Memorandum from Terence Taylor, International
Institute for Strategic Studies-US
1. If I can make a useful contribution to
the Committee's deliberations it would be to set the context in
which the government's highest-level decision-makers were determining
and explaining their policies with regard to Iraq. My perspective
of the issues concerning Iraq are those of an independent analyst
with an intimate knowledge of the UN inspection process in the
1990s as a Commissioner with the UN Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM) and as a Chief Inspector in the field in Iraq. In the
former capacity I had a good overview of all the inspection activities
in all areas of concern, nuclear, biological, chemical and missiles.
In the latter capacity I experienced first hand the Iraqi regime's
persistent denials, elaborate concealment measures and information
attack on the UN communications at all points of our operations
from New York to Baghdad. As far as UNSCOM was concerned it was
through years of dedicated and professional work of inspectors
from 44 different countries that parts of the clandestine weapons
programmes were brought to light as the Iraqi regime failed to
meet its obligations under the UN Security Council Resolutions
to declare and show these prohibited activities. Also clear evidence
of efforts to continue these weapons programmes was discovered
while inspectors were in the country.
2. The Iraqi regime's behaviour and responses
are important considerations for the Committee to take into account
as a key element in high-level decision-makers deliberations.
These aspects rightly had to weigh heavily in assessments of the
risks involved in failing to deal effectively with the Iraqi's
persistent non-compliance with the obligations placed on them
by the various UN Security Council resolutions. This factor, in
addition to national intelligence and the mountain of evidence
provided through the years of UN inspections by UNSCOM, the successor
organisation the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), had
to be a vital element in putting the classified and open source
information into context. The Iraqi regime was repeatedly found
to be acting in bad faith, doing the minimum necessary to give
a semblance of co-operation and making admissions only when it
was certain that UN inspectors had uncovered the truth. This was
the case from 1991 through to 2003 during two generations of inspection
efforts.
3. Even without the intelligence information
there was substantial evidence from UN sources that programmes
continued. As far as the general public was concerned this substantial
evidence became obscured by pressure from some quarters for "smoking
guns", that is to say more immediate and "new"
information. It is the UN sourced information that convinced the
Security Council to repeatedly take the consensus view that Iraq
had failed to reveal all that it should about its weapons programmes.
Even during the period of inspections following Resolution 1441
of November 2002 there was no serious dispute over the view that
Iraq continued to be in breach of its legal obligations.
4. From the information available from UN
sources alone it would not have been a safe assessment to conclude
that Iraq did not pose a serious risk to its neighbours and to
the wider world from its nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities,
particularly if given the opportunity, to regenerate them. There
was evidence from UN sources of efforts to acquire materials for
these programmes while inspections were in progress, let alone
the information deriving from national intelligence agencies.
Other weighty considerations included the weapons programme personnel
that remained in place and the "mobilisation" production
techniques employed in, for example, the biological weapons programme
to help avoid detection and reduce the vulnerability of what,
for the Iraqi regime, were high value military assets.
5. In UNSCOM's final report of 1999 the
then Executive Chairman concluded that Iraq continued to hide
substantial information about prohibited programmes and probably
continued to develop them. Subsequently an independent panel of
international experts headed by Ambassador Amorin endorsed this
opinion. What is more UNMOVIC reviewed this evidence at the start
of their work and came to the same conclusion. In his official
reports to the Security Council Dr Hans Blix, the head of UNMOVIC,
repeatedly asserted that the Iraqi regime failed to meet its obligations
to provide convincing answers on the outstanding issues and, in
his words "played catch as catch can", with the inspectors
instead of meeting the clear obligation to declare and show verifiable
evidence of their claims. Thus in the final phase of inspections
the Iraqi behaviour, in the words of the Spanish Foreign Minister
Sra Ana Palacio, in her statement in the final Security Council
meeting before military operations began, "confirmed our
worst fears" that Iraq was playing the same game as in the
1990s. That is to draw out the inspection process as a form of
negotiation in the hope that, as in the latter part of the inspection
process of the 1990s, the military pressure would ease and the
regime could survive and continue rebuilding its weapons capabilities
so central to Sadaam Hussein's strategy.
6. With the information available to members
of the Security Council in March 2003 it would have been hard
to conclude anything other than Iraq presented a serious threat
to international security. There was no credible evidence that
more inspections would resolve the issue and, in any case this
activity could not be considered as the "serious consequences"
that all fifteen members of the Security Council had agreed to
in Resolution 1441 if Iraq continued to be in breach of its obligations
(which none of them disputed).
7. I believe it is essential that the Committee
take account of these considerations in assessing whether or not
the government misled Parliament and the public about the seriousness
of the risks posed by Iraq's continued defiance of the UN. Finally
the Iraq Survey Group, composed of a large number of specialists
with the right kind of scientific and technical expertise and
including a significant number of personnel with substantial experience
of inspections in Iraq, has yet to be fully deployed. It is likely
that more evidence will be unearthed on Iraq's nuclear, biological,
chemical and missile programmes over the coming months.
Terence Taylor
President and Executive Director
International Institute for Strategic Studies—US
June 2003
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