Memorandum from BASIC and Saferworld
SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
EVIDENCE OF
WMD BEFORE THE
WAR
Before the war broke out no conclusive WMD had
been found. The official justification of the coalitions use of
military force against Iraq was to disarm the country of its weapons
of mass destruction because they posed a threat to international
peace and security and because the inspections process was not
working. If US inspectors continue to fail to uncover significant
amounts of WMD the reason why the US and UK went to war needs
to be carefully analysed and objectively reassessed on both sides
of the Atlantic.
EVIDENCE OF
WMD POST-WAR
If Downing Street has, as was claimed by the
Prime Minister at the end of May, as yet unpublished evidence
of Iraqi WMD, this should be published without delay.
Continued instability in Iraq is undoubtedly
making it difficult for US teams to conduct systematic surveys
and careful testing. However, the conduct of the war suggests
that Iraq probably had no useable WMD and posed no threat outside
its borders. Most analysts had predicted that Saddam Hussein would
use such weapons if his regime faced collapse, but no such weapons
were used, suggesting either unprecedented restraint (possibly
because of the threat of being charged with war crimes) or confirmation
that he lacked the weapons or an effective delivery capability.
Despite the doubts raised, UNMOVIC was relatively
successful in Iraq, and a return of the UN inspectors would confer
some much needed legitimacy to the post-conflict search for weapons,
and also help to re-engage the wider international community in
the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq. UNMOVIC should also
be given the task of on-going monitoring in Iraq once the "coalition"
military forces have left in order to ensure that any new Iraqi
government complies with its disarmament obligations.
The fact that US and UK officials are now indicating
that the search process could take up to a year to complete is
ironic. Before the war began, UNMOVIC said it could complete inspections
in a few months.
The UK Government should put its weight behind
establishing a broader mandate within the UN Security Council
for UNMOVIC as suggested by Hans Blix. Over the years, UNMOVIC
has acquired much experience in the verification and inspection
of biological weapons and missiles as well as chemical weapons,
but only in Iraq. It has scientific cadres who are trained and
could be mobilised to provide the Security Council with a capability
to ad hoc inspections and monitoring, wherever this might
be needed.
It is unlikely that weapons were destroyed or
moved out of Iraq immediately prior to the invasion. The logistical
problems of transporting or destroying large stocks of chemical
and biological weapons just days before the US-led invasion are
likely to have precluded this as a realistic option, although
there is a real danger that in the post-war chaos and looting
that some WMD materials may have been diverted out of Iraq (as
was predicted by at least one analyst prior to the war).
The destruction of weapons by the bombing campaign
is only a semi-plausible explanation (at best) for the failure
to find ANY illicit weapons that had been identified so confidently
prior to the war.
There are strong grounds for believing that
the main reason that the US and British forces have been unable
to find chemical and biological weapons in Iraq is because the
vast majority, if not all, of these weapons were destroyed by
a combination of the first Gulf War, 12 years of punishing sanctions
and the successful destruction of weapons and materials by UN
inspectors from 1991-98.
Reports suggesting that Iraq may have concentrated
on dual-use programmes in recent yearsputting chemical
and biological production equipment within commercial facilities
so that it would not be discovered but could be used "on
demand" or "just in time"seem plausible
enough, but are hardly the imminent threat to the US, UK and the
rest of the world that justified the decision to go to war.
CONCLUSIONWAS
THE WMD THREAT
FROM IRAQ
OVERSTATED BY
THE US AND
UK GOVERNMENTS?
US
Final conclusions about the reliability of US
intelligence on Iraq's WMD programme and the role of senior figures
in the US Administration in interpreting and disseminating that
evidence will need to be deferred until further information becomes
available, hopefully as a result of the planned oversight hearings
by Congress. However, on information currently in the public domain,
it appears that the US administration hyped the intelligence,
drawing the most alarming conclusions from the available information
in a push for war to oust Saddam Hussein.
UK
Many people who questioned the war against Iraq
on the grounds that the doctrine of pre-emption is a flawed and
dangerous instrument of foreign policy, did take at face value
the evidence presented by the British government that Saddam Hussein
possessed unconventional munitions, long-range missiles or missile
parts, bulk stores of chemical or biological warfare agents or
enrichment technology for the core of a nuclear weapons programme.
Although the British Government cited all those components specifically
as part of Iraq's concealed arsenal, to date no evidence to support
any of these claims has been uncovered in post-war Iraq.
It is important to establish whether the threat
was either genuinely miscalculated or deliberately exaggerated.
In either case, unless independent evidence to the contrary arises,
it would appear that the biological and chemical agents in the
country did not present a realistic threat to the UK that could
not be dealt with by vigorous international inspection.
The Inquiry by the Intelligence and Security
Committee (ISC) is welcome, but unlikely to be sufficient. The
ISC is appointed by and answerable to the Prime Minister, and
reports are censored before they are published. The magnitude
of the issue involvedthe decision to go to warrequires
an independent judicial inquiry. Such an inquiry is also important
because with the doctrine of pre-emption seemingly accepted by
the British Government and with bellicose noises now being made
by the US Administration towards Iran, it is possible that future
wars will be fought on the basis of intelligence claims about
possession of WMD. It is vital therefore to scrutinise the intelligence
gathering and claims that led to the Iraq war. It took the Scott
Inquiry to uncover the truth over the UK's role in arming Iraq;
it may be that a similar inquiry is necessary to uncover the truth
surrounding the disarming of Iraq.
INTRODUCTION
1. The British American Security Information
Council (BASIC), Saferworld and the International Security and
Information Service (ISIS) have a joint project entitled "Iraq
conflict", which aims to be an authoritative source of information
on the conflict and to provide critical analysis of UK, EU and
US policy. Set up in January 2003, the rationale behind the project
was to ensure that wider concerns about the consequences of military
action were raised and that any action should be in strict adherence
to international law.
2. Post conflict, the project has turned
its attention towards longer-term reconstruction issues including
legal aspects and regional dimensions. The project (www.iraqconflict.org)
has commissioned discussion papers and web notes from a wide range
of experts[4]
including those with military, humanitarian and local insight.
In addition we have produced a weekly (now bi-weekly) e-mail bulletin
for those who make and shape policy, including government officials,
journalists and parliamentarians that provides an overview of
recent developments and highlights key issues that may not have
received much media attention elsewhere.
3. This written evidence draws upon the
experience of BASIC and Saferworld's specialist knowledge of arms
control and international security issues. [5]
4. The primary reason given for the US-led
invasion of Iraq was the biological and chemical weapon disarmament
of Saddam Hussein's regime. Since the invasion, US and UK forces
have failed to find any significant quantities of either biological
or chemical agents, despite the deployment of a special force
of US inspectors.
5. There is increasing reason to wonder
whether Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD),
code for nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, was
as extensive as US and UK officials claimed before going to war.
6. This written submission sets out to review
the evidence and is divided into four parts:
an overview and reconsideration of
the evidence of Iraqi possession of chemical and biological weapons
as uncovered by the UN inspectors prior to their withdrawal and
the subsequent military "liberation" of Iraq;
an analysis of the information given
to the UK Parliament in the period leading up to military action
in Iraq;
a review of the evidence of Iraqi
WMD that has been accumulated since the fall of the Saddam regime;
and
an assessment as to whether the WMD
threat from Iraq was overstated by the US and UK.
Annex 1: A chronology of key events in Iraq
between the departure of UNMOVIC in 1998 and to date.
Annex 2: Relevant excerpts from UNMOVIC Report
"Unresolved Disarmament Issues" 6 March 2003.
PART I: EVIDENCE
OF WMD PRIOR
TO WAR
7. Annex 1 provides a chronology of key
events between the departure of UNMOVIC in 1998 and the date of
this submission.
BACKGROUND
8. That Iraqi armed forces had chemical
and biological weapons, and tried to produce nuclear weapons,
is beyond doubt. The seven years of UN inspections after the 1991
Gulf War clearly established the existence of weapons programmes
in all three areas. The world knew as far back as the Iraq-Iran
war that Iraq had successfully developed and used chemical weapons.
Iraq also used chemical weapons on its own Kurdish population
in Halabja in March 1998. And despite declaring in 1991 that it
did not possess any biological weapons or related items, the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) uncovered a well-developed
biological weapons programme in 1995.
9. However, those same chemical and biological
programmes experienced setbacks as a result of the 1991 war, and
the subsequent UN inspections regime. UNSCOM, for example, destroyed
more than 480,000 litres of chemical agents and 1.8 million litres
of chemical precursors in Iraq's arsenal. That, coupled with Saddam
Hussein's past refusal to comply with UN Security Council resolutions
to disarm, and to obstruct inspections by UNSCOM and its successor,
the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
(UNMOVIC), made assessing the scope and extent of Iraq's biological
and chemical programmes very difficult.
THE UN INSPECTION
PROCESS EVIDENCE
10. Despite formidable obstacles, and contrary
to many public statements by British and American officials and
political leaders (see Part II below), UN inspectors had made
progress in narrowing down the uncertainties. These uncertainties
were compiled by UNMOVIC in a report, Unresolved Disarmament Issues:
Iraq's Proscribed Weapons Programmes, dated March 6[6].
The report was released the day before Hans Blix, UNMOVIC director,
gave his last quarterly report to the Security Council, just 13
days before the start of the war. It grouped 100 "unresolved
disarmament issues" into 29 clusters, and presented by discipline:
missiles, munitions, chemical and biological weapons. The report
provided much evidence to support both sides of the debate over
the state of Iraq's NBC weapons programmes.
11. Unfortunately, the report received very
little public attention, even though UNMOVIC promptly posted it
on its website, and was largely ignored by UK and US political
leaders in pre-war debates. Relevant extracts from the report
are provided in Annex 2.
12. In terms of delivery systems, 10 days
before the invasion began, the New York Times reported that UN
weapons inspectors in Iraq had discovered a new variety of rocket
seemingly configured to strew bomblets filled with chemical or
biological agents over large areas[7].
The weapon was discovered after the UN inspectors returned to
Iraq in November 2002. At first, Iraq told the inspectors that
it was designed as a conventional cluster bomb, which would scatter
explosive sub-munitions over its target, and not as a chemical
weapon. A few days later, the Iraqis conceded that some of the
weapons might have been configured as chemical weapons.
13. But it remains unclear, according to
the UNMOVIC report, whether the Iraqi cluster warhead was a newly
developed one, devised during the absence of inspectors over the
past four years, or whether its existence was kept secret before
1998, when the inspectors left[8].
14. The situation regarding anthrax stocks
also remained unresolved. Despite receiving an updated report
from Baghdad just before the war in Iraq began, UN inspectors
continued to doubt that Iraq had destroyed all of its anthrax
stores. In the report, Iraq tried to account for the destruction
of 3,400 litres of anthrax agent at a site called al-Hakam. A
translation of the report from Arabic was completed recently and
UNMOVIC experts have since reviewed the report[9].
15. Citing data collected from soil samples,
Iraq claims it used a sufficient quantity of potassium magnate
to neutralize all the anthrax at its al-Hakam facility. UNMOVIC
spokesman Ewen Buchanan said commission experts were sceptical
that the Iraqi report completely documented anthrax destruction
activities. [10]
16. Even if the document were true, he said,
Iraq had still not fully accounted for the remainder of the 8,445
litres of anthrax agent it had declared that it produced at two
facilities and destroyed. Iraq previously had declared that some
of the material had been loaded into aerial bombs and missile
warheads[11].
17. Three days before the war started, the
Washington Post reported that despite US administration claims
about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, US intelligence agencies
had been unable to give Congress or the Pentagon specific information
about the amounts of banned weapons or where they were hidden[12].
18. On 17 March the former UK Foreign Secretary
and then Leader of the House of Commons, Robin Cook, resigned
from the Cabinet and told the UK Parliament that:
19. Iraq probably has no weapons of mass
destruction in the commonly understood sense of the termnamely
a credible device capable of being delivered against a strategic
city target. It probably still has biological toxins and battlefield
chemical munitions, but it has had them since the 1980's . . .
[13]
Before the war broke out no conclusive WMD had
been found. The official justification of the coalitions use of
military force against Iraq was to disarm the country of its weapons
of mass destruction because they posed a threat to international
peace and security and because the inspections process was not
working. If US inspectors continue to fail to uncover significant
amounts of WMD, the reason why the US and UK went to war needs
to be carefully analysed and objectively reassessed on both sides
of the Atlantic.
PART II: INFORMATION
GIVEN TO
THE UK PARLIAMENT
IN THE
PERIOD LEADING
UP TO
MILITARY ACTION
IN IRAQ
"As a result of the intelligence we judge
that Iraq has: continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons,
including against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons
are deployable within 45 minutes of an order to use them."
BRITISH DOSSIER
ON THE
THREAT POSED
BY IRAQ,
PUBLISHED SEPTEMBER
24 2002
The September 2002 dossier
20. On 24 September 2002, Prime Minister
Tony Blair released an intelligence report on Iraq, often referred
to as the "British dossier"[14].
One of the major new claims in the dossier was the assertion that
"As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has .
. . sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite
having no active civil nuclear power programme that could require
it." [15]The
evidence that Iraq sought to obtain uranium from an African country,
Niger, played a major role in the case against Iraq. The evidence
was a central component of the assertion that Iraq was developing
nuclear weapons, the only true weapon of mass destruction. This
evidence was subsequently used by the US State Department in its
response to Iraq's arms declaration, by the President in his State
of the Union address, and by numerous senior US Administration
officials, including Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and National
Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice. However, the IAEA revealed on
7 March 2003 that the evidence was forged.
21. The release of the dossier received
widespread media coverage, with the claim that Iraq sought uranium
from Africa being prominently featured on network news and the
front pages of major newspapers around the world.
22. On the 10 October 2002, the US House
of Representatives passed the resolution authorising the use of
force against Iraq, and the Senate followed suit on 11 October.
In the weeks leading up to and after the vote on the resolution,
over 180 members of Congress cited the threat of Iraqi nuclear
capability as a reason for supporting the use of force in Iraq.
Numerous members specifically cited the Iraq's purported effort
to obtain uranium from an African country in their floor statements
during debate over the war resolution. [16]
23. On 7 December 2002, the Iraqi government
submitted its arms declaration to the UN. In its response to the
Iraqi declaration, the US State Department highlighted the failure
of Iraq to account for its attempts to procure uranium from Niger.
According to the State Department, one of eight "key omissions
and deceptions" in Iraq's weapons declaration was that "(t)he
Declaration ignores efforts to procure uranium from Niger"[17].
The US emphasis on the failure of Iraq to explain its efforts
to obtain uranium from Africa was reflected in news coverage.
Once again, the forged nuclear evidence was prominently featured
on network news and the front pages of newspapers around the world.
24. The most prominent use of the forged
evidence occurred in the President's State of the Union address
on 28 January 2003. The President told Congress and the nation:
"The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa". US
officials continued to cite the forged nuclear evidence as part
of the case against Iraq until virtually the day the IAEA revealed
the evidence to be a forgery. For example, in his presentation
to the UN on 5 February, Secretary of State Colin Powell referred
to the dossier as a "fine paper" that describes Iraqi
deception in "exquisite detail".[18]
25. In June 2003, the CIA was accused of
withholding evidence when it emerged that the Agency failed to
pass on its conclusions that allegations of Iraq attempting to
buy Uranium in Niger were false. A retired US ambassador had been
sent to Niger in February 2002 and had reported back that the
alleged weapons documents may have been forged. He reported his
concerns over the British nuclear claims to the CIA, but the CIA
failed to pass this on. A senior intelligence official told the
Washington Post that the CIA was guilty of "extremely sloppy"
handling of a crucial piece of evidence. [19]
THE FEBRUARY
2003 DOSSIER
26. In a statement to the House of Commons
on 3 February 2003, Tony Blair drew attention to a new report
published by Downing Street, which further detailed Iraqi non-compliance
with UN weapons inspectors. The report, which claimed to include
new intelligence, was subsequently criticized when it was found
to include information, which had been publicly been available
for a number of years and based on academic research, without
this being made clear.
PART III: THE
EVIDENCE POST-WAR
The US inspections regime
27. The day the war started, the New York
Times reported that the Bush aministration had deployed several
new tactical units called mobile exploitation teams, or METs,
to locate and survey at least 130 and as many as 1,400 possible
weapons sites. [20]The
day after the war started, the Washington Post reported that the
UN agencies would not be invited to participate until US forces
were ready to turn over dual-use biological or chemical sites
for long-term monitoring. [21]
28. US military planners see four stages
in their search-and-disarm effort:
to take control of and assess any
known site that might present an immediate threat to U.S. forces;
to disable the threat and any ongoing
production:
to deploy "exploitation teams"
with linguists, tools to extract information from hidden or encrypted
computer files, and field laboratories that include detectors
for radiation and sophisticated tests for biological and chemical
toxins; and
full destruction, which is expected
to come much later. [22]
29. In April the Pentagon announced that
it was sending 1,000 scientists, technicians, intelligence analysts
and other experts to Baghdad. Called the Iraq Survey Group, the
largely civilian team will be led by a general and will be equipped
with mobile laboratories that can do tests in Iraq. It also is
developing procedures for testing in laboratories in the US and
the United Kingdom. The US Army's 75th Exploitation Group, which
has searched several sites in Iraq, will come under the command
of the larger Survey Group and provide its transportation and
logistics. [23]
30. Interestingly, the search for weapons
will be only one of the Iraq Survey Group's tasks. Its mission
also includes uncovering information related to Saddam Hussein's
regime, his intelligence services, terrorist outfits that might
have had a presence in Iraq, any connections between the regime
and terrorist organizations, war crimes and POWs. [24]
31. On May 1 President Bush declared an
end to major combat operations in Iraq. At that point the search
for evidence of biological and chemical weapons in Iraq was intensified.
However, as time has passed those searching for biological and
chemical weapons have become increasingly disillusioned. [25]A
nuclear special operations group from the Defence Threat Reduction
Agency, called the Direct Support Team, has already sent home
a third of its original complement, and plans to cut the remaining
team by half. [26]
What US inspectors are looking for
Chemical Weapons: |
80 tones of mustard gas | unaccounted for by Iraq
|
| weaponized VX nerve agent
| UN says Iraq may have retained this |
| stocks of tabun, sarin, cyclosarin
| UN disputes Iraq's declaration on this |
Biological weapons: | 10,000 litres of anthrax
| "strong presumption" that this still exists according to the UN
|
| 3-11,000 litres of botulinum toxin
| UN says Iraq failed to disprove figures of previous inspectors
|
| Up to 5,600 litres of clostridium perfringens
| UN says Iraq failed to disprove figures of previous inspectors
|
Missiles: | 86 Samoud 2 missiles which fly more than the permitted range of 150 km
| Out of 120 listed by UN, 34 have been destroyed
|
| Scud and al-Hussein missiles system, Plus 50 Scud-B warheads
| UN says this "suggests" they may have been retained for "proscribed missile force"
|
Munitions: | R-400 bombs, which can deliver chemical and biological weapons
| |
SIGNS AND
INDICATIONS, BUT
NO "SMOKING
GUN"
32. Despite frequent media reports that coalition military
forces are finding "signs" and "indications"
of chemical and biological weapons, usually turning out to be
unspecified documents and possible dual-use equipment, to-date
no chemical, biological or nuclear weapons have been found. Substantive
evidence of a "smoking gun" remains as elusive as ever.
33. As the coalition forces advanced increasing effort
was devoted to locating CB weapons, but to no effect. For example,
an entire artillery brigade, typically comprising 3,000-5,000
soldiers, was retrained to secure and examine sites suspected
of holding banned weapons. The Pentagon offered rewards of up
to $200,000 for help in finding Iraqi leaders or chemical, biological
or nuclear weapons. [27]
34. In mid April, US forces were reported to have narrowed
their hunt for banned weapons to about three-dozen sites dispersed
throughout Iraq. Inspection of these sites was expected to take
about at least a month. [28]By
the end of April it was being reported that around 90 of the top
150 "hot" sites that US intelligence indicated were
most likely to hold illegal weapons had been visited. The current
string of false alarms includes:
Al Tuwaitha (south east of Baghdad): suspected
nuclear weapons
35. US soldiers broke IAEA seals in attempting to "verify"
the presence of safeguarded nuclear material. Not appreciating
the significance of the facility, the soldiers left the contents
unattended for days, during which time the materials could have
been diverted or stolen. [29]The
IAEA issued a statement calling for greater care and requesting
to be allowed back in to ensure that the material is not diverted
or disturbed.
Baghdad: suspected biological and chemical weapons
36. In April, US special forces raided the Baghdad home
of a microbiologist Rahib Taha, nicknamed "Dr. Germ",
who allegedly ran Iraq's secret biological weapons programme.
Documents were seized and three men arrested. [30]Taha
was subsequently detained along with her husband Amir Muhammed
Rasheed, Saddam's former oil minister and one of the most senior
Iraqis dealing with UN inspectors. However, despite capturing
and interrogating several key leaders of the former Iraqi weapons
programme, it is reported that almost nothing of value has been
disclosed to the US inspectors. [31]
37. At the Taji Airfield on the outskirts of Baghdad,
US troops have been searching for traces of chemical and biological
weapons, so far without success.
Baija (northern Iraq): suspected chemical weapons
38. Field tests are being conducted on 14 55-gallon drums
discovered by US special forces on April 25. Initial reports suggested
that tests had confirmed positive for a chemical nerve agent cyclo-sarin,
although these reports were later said to be incorrect. More accurate
verification is awaited, as samples of the fluid have been sent
to three labs for further testing: one in the United States, one
in Europe and one in the Persian Gulf. [32]
Hindiya (near Kerbala, central Iraq): suspected
chemical weapons
39. Initial tests on substances found suggested the presence
of nerve agents sarin and tabun and the blister agent lewisite.
Subsequent US tests indicated that substances found are not chemical
weapons agents but pesticides.
Nassiriya (southern Iraq): suspected chemical
weapons and conventional munitions
40. US marines found chemical suits, masks and atropine
injectors in buildings used by Iraq's 11th Infantry Division.
Earlier marines found weapons and ammunition inside a hospital.
Najaf (southern Iraq): suspected chemical weapons
41. Early reports that US forces captured a possible
chemical-weapons plant in the town of Najaf turned out to be false.
[33]
Qa Qaa (central Iraq): suspected chemical, biological
and conventional munitions
42. Ongoing investigations at this five-square-mile ammunition
manufacturing and storage plant near Karbala have so far been
inconclusive. [34]Reports
suggest that some radioactive material was discovered in a maintenance
building, together with suspicious dual use biological equipment
that was buried in metal containers. Seven canisters of cesium
were removed from the huge maintenance warehouse, and although
analysts have not yet determined their specific purpose, early
indications suggest that the containers of cesium were probably
intended to calibrate machinery in one of the many buildings and
production facilities under construction at the site. International
inspectors visited the plant as late as February, but failed to
find biological or chemical weapons or agents there. [35]
43. CNN reported on April 15, that the 11 mobile laboratories
found buried in the ground near the ammunition plant were not
for chemical and biological weapons, as originally reported, but
are likely to have been intended to make conventional weapons.
[36]
Mobile biological weapons laboratories
44. In a presentation before the United Nations in February,
US Secretary of State, Colin Powell said Iraq had as many as 18
trucks used as mobile facilities for making anthrax and botulinum
toxin. With nothing to distinguish them from ordinary trucks,
such mobile trucks are likely to be difficult to find. It was
reported on April 29 that US forces in northern Iraq had seized
a truck that US intelligence officials believed could be a mobile
biological weapons laboratory. [37]Another
trailer was found at the al-Kindi Research, Testing, Development,
and Engineering facility in Mosul in early May.
45. A May 28 joint CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency
report on the trailers, Iraqi Mobile Biological Warfare Agent
Production Plants, said:
Coalition experts on fermentation and systems engineering
examined the trailer found in late April and have been unable
to identify any legitimate industrial usesuch as water
purification, mobile medical laboratory, vaccine or pharmaceutical
productionthat would justify the effort and expense of
a mobile production capability. [38]
46. But subsequent analyses by respected non-governmental
experts have raised questions about the trailer's utility for
biological weapons production. [39]For
example, the trailers are said to lack proper containment equipment
and are thus unsuited to the production of virulent BW agents.
An as yet unpublished investigation into the two trailers by British
scientists is reported to have concluded that they were for the
production of hydrogen to fill artillery balloons. [40]
47. Furthermore, as noted by the US Institute for Science
and International Security, there are several problems with the
CIA/DIA report. The chief findings rely heavily on intelligence
gathered from a single source: an Iraqi chemical engineer who
revealed this information to the United States in 2000. However,
much of the US intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
has turned out to be flawed, including information derived from
human sources. The report lists other additional human sources
as supporting this defector's information, but close scrutiny
of their information shows only weak confirmation of this original
story. [41]
SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE FAILURE
TO FIND
BANNED WEAPONS
48. There are four potential explanations for the current
failure to find significant evidence of banned weapons in Iraq,
both before and post the recent invasion
The Weapons Exist but have Not Yet Been Found;
The weapons were destroyed or moved out of Iraq
prior to invasion;
The weapons were destroyed in coalition bombing
or subsequent looting; or
The weapons were destroyed even earlier, perhaps
in the mid 1990s
49. Each of these explanations, which are not necessarily
mutually exclusive, is considered in turn.
THE WEAPONS
EXIST BUT
HAVE NOT
YET BEEN
FOUND
50. The lack of success thus far in finding chemical
or biological weaponseven the most strident proponents
of the war no longer expect to find any nuclear weaponsis
increasingly a problem for the United States. As Scott Ritter,
former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) arms inspector,
wrote:
What if it turns out that Iraq was, in fact, disarmed? What
if it transpires that the UN weapons inspectors had succeeded
in their mandate, and that the Iraqi government had complied with
its obligation? The consequences and ramifications of such a finding
are many, and few are trivial. [42]
51. Even if coalition forces find evidence of Iraqi chemical
and biological weapons, they will face a credibility problem.
An article in the Washington Post quotes Jay Davis, who led the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency until 2001:
A very important political component is if you find these
things, how do you establish the proof of that to the satisfaction
of 35 foreign ministries and those of you in the media? A large
number of conspiracy theorists all over the world will say the
US government has planted all that stuff. [43]
52. And similar concerns were expressed by British Defence
Secretary, Geoff Hoon, who called for any discovery of weapons
to be verified by an independent body:
I think it is important that we have an objective source of
verification. Whether that should be UNMOVIC, which wasn't particularly
successful in its time in Iraq, or whether it should be some other
international body or some other country that has a tried and
tested reputation for objectivity in this area, I think we are
still looking at it. [44]
53. Britain has considered asking impartial countries
such as Sweden or Switzerland to verify any banned items uncovered
by US or UK forces, but it would be more appropriate to facilitate
the return of UNMOVIC to Iraq.
54. The Prime Minister has remained confident that evidence
of Iraqi WMD would be found, and has even hinted that some of
the evidence has already been accumulated. In a television interview
at a Russia-European Union summit at the end of May, Tony Blair
said that he had already seen plenty of information that his critics
had not, but would in due course:
"Over the coming weeks and months we will assemble this
evidence and then we will give it to people . . . I have no doubt
whatever that the evidence of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
will be there. Those people who are sitting there saying `Oh it
is all going to be proved to be a great big fib got out by the
security services, there will be no weapons of mass destruction',
just wait and have a little patience. I certainly do know some
of the stuff that has already been accumulated. . . which is not
yet public but what we are going to do is assemble that evidence
and present it properly." [45]
If Downing Street has, as was claimed by the Prime
Minister at the end of May, as yet unpublished evidence of Iraqi
WMD this should be published without delay.
Continued instability in Iraq is undoubtedly making
it difficult for US teams to conduct systematic surveys and careful
testing. However, the conduct of the war suggests that Iraq probably
had no useable WMD and posed no threat outside its borders. Most
analysts had predicted that Saddam Hussein would use such weapons
if his regime faced collapse, but no such weapons were used, suggesting
either unprecedented restraint (possibly because of the threat
of being charged with war crimes) or confirmation that he lacked
the weapons or an effective delivery capability.
Despite the doubts raised, UNMOVIC was relatively
successful in Iraq, and a return of the UN inspectors would confer
some much needed legitimacy to the post-conflict search for weapons,
and also help to re-engage the wider international community in
the reconstruction of a post-Saddam Iraq. UNMOVIC should also
be given the task of on-going monitoring in Iraq once the "coalition"
military forces have left in order to ensure that any new Iraqi
government complies with its disarmament obligations.
The fact that US and UK officials are now indicating
that the search process could take up to a year to complete is
ironic. Before the war began, UNMOVIC said it could wrap up inspections
in a few months.
The British Government should also put its weight
behind establishing a broader mandate within UNMOVIC as suggested
by Hans Blix. [46]Over
the years, UNMOVIC has acquired much experience in the verification
and inspection of biological weapons and missiles as well as chemical
weapons, but only in Iraq. It has scientific cadres who are trained
and could be mobilised to provide the Security Council with a
capability for ad hoc inspections and monitoring, whenever this
might be needed.
WERE THE
MISSING WEAPONS
DESTROYED OR
MOVED OUT
OF IRAQ
PRIOR TO
THE INVASION?
55. There are reports from individual scientists that
Iraq destroyed chemical weapons and biological warfare equipment
only days before the war began. Reportedly the scientist led Americans
to a supply of material that proved to be the building blocks
of illegal weapons, which he claimed to have buried as evidence
of Iraq's illicit weapons programmes. [47]However,
these reports have not yet been substantiated by independent evidence
and have been the focus of much debate in the US media. [48]
It is unlikely that weapons were destroyed or
moved out of Iraq immediately prior to the invasion. The logistical
problems of transporting or destroying large stocks of chemical
and biological weapons just days before the US-led invasion are
likely to have precluded this as a realistic option, although
there is a real danger that in the post-war chaos and looting
that some WMD materials may have been diverted out of Iraq (as
was predicted by at least one analyst prior to the war[49]).
WERE THE
WEAPONS DESTROYED
IN THE
BOMBING CAMPAIGN
OR STOLEN
BY LOOTERS?
56. Scores of suspect sites, industrial complexes and
offices have been stripped of valuable documents and equipment.
Investigations at the Qa Qaa facility, for example, have been
hampered by the failure to secure it from looters. For instance,
the experts found manuals that came with two drying ovens imported
from Germany, equipment that can be used to culture viruses and
bacteria for weapons. But the ovens themselves were gone by the
time the specialists arrived. [50]
The destruction of weapons by the bombing campaign
is only a semi-plausible explanation (at best) for the failure
to find ANY illicit weapons that had been identified so confidently
prior to the war
WERE THE
MISSING WEAPONS
DESTROYED MANY
YEARS AGO?
57. Claims that Iraq destroyed some illicit chemical
and biological weapons in the 1990san explanation that
failed to convince the UN inspectors and British and American
intelligence officials prior to the invasionare also being
given greater credence in current US administration briefings.
[51]There was very little
reporting of this speculation prior to the war, however.
58. One exception was an exclusive report largely ignored
by the rest of the US and UK media at the time. In early March,
Newsweek reported that Hussein Kamel, the highest-ranking Iraqi
official ever to defect from Saddam Hussein's inner circle, told
CIA and British intelligence officers and UN inspectors in the
summer of 1995 that after the gulf war, Iraq destroyed all its
chemical and biological weapons stocks and the missiles to deliver
them. The UN inspectors allegedly covered up Kamel's revelations
for two reasons: Saddam did not know how much Kamel had revealed;
and the inspectors hoped to bluff Saddam into disclosing still
more. Iraq has never shown the documentation to support Kamel's
story, but the defector's tale raises questions about whether
the stockpiles attributed to Iraq still existed prior to the war.
[52]
59. Other post facto (but still unconfirmed) reports,
based on recent interviews with a leading Iraqi scientist, Nassir
Hindawi, suggest that Iraq's biological weapons programme may
have been shut down as a result of the economic sanctions in the
1990s. [53]
There are strong grounds for believing that the
main reason that the US and British forces have been unable to
find chemical and biological weapons in Iraq is because the vast
majority, if not all, of these weapons were destroyed by a combination
of the first Gulf War, 12 years of punishing sanctions and the
successful destruction of weapons and materials by UN inspectors
from 1991-98.
Reports suggesting that, Iraq may have concentrated
on dual-use programmes in recent years[54]putting
chemical and biological production equipment within commercial
facilities so that it would not be discovered but could be used
"on demand" or "just in time"seem plausible
enough, but are hardly the imminent threat to the US, UK and the
rest of the world that justified the decision to go to war.
PART IV: CONCLUSIONWAS
THE WMD THREAT
FROM IRAQ
OVERSTATED BY
THE UK AND
US GOVERNMENTS?
THE US
60. Although it is still too soon to be drawing any final
conclusions, reports started to emerge in the US media in mid
April 2003 that the US intelligence community widely misjudged
the Iraqi weapons programme and was seeking to lower expectations
at what might be found. Some senior officials began to emphasize
the need to find a paper trail and testimony that pointed to the
Hussein regime's capability and intent to develop chemical, biological,
or nuclear weapons, as opposed to a readily usable stockpile of
weapons. [55]
PRESSURE APPLIED
TO INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY
61. Anecdotal evidence of pressure being applied to the
intelligence community has also come to the fore. As John Prados,
a historian of the intelligence community wrote:
What is clear from intelligence reporting is that until about
1998 the CIA was fairly comfortable with its assessments on Iraq,
but from that time on the agency gradually buckled under the weight
of pressures to adopt alarmist views. In fact, the looming threat
of the dayIranhas gradually been eclipsed even though
it, like North Korea, hadand hasmore questionable
and more highly developed programs in several areas than had Iraq.
[56]
62. Prados also elaborated further on June 10:
a leaked passage of a September 2002 report from the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA)the kind of report used to plan
military operationsconceded that there was "no reliable
information" on either the location of Iraqi chemical and
biological weapons facilities or "on whether Iraq is producing
and stockpiling chemical weapons" at all.
The DIA, which works for the Pentagon, usually takes a more
extreme view of foreign military threats than CIA. So, if there
was evidence of an Iraqi weapons infrastructure it would certainly
have been articulated in a DIA document.
Instead, the DIA information is consistent with the CIA's
reports to Congress (up until September of 2001) which outlined
Iraq's desire to reconstitute a weapons infrastructure but did
not declare there was a clear and present threat. [57]
63. A recent article in the New Yorker reported that
analysts and advisers in the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans
rivalled both the CIA and the Pentagon's own Defense Intelligence
Agency as President Bush's main source of intelligence regarding
Iraq's possible possession of weapons of mass destruction. [58]And
it is also worth noting that both Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
and his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, have a long record of questioning
the assumptions, methods and conclusions of the CIA. [59]
64. It has also been revealed that Vice President Cheney
and his most senior aide, chief of staff, I. Lewis "Scooter"
Libby, made multiple trips to the CIA to question analysts studying
Iraq's weapons programmes and alleged links to al Qaeda, creating
an environment in which some analysts felt they were being pressured
to make their assessments fit with the Bush administration's policy
objectives. [60]
65. Indeed, the CIA has begun a review to try to determine
whether the American intelligence community erred in its pre-war
assessments of Saddam Hussein's government and Iraq's weapons
programmes. [61]
RELIANCE ON
IRAQI DEFECTORS
66. An over-reliance on intelligence from Iraqi defectors
may be another problem, as indicated by David Albright, a former
UNSCOM inspector:
There seemed to be in the last couple of years more of a reliance
on human defectors and the INC produced a lot of them. We had
been reviewing INC defector information for years and often found
it deeply flawed. And we knew that a lot of those people and they
do have an agenda. It was regime change, very much opposed to
inspections because inspections work, no regime change, and they
skewed a lot of information. We would see that when we evaluate
their information. Some would be almost ludicrous technically.
[62]
67. TIME magazine has interviewed several dozen current
and former intelligence officials and experts at the Pentagon
and CIA and on Capitol Hill in recent weeks to try to understand
how the public version of the intelligence got so far ahead of
the evidence. The reporting suggests three factors were at play:
treating the worst-case scenario as fact; glossing over ambiguities;
and the fudging of mistakes. For example, after it became known
that the British intelligence report on Iraqi uranium procurement
from Niger was revealed to be bogus, rather than withdraw the
charge, the White House claimed instead that Bush omitted any
reference to Niger because reports that Saddam had sought uranium
had come, an official explained, "from more than one country
and more than one source". The other nation, if it exists,
has yet to be named, but the Senate Intelligence Committee has
asked the CIA for an investigation. [63]
Final conclusions about the reliability of US
intelligence on Iraqi's WMD programme and the role of senior figures
in the US Administration in interpreting and disseminating that
evidence will need to be deferred until further information becomes
available, hopefully as a result of the planned oversight hearings
by Congress. However, on information currently in the public domain,
it appears that the US administration hyped the intelligence,
drawing the most alarming conclusions from the available information
in a push for war to oust Saddam Hussein.
THE UK
68. In recent weeks, the Prime Minister's former Cabinet
colleagues, Clare Short and Robin Cook, have suggested that the
evidence presented in the run up to the conflict was misleading
or worst deliberately deceiving. Blair refuted this stating:
I stand absolutely 100% behind the evidence, based on intelligence,
that we presented to people . . . the idea that we doctored intelligence
reports in order to invent some notion about a 45 minute capability
of delivering weapons of mass destruction, the idea that we doctored
such intelligence is completely and totally false. Every single
piece of intelligence that we presented was cleared very properly
by the Joint Intelligence Committee. [64]
69. However, there are four crucial questions that remain
to be clarified:
i. Did Downing Street ask the joint intelligence committee
(JIC) to add to, or change the wording of, the September 2002
dossier?
The dossier contains four references to the claim that Iraq
could deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes
of an order to do so. It has been claimed that these were inserted
at Downing Street's request. It has also been reported that Alastair
Campbell and John Scarlett, chairman of the JIC, spent considerable
time discussing what should go into the dossier, and that it may
have been "sexed up" at the former's request. The Government
has dismissed both allegations as the work of "rogue elements"
in the intelligence agencies. However, a comparison between what
Downing Street wanted and what the intelligence agencies preferred
would be tellingand publication of the minutes of the meetings
between Campbell and Scarlett would be one way of helping to resolve
this question.
ii. Why did the government fail to publish a promised
first dossier in March 2002?
Allegations have arisen that Downing Street scrapped a dossier
on Iraq drawn up by intelligence officials because it failed to
establish that Saddam Hussein posed a growing threat. The six-page
document was allegedly produced in March last year by staff working
for the joint intelligence committee using material supplied by
MI6 and the Ministry of Defence. It was said to have been written
six months before the release of the governments controversial
50-page dossier, but was never published. [65]
iii. Who was responsible for the "dodgy dossier"
published by Downing Street in February 2003?
In its Annual Report published on 10 June, the Intelligence
and Security Committee (ISC) was heavily critical of the February
dossier:
In September 2002 some intelligence was declassified and used
to produce a dossier on the Iraqi WMD programme. The Agencies
were fully consulted in the production of the dossier, which was
assembled by the Assessments Staff, endorsed by the JIC and issued
by the Prime Minister. The Committee supports the responsible
use of intelligence and material collected by the Agencies to
inform the public on matters such as these.
We believe that material produced by the Agencies can be used
in publications and attributed appropriately, but it is imperative
that the Agencies are consulted before any of their material is
published. This process was not followed when a second document
was produced in February 2003. Although the document did contain
some intelligence derived material it was not clearly attributed
or highlighted amongst the other material, nor was it checked
with the Agency providing the intelligence or cleared by the JIC
prior to publication. We have been assured that systems have now
been put in place to ensure that this cannot happen again, in
that the JIC Chairman endorses any material on behalf of the intelligence
community prior to publication. [66]
Downing Street has apologised for failing to admit that much
of the dossier came from published academic sources, including
an article by a Californian PhD student. But the question remains,
who authorised its release in this format, and why?
Some of the answers may well surface in the forthcoming ISC
inquiry:
It is impossible at the present moment to make any definitive
statements about the role of intelligence and the situation in
Iraq. Whilst the Committee has been briefed, we intend to examine
in more detail the intelligence and assessments available and
their use. We will report when our inquiries have been completed.
[67]
iv. Did the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, have concerns
similar to those of his US counterpart, Colin Powell, about intelligence
claims?
The Foreign Secretary denies he expressed doubts to Powell
about the quality of intelligence prior to the crucial UN Security
Council meeting on 5 February. Yet Powell had doubts of his own
about some of the questionable intelligence on Iraq's weapons
programme and was in constant communication with the Foreign Secretary
during this period. [68]
Indeed, the Foreign Secretary has since conceded that hard
evidence might never be uncovered. In a BBC radio interview on
14 May, he said that uncovering Iraq's WMD was not "crucially
important".[69]
This is a stark change from the Foreign Secretary's earlier remarks
that "the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime has become necessary
to eradicate the threat from his programmes to develop weapons
of mass destruction".[70]
Many people who questioned the war against Iraq
on the grounds that the doctrine of pre-emption is a flawed and
dangerous instrument of foreign policy, did take at face value
the evidence presented by the British government that Saddam Hussein
possessed unconventional munitions, long-range missiles or missile
parts, bulk stores of chemical or biological warfare agents or
enrichment technology for the core of a nuclear weapons programme.
Although the British Government cited all those components specifically
as part of Iraq's concealed arsenal, to date no evidence to support
any of these claims has been uncovered in post-war Iraq.
It is important to establish whether the threat
was either genuinely miscalculated or deliberately exaggerated.
In either case, unless independent evidence to the contrary arises,
it would appear that the biological and chemical agents in the
country did not present a realistic threat to the UK that could
not be dealt with by vigorous international inspection.
The Inquiry by the Intelligence and Security Committee
(ISC) is welcome, but unlikely to be sufficient. The ISC is appointed
by and answerable to the Prime Minister, and reports are sensored
before they are published. The magnitude of the issue involvedthe
decision to go to warrequires an independent judicial inquiry.
The magnitude of the issue involvedthe decision to go to
warrequires an independent judicial inquiry. Such an inquiry
is also important because with the doctrine of pre-emption seemingly
accepted by the British Government and with bellicose noises now
being made by the US Administration towards Iran, it is possible
that future wars will be fought on the basis of intelligence claims
about possession of WMD. It is vital therefore to scrutinise the
intelligence gathering and claims that led to the Iraq war. It
took the Scott Inquiry to uncover the truth over the UK's role
in arming Iraq; it may be that a similar inquiry is necessary
to uncover the truth surrounding the disarming of Iraq.
BASIC and Saferworld
16 June 2003
Annex 1
A CHRONOLOGY OF KEY EVENTS IN IRAQ BETWEEN THE DEPARTURE
OF UNMOVIC IN 1998 AND TO DATE
199820-23 FebruaryIraq signs a Memorandum of
Understanding with the United Nations on February 23, 1998. Iraq
pledges to accept all relevant Security Council resolutions, to
cooperate fully with UNSCOM and the IAEA, and to grant to UNSCOM
and the IAEA "immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access"
for their inspections.
199831 OctoberIraq ends all forms of cooperation
with the UN Special Commission to Oversee the Destruction of Iraq's
Weapons of Mass Destruction (UNSCOM).
199816-19 DecemberAfter UN staff are evacuated
from Baghdad, the U.S. and U.K. launch a bombing campaign, "Operation
Desert Fox," to destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons programs.
19998 JanuaryClinton Administration officials
admit monitoring coded radio communications of Saddam Hussein's
security forces, using equipment secretly installed by UN arms
inspectors.
199917 DecemberUNSC Resolution 1284 creates
the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
to replace UNSCOM. Iraq rejects the resolution.
2000NovemberIraq rejects new weapons inspections
proposals.
2000DecemberIraq temporarily halts oil exports
after the UN rejects Iraq's request that buyers pay a 50-cent-a-barrel
surcharge into an Iraqi bank account not controlled by the UN.
2001FebruaryUS and British aircraft attack
two communications and control facilities outside Baghdad. Iraq
has been actively, but unsuccessfully, trying to shoot down allied
planes patrolling the no-fly zones since December 1998.
200120 SeptemberBritish and US jets go on a
bombing raid against surface-to-air missile batteries in southern
Iraq. A Ministry of Defence official denies any connection to
the September 11 attacks.
200119 NovemberJohn Bolton, the under-secretary
for arms control and international security, tells an arms conference
in Geneva that President Saddam Hussein may have covertly developed
biological weapons in the past three years.
2002JanuaryIn his State of the Union address,
President Bush refers to Iraq as part of the "axis of evil",
alongside North Korea and Iran
2002FebruaryResponding to anti-aircraft fire,
the U.S. and Britain strike Iraq with bombs in the northeast
200214 MayThe UN introduces "smart sanctions"
targeted at military equipment, to replace existing sanctions.
The UN agrees to long-awaited smart sanctions for Iraq.
20025 JulyIn talks with UN Secretary General,
Iraq rejects weapons inspections proposals.
20022 AugustIn a letter to the UN Secretary
General, Iraq invites the UN chief weapons inspector to Baghdad.
200219 AugustUN Secretary General rejects Iraq's
proposal as the "wrong work program" but renews offer
to facilitate the return of inspectors in accordance with UNSC
resolution 1284, passed in 1999. The resolution calls for UNMOVIC
inspectors to spend 60 days conducting active inspections to determine
what has changed since UN weapons inspectors were expelled in
1998 and what needs to be done for Iraq to be rid of all chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons.
200212 SeptemberPresident Bush addresses the
UN to present the case for war against Iraq.
200216 SeptemberIraq accepts "unconditional"
return of UN inspectors.
200224 SeptemberBritain publishes dossier saying
Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon within one or two years, if
it obtains fissile material and other components from abroad.
200230 SeptemberUN negotiators and an Iraqi
delegation meet in Vienna for three days of talks to agree to
terms for resuming weapons inspections.
20028 NovemberUN Security Council votes unanimously
to back a US-British resolution requiring Iraq to reinstate weapons
inspectors after a four year absence.
200213 NovemberPresident Saddam sends a letter
to the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, accepting the UN resolution.
200227 NovemberThe weapons inspectors start
inspections.
200212 DecemberIraqi officials in Baghdad present
the UN with a 12,000 page dossier disclosing Iraq's programs for
weapons of mass destruction
2003 MarchChief weapons inspector Hans Blix reports
that Iraq has accelerated its cooperation but says inspectors
need more time to verify Iraq's compliance.
2003 17 MarchUK's ambassador to the UN says the diplomatic
process on Iraq has ended; arms inspectors evacuate; US President
George W Bush gives Saddam Hussein and his sons 48 hours to leave
Iraq or face war.
2003 20 MarchAmerican missiles hit targets in Baghdad,
marking the start of a US-led campaign to topple Saddam Hussein.
In the following days US and British ground troops enter Iraq
from the south.
2003 9 AprilUS forces advance into central Baghdad.
Saddam Hussein's grip on the city is broken. In the following
days Kurdish fighters and US forces take control of the northern
cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. There is widespread looting in the
capital and other cities.
2003 MayUN Security Council approves resolution backing
the US-led administration in Iraq and the lifting of economic
sanctions. US administrator abolishes the Baath Party and institutions
of the former regime.
Source: http://academic3.american.edu/-mertus/timelineoniraq.htm
Annex 2
RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM UNMOVIC REPORT: UNRESOLVED DISARMAMENT
ISSUES, 6 MARCH 2003
According to Iraqi authorities, instructions were given to
all MIC (Military Industrial Complex) establishments that they
were to be evacuated of "all dangerous materials and essential
assets" by 15 January 1991. The Gulf War started two days
later. It would appear that most WMD programmes were halted during
the war, although Iraq has acknowledged that the diversion of
aircraft fuel drop tanks in to spray tanks for BW agents such
as anthrax, did continue throughout the war (p 8)
By its design and technical parameters, the R-400 bombs could
be quite suitable as a delivery means for some chemical warfare
agents, but less so for the proper aerosolization of biological
agents. With an impact fuse the R-400 could have been effective
for delivering a Sarin weapon; fitted with an air burst fuse it
could have been suitable for delivering persistent agents, such
as VX and Mustard. With respect to biological agents, the relatively
large volume of liquid agents together with the small burster
tube and thick bomb walls means that much of the agents would
not be dispersed as respirable particles but as relatively large
droplets (p 47)
According to documents discovered by UNSCOM in Iraq, the
purity of Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were on level below
60%, and dropped below Iraq's established quality control acceptance
level of 40% by purity some three to 12 months after production
(p 72)
There is no evidence that any bulk Sarin-type agents remain
in Iraqgaps in accounting of these agents of these agents
are related to Sarin-type agents weaponized in rocket warheads
and aerial bombs. Based on the documentation found by UNSCOM during
inspections in Iraq, Sarin-type agents produced by Iraq were largely
of low quality and as such, degraded shortly after production.
Therefore, with respect to the unaccounted for weaponized Sarin-type
agents, it is unlikely that they would still be viable today (p
73)
To UNMOVIC's knowledge, the only precursors for Sarin-type
agent production that Iraq may have been may have been capable
of producing indigenously (although no such production has been
declared) were cyclohexanol and thionyl chloride, as the starting
materials for production of these precursors are available in
Iraq. While the specific chemical process equipment required to
construct such plants could be obtained by removing them from
various facilities in Iraq, to UNMOVIC's knowledge, there is no
such plant. Therefore, unless precursors remain from Iraq's CW
programme before the Gulf War, or are clandestinely acquired since
then, Iraq would not possess all of the chemical required to produce
Sarin-type agents. Iraq would also need to use "corrosion
resistant" process equipment for some processes involved
in this production sequence. The bottleneck for Sarin-type agents
would then be the limited amount of such process equipment available
to Iraq.
Assuming improvements in its quality control and process
to produce the agent, it is possible that Iraq today has the capability
to produce Sarin-type agents of a storable quality. If not, Iraq
might instead produce readily storable precursors such as MPC,
which can be used for Sarin production when needed. However, no
evidence of precursors has so far been observed by UNMOVIC inspection
teams. (p 74)
There is much evidence, including documents provided by Iraq
and information collected by UNSCOM, to suggest that most quantities
of Mustard remaining in 1991, as declared by Iraq, were destroyed
under UNSCOM supervision. The remaining gaps are related to the
accounting for Mustard filled aerial bombs and artillery projectiles.
There are 550 Mustard filled shells and up to 450 Mustard filled
aerial bombs unaccounted for since 1998. The mustard filled shells
account for a couple of tonnes of agents while the aerial bombs
account for approximately 70 tonnes. According to an investigation
made by the Iraqi "Depot Inspection Commission", the
results of which were reported to UNMOVIC in March 2003, the discrepancy
in the accounting for the mustard filled shells could be explained
by the fact that Iraq had based its accounting on approximations.
(p 76)
Iraq has trouble storing Sarin/Cyclosarin (GB and GF) for
long periods of timemost of the agent found by UNSCOM after
the Gulf War was of low quality. The quality of Sarin that Iraq
produced was such that it would drop to below 40% purity (Iraq's
minimum acceptance purity for filling munitions with the agent)
three to 12 months after production. The same problem would have
been encountered with Soman.
On the other hand, it seems unlikely that significant undeclared
quantities of botulinum toxin could have been produced, based
on the quantity of media unaccounted for. Thus the estimate based
solely on fermenter availability, that an additional 7,000 litres
of botulinum toxin could have been produced is not supported ie
the limiting factor for additional botulinum toxin production
is not fermenter availability but media (p 125)
4
These included Air Marshall Sir Timothy Garden, former US Ambassador
Robert Barry, Glenys Kinnock MEP, London Iraqi, Munder Adhami. Back
5
This submission also draws heavily on a BASIC Special Briefing,
"Matters of Emphasis: The Hunt for Chemical and Biological
Weapons in Iraq", by David Isenberg, Ian Davis and Paul Ingram,
which is being periodically updated on the BASIC website: www.basicint.org Back
6
UNMOVIC Working Document, Unresolved Disarmament Issues: Iraq's
Proscribed Weapons Programmes, 6 March 2003, http://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/6mar.pdf. Back
7
John H. Cushman Jr. with Steven R. Weisman, "A new type
of rocket found in Iraq: Inspectors say chemicals could cover
wide area," New York Times, 10 March 2003. Back
8
Ibid. Back
9
David Ruppe, "Iraq: Latest Iraqi Report Fails to Clear Anthrax
Questions," Global Security Newswire, http://www.nti.org/d<au0,0>
<xunewswire/issues/2003/4/2/9s.html. Back
10
Ibid. Back
11
Ibid. Back
12
Walter Pincus, "U.S. Lacks Specifics On Banned Arms,"
Washington Post, 16 March 2003, p 17. Back
13
House of Commons Hansard, 17 March 03, col 727. Back
14
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Assessment of the
British Government, 24 September 2002 http://www.pm.gov.uk/files/pdf/iraqdossier.pdf. Back
15
Ibid., Para.24. Back
16
"Fact Sheet: The Bush Administration's Use of the Forged
Iraq Nuclear Evidence", Committee on Government Reform, Minority
Office Rep. Henry A Waxman, Ranking Member, June 2003. Back
17
US Department of State, Fact Sheet, Illustrative Examples
of Omissions From the Iraqi Declaration to the United Nations
Security Council, 19 December 2002. Back
18
US Department of State, Remarks to the United Nations Security
Council, 5 February 2003. Back
19
Washington Post, 12 June 2003. Back
20
Judith Miller, "U.S. Mobile Labs Are Poised to Hunt Iraqi
Arms," New York Times, 19 March 2003 Back
21
Barton Gellman, "U.S. Reaps New Data On Weapons," Washington
Post, 20 March 2003, p 1. Back
22
Ibid. Back
23
John J. Fialka, "U.S. Readies A Different Army To Search
For Weapons In Iraq", Wall Street Journal, 17 April
2003. Back
24
David Corn, "Bush's WMD Search: No Full Speed Ahead,"
Capitol Games column, The Nation, 8 May 2003. Back
25
See, for example, Barton Gellman, "Odyssey of Frustration:
In Search for Weapons, Army Team Finds Vacuum Cleaners,"
Washington Post, 18 May 2003, p A1. Back
26
Barton Gellman, "Frustrated, U.S. Arms Team to Leave Iraq:
Task Force Unable To Find Any Weapons," Washington Post,
11 May 2003; p A01. Back
27
Peter Eisler and Cesar G. Soriano, "Iraq Scoured For Signs
Of Banned Arms," USA Today, 16 April 2003, p 5. Back
28
Don Van Natta Jr. and David Johnston, "U.S. to check 36
sites for chemical weapons", International Herald Tribune,
15 April 2003. Back
29
Philip Coyle, "Finding Saddam Hussein's Weapons of Mass
Destruction", San Diego Union-Tribune, 23 April 2003. Back
30
"U.S. Raids Home of Iraq's Bio Lab Chief", The Associated
Press, 16 April 2003. Back
31
Barton Gellman, "Covert Unit Hunted for Iraqi Arms-Amid
Raids and Rescue, Task Force 20 Failed To Pinpoint Weapons",
Washington Post, 13 June 2003; Page A01. Back
32
Guy Taylor, "Second Test Positive for Nerve Agent",
The Washington Times, 28 April 2003; Judith Miller, "Suspicious
Discovery Apparently Wasn't Chemical Weapons", New York
Times, 28 April 2003. Back
33
"Iraq: No Chemical Weapons Found at Captured Najaf Site,"
Global Security Newswire, 17 March 2003. Back
34
Judith Miller, "U.S. Inspectors Find No Forbidden Weapons
At Iraqi Arms Plant," New York Times, 16 April 2003. Back
35
Judith Miller, "Survey of Arms Plant: Mysteries But No Proof",
International Herald Tribune, 16 April 2003. Back
36
"Tests rule out suspect bio-labs," CNN, 15 April
2003. Back
37
Greg Miller and Bob Drogin, "Truck is Tested for Biological
Agents", Los Angeles Times, 29 April 2003; and Rupert
Cornwell, "Trailer found in Iraq `was bioweapons lab',"
8 May 2003, Independent. See photo of trailer at http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/May2003/030507-D-9085M-001.jpg. Back
38
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/iraqi-mobile-plants/index.html06. Back
39
Critical debate on the use of the trailers has been ongoing on
the Federation of American Scientists' CBW email list-serve. Further
details of this discussion can be found in a forthcoming update
of the BASIC Special Briefing, Matters of Emphasis, Op Cit.
Back
40
Peter Beaumont, Antony Barnett and Gaby Hinsliff, "Iraqi
mobile labs nothing to do with germ warfare, report finds",
The Observer, 15 June 2003. Back
41
New Intelligence Report Does Not Replace the Need for Independent
International Inspections of Suspect Iraqi Biological Weapons
Trailers, ISIS Issue Brief, 28 May 2003, http://isis-online.org. Back
42
Scott Ritter, "Missing Arms Cast Doubt On War", Long
Island Newsday, 16 April 2003. Back
43
Gellman, Op cit. Back
44
Quoted in Rory McCarthy, Nicholas Watt and Julian Borger, "Saddam's
half-brother in custody, US says", The Guardian, 14
April 2003. Back
45
Mike Peacock, "Blair Says Iraq Weapons Secrets Will Be Publicized",
Reuters, 31 May 2003. Back
46
Hans Blix, "Let Us Inspect Everywhere", Wall Street
Journal, 16 May 2003. Back
47
Judith Miller, "Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve of War, an Iraqi
Scientist Is Said to Assert," New York Times, 21 April
2003. Back
48
See, for example: Howard Kurtz, "Times Battle Over
Iraqi Weapons," Washington Post, 26 May 2003; Page
C1; Jack Shafer, "Reassessing Miller: U.S. intelligence on
Iraq's WMD deserves a second look. So does the reporting of the
New York Times' Judith Miller." SLATE, http://slate.msn.com/id/2083736/;
and Eli J. Lake, "CIA report slams Pentagon's favorite Iraqi,"
UPI, 8 April 2003, http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030407-055713-8345r. Back
49
Jonathan B. Tucker, "Can We Find The Weapons?", Washington
Post, 14 March 2003, p A27. Back
50
"Tests rule out suspect bio-labs," CNN, 15 April
2003. Back
51
See, for example, Ken Fireman, "Finding No Arms Test
U.S. Esteem", Long Island Newsday, 28 April 2003. Back
52
"The Defector's Secrets", Newsweek, 3 March
2003. Back
53
"Iraqi scientist: Sanctions killed germ war programme",
CNN, 30 April 2003. Back
54
Walter Pincus, "Weapons Linked to `Dual-Use' Facilities
in Iraq", Washington Post, 2 June 2003, p 14. Back
55
Bryan Bender "Pressure to find weapons mounts," Boston
Globe, 17 April 2003, p A1. Back
56
John Prados, "Iraq: A necessary war?," Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2003, Volume 59, No 3,
pp 26-33. Back
57
John Prados, "Hoodwinked," TomPaine.com, 10 June 2003,
http://www.TomPaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/8035. Back
58
Seymour M. Hersh, " Selective Intelligence: Donald Rumsfeld
has his own special sources. Are they reliable?," New
Yorker, 12 May 2003, http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/030512fa-fact.
See also news transcript from the US Department of Defense, DoD
News Briefing, Douglas J. Feith, USD (Policy), 4 June 2003-8:38
a.m. EDT, http://defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030604-0248.html. Back
59
Michael Duffy, "Weapons Of Mass Disappearance: The war in
Iraq was based largely on intelligence about banned arms that
still haven't been found. Was America's spy craft wrong or manipulated?,"
Time 9 June 2003, p 28. Back
60
Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, "Analysts Cite Pressure on
Iraq Judgments: Cheney, Aide `Sent Signals,' Senior Official Says,"
Washington Post, 5 June 2003; p A1. Back
61
James Risen, "C.I.A. Studying Prewar Reports On Iraqi Threat,"
New York Times 22 May 2003. Back
62
"Where Are the Weapons?," Segment of The News Hour
with Jim Lehrer, 29 May 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle-east/jan-june03/wmd-5-29.html. Back
63
Michael Duffy, "Weapons of Mass Disappearance", Time,
9 June 2003, p 28. Back
64
Evian G8 statement, 02/06/03. Back
65
Nicholas Rufford and Nick Fielding, "No 10 Shelved `No Threat'
File On Saddam," Sunday Times, 8 June 2003. Back
66
Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2002-03,
Chairman: The Rt Hon Ann Taylor, MP, Intelligence Services Act
1994, Chapter 13, Cm 5837, paras 81-82. Available at: http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/reports/intelligence/pdf/annualir0203.pdf. Back
67
Ibid., para 83. Back
68
See, for example, Bruce B. Auster, Mark Mazzetti and Edward
T. Pound, "Truth and Consequences", US News &
World Report, 9 June 2003. Back
69
The BBC Today Programme, 14 June 2003. Back
70
Speech at Newspaper Society Lunch, 2 April 2003. Back
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