Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Twelfth Report


Management of the overseas estate Asset recycling programme

57. The Foreign Office's overseas estate consists of over 4,300 properties. Although 70% of these are leased, the Office still owned assets worth approximately £960 million worldwide as at March 2002.[86] Since 1998, the FCO, in agreement with HM Treasury, has been engaged in an 'asset recycling programme', under which future investment, primarily in ICT and the estate, is funded by the sale of FCO property at home and abroad. The process involves the Office identifying and selling properties that have become, "surplus through re-prioritisation, or which are not operationally effective or good value for money."[87] We have commented on this programme in our previous Reports on the Office's Annual Reports.[88]

58. In the period 1999/00-2001/02, the FCO recycled £90 million of assets under this programme. The Office subsequently agreed with the Treasury in the Spending Reviews 2000 and 2002 (SR2000 and SR2002) that it could recycle £100 million of assets in the "triennium" 2001-04 and a further £100m in the period 2003-06. However, the 2003 Annual Report indicates that the FCO is experiencing difficulty in meeting its target of finding £100 million worth of property to recycle in the triennium 2001-04.[89] Apparently only £53 million had been identified at the time of printing. This shortfall was attributed largely to "downturns in the property market" across the globe.

59. The Annual Report makes clear the daunting task facing the FCO in meeting its targets of asset recycling:

    we shall have to identify £100 million of disposals during the SR 2002 triennium from a remaining pool of £734 million of properties, many of which are performing well at present.[90] In order to sustain a beneficial programme of recycling in the third triennium, 2003-4 to 2005-6, without eroding our base of strongly performing assets, we are considering innovative ways of obtaining better value for money from the estate.[91]

60. In a memorandum to the Committee, the Office reported that it believed the, "release of 10% of the value of its £1 billion estate over three years," to be not "unreasonable".[92] However, it also made clear the effect of a failure to identify sufficient assets to recycle:

    In the event of a shortfall in asset recycling receipts the FCO would reprioritise in accordance with our Departmental Investment Strategy. The larger impact would be on our estate programme, which is increasingly dependent on asset sale receipts. Projects would have to be postponed.[93]

61. Sir Michael Jay confirmed in his oral evidence to the Committee that any shortfall in the asset recycling programme would have a knock-on effect on other aspects of the Foreign Office's work.[94] Mr Gass, Director of Resources, also made it clear that the programme's reliance on the international property market meant that it was far from being a "certain business."[95] He assured us, however, that there would be no question of carrying out some sort of "bargain basement sale on properties," while the international market was so depressed, merely to meet an artificial target.[96]

62. During the course of this inquiry we examined the cases of two individual properties that have been "targeted" by the asset recycling programme (in San Francisco and Prague—see below). We were pleased to learn that the proportion of the scheme's proceeds going to fund the Office's ICT needs has been reduced, compared to re-investment in the estate.[97] It remains the case, though, that a significant proportion of the resources freed up by the sale of, what is in effect, the Foreign Office's 'family silver' is paying for ICT equipment that will be obsolete and require replacement in a matter of years. It appears to us patently wrong to replace appreciating assets with depreciating ones.

63. The Committee understands the need to review regularly the property requirements of posts overseas to ensure that the estate is "fit for purpose," and where decisions have been made purely on that basis, for example where an embassy is in the wrong location in a city, we support fully the changes made. However, the evidence presented to us during this inquiry, and elsewhere, indicates very clearly that FCO managers are being put under increasing pressure to identify properties for recycling 'come what may.' This pressure, in turn, is arising from the Office's increasingly desperate need to find the resources necessary to fund core programmes and activities such as vital repairs to what remains of the diplomatic estate and the urgent modernisation of out-of-date ICT.

64. We conclude that there are very grave concerns about the long-term impact the asset recycling programme is having on the FCO's overseas estate. There is a real danger that, in its attempts to take full advantage of the scheme agreed with HM Treasury, the Foreign Office is selling properties below their real value in order to meet a short-term target. We recommend that every precaution be taken to ensure that the asset recycling scheme takes full account of the overall, long-term value of properties before they are recycled. If necessary, the Office should be prepared to 'bite the bullet' and miss its target for the asset recycling programme in order to preserve the long-term value of its overseas estate and identify alternative sources of funding for future investment. We further recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Foreign Office sets out when it envisages that the scheme will cease to be viable, and how ICT and estate modernisation will be funded when that happens. The Committee concludes that as a direct result of the FCO's asset recycling programme irreplaceable UK Government property assets are being lost to the nation for ever for short-term and rapidly depreciating ICT gain. The Committee further concludes that this policy should be abandoned forthwith and that the proceeds of any further property sales should be used to improve and expand Britain's diplomatic estate overseas.

65. We comment further on the level of resourcing received by the Foreign Office from HM Treasury below (see paras. 96-98).

Consul-General's Residence in San Francisco

66. In 2001, the Foreign Affairs Committee raised the issue of the proposed sale of the Consul-General's Residence in San Francisco with the then Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir John Kerr.[98] He told Members that he was not sure that the current house's "home counties, 1920s atmosphere is exactly right for a Silicon Valley … Maybe we are not quite right with our Great Missenden image in a San Francisco home." This was in contradiction to a letter from the then Chief Executive of British Trade International (BTI), Sir David Wright.[99] He described the Residence as "an integral part" of BTI's operations in the city, offering a useful venue for lunches, seminars, meetings, etc. (the Consular Office in San Francisco being too small for such events).

67. Earlier this year the FCO announced that the current property was to be sold and a smaller house purchased in another suburb of the city. In its memorandum to the Committee, the FCO said the current property was "oversize and does not provide value for money."[100]

68. A number of individuals and groups have lobbied forcefully for the retention of the Residence as part of the FCO estate, however, most notably the British American Chamber of Commerce.[101] In April, it wrote to the Committee to protest against the purchase of this "much more inferior residence," which they argued was more suitable as a "modest family residence" than a consular residence on a par with other delegations.[102] It believed that the work of the Consul-General, and the UK's image more generally, would suffer significantly by the sale and that it could ascertain little financial benefit to the FCO.

69. The Permanent Under-Secretary disagreed with the concerns raised by the British American Chamber of Commerce, and others, when he came before the Committee. He told us that:

    The residence in San Francisco, the Consulate-General, the present one, is a large and rather splendid building; it is larger than we need, and we would not be able to keep it in the condition in which it would need to be kept if really it was to be a good advertisement for Britain. So I am quite clear in my own mind, having visited it, the right thing to do is to sell it and to move into what we believe is a very good, fit for purpose but smaller building.

He also assured the Committee that the new offices which the consulate had moved into recently, were superior to the previous ones and would provide many of the facilities lost by the sale of the current residence.

70. Despite the Permanent Under-Secretary's evidence on the sale of the Residence, we remained concerned about the decision to sell the building and asked for further written and oral evidence from the Department. After two requests, we were eventually shown the discounted cash-flow analysis used by the FCO to assess the different options relating to the Residence (retain existing building, buy a new one or rent accommodation) and took oral evidence from the key officials involved on 14 October.[103] We also received a very helpful memorandum from the Comptroller and Auditor General on the matter.[104]

71. From the evidence we saw, the Committee was able to conclude that the Office had acted with all propriety throughout the process of selling the old Residence and buying its replacement, with due regard for the guidelines set down by HM Treasury on such matters. We raised a number of concerns about the detail of the sale and the new building, for example about disabled access, and, on the whole, were satisfied by the answers we received.[105] We also note that the sale will free up approximately £2 million for immediate re-investment in the estate and ICT, and roughly £230,000 in annual costs; this is a significant sum for the FCO.[106]

72. It remains true, however, that the sale of the Consul General's Residence in San Francisco represents a significant loss to the FCO's overseas estate and to its diplomatic representation in the USA. The new residence is smaller, less versatile, further from the city centre and a far less impressive building. It can only be seen as a downgrading of the status of the UK's presence in one of the most important cities in the USA for British trade and investment. The short-term savings that will be made do not make up for the loss of an appreciating asset that has been a prestigious part of the FCO's estate for 50 years and which, now sold, can never be regained.

73. We also note with concern that, in spite of assurances given to the Committee previously, simple finances seem to triumph over all other considerations in decisions made in the recycling programme. In its 2002 Report on the Annual Report, the Committee recommended that "the Government ensure that the contribution of a building or location to the effectiveness of British diplomacy is given paramount importance when deciding its future".[107] In its Reply, the Government assured the Committee that "all factors" were taken into account when considering which properties to recycle, including "intangible elements such as the historical associations of a building or how it is viewed by the local community".[108]

74. However, when the Committee raised this matter with the FCO earlier this year, Sir Michael stated in his reply that: "the intangible costs and benefits of making a move are not easy to quantify ... there is no precise mechanism for reaching a conclusion when subjective views differ".[109] These were not included, therefore, in the financial comparison of the options shown to the Committee, and were apparently ignored in the decision whether or not to sell the Residence. We fear that this disregard for such key factors as the location, history or status is being repeated across the recycling programme.

75. We conclude that the sale of the Consul General's Residence in San Francisco is another deeply regrettable result of the Foreign Office's misguided asset recycling programme. FCO managers should not have been placed in a position where they had to sell this key diplomatic asset for short-term financial gain. The damage done to British interests in San Francisco, and the USA, will undoubtedly be significant and felt long after the lump sum gained for the Office by its sale has been spent.

British Embassy, Prague

76. During the course of its regular scrutiny activities, the Committee received reports that the FCO was considering the sale of its Embassy in Prague. This is currently housed in the 15th Century Thun Palace, in the centre of the city and its work was highlighted in this year's Annual Report.[110]

77. We questioned Sir Michael about the veracity of these reports and were very disturbed to hear that the Embassy was indeed being examined as a possible target for the asset recycling scheme.[111] However, the Permanent Under-Secretary assured the Committee that no firm decision had been made at that time and that the need to have "good-quality, well-placed, centrally-located offices and residences around the world" would be given serious consideration.[112]

78. We strongly recommend that the current historic, irreplaceable, centrally-located Embassy building in Prague be retained as part of the FCO's estate and not sacrificed to the asset recycling programme. Its loss would inevitably be a serious blow to British prestige and interests in this key European country and partner, which by May of next year will be a full member of the European Union.

79. It is of grave concern to this Committee that we only heard about the possible sale of the Prague Embassy by chance. Given our long-standing concerns about the asset-recycling programme, particularly as it has now reached the stage of considering the sale of assets that are "performing well at present," we would hope to be fully informed in the future.[113] We recommend that the Foreign Office identify those properties which, like the Prague Embassy, are being considered as possible asset recycling targets and provide a full list, in confidence if necessary, to the Committee. We would expect this list to be updated by regular memoranda to the Committee in the future, say on a six-monthly basis.


86   Departmental Report 2003, p 138 ff. Back

87   Ibid., p141 Back

88   For example, see: Foreign Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2001-02, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2002, HC 826, paras 53-62. Back

89   Departmental Report 2003, p 141 Back

90   Also see: Departmental Report 2003, p 141. Back

91   IbidBack

92   Ev 65, para 24 Back

93   Ev 65, para 25 Back

94   Q 86 ff. Back

95   Q 87 Back

96   Q 88 Back

97   Q 165 [Collecott] Back

98   Foreign Affairs Committee, Ninth Report of Session 2000-01, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2001, HC 428, QQ 130-132 Back

99   Ibid., appendix 2 Back

100   Ev 65, para 27 (also see Ev 84). Back

101   Ev 125 and Ev 126. Letters have also been received by the Committee and individual Members from other correspondents (not printed). Back

102   Ev 125 Back

103   Q 107 [Jay]; Ev 84; Ev 95; Ev 19 Back

104   Ev 129 Back

105   Q 144 [Coates] Back

106   Q 117 [Metcalfe] Back

107   Foreign Affairs Committee, Twelfth Report of Session 2001-02, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2002, HC 826, para 56 Back

108   FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Annual Report 2002: Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Cm 5712, p 6 Back

109   Ev 96 Back

110   See: www.britain.cz/en and Departmental Report 2003, p 98 Back

111   Q 97 Back

112   Q 96 Back

113   Departmental Report 2003, p 141 Back


 
previous page contents next page

House of Commons home page Parliament home page House of Lords home page search page enquiries index

© Parliamentary copyright 2003
Prepared 4 December 2003