Further supplementary memorandum from
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
QUESTIONS FROM THE FAC HEARING, 24 JUNE,
(SHOWN HERE IN ITALICS).
1. What assessments were made of the
production of chemicalschlorine, phenol and phosgene needed
to supply Iraq's industry?
As indicated in the September dossier, Iraq
was able to produce chlorine, phenol and phosgene. While there
are legitimate uses for the chemicals, they also could be used
in the production of chemical agents.
2. Was there any assessment made of
surplus production or diversion of production to the military
for their use in WMD?
Part of UNSCOM's role was to monitor Iraq's
dual use production capability. Between the departure of UNSCOM
and the arrival of UNMOVIC, it was not possible to monitor on
the ground either production or diversion activity. The Iraqi
2002 Declaration failed to provide the information necessary to
confirm and reconcile Iraq's imports of chemicals, indigenous
production and overall consumption.
3. Has any assessment been made of the
quantities of these chemicals that would be needed to produce
the sort of stocks of WMD that would have been sufficient to allow
the Iraqi Army to mount a sustainable and credible military action
against an attack from coalition forces. If there was what sort
of quantities are we talking about?
A variety of assessments on Iraq's WMD programmes
were carried out by the Government. The quantities of WMD required
to achieve an effect would depend on the scenario under which
it was employed. Even a small quantity of WMD, used in a focused
strike against key military targets could have impaired the effectiveness
of Allied operations.
4. Was there an assessment made that
that gave a view on the degrees of threat posed by Iraq's WMD
capability to coalition forces? Were the scientific community
involved in making those assessments? Did the Cabinet Committee
agree with the assessments made by the scientific community or
The threat to Coalition forces from WMD was
assessed. Government departments have access to both their own
scientific experts and the wider scientific community. The views
of these experts were taken into account.
5. Have inspections and testing been
launched since the conflict at Tarmiyah and other new plants?
If so, what progress has been made and what has been found? When
are the full results expected? Did the UN inspectors visit Tarmiyah
in the months immediately before the conflict? If so, what did
Tarmiyah was a nuclear research establishment
prior to 1991; the infrastructure was destroyed by the IAEA and
the site taken over for industrial chemical research. Now known
as the Ibn Sina Research Centre, it was included in the September
dossier on account of concerns over its research capabilities
into chemical warfare and missile fuel. The site was visited by
UNMOVIC and the inspectors discovered that Iraq had restarted
research into the preparation of UDMH, a prohibited missile fuel.
UNMOVIC believed that this could have been an element in a prohibited
missile development programme.
6. How far are we from granting immunity
It is clearly important that Iraqis with information
on concealed WMD programmes should not be deterred from coming
forward. We are discussing with our coalition partners a range
of possible measures which could encourage them to do so. Immunity
from prosecution is just one possible option.
7. Is there any truth in the fact that
it (the September dossier) was sent back six or seven times to
the intelligence community to be rewritten?
Between the decision to produce a dossier for
public consumption and the final published version, the dossier
was continually updated as new intelligence was received and comments
incorporated. Individual sections were the subject of discussions
between officials in different departments and the intelligence
agencies and were incorporated, updated or removed as the intelligence
picture developed. It is therefore impossible to say how many
formal drafts the document went through, however during September
it was circulated to JIC members on two occasions. As the Foreign
Secretary said in his evidence, the process was an iterative one.
8. Did we give our nuclear intelligence
to Dr EI-Baradei?
The British government co-operated fully with
both UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Intelligence was passed to the Head
of the IAEA Iraq action team and his staff.
Secretary of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
26 June 2003