of 24 September, making the case
from the first draft of the publication. What are you prepared
to show us?
Mr Straw: Sorry?
Q1295 Chairman: What are you prepared
to show us in private which can help to assist us in reaching
a conclusion?
Mr Straw: What I am prepared to
read to you, and I will do so as soon as we have recovered from
our coffee break and find the relevant document, is the section
of the JIC report that refers to this.
Q1296 Chairman: Could you produce
the section, read it to us and tell us from where and when it
comes so it can help to make up our minds.
Mr Straw: This is the JIC assessment
of 9 September.
Q1297 Chairman: Was this the first
assessment subsequent to the PM's decision?
Mr Straw: Yes.
Mr Ricketts: This was the formal
JIC assessment, not a draft of the dossier. This was the formal
JIC assessment which was then the basis for the dossier.
Q1298 Chairman: So could we read
that?
Mr Straw: Sure. ***
Q1299 Sir John Stanley: This is very
important. Could you just read that again slowly?
Mr Straw: The opening of the sentence
is: ***
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