Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Ninth Report


Formal minutes

Thursday 3 July 2003

Members present:

Mr Donald Anderson, in the Chair


Mr David ChidgeyMr Bill Olner
Mr Fabian HamiltonMr Richard Ottaway
Mr Eric IllsleyMr Greg Pope
Andrew MackinlaySir John Stanley
Mr John MaplesMs Gisela Stuart


The Committee deliberated.

Draft Report (The Decision to go to War in Iraq), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the Chairman's draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraph 1 read and agreed to.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 4 read, amended, divided and agreed to (now paragraphs 4 and 5)

Paragraph 5 (now paragraph 6) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 6 to 10 (now paragraphs 7 to 11) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 11 (now paragraph 12) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 12 to 14 (now paragraphs 13 to 15) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 15 (now paragraph 16) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 16 to 23 (now paragraphs 17 to 24) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 24 (now paragraph 25) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 25 (now paragraph 26) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 26 (now paragraph 27) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 27 (now paragraph 28) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 28 (now paragraph 29) read, amended and agreed to.

A paragraph—(Sir John Stanley)—brought up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now paragraph 30).

Paragraph 29 (now paragraph 31) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 30 (now paragraph 32) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 31 to 36 (now paragraph 33 to 38) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 37 (now paragraph 39) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 38 (now paragraph 40) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 39 (now paragraph 41) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 40 to 44 (now paragraphs 42 to 46) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 45 (now paragraph 47) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 46 to 54 (now paragraphs 48 to 56) read and agreed to.

A paragraph—(Sir John Stanley)—brought up, read the first and second time and inserted (now paragraph 57).

Paragraphs 55 and 56 (now paragraphs 58 and 59) read and agreed to.

Paragraphs 57 and 58 (now paragraphs 60 and 61) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 59 to 62 (now paragraphs 62 to 65) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 63 (now paragraph 66) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 64 to 66 (now paragraphs 67 to 69) read, amended and agreed to.

A paragraph—(Sir John Stanley)—brought up and read, as follows:

"The Committee notes in relation to the 45 minutes claim that, thus far, there have been no finds of chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of Iraqi delivery systems and no finds of command and control documents, codes or other materials relating to the deployment of chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so."

Ordered, That the paragraph be read a second time.

Question put, That the paragraph be inserted.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 4

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 5

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Paragraphs 67 and 68 (now paragraphs 70 and 71) read and agreed to.

Paragraphs 69 to 71 read, agreed to and transferred (now paragraphs 87 to 89).

Paragraph 72 read, amended, agreed to and transferred (now paragraph 90).

Paragraphs—(Mr Maples)—brought up and read, as follows:

Andrew Gilligan's allegations

The allegation made by Andrew Gilligan's source as reported on the Today programme on 29 May was that the WMD Dossier 'was transformed in the week before it was published to make it 'sexier' and that 'the classic' example was the statement that WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes, that information was not in the original draft. It was included in the dossier against their (the Intelligence Services) wishes because it was not reliable.' He repeated these points to us in his evidence to us.

Mr Gilligan seemed a credible witness and in some two hours before us did not vary or backtrack at all on these central points. His source has proved correct on two matters which he told Mr Gilligan: that the 45 minute capability was a late insertion in the document and that it was single sourced. The Foreign Secretary confirmed both these points to us in his evidence.

It is worth noting that similar reports of unhappiness among the Intelligence Services were appearing elsewhere around the same time. These are set out in detail in the BBC's letter to the Chairman of the Committee. They include articles in The Observer Feb 24, Independent on Sunday April 27, Guardian May 30, The Times May 30, Washington Post May 30, The Observer June 1. It seems that Mr Gilligan's source was not the only person talking to journalists.

In her evidence, Dame Pauline Neville Jones told us (Q 382) in relation to people in the Intelligence Services talking to the press: 'There clearly was turbulence inside the machine…'.

Mr Gilligan described the source for his story as:

'one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier and I can tell you that he is a source of longstanding, well-known to me, closely connected with the question of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, easily sufficiently senior and credible to be worth reporting.'

We consider below questions about Mr Gilligan's source, and about the relationship between the security and intelligence services and the media.

As we have noted above, there had been earlier drafts by the FCO, before the JIC assumed responsibility for the document. Mr Gilligan suggests that it was at this point that the dossier was 'sexed up', shortly before publication, by the insertion of the 45 minutes claim:

'… only a few weeks before the publication of the September dossier, … Whitehall officials had been describing it to the press as rather uneventful. … then three weeks after that the dossier appeared and it was more revelatory than those accounts had it. So something had changed in that three week period.'

Andrew Gilligan also said:

'The source's claim was that the dossier had been transformed in the week before it was published and I asked, "So how did this transformation happen?", and the answer was a single word, which was "Campbell". … He also said that Downing Street officials, he did not name anybody else, had asked repeatedly if there was anything else [in addition to the 45-minutes claim] that could be included on seeing the original draft of the dossier which was considered dull.'

Mr Straw denied this:

'There had been previous drafts and this particular draft, which I think started its life sometime in early September, went out, it went out for comment and I had a look at it. The thing I can say perfectly publicly is that I thought it should make more reference to earlier inspections because having read this document I thought it should have a wider audience, referring to UNSCOM's final report of uncompleted disarmament tasks through late 1998, things like that, suggestions. I think one of my colleagues suggested that there should be a foreword. That is what happens. I think the implication of what Mr Gilligan was saying was that the judgments were changed, but that was not the case.'

Alastair Campbell himself, Jack Straw and senior FCO officials who were closely involved in the preparation of the dossier all denied in evidence to us that the dossier had been materially changed by Mr Campbell. In particular, they deny that the 45 minutes claim was inserted by him or at his request, pointing out that it first appeared in a JIC assessment discussed at a meeting on 9 September and then in the first JIC draft of the dossier, dated 10 September, and that this was the first draft seen by Mr Campbell. Mr Campbell has told us in terms that: 'It (the 45 minutes claim) was not inserted at my request.'

Mr Campbell supplied us with a list of changes to the September dossier which were requested by him, some of which were made and some not. The first thing we note from this paper is that Mr Campbell actually chaired the planning meeting which took place on 9 September. This was surprising, because we were told by a FCO official, albeit one who had not attended the drafting meetings, that they had been chaired by the Chairman of the JIC. We are concerned that a meeting to discuss a document which Ministers had asked the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare was chaired by the Prime Minister's Special Adviser.

We conclude that it was wrong for Alastair Campbell or any Special Adviser to have chaired a meeting on an intelligence matter, and we recommend that this practice cease.

Mr Campbell tells us that he underlined the importance for the credibility of the document that it should be, and be seen to be, the work of the JIC. He states that he emphasised "it goes without saying that nothing should be published that you (the JIC Chairman and the Intelligence Agencies) are not 100% happy with."

The first draft of the document as prepared by the JIC Chairman reached Mr Campbell the following day. He tells us he made no comment on it. He received a further draft on 17 September. Mr Campbell has listed the comments which, to the best of his recollection and that of the Chairman of the JIC, he made on this draft. There is some confusion over what is meant by the phrase 'first draft' in this context. It appears that the first draft to contain the 45 minute point was seen by Mr Campbell on September 10th; however, there had clearly been drafts around since March. It is not clear how these drafts changed between March and September 10, nor which if any of these were seen and/or commented on by Mr Campbell. As it was intended back in March to produce a document for publication, it seems unlikely that Mr Campbell did not see these as well. Without seeing these earlier drafts, the minutes of meetings and correspondence, it is impossible for us to know what if any input he had between March and September 10.

Speaking about the generality of his comments, Mr Campbell told us that: 'I know the accusation is I sexed it up, I think this is sexing it down'. On the whole, the effect of his comments was, so far as we can tell, neutral. Some aspects of the draft he suggested should be toned down, some he asked to be explained more fully. Mr Campbell is adamant that, after September 10th, he only suggested the changes set out in his note to us.

Mr Campbell received a final draft of the dossier on 19 September, five days before publication. He has told us that neither he nor the Chairman of the JIC can recall that he made any further comments. Mr Straw told us that 'Let me make clear, nobody 'sexed-up' or exaggerated that September dossier, no-one at all, and that includes Alastair Campbell.'

We regret that the substance of all this has become a very public row between Mr Campbell and the BBC. We are neither equipped nor willing to arbitrate that dispute, or to come down in favour of one of the parties. We have received very compelling evidence from Mr Gilligan and from Mr Campbell; Mr Campbell's evidence has in important respects been confirmed by the Foreign Secretary. Without full access to all the relevant papers and witnesses, which we have been denied, we do not believe that we or anyone could resolve this matter satisfactorily.

Jack Straw told us that there had been no formal complaints from members of the security and intelligence services about the content of the dossier. We trust that our colleagues on the Intelligence and Security Committee will be in a position to confirm this or otherwise.

We conclude that the claims made in the September dossier were in all probability well founded on the basis of the intelligence then available, although as we have already stated we have concerns about the emphasis given to some of them.

Was the language appropriate?

Another question which arises, and which has been asked quite separately from Mr Gilligan's accusations, is whether the language employed in the dossier was more assertive or more tendentious than that which is normally associated with a JIC assessment. If it was, that would lend credence to the view that the dossier was the object of political interference, or at least pressure.

Dame Pauline Neville Jones was Chairman of the JIC in the early 1990s. She characterised the traditional JIC approach to drafting in the following terms: "If there is a bias in the system the bias is towards care, which means you are cautious, which means, if anything, you are conservative." Dame Pauline highlighted the danger that information can become propaganda: "Clearly there is a very fine line between showing the evidence and making a case. It is where showing the evidence turns into making the case where the system has to take a very, very strong grip on itself." Andrew Wilkie, who had seen other JIC papers but who accepted he was a lone voice in the Australian intelligence community, believed the dossier had been exaggerated: "I think this document is a step beyond what I would expect the JIC to produce. … It is too unambiguous. It paints too confident a picture of Iraq's WMD programme." Andrew Gilligan, who claimed to have seen a number of JIC Reports—although with one exception they were old and already in the public domain—told us that "It is as much a matter of language, phraseology … an intelligence report of any description is pretty unexciting to be honest. It is couched, it is full of caveats, it is full of conditionals."

Gary Samore said that

'Certainly in the Institute dossier we were a bit more cautious in saying "probably" and trying to explain on which basis we had reached that conclusion but I think that the kind of confidence that you just described in the British Government dossier was very widely shared in western intelligence agencies.'

We note that the paper published by the FCO on November 10 1998 (Iraq ) in advance of Operation Desert Fox and which clearly draws on intelligence material, uses much less certain language. In para 9 it says 'The Iraqi chemical industry could produce mustard gas almost immediately and nerve agents within months"; and "Saddam almost certainly retains some BW production equipment, stocks of agents and weapons.' The WMD Dossier says (para 6 Executive Summary) 'As a result of intelligence we judge that Iraq has: …continued to produce chemical and biological agents.' The Dossier is much more certain.

In her evidence Dame PNJ told us (Q 362): 'If you put those two statements together one is a much more active statement than the other…' and 'those two statements are justified but can only be justified by a change in the situation.'

We also note a difference in wording between the body of the Dossier and the Executive Summary. The Executive Summary para 6 says 'As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has…continued to produce chemical and biological agents'. The main text says (p 18 para 3) 'The JIC concluded that Iraq had sufficient expertise, equipment and material to produce biological warfare agents within weeks…' and '…the JIC assessed that Iraq retained some chemical warfare agents, precursors, production equipment and weapons from before the Gulf War. These stocks would enable Iraq to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and nerve agent within months.' The wording of the Executive summary is again stronger than the main text.

This occurs again in relation to the 45 minute claim. The Summary says (para 6) 'As a result of intelligence we judge that Iraq has….military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons…. Some of these weapons are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them.' The main text says (p 19, para 5) 'Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical or biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so.'

In significant respects the Executive Summary is stronger than the main text.

On the other hand, the immediate past Chairman of the JIC, Peter Ricketts, '[did] not find anything in the language of [the dossier] at all surprising in terms of the judgments that the JIC reach.' And Dr Tom Inch thought the dossier was if anything less assertive than he would have wished: 'I found that there were too many weasel-words in the report, as I read it. They could do this or they might do that and so on, rather than saying that the evidence was hard.'

We conclude that the language used in the September dossier was in places more assertive than that traditionally used in intelligence documents. We believe that there is much value in retaining the measured and even cautious tones which have been the hallmark of intelligence assessments and we recommend that this approach be retained."

Question put, That the paragraphs be inserted.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 4

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 6

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Paragraph 73 (now paragraph 72) read, amended and agreed to.

A paragraph—(Mr Maples)—brought up, and read the first and second time.

Question put, that the paragraph be inserted in the report.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 5

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Ayes.

Paragraph inserted (now paragraph 73).

Paragraphs 74 to 76 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 77 read.

Amendment proposed in line 8, to leave out from the word "request" to the end of the paragraph.—(Mr Maples)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 4

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 6

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Paragraph 77 agreed to.

Paragraph 78 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 79 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 80 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 81 read.

Amendment proposed in line 3, after the word "draft", to insert the words:

"There is some confusion over what is meant by the phrase 'first draft' in this context. It appears that the first draft to contain the 45 minute point was seen by Mr Campbell on September 10th; however, there had clearly been drafts around since March. It is not clear how these drafts changed between March and September 10, nor which if any of these were seen and/or commented on by Mr Campbell. As it was intended back in March to produce a document for publication, it seems unlikely that Mr Campbell did not see these as well. Without seeing these earlier drafts, the minutes of meetings and correspondence, it is impossible for us to know what if any input he had between March and September 10."—(Mr Maples)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 4

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 6

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 82 read.

Amendment proposed in line 4, to leave out from the word "fully" to the end of the paragraph and insert the words: "Mr Campbell is adamant that after September 10th, he only suggested the changes set out in his note to us."—(Mr Maples)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 4

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 6

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 83 read and agreed to.

Paragraph 84 read.

Amendment proposed to leave out paragraph 84 and insert the following new paragraph:

"We regret that the substance of all this has become a very public row between Mr Campbell and the BBC. We are neither equipped nor willing to arbitrate that dispute, or to come down in favour of one of the parties. We have received very compelling evidence from Mr Gilligan and from Mr Campbell; Mr Campbell's evidence has in important respects been confirmed by the Foreign Secretary. Without full access to all the relevant papers and witnesses, which we have been denied, we do not believe that we or anyone could resolve this matter satisfactorily."—(Mr Maples)

Question put, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 5

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Noes.

Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraph 85 read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 86 read.

Amendment proposed in line 4, to leave out from the word "them" to the end of the paragraph.—(Mr Maples)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 4

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 6

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Paragraph agreed to.

Paragraphs 87 to 89 (now paragraphs 91 to 93) read and agreed to.

Paragraphs—(Mr Maples)—brought up and read the first and second time.

Question put that the paragraphs be inserted.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5

Mr David Chidgey

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr John Maples

Mr Richard Ottaway

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 5

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Ayes.

Paragraphs inserted (now paragraphs 94 to 98).

Paragraph 90 (now paragraph 99) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 91 read.

Amendment proposed in line 2, to leave out from the word "documents" to the word "We".—(Mr Maples)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 5

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Ayes.

Paragraph, as amended, agreed to (now paragraph 100).

Paragraphs 92 to 98 (now paragraphs 101 to 107) read and agreed to.

Paragraphs 99 and 100 (now paragraphs 108 and 109) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 101 and 102 (now paragraphs 110 and 111) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 103 read.

Amendment proposed to leave out lines 9 to 14 and insert the words:

"Mr Campbell was asked by the Committee to submit a written statement separating intelligence from open source information in the February dossier. Mr Campbell was forthcoming with regards to this request, however, he was not authorised by the SIS to go into greater detail.

Our own analysis based on Dr Rangwala's written statement has revealed that almost the entire second part was taken from three articles which corresponds to Mr Campbell's confirmation that only the first and third part of the dossier were backed by SIS information. Dr Rangwala also pointed out to the Committee that several claims made in the first part, which Mr Campbell explicitly refers to as intelligence information, are in open contradiction to Dr Blix's and UNMOVIC's accounts. " —(Mr Andrew Mackinlay)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5

Mr David Chidgey

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr Richard Ottaway

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 5

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Ayes.

Paragraph, as amended, agreed to (now paragraphs 112 and 113).

Paragraphs 104 to 108 (now paragraphs 114 to 118) read and agreed to.

Paragraphs—(Sir John Stanley)—brought up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now paragraphs 119 to 121).

Paragraph 109 read.

An amendment made.

Another amendment proposed in line 4, to insert the words:

"We further conclude that Alastair Campbell was seriously negligent in his handling of the Government's report "Iraq - its infrastructure of concealment, deception and intimidation" - the so-called dodgy dossier."—(Sir John Stanley)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 4

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Richard Ottaway

Mr John Maples

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 6

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Paragraph, as amended, agreed to (now paragraph 122).

A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now paragraph 123).

Paragraphs 110 to 122 (now paragraphs 124 to 136) read and agreed to.

A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now paragraph 137).

Paragraph 123 (now paragraph 138) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraphs 124 to 133 (now paragraphs 139 to 148) read and agreed to.

A paragraph—(Mr Mackinlay)—brought up, read the first and second time, amended and inserted (now paragraph 149).

Paragraphs 134 to 150 (now paragraphs 150 to 166) read and agreed to.

Paragraph 151 read.

Amendment proposed in line 2, to leave out from the word "Parliament" to the end of the paragraph and insert the words:

"This option would offer a number of advantages: the possibility of joint hearings, joint inquiries and joint reports; established structures for the management of overlap; a more open way of working; and a seat for the ISC Chairman on the Liaison Committee. We recommend that the Intelligence and Security Committee be reconstituted as a select committee of the House of Commons."—(Chairman)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 7

Mr David Chidgey

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Sir John Stanley

Ms Gisela Stuart

Noes, 3

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr John Maples

Mr Richard Ottaway

Paragraph, as amended, agreed to (now paragraph 167).

Paragraphs 152 to 169 (now paragraphs 168 to 185) read and agreed to.

Paragraphs 170 and 171 (now paragraphs 186 and 187) read, amended and agreed to.

Paragraph 172 read.

Amendment proposed in line 8, to leave out from the word "that" to the end of the paragraph and insert the words:

"although Ministers misrepresented the provenance of the February 2003 dossier there was no intention to mislead Parliament."—(Mr Chidgey)

Question proposed, That the Amendment be made.

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 5

Mr David Chidgey

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr John Maples

Mr Richard Ottaway

Sir John Stanley

Noes, 5

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Noes.

Paragraph agreed to (now paragraph 188).

Motion made, and Question put, That the Report, as amended, be the Ninth Report of the Committee to the House.—(The Chairman.)

The Committee divided.

Ayes, 6

Mr Fabian Hamilton

Mr Eric Illsley

Andrew Mackinlay

Mr Bill Olner

Mr Greg Pope

Ms Gisela Stuart

Noes, 4

Mr David Chidgey

Mr John Maples

Mr Richard Ottaway

Sir John Stanley

Ordered, That the Chairman do make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That the provisions of Standing Order No. 134 (Select committees (reports)) be applied to the Report.

Several Papers were ordered to be appended to the Report.

Ordered, That the Appendices to the Report be reported to the House.—(The Chairman.)

Several Papers were ordered to be appended to the Minutes of Evidence.

Ordered, That the appendices to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported to the House.—(The Chairman.)

[Adjourned till Tuesday 15 July at 2.30pm


 
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Prepared 7 July 2003