Conclusions and recommendations
1. We conclude that it
appears likely that there was only limited access to reliable
human intelligence in Iraq, and that as a consequence the United
Kingdom may have been heavily reliant on US technical intelligence,
on defectors and on exiles with an agenda of their own. (Paragraph
15)
2. We conclude that the
March 2002 assessment of Iraq's WMD was not "suppressed",
as was alleged, but that its publication was delayed as part an
iterative process of updating and amendment, which culminated
in the September dossier. (Paragraph 25)
3. We conclude that it
is too soon to tell whether the Government's assertions on Iraq's
chemical and biological weapons will be borne out. However, we
have no doubt that the threat posed to United Kingdom forces was
genuinely perceived as a real and present danger and that the
steps taken to protect them taken were justified by the information
available at the time. (Paragraph 41)
4. We recommend that in
its response to this Report the Government set out whether it
still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it
states about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programmes,
in the light of subsequent events. (Paragraph 42)
5. We recommend that,
in its response to this Report, the Government give its current
assessment of the status of the Al Samoud 2 missile infrastructure.
We further recommend that in its response to this Report the Government
set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be
accurate in what it states about Iraq's ballistic missile programme
generally, and the retained al-Hussein missiles in particular,
in the light of subsequent events. (Paragraph 47)
6. We conclude that the
accuracy of most of the claims in relation to Iraq's nuclear weapons
programme can only be judged once the Survey Group has gained
access to the relevant scientists and documentation. (Paragraph
53)
7. We recommend that the
Foreign Secretary provide the Committee with the date on which
the British intelligence community were first informed by the
CIA that forged documentation in relation to Iraqi purchases of
uranium from Niger existed, as soon as he has found this out.
(Paragraph 57)
8. We conclude that it
is very odd indeed that the Government asserts that it was not
relying on the evidence which has since been shown to have been
forged, but that eight months later it is still reviewing the
other evidence. The assertion "… that Iraq sought the
supply of significant amounts of uranium from Africa …"
should have been qualified to reflect the uncertainty. We recommend
that the Government explain on what evidence it relied for its
judgment in September 2002 that Iraq had recently sought significant
quantities of uranium from Africa. We further recommend that in
its response to this Report the Government set out whether it
still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it
states about Iraq's attempts to procure uranium from Africa, in
the light of subsequent events. (Paragraph 60)
9. We conclude that the
45 minutes claim did not warrant the prominence given to it in
the dossier, because it was based on intelligence from a single,
uncorroborated source. We recommend that the Government explain
why the claim was given such prominence. (Paragraph 70)
10. We further recommend
that in its response to this Report the Government set out whether
it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what
it states about the 45 minute claim, in the light of subsequent
events. (Paragraph 71)
11. We conclude that Alastair
Campbell did not play any role in the inclusion of the 45 minutes
claim in the September dossier. (Paragraph 77)
12. We conclude that it
was wrong for Alastair Campbell or any Special Adviser to have
chaired a meeting on an intelligence matter, and we recommend
that this practice cease. (Paragraph 79)
13. We conclude that on
the basis of the evidence available to us Alastair Campbell did
not exert or seek to exert improper influence on the drafting
of the September dossier. (Paragraph 84)
14. We conclude that the
claims made in the September dossier were in all probability well
founded on the basis of the intelligence then available, although
as we have already stated we have concerns about the emphasis
given to some of them. We further conclude that, in the absence
of reliable evidence that intelligence personnel have either complained
about or sought to distance themselves from the content of the
dossier, allegations of politically inspired meddling cannot credibly
be established. (Paragraph 86)
15. We conclude that without
access to the intelligence or to those who handled it, we cannot
know if it was in any respect faulty or misinterpreted. Although
without the Foreign Secretary's degree of knowledge, we share
his confidence in the men and women who serve in the agencies.
(Paragraph 90)
16. We conclude that the
language used in the September dossier was in places more assertive
than that traditionally used in intelligence documents. We believe
that there is much value in retaining the measured and even cautious
tones which have been the hallmark of intelligence assessments
and we recommend that this approach be retained. (Paragraph 100)
17. We conclude that continuing
disquiet and unease about the claims made in the September dossier
are unlikely to be dispelled unless more evidence of Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction programmes comes to light. (Paragraph 108)
18. We conclude that the
degree of autonomy given to the Iraqi Communications Group chaired
by Alastair Campbell and the Coalition Information Centre which
reported to him, as well as the lack of procedural accountability,
were contributory factors to the affair of the 'dodgy dossier'.
(Paragraph 122)
19. The Committee also
concludes that the process of compiling the February dossier should
have been more openly disclosed to Parliament. (Paragraph 123)
20. We recommend that
the Government offer every assistance to Mr Marashi in tracing
his relatives in Iraq. (Paragraph 133)
21. We conclude that the
effect of the February dossier was almost wholly counter-productive.
By producing such a document the Government undermined the credibility
of their case for war and of the other documents which were part
of it. (Paragraph 138)
22. We further conclude
that by referring to the document on the floor of the House as
"further intelligence" the Prime Minister—who
had not been informed of its provenance, doubts about which only
came to light several days later—misrepresented its status
and thus inadvertently made a bad situation worse. (Paragraph
139)
23. We conclude that it
is wholly unacceptable for the Government to plagiarise work without
attribution and to amend it without either highlighting the amendments
or gaining the assent of the original author. We further conclude
that it was fundamentally wrong to allow such a document to be
presented to Parliament and made widely available without ministerial
oversight. (Paragraph 140)
24. We recommend that
any paper presented to Parliament—whether laid on the Table,
made available in the Vote Office or placed in the Library—for
the purpose of explaining the Government's foreign policy be signed
off by a FCO Minister. We further recommend that any FCO document
presented to Parliament which draws on unofficial sources should
include full transparency of sources, and attribution where appropriate.
(Paragraph 141)
25. We recommend that
there should be clarity over which Department has lead responsibility
for groups such as the CIC. That Department should then be accountable
to the relevant select committee. This would avoid the situation
where nobody is prepared to take responsibility for certain interdepartmental
groups. (Paragraph 149)
26. We recommend that
Andrew Gilligan's alleged contacts be thoroughly investigated.
We further recommend that the Government review links between
the security and intelligence agencies, the media and Parliament
and the rules which apply to them. (Paragraph 154)
27. We conclude that the
continuing independence and impartiality of the Joint Intelligence
Committee is of utmost importance. We recommend that Ministers
bear in mind at all times the importance of ensuring that the
JIC is free of all political pressure. (Paragraph 159)
28. We recommend that
the Intelligence and Security Committee be reconstituted as a
select committee of the House of Commons. (Paragraph 167)
29. We conclude that continued
refusal by Ministers to allow this committee access to intelligence
papers and personnel, on this inquiry and more generally, is hampering
it in the work which Parliament has asked it to carry out. (Paragraph
170)
30. We recommend that
the Government accept the principle that it should be prepared
to accede to requests from the Foreign Affairs Committee for access
to intelligence, when the Committee can demonstrate that it is
of key importance to a specific inquiry it is conducting and unless
there are genuine concerns for national security. We further recommend
that, in cases where access is refused, full reasons should be
given. (Paragraph 171)
31. We conclude that the
September dossier was probably as complete and accurate as the
Joint Intelligence Committee could make it, consistent with protecting
sources, but that it contained undue emphases for a document of
its kind. We further conclude that the jury is still out on the
accuracy of the September dossier until substantial evidence of
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, or of their destruction, is
found. (Paragraph 186)
32. We conclude that the
February dossier was badly handled and was misrepresented as to
its provenance and was thus counter-productive. The furore over
the process by which the document was assembled and published
diverted attention from its substance. This was deeply unfortunate,
because the information it contained was important. (Paragraph
187)
33. Consistent with the
conclusions reached elsewhere in this Report, we conclude that
Ministers did not mislead Parliament. (Paragraph 188)
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