Memorandum from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS (IN ITALICS) FROM THE
COMMITTEE, 16 JUNE 2003
SECTION ONE:
WITH REFERENCE
TO THE
DOCUMENT IRAQ'S
WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION:
Q: Who was the author?
A: The drafting was co-ordinated by the
Cabinet Office Assessments Staff working with representatives
of other departments, including the intelligence agencies, DIS
and FCO. The final draft was approved by the JIC.
Q: When was the document received in draft
by officials in FCO?
A: The draft had a long history. The Assessments
Staff, in coordination with the intelligence agencies, DIS and
policy departments, including the FCO, prepared a paper in March
on WMD in Iraq intended for possible publication. The draft was
kept under review during the summer but there was no decision
on whether or when to proceed with publication. On 3 September
the Prime Minister announced that the Government's assessment
of Iraq's WMD capabilities would be published.
The FCO led the drafting of Parts two and three
of the final dossier, and began this work in spring 2002. There
was an ongoing drafting process until the document was published
in September.
Q: At what dates were drafts put to Ministers?
A: During the drafting process, departments
represented on the JIC were asked to consult their Departmental
Ministers as appropriate. The Foreign Secretary and Mike O'Brien
offered comments as did No 10. At no stage was there any attempt
from No 10 or elsewhere to overrule the JIC Chairman's judgement
on the intelligence.
Q: How many drafts did the document go through?
A: As noted previously, there was an ongoing
drafting process until the document was published in September.
Q: Did (a) Ministers or (b) Special Advisers
ask for amendments to the document before it was published?
A: As noted, Ministers and Special Advisers
offered comments during the drafting process in the normal way.
See above question on FS/Mr O'Brien's comments.
Q: Did the "45 minutes" evidence
come from a single source, or from mutually corroborating multiple
sources? Was there any corroboration at all for this claim? Did
the US accept that the claim was sound?
A: The information came from an established,
reliable and longstanding line of reporting. The specific information
about 45 minutes came from one source, but it fitted with the
broad picture of command and control arrangements for Saddam's
WMD, as supplied by other sources over a period of time. Its inclusion
in the document was approved by the JIC. It was not inserted under
pressure from No 10.
Q: Was the wording of the "45 minutes"
claim given on p 19 of the document Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction,
exactly the same as it was in the intelligence assessment supplied
to the Government? If not, was it accompanied in the intelligence
assessment by qualifications not included in the public document?
A: The same report was reflected in almost
identical terms in the JIC's classified work. There were no further
caveats used.
Q: What has the US Government said publicly
about the "45 minutes" claim?
A: We are not aware of any public comments
from the US.
Q: Did the "significant quantities of
uranium" evidence come from a single source, or from mutually
corroborating multiple sources? Was there any corroboration at
all for this claim? (Did the US accept that the claim was sound?)
Are you satisfied that documents on this are genuine?
A: The document stated on p 25 that "there
is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant
quantities of uranium from Africa." This reference drew on
intelligence reporting from more than one source. We understand
that the IAEA acquired documents on this subject in February 2003.
At no stage prior to the publication of the dossier did the UK
possess or have sight of these documents. The IAEA have confirmed
that the documents were not provided by the UK, contrary to some
media reporting. Since the publication of the dossier, we have
had the opportunity to examine the documents. Some of these documents
are forgeries, others are still under consideration.
Q: Was the wording of the "significant
quantities of uranium" claim given on p 25 of the document
Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction, exactly the same as it was
in the intelligence assessment supplied to the Government? If
so, was it accompanied in the intelligence assessment by qualifications
not included in the public document?
A: The reporting post dated the last JIC
assessment of Saddam's nuclear programme. But the language used
in the document was approved by the JIC.
Q: What has the US Government said publicly
about the "significant quantities of uranium" claim?
A: In his State of the Union address earlier
this year, President Bush said that the British Government had
learned that Saddam had recently sought significant quantities
of uranium from Africa. Condoleeza Rice referred to the claim
and to the existence of falsified documents, which were not, as
implied, of British origin, during press interviews on 8 June.
Q: How was the original evidence in support
of the "significant quantities of uranium" claim tested?
When did Ministers conclude that some of the evidence was unreliable?
Does there remain any reliable evidence for this claim?
A: See above. The information about the
forged documents first emerged in February 2003 when the IAEA
declared documents it had received concerning the Iraq/uranium/Niger
issue were fabricated. We cannot comment on the origin or history
of these documents. As noted above, the statement in the dossier
drew on intelligence reporting from more than one source. This
intelligence remains under review.
SECTION TWO:
WITH REFERENCE
TO THE
DOCUMENT IRAQ—ITS
INFRASTRUCTURE OF
CONCEALMENT, DECEPTION
AND INTIMIDATION:
Q: Who compiled the document?
A: The Communications and Information Centre
(which later became the Coalition Information Centre during the
military operation). The CIC was a cross-government information
team, originally established in the wake of 11 September, which
reported to the Prime Minister's Director of Communications. It
was based in the FCO.
Q: When was the document received in draft
by officials in the FCO?
A: The document evolved through a number
of stages. In its earliest draft it drew on open source material
which had originally been sent to the CIC by the FCO in preparation
for a possible press background paper on the Iraqi security apparatus.
Additional material was subsequently included, much of it based
on documents provided by the FCO and MOD. A final draft, bringing
together material from a number of sources, was sent to FCO officials
with a short deadline for comment on Thursday 30 January. No decision
had been taken at that stage on whether or how to publish the
document. The document was published on 3 February by the Prime
Minister's Office.
Lessons have been learned from the way the paper
was handled. Attribution to external sources will be explicit
in any future documents. The document was not cleared by the JIC.
Systems are now in place to ensure that any intelligence material
which is made available publicly will first be authorised by the
JIC Chairman.
Q: At what dates were drafts put to Ministers?
A: No Ministers were consulted in the preparation
of the document.
Q: How many drafts did the document go through?
A: The document was a collation of material
from various sources and went through a series of drafting changes—in
particular as the focus and structure of the paper evolved.
Q: Did (a) Ministers and (b) Special Advisers
ask for amendments to the document before it was published?
A: No FCO Ministers, neither FCO Special
Advisers, were consulted on the document. No 10 officials including
Special Advisers asked for some editorial changes which did not
affect the overall judgement in the document, nor the intelligence-related
material.
Q: What has the US Government said publicly
about this document?
A: At the UN Security Council on 5 February,
Colin Powell drew attention to the document which he said "describes
in exquisite detail Iraqi deception activities".
SECTION THREE:
GENERAL QUESTIONS:
Q: Are Ministers entirely satisfied with
the completeness and accuracy of all their evidence to the FAC
and of each of their statements in the House on Iraq and WMD to
date? Is there anything which they would now wish to amend in,
clarify in or add to those statements?
A: FCO Ministers are entirely satisfied.
Q: What steps is the FCO taking to ensure
objectivity and accuracy in the search for WMD? Will UNMOVIC or
other third parties be involved, either on the ground or in a
testing/verification role?
A: We recognise the need for credible, independent
validation of any discoveries by the Coalition. We are engaged
in discussions on how best to ensure this. We have, for example,
been in touch with a number of governments about the possibility
of using internationally accredited laboratories for the analysis
of chemical and biological samples.
UNSCR1483 explicitly tasks the Security Council
to review the mandates of the inspectors. We have made clear that
we are ready to see the Council take this forward, and that meanwhile
UNMOVIC should maintain its ability to deploy.
UNMOVIC and the IAEA would be one option to
provide such validation. If they were to return to Iraq, their
tasks would have changed: the focus would be on monitoring and
verification rather than detection. That would call for different
skills: some restructuring of their operations would be needed.
Q: What is the degree of involvement of FCO
personnel in the teams established to find WMD or evidence of
production or destruction of WMD in Iraq?
A: There are no FCO personnel involved in
the physical search for WMD in Iraq. FCO staff participate in
inter-departmental co-ordinating groups in Whitehall.
Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
16 June 2003
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