Select Committee on Home Affairs Second Report


PART 7: TRIALS ON INDICTMENT WITHOUT A JURY

BACKGROUND

79. Part 7 follows a lengthy debate over various proposals to reduce the number of jury trials. In Session 1999-2000, the Government made two abortive attempts to abolish the defendant's right of election for jury trial in either way cases.[92] (Either way offences are those offences which can either be tried in the magistrates' court or in the Crown Court). Lord Justice Auld gave further impetus to the case for removing the defendant's choice, by recommending that the court, not the defendant, should decide mode of trial. He also recommended the creation of an 'intermediate' court with a bench consisting of a District Judge and two magistrates[93]—a reform which would have effectively absorbed the majority of either way offences. The Government rejected the proposal for an intermediate court.

80. We welcome the Government's decision to retain the defendant's right to elect jury trial in either way cases.

81. The Government has now adopted a new approach. Rather than concentrate its reforms on the mode of trial decision for either way offences, it has decided to make specific exceptions to trial by jury, for some of the cases which are tried in the Crown Court. Given that the focus is on 'complex or lengthy' trials, the measures are likely to have a greater impact on the more serious indictment only offences. (Indictment only offences are those offences which can only be tried in the Crown Court).

82. We believe that the right to trial by jury should be preserved unless there are cogent reasons for conducting the trial without a jury.

TRIAL BY JUDGE ALONE: COMPLEX AND LENGTHY TRIALS (CLAUSE 37)

83. Clause 37 is perhaps the most controversial measure in Part 7. It will allow the prosecution to apply for a complex or lengthy trial to be conducted without a jury. The provision is clearly aimed at fraud and organised crime,[94] although it may well catch other types of case. To succeed, the application must meet two conditions, one of which requires the prosecution to show that the:

    "complexity or length of the trial (or both) will be attributable...to the fact that the issues...relate to arrangements, transactions or records of a financial or commercial nature or which relate to property..." (Clause 37(5)(a)).

84. The arguments put forward in the White Paper suggest that the length and/or complexity of such cases makes them inappropriate for jury trial. First, the length of these cases imposes a time commitment burden on juries and as a consequence "it is not always possible to find a representative panel of jurors". Secondly, the complexity of the issues means that the prosecution "pare down cases" to such an extent that "the full criminality of [the case] is not always exposed".[95] On the second point, the Home Office explained that "the prosecution tend to narrow the charges and do a sample count of charges".[96]

85. When we took evidence from the Minister, he said that the measure was directed primarily at lengthy trials:

    "The problem in relation to a complex financial and commercial-type trial is that they go on for a very long time. The essence of jury trial is random selection of jurors who come in from normal lives and sit for a period of time as a juror. If you have a trial that lasts ten months, 12 months, even 18 months or two years then the people who can sit as jurors in effect have got to give up their normal lives in order to become jurors, the length and complexity of the trial will require that. In those circumstances we believe we have something that is not as the jury trial was intended".[97]

86. The case against the proposal is largely one of principle. Many claim that jury trial is the "fairest" form of trial and therefore ought to be preserved for all cases and particularly for serious cases. Peter Rook QC said that there was "no evidence that juries are not understanding the cases". He said that the Serious Fraud Office had made "enormous advances in the last ten years" with a conviction rate now running at 86 per cent.[98] Others suggested the problem of length and complexity could be addressed by better trial management.[99]

87. The Society of Labour Lawyers told us that:

    "Comprehension is also a particular concern. If fraud were allowed to become the preserve of lawyers alone the language and process of such trials would swiftly become incomprehensible to the rest of society. This would both allow a criminal court to function without the proper, if occasionally irksome, scrutiny that the press and the public bring and could result in defendants being convicted and imprisoned by way of proceedings that they simply do not understand".[100]

88. However, the Minister explained to us that the issue was not that the jury could not understand complex and lengthy trials, "it is just that your pool [of jurors] is reduced dramatically.[101] He also said:

    "we are seeking to uphold one of the principles of the justice system which is that serious crime should normally be tried by juries, but we are recognising and seeking to deal with those cases where there are problems in relation to jury trials. The sorts of cases we are talking about here involve a handful of cases".[102]

89. We accept that there may be cogent reasons for dispensing—in some cases—with a jury in a complex financial case. In particular, the length of these cases can place a significant burden on the jury system which, in turn, may reduce dramatically the pool of available jurors. This (arguably) undermines the principle of random selection on which our jury system is based. However, such cases should not be used to undermine generally the jury system which has served well justice in this country.

90. We therefore accept that the prosecution should have a right to apply for a trial without a jury. Furthermore, we are satisfied that the defendant's interests are protected adequately by the provision of a right of appeal.

TRIAL BY JUDGE ALONE: DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION (CLAUSE 36)

91. Clause 36 will allow a defendant in the Crown Court to 'opt out' of a jury trial by applying for a trial by a judge alone. The judge will be able to refuse an application in specified circumstances, for example, where there is a co-defendant who opposes it. Importantly, Clause 36(8) provides that the judge must refuse an application if there are exceptional circumstances which make it necessary in the public interest to conduct the trial with a jury.

92. Lord Justice Auld was in favour of an 'opt out' on the basis that it would give the defendant a choice and "has a potential for providing a simpler, more efficient, fairer and more open form of procedure than is now available in many jury trials, with the added advantage of a fully reasoned judgment".[103]

93. We received mixed responses to this proposal. In a joint paper, the Bar Council and the Criminal Bar Association warned that:

    "Rather than trying a cross section of cases and defendants, judges are likely under these proposals to have a diet of unpopular sexual allegations; unattractive middle or upper class fraudsters; and cases where the defence lawyers hope for a technical victory, either in the court of trial, or on appeal following defects in the reasoned judgment".[104]

94. Roger Smith, Director of JUSTICE, said that the measure might expose a judge who tried a case without a jury to a storm of media criticism. He told us:

    "the jury is often presented as something which is to defend the defendant's interest, it is actually wider than that. The jury protects the public's interest in the system. That is not just the defendant, it is a protection for the professional judiciary in the system because they take the decision on guilt or innocence".[105]

95. We do not accept that the potential for media criticism of the judiciary will be any greater than it is already. The judiciary make decisions on the admissibility of evidence every day, some of which may be unpopular or controversial. We do not see why the position should be any different if they were also required to decide on the facts.

96. We do not see why a defendant, who is tried on indictment, should not have the option to waive his right to a jury trial, subject to the conditions specified in the Bill. In our view, the proposal offers the potential for a quicker and cheaper form of trial without affecting adversely the defendant's interests. For these reasons, we welcome the proposal to allow a defendant to apply for a trial without a jury.

TRIAL BY JUDGE ALONE: JURY TAMPERING (CLAUSES 38 & 40)

97. Clause 38 will allow the prosecution to apply for a trial to be conducted without a jury where "there is a real and present danger that jury tampering will take place". Clause 40 will also allow a judge to discharge a jury where "jury tampering appears to have taken place". If the judge discharges a jury, he will be required to order that the trial continue without the jury, unless it is in the interests of justice to terminate the trial. If the trial is terminated, the judge may order a new trial to take place without a jury. Clauses 39(5) and 41 make provision for rights of appeal.

98. These proposals have received strong support from the police, mainly for reasons of economy. In the last two years, the Metropolitan Police alone have spent £9 million on jury protection.[106] The National Crime Squad told us that it takes 72 officers to protect one jury, with additional security costs when the jury are at court.[107] Despite these costs, we were also told that the police have no way of knowing whether the protection works.[108] The police can only protect the juror, but there is always a danger that others—such as friends or family—may be intimidated in the hope that the juror will be influenced.[109] It seems to us, therefore, that as well as being expensive, jury protection may not always be the best way of dealing with jury tampering.

99. We accept that there are cogent arguments for dispensing with a jury trial where there is a real and present danger of jury tampering.

100. We note in passing that section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 prohibits research into juries' reasons for their verdicts. As a result, we do not know enough about how the jury system operates. The question of whether to repeal section 8 has been a matter of some debate. While the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) was broadly in favour,[110] Lord Justice Auld was against it.[111]

101. We invite the Government to consider the merits of repealing section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, in order to permit meaningful research into how the jury system operates.




92   The Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial) Bill 1999 and The Criminal Justice (Mode of Trial)(No.2) Bill 2000. Back

93   Rt Hon Lord Justice Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales: Report (2001), p 200, para 172 and p 280, para 35. Back

94   See Justice for All, Cm 5563, para 4.31. Back

95   Ibid, paras 4.28-4.29 and 4.31. Back

96   Q 358, Ian Chisholm. Back

97   Q 356. Back

98   Q 245; Serious Fraud Office, Annual Report 2001/02. Back

99   See for example Q 245, Peter Rook QC. Back

100   Justice for All: A Response from the Society of Labour Lawyers, October 2002, p 12, para 22(5). Back

101   Qq 358-359. Back

102   Q 372. Back

103   Rt Hon Lord Justice Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales: Report, 2001, p 180, para 117. Back

104   The General Council of the Bar and The Criminal Bar Association, Response to the Criminal Justice White Paper "Justice for All", October 2002, p 20, para 15. Back

105   Q 242. Back

106   Q 98. Back

107   Ev 82. Back

108   Q 98. Back

109   Q 102. Back

110   The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice: Report, Cm 2263 (1993), chp 1, para 8. Back

111   Rt Hon Lord Justice Auld, Review of the Criminal Courts of England and Wales (2001), p 166, para 82. Back


 
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