Further memorandum from the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
BUILDING A CASE AGAINST IRAQ
SUMMARY
1. Iraq under Saddam Hussein posed a threat
to international peace and security because of its weapons of
mass destruction, its missile systems and its systematic defiance
of mandatory UNSCRs over 12 years. Our judgement was that a peaceful
solution to the problem could only be found if Iraq complied in
full with the unequivocal terms of UNSCR 1441 passed unanimously
in November 2002. Once inspections resumed it quickly became clear
that Saddam was not offering the active co-operation necessary
to allow inspections to fulfil their objective. Nor did he make
a full and accurate report of his programmes or plans to develop
WMD to the UN as required by UNSCR 1441. Right up until the last
moment, the British Government worked strenuously to find a peaceful
solution to the crisis. Comprehensive illustration of Iraq's deception,
and its WMD activities included the final report of UNSCOM inspectors
in 1999, and the March 2003 UNMOVIC document on Iraq's unresolved
disarmament issues, as well as intelligence material.
BACKGROUND
2. By 2003, Iraq had already had 12 years
in which to comply with UN demands for WMD disarmament. Although
it emerged in the 1980s that Saddam's regime had used chemical
weapons against Iranian troops and against Iraqi Kurds at Halabja,
the full extent of Saddam's WMD programmes was not known until
the 1990s and after the Gulf War. Security Council resolution
687—adopted in April 1991—required Iraq to co-operate
with UN inspections and to comply in the destruction, removal
or rendering harmless of its WMD programmes, facilities and equipment;
its ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 km and their associated
manufacturing and testing equipment.
3. Saddam set out to frustrate the will
of the Security Council. He repeatedly submitted incomplete declarations
of his WMD programmes and activities, and engaged in obstruction
and harassment of UN inspectors. He also concealed WMD activities
and only admitted an offensive biological warfare programme in
1995. By the late 1990s it was recognised that UN diplomacy needed
to be backed by force. In February 1998 the Prime Minister said
that Saddam "knows the threat of force is there and it is
real". As a result of further obstruction of inspectors the
US/UK took military action in Operation Desert Fox later in the
same year.
4. When the UN inspectors withdrew in 1998
key questions remained unanswered. These were set out in a report
to the UN Security Council in early 1999. They included Iraq's
failure to account for up to 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals,
up to 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, including 1.5
tonnes of the VX nerve agent, more than 30,000 special munitions
for delivery of chemical and biological agents, and large quantities
of growth media which could be used in the production of biological
weapons.
5. Between 1998-2002 repeated efforts were
made to secure the return of inspectors. UNSCR 1284 offered Saddam
the prospect of the eventual suspension of sanctions if he co-operated
fully with renewed inspections. But Saddam refused to move. It
became increasingly clear that he had no intention of co-operating.
It also became clear that UN sanctions were not succeeding in
fulfilling the UN's objective, namely the WMD disarmament of Iraq:
breaches of sanctions were multiplying, including the illegal
export of oil which was putting millions of dollars at the disposal
of the regime.
6. The events of 11 September 2001 changed
the appreciation of the level of risk from weapons of mass destruction
in the hands of terrorists and rogue regimes. As a result, Iraq
inevitably came once again under the international spotlight.
7. In the early months of 2002, British
Government statements underlined the singular threat posed by
Iraq's behaviour. In an interview with the Times on 5 March 2002
the Foreign Secretary said that Saddam was unique among the world's
tyrants in having both the ruthlessness and capability to employ
weapons of mass destruction. In a Westminster Hall debate on 6
March 2002, the then Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for
Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Ben Bradshaw, stated that our
main concern was Iraq's determination to rebuild weapons of mass
destruction programmes and the threat it posed not just to its
neighbours but to the rest of the world. He emphasised the unique
nature of the Iraq problem: Iraq was in breach of UN Security
Council resolutions and of the cease-fire terms at the end of
the Gulf War and had already used chemical weapons against its
neighbours and against its own people.
8. By late March/April there was already
speculation about the possibility of military action against Iraq.
The then Parliamentary Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth
Affairs, Ben Bradshaw, in his evidence to the Foreign Affairs
Committee on 23 April 2002 said that there were instances when
military action would be justified without a further UN Resolution.
He referred to the argument that because Iraq was in breach of
the cease-fire agreement the cease-fire was no longer in force.
9. In early September 2002 the Prime Minister
met President Bush at Camp David. At a Press Conference then they
both emphasised the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. The Prime
Minister said that inaction was not a policy to which we could
subscribe.
SEPTEMBER 2002—8
NOVEMBER 2002
10. Against the background of growing international
concern about Iraq, Parliament was re-called on 24 September 2002
to debate the issue. On the same day, the British Government published
its dossier on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. During the
debate and during the Foreign Secretary's appearance before the
Foreign Affairs Committee on 25 September, the Prime Minister
and Foreign Secretary outlined the framework of HMG's policy.
Containment was not working, but we had made no decision to take
military action. Our argument was not that we should take military
action, come what may, but that the case for verifying Iraqi disarmament
and compliance with UNSCRs was overwhelming. The Foreign Secretary
reiterated to the FAC that no decision on military action had
been taken. However, we also made clear the threat was not an
"imminent" one. We could not say that Saddam would use
his weapons this month or next, even this year or next, a point
underlined by the Prime Minister in his statement on 24 September.
But, if the international community did not act decisively, Saddam's
efforts would intensify and at some point the threat would become
a reality for the region and wider world.
11. Throughout, we also made clear that
we were committed to working with the UN. Alongside diplomacy
there should be a genuine threat of military action, which required
preparedness and planning to take action, if diplomacy failed.
12. The question of possible links with
international terrorism and with al Qaeda were also considered
at this time. The Foreign Secretary told the Foreign Affairs Committee
that there was no evidence to suggest that Saddam Hussein was
behind al-Qaeda, although he had unquestionably supported terrorist
organisations in the Middle East. And, given his hatred for the
United States, it was reasonable to assume that he had some sympathy
with al Qaeda's aim.
13. The British Government made clear its
abhorrence of Saddam Hussein's human rights record and in December
published a dossier outlining this. On 24 September the Foreign
Secretary told the House that no other regime had Saddam's record
for brutality, torture and execution as a routine way of life
and as the principal means by which an elite stayed in power.
He said that given this and the threat from Iraq's WMD, that country
was uniquely evil and uniquely dangerous.
14. But it was never our policy to pursue
regime change for its own sake. As early as 5 July, in a letter
to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the then Parliamentary Under
Secretary of State, Mike O'Brien, had said that a more sympathetic
regime in Iraq was desirable. Iraq would be a better place without
Saddam Hussein. But the real issue was the threat that the Iraqi
regime posed to its own people and the international community
through its weapons of mass destruction programmes.
15. In the weeks after 24 September, there
were intensive negotiations in New York and Security Council capitals
leading to the adoption of UNSCR 1441 on 8 November. This obtained
the unanimous support of members of the Security Council, who
agreed that Iraq was in material breach of its obligations, and
constituted a threat to international peace and security. This
resolution fulfilled our objective of obtaining the re-admission
of inspectors with stronger powers backed up by credible threat
of force. In a statement to the House on 7 November, just before
the resolution was adopted, the Foreign Secretary re-affirmed
that the British Government wanted a peaceful resolution to the
crisis, but that if diplomacy was to succeed it must be combined
with a credible threat of force. It was this threat which had
forced Saddam to concede the prospect of readmitting weapons inspectors.
But Saddam should be in no doubt: his choice was to comply with
the demands of the Security Council or face the "serious
consequences". This was his "final opportunity"
to comply.
16. It is worth also briefly recalling the
statements made at the time on the question of second resolution
to authorise military action. In a debate on UNSCR 1441 in the
House on 25 November, the Foreign Secretary made clear the British
Government's preference that in the event of a further material
breach by Iraq, there should be a second resolution. But he reaffirmed
that UNSCR 1441 did not stipulate that there had to be a second
resolution. The French had proposed inserting a reference to the
need for a (further) decision in as a pre condition to the use
of force, but this was rejected by the Security Council. Instead,
every member of the Security Council voted for the text of resolution
1441. In his speech to the Security Council on 8 November, the
day that UNSCR 1441 was adopted, Sir Jeremy Greenstock emphasised
that there was no automaticity in the resolution. If there was
a further breach of its obligations by Iraq, the matter would
return to the Council for further discussion.
THE RESUMPTION
OF INSPECTIONS
17. Hopes that Saddam would actively comply
with UNSCR 1441 were short-lived. His 8 December declaration was
clearly inadequate. On 19 December the Secretary of State issued
a statement saying that the report of UNMOVIC inspectors to the
Security Council that day confirmed that Iraq had failed to meet
the obligations imposed on it by UNSCR 1441.
18. Despite this the British Government
was still urging Saddam to disarm peacefully. But pressure had
to be maintained. The key points had not changed since September.
The threat was the broad one arising from Saddam's clear determination
to retain and develop his WMD capability. The Prime Minister told
a Press conference on 13 January of his fear that one day a dictatorial
state would use weapons of mass destruction as Iraq had done in
the past—and that we would get sucked into a conflict.
19. Appearing before the Commons' Liaison
Committee on 21 January the Prime Minister addressed the same
issues. This was not a situation where there was an immediate
threat to Britain of a nuclear strike from Iraq. He said "there
is not an immediate act that Saddam has taken to provoke America,
ourselves or other countries, but I think when you sit down and
analyse this issue of weapons of mass destruction, and, as I say,
the link that is inevitably going to be there with international
terrorism, it is right that the world takes a stand".
20. Again, the Prime Minister said that
the policy of containment of Iraq had only worked up to a point
and was beginning to fracture. The sanctions regime was crumbling.
Saddam had access to approximately $3 billion per year of illicit
oil revenues.
21. The potential link between WMD and terrorism
continued to be a prominent area of media interest. But the Prime
Minister made clear there was no information directly linking
Iraq to the events of 11 September. There was some intelligence
about loose links between al Qaeda and various people in Iraq,
but the justification for action in Iraq was separate from any
potential link with al Qaeda. In particular, he noted that there
was no information directly linking al Qaeda in Iraq and terrorist
activity in the UK.
22. At the same time, the British Government
was focusing on the problems which inspectors were encountering
in Iraq. These underlined that inspections could not succeed without
Saddam's active compliance. In his speech to the UNSC on 27 January,
Dr Blix made the point that "inspection is not a game of
catch as catch can . . . rather a process of verification for
the purpose of creating confidence". The inspectors were
also encountering troubling evidence. Dr Blix referred to the
discovery of a number of chemical rocket warheads and a large
number of documents relating to laser enrichment of uranium in
the home of an Iraqi scientist.
23. On 5 February, the US Secretary of State,
Colin Powell, briefed the UN Security Council on selected US intelligence
information on Iraq's WMD activities. In the subsequent debate,
the Foreign Secretary emphasised that Saddam was failing to take
his final opportunity to co-operate. Saddam held UNSCR 1441 in
the same contempt as all previous resolutions on Iraq. He was
gambling that the Security Council would lose its nerve rather
than enforce its will. The Iraqi declaration was not full, accurate
or complete. It omitted to explain what had happened to the material
unaccounted for by UN inspectors in 1998. Nor was there any admission
of efforts to develop WMD since then. The Foreign Secretary said
our worst fears were confirmed. Iraq had no intention of following
the path of peaceful disarmament. The Foreign Secretary noted
instances reported by Dr Blix which revealed Iraq's determination
to avoid compliance. For example, Iraq was refusing to allow the
inspectors to use a U2 plane to conduct surveillance. He asked
how Iraq could explain concealment of nuclear documents and the
development of a missile programme in contravention of UN resolutions.
24. Nine days later the Security Council
met again on 14 February to hear reports from Dr Blix and Dr el
Baradei. As the Foreign Secretary told the Council, further questions
about Iraqi behaviour had emerged. Why had Iraq refurbished motor
casting chambers and chemical processing equipment which had previously
been destroyed by UNSCOM inspectors? Why were they resisting making
available requested officials for interview in locations free
from Iraqi bugging? Why had none of the issues identified by UNSCOM
been satisfactorily dealt with?
25. The Foreign Secretary underlined the
need for the Council to consider its own credibility. He said
that the issue concerned the authority of the UN, and the responsibility
of the Security Council for international peace and security.
When the Security Council had unanimously adopted resolution 1441,
every member knew that Iraq had WMD and long-range missiles and
accepted that it was in material breach of previous resolutions.
The question now was whether Iraq was demonstrating the active
co-operation necessary. He reminded the Council that on 3 April
1991, the Council had given Iraq 90 days to disarm. Twelve years
had passed and the Iraqi regime had continued to lie, to conceal
and to play games. Dr Blix had said that the period of disarmament
could still be short if immediate active and unconditional co-operation
was forthcoming. This meant that Iraq was not yet demonstrating
such co-operation. Nevertheless, the Foreign Secretary still hoped
that a peaceful solution would be possible. But this would require
a dramatic and immediate change by Saddam.
THE FINAL
STAGE
26. During February the British Government
repeatedly stated that time was running out. On 26 February the
Foreign Secretary told the House that Saddam's tactics all along
had been to prevaricate in the hope of stringing out the process
forever. New details had emerged of Saddam's attempts to frustrate
inspections. The Foreign Secretary said that unrestricted interviews
with scientists were the most important way in which to arrive
at the truth of Iraq's CBW programmes. But there had been concerted
Iraqi efforts to prevent access to scientists. There had also
been categorical Iraqi denials that the Al Samoud II missile was
a prohibited system. But this had been disproved by an independent
panel of experts. In 15 weeks of inspections, the Inspectors had
not been able to close a single outstanding issue.
27. The Foreign Secretary said he understood
why there were calls for more time. But it was still not clear
that Saddam was ready to break from the past. In the absence of
active and immediate co-operation to fulfil the requirements of
UNSCR 1441, more time would achieve nothing of substance.
28. Once again, the Foreign Secretary addressed
the argument of persisting with containment. Containment was not
the policy of disarmament set out in resolution 1441 or preceding
resolutions. What might appear to be containment for some was
rearmament for Saddam. The period 1998-02 had allowed Saddam to
begin rebuilding his capabilities: according to UNMOVIC inspectors,
Iraq had used that time to refurbish prohibited equipment previously
disabled by UNSCOM; to build a missile test stand for missiles
much more powerful than those of permitted systems and to develop
al-Samoud missiles beyond the range permitted by UNSCRs.
29. More details of Saddam's failure to
co-operate with the UN were highlighted in British Government
statements. On 4 March, the Foreign Secretary appeared before
the Foreign Affairs Committee. He said that our current assessment
was that Iraq had the capability to produce mustard gas, tabun,
sarin, syclosarin and VX, and the biological agent, anthrax, botulinum
toxin, aflatoxin and ricin. The Iraqi regime had put up an elaborate
screen of concealment to cover this capability. Our intelligence
information indicated that sensitive materials and documents had
been hidden in the homes of employees, in hospitals, farms and
other sites. WMD related items may have been buried and others
were being kept on the move using trucks and trains. In early
December, Saddam had issued instructions that scientists and their
families were to be threatened if they revealed any sensitive
information to the UN inspectors. They were ordered not to agree
to any interviews with UN inspectors outside Iraq.
30. The Foreign Secretary once again repeated
key arguments: there was a threat from having a tyrannical rogue
regime like Saddam's in such an inherently unstable region as
the Middle East; we could not allow it to continue to defy the
UN. Iraq was certainly supporting terrorism in Israel and the
Occupied Territories: refusal to deal with it would send a message
to other regimes that they too could act in defiance of international
obligations.
31. On 7 March, the Foreign Secretary attended
another ministerial meeting of the Security Council. During the
debate, the Foreign Secretary highlighted yet another example
of Iraq's games playing. Iraq had recently issued a Presidential
Decree prohibiting private individuals and companies from working
on WMD. But the Decree did not cover the operations of the State.
Iraq was therefore still refusing to fulfil its obligations set
out by the Security Council in 1991. Although Iraq had reluctantly
conceded 12 private interviews, scientists were intimidated by
the Iraqi regime beforehand and were told their exchanges were
being recorded.
32. The Foreign Secretary told the Security
Council that the choice was Saddam Hussein's. Nothing had ever
been automatic about the threat of force or the use of force.
It was still possible for Saddam Hussein to comply. The UK remained
committed to exploring every reasonable option for a peaceful
outcome. Subsequently the British Government examined whether
a list of defined tests for Iraqi compliance would be useful in
helping the Security Council come to a judgement.
33. On 24 February the UK, US an Spain introduced
a draft Security Council Resolution declaring that Iraq had failed
to take the final opportunity afforded to it in UNSRC 1441. But
the UK made clear that we would not put the Resolution to the
vote immediately. Instead we would give Saddam one further final
chance to disarm voluntarily. At the Security Council on 7 March
the Foreign Secretary announced that he was tabling a joint UK/US/Spanish
amendment to the Resolution that would specify that Iraq had until
17 March to comply.
34. Over the following days, in consultation
with Dr Blix and Security Council partners this ultimatum was
refined. In a statement to the House on 10 March the Foreign Secretary
underlined that the British Government had all along made clear
their desire to secure a peaceful outcome to the crisis. It was
for this reason that we were prepared to offer an ultimatum. Negotiations
were continuing on whether a list of defined tests for Iraqi compliance
would be useful in helping the Security Council to come to a judgement.
The Foreign Secretary made clear that we did not expect Saddam
to disarm in a week. But we were expecting Iraq to demonstrate
active co-operation. There was no reason why Iraq could not make
this clear within a matter of days. The Foreign Secretary expressed
the hope that even at this late stage Iraq would seize the chance
to disarm peacefully.
35. On 12 March the UK circulated a side
statement to the Security Council setting out six benchmarks for
Iraqi compliance. These were:
— a public statement from Saddam Hussein
that Iraq would henceforth fully cooperate with inspectors including
by requiring all Iraqis to hand over documentation and data, and
to volunteer information on prohibited activities;
— inspectors would select 30 Iraqi
scientists which Iraq would agree to make available for interview
outside Iraq;
— Iraq must provide credible evidence
to account for the whereabouts of all remaining anthrax, and associated
production activities;
— Iraq must complete the destruction
of all Al-Samoud II missiles and components;
— Iraq must fully account for all programmes
to develop unmanned aerial vehicles and remotely piloted vehicles;
— Iraq must surrender for destruction
all mobile chemical and biological facilities.
36. In the weeks before the conflict the
British Government's focus was on Saddam's failure to demonstrate
compliance with UNSCR 1441 and, the increasing irrelevance of
giving him more time. In his statement to the House on 10 March,
the Foreign Secretary acknowledged that there had been some limited
movement such as the partial destruction of al-Samoud missiles,
but this was only after UNMOVIC had declared the missiles in breach
of Iraq's obligations. This was only the tip of the iceberg. A
description of Iraq's WMD programme, its evasion and deceit was
set out in 173 page document issued by UNMOVIC on 6 March, entitled
"Unresolved Disarmament Issues—Iraq's Proscribed Weapons
Programme". Copies of this document were placed in the library
of the House. The Foreign Secretary argued that, without more
co-operation from Iraq, to continue inspections with no end firm
date, would not achieve the disarmament required by the Security
Council.
37. On 17 March, the Foreign Secretary published
a second Command Paper (CM 5785) and other documents which included
a nine page note summarising Iraq's record on non-compliance with
UNSCR 1441. On 18 March a motion to the House of Commons calling
for a further UNSC resolution before military action should take
place was defeated by 396 votes to 217. A Government resolution
approving the use of force was approved by 412 votes to 149.
38. During the 18 March debate the Prime
Minister explained that we had explored every option for a peaceful
solution to persuade Saddam Hussein to comply with UNSCR 1441.
We had been ready to set clear benchmarks and an ultimatum. Unfortunately,
despite the UK's efforts, a second resolution proved impossible.
39. On 20 March, in his address to the nation,
the Prime Minister summarised the case against Iraq. He made clear
that the threat to Britain was a new threat: of disorder and chaos
born either of brutal states like Iraq, or of extreme terrorist
groups. He explained his fear that these threats would come together.
In his judgement, the threat was real, growing and of an entirely
different nature from any previous conventional threat to Britain's
security. The international community through the UN had tried
to disarm Saddam for 12 years. UN inspectors said vast amounts
of chemical and biological poisons remained unaccounted for in
Iraq. Our choice was clear: back down and leave Saddam hugely
strengthened; or proceed to disarm him by force.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
19 June 2003
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