Further supplementary memorandum from
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO PROCURE URANIUM
1. The statement in the Government's published
Assessment on Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) that Iraq
sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa
was based on intelligence information received in 2002 from more
than one source. We did not have intelligence that Iraq had actually
acquired uranium: the dossier was clear on this point.
2. We asked the originators of our intelligence
information to discuss this issue with the IAEA. We understand
that this was done shortly before the IAEA report of 7 March 2003.
3. We understand that the IAEA acquired
documents on this subject—not originating from the UK—in
February 2003. Some of these turned out to be forgeries. Prior
to the publication of the September dossier we had not seen copies
of these documents, and did not do so until March 2003. We understand
that the documents first came into circulation in October 2002:
after the publication of the dossier.
4. We have now seen the documents passed
to the IAEA and agree that some are forgeries. But others are
still under consideration. We do not know the precise origin or
history of these documents.
5. Our information post-dated the visit
of a former US diplomat to Niger, reported in the media. In addition,
as our dossier demonstrated, there was other evidence of Iraqi
efforts to revive their covert nuclear programme, such as the
recall of specialists to work on Iraq's nuclear programme and
the procurement of dual use equipment.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
July 2003
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