House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence

Written evidence

Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid

INTRODUCTION

Christian Aid welcomes the opportunity to present evidence to the International Development Committee. Christian Aid is the official development agency of 40 churches in Britain and Ireland. In 1986 it began funding and working through Afghan partner organizations. It opened a field office in Herat in western Afghanistan in 1997. It opened a sub-office in Kabul in 2002.

Christian Aid's Afghan programme has a current annual budget of in excess of £2.5 million. All of our assistance is channeled through local Afghan partner organizations. This year Christian Aid is overseeing 31 different programmes operating in the provinces of Herat, Ghor, Badghis, Farah and Faryab. Since August 2001, Christian Aid funded programmes have directly assisted over 500,000 people in western Afghanistan in relief, emergency and development activities. Christian Aid's DFID-funded programme for food assistance to vulnerable families in Ghor (which provided food packs to 200,000 people) and the EC-funded Sustainable Rural Livelihoods Programme in Ghor and Badghis are examples of these humanitarian and development activities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Christian Aid believes that UK Government policy should be modified as follows:

1. The UK Government should sponsor a UN resolution that allows an expansion of the ISAF mandate so that ISAF troops can operate outside of Kabul, even if such a role is limited to securing key urban areas and transport networks outside of Kabul.

2. The UK Government (as part of the US-led Coalition of forces) should reconfigure the PRT mandate, so that PRTs adopt an exclusive security role and do not engage in reconstruction activities.

3. The UK Government should actively support a threefold increase in financial contributions from the international community for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and should increase its own contributions accordingly. Furthermore, the UK Government should urge the international community to disburse the amounts of money it has pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan as a matter of importance, in order that the ATA can meet its recurrent financial obligations and consolidate on the reconstruction efforts that have been made to date.

4. The UK Government to use its influence to persuade WFP that providing free externally produced wheat without adequate local needs assessments to the western regions is undermining local commerce and therefore impeding the regeneration of the region.

5. The Secretary of State for International Development should be urged to reinforce her Department's Transitional Country Assistance Plan's commitments to Afghan civil society by ensuring that funds are allocated to a concrete programme aimed at supporting the building and expansion of civil society.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT

<dt6p0,18p0>ATA<ntAfghanistan Transitional Authority<etDfID<ntDepartment for International Development<etISAF<ntInternational Security Assistance Force<etNATO<ntNorth Atlantic Treaty Organisation<etNGO<ntNon-governmental Organisation<etPRT<ntProvincial Reconstruction Team<etUNDP<ntUnited Nations' Development Programme<etWFP<ntWorld Food Programme<et

<jf98>

SECURITY

General

1.1 Security in Afghanistan has been the overriding concern since December 2001. Security is the precondition for tangible reconstruction and development and provides the enabling environment that allows development professionals to do their job. Without security, reconstruction of infrastructure, political transformation and the ability to implement development projects remain at risk. Despite comments from US Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld on 1 May 2003 that security was improving[1], the reality on the ground today suggests the opposite.

1.2 The security situation in Afghanistan remains precarious. Recent months have seen a significant increase in violent attacks on local populations, Afghan Army and Afghan Police forces, US military, national and international aid workers as well as ordinary Afghans[2]. This has culminated in more violence occurring in the past month than in any other since December 2001, with more than 90 murders alone in the 10 days prior to 21 August 2003[3]. Private sector investment in the country is a good indicator of the levels of and confidence in long-term security in the country. To date, the ATA's Commerce Ministry has signed 4,000 private project/investment agreements with the private sector. Yet none of these projects have begun to be implemented, due to general insecurity within the country.

1.3 Christian Aid's partners in the western provinces of Afghanistan have been fortunate because of the relative peace that exists in these provinces. Compared with other areas of Afghanistan (noticeably Mazar province and the south eastern provinces of Afghanistan), there has been relative calm. Nonetheless, even our programmes have been adversely affected by insecurity:

1.3.1 Farah province remains largely inaccessible due to heightened insecurity from members of feuding Police Offices and rival commanders and little/no protection of transport networks.

1.3.2 Fighting, reportedly between militia loyal to Ismail Khan and Ammanullah Khan, has meant that some areas of Herat and Badghis have also been inaccessible since October 2002.

1.3.3 A large EC funded project in Faryab was left isolated and programme staff incommunicado in April 2003, during a spate of fighting between Atta Mohammed and General Dostum's forces.

1.4 There are currently four military forces in Afghanistan, all of whom contribute to providing security. These are:

1.4.1 The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This is a multi-national UN-mandated security force that only operates in Afghanistan's capital city, Kabul. The force is 5,200 strong and is under the command of NATO.

1.4.2 The US-led Coalition forces. These consist of (predominantly) US troops who are continuing to prosecute the war against al-Qaeda and Taleban remnants in the South and East of Afghanistan. The force is approx 9,000 strong and is commanded by US central command.

1.4.3 The Afghan National Army. This army is currently made up of approx 5,000 troops but it is widely agreed that the Afghan National Army needs to comprise a force of some 70,000 troops for it to be effective. The ATA controls the Afghan National Army.

1.4.4 Local Militia groups maintained by regional powerholders. Different powerholders control different size militia groups, estimated to range from 5,000 to 50,000. These groups are loyal to regional powerholders not to the Afghan government.

Current Security—inside Kabul

1.5 Within Afghanistan's capital city, Kabul, the UN-mandated, 5,200 strong ISAF is responsible for maintaining law and order. In reality however there remains serious security breaches in Kabul[4]. Kabul is often heralded as an example of peace and stability and of the US-led Coalition's success in Afghanistan but the reality is somewhat different: murder rates in Kabul have risen since December 2001, as have levels of serious and petty criminality[5].

Current Security—outside Kabul

1.6 With ISAF forces restricted to Kabul, the rest of the country remains subject to different interest (and sometimes radical) groups that seek to undermine both the transitional government and the reconstruction process. Local struggles for power, fuelled in some areas by the opium trade, are contributing to a growing fragmentation of the country. The ongoing climate of impunity means that there is no protection for the individual from the arbitrary use of power. Growing criminality is further compounding the insecurity felt by the Afghan population; there are numerous examples of robberies, thefts and assaults even in (supposedly) one of the country's most secure regions, Herat.

1.7 The most favoured means of ensuring national security is to allow ISAF troops to move beyond Kabul, even if such an expansion is limited to key urban centres and mobile units secure transport networks. A UN Security Council Resolution will be needed to allow this expansion. Whilst UK and US decision makers have been opposed to the expansion of ISAF, now that NATO has taken over ISAF command, this may be the optimum time for a re-think of security policy. The UN Secretary General, the ATA, MPs, MEPs, US Senators and NGOs have called for an expansion of the ISAF mandate. Many others, including respected journalists and commentators share this view: Ahmed Rashid for example recently said, "I really think now crunch time is coming. The Americans and the British and the United Nations, they have to sit down and reconfigure the issue of security. If they don't, I see the situation in Afghanistan getting much worse"[6]. This is a view with which Christian Aid concurs.

1.8 Recommendation: The UK Government should sponsor a UN resolution that allows an expansion of the ISAF mandate so that ISAF troops can operate outside of Kabul, even if such a role is limited to securing key urban areas and transport networks outside of Kabul.

1.9 In response to insecurity outside of Kabul, the US-led Coalition forces have formed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These 50-100 troop teams do not have an exclusive security mandate; they are also charged with identifying reconstruction projects (and in some cases, complete the reconstruction projects as well).

1.10 Supported by the position paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations, produced by the worldwide network Standing Committee on Humanitarian Responses[7], Christian Aid has a number of concerns about PRTs:

1.10.1 Development and/or reconstruction led by military assessment is essentially "political" humanitarianism and the blurring of the exclusive roles of the military and humanitarian agencies compromises the humanitarian imperative and there are other non-military means of achieving humanitarian objectives.

1.10.2 The US-led Coalition forces are simultaneously a party to an ongoing conflict against Afghans in the south of Afghanistan and attempting to assist with the reconstruction initiative in other parts of the country. This means US-led Coalition forces are both friend and foe to Afghans. As US-led Coalition forces are actively involved in hostilities against a section of the Afghan community, to be active in reconstruction activities with other Afghans as well puts the security of development professionals at risk.

1.10.3 Direct contact and collaboration with military forces jeopardises existing long-standing relationships with local communities as well as Christian Aid's neutrality.

1.10.4 The use of military personnel to identify and implement reconstruction work could engender mistrust amongst local communities and between communities and NGOs.

1.10.5 The use of PRT personnel to determine who should benefit from a project may conflict with the long-term goals of assistance, as long-term impact may be sacrificed for short-term political ends.

1.10.6 Military personnel should be accountable to the host nation government—currently PRT troops report directly to US-led Coalition command.

1.10.7 Teams of 50-100 US-led Coalition troops have been sent to provide security, spread the ATA's writ into the regions and facilitate diplomacy and reconstruction to areas the size of Scotland[8], which is clearly unfeasible. It is unfeasible because security in these areas remains in the hands of provincial militia and warlords, who will not automatically surrender control.

1.10.8 Officially, the purpose of PRTs is to extend the authority of the ATA beyond the confines of Kabul city. What this means in practice is unclear. What is needed is effective and sustainable security that ensures that the regional powerholders' grip is weakened through the ATA implementing its state-led reconstruction proposals, rogue and radical elements do not gather support and that petty criminality is eliminated. An exclusive security mandate will allow this; the current mandate compromises the effective provision of security.

1.11 Recommendation: The UK Government (as part of the US-led Coalition of forces) should reconfigure the PRT mandate, so that PRTs adopt an exclusive security role and do not engage in reconstruction activities.

Long Term Security

1.12 Most people recognise that the best and most appropriate way to address the insecurity is for the Afghan security forces (Army and police) to establish the rule of law and order. However, the Afghan National Army still only has approximately 5,000 troops[9]. The rates of desertion are high. At current rates of recruitment and desertion, the Afghan National Army will only reach its full complement (70,000 troops) in 25 years[10]. Afghan deputy Interior Minister Hilal suggests that desertion and corruption have largely occurred because "donor countries are not releasing required funds so we cannot afford to give policemen their salaries. Providing security and peace to Afghans is our priority. But we cannot do much with our pockets empty"[11] (see paras 2 below).

1.13 Furthermore, reliable reports suggest that the National Army is being unduly influenced by factionalism, undermining its role as a national body. For example, the Kabul garrison is almost entirely composed of Tajiks from Panjshir (Kapisa province) and Shamali districts. Outside of Kabul, the military units stationed in garrisons around the country are recruited entirely from those regions and serve the local and regional commanders, which risks accentuating the current factionalism.

2. RECONSTRUCTION

2.1 The reconstruction of Afghanistan is under-funded: the reconstruction "bottle is only 5% full"[12]. In January 2002, the international community pledged $4.5 billion to meet reconstruction costs in Afghanistan, to be disbursed over the next five years. The UN, World Bank and most recently the ATA have all confirmed that a more realistic figure to complete the reconstruction effectively is between $15-20 billion over the same period, ie at least three times as much money as the earlier pledges made. On this basis, donor countries should be urged to pledge and disburse at least three times as much as they pledged at the Tokyo Conference, in order that Afghanistan's needs are met and the reconstruction effort effective.

2.2 Not only are the pledged amounts themselves insufficient, there remain large and growing gaps between these pledged amounts and disbursement rates. UN figures suggest that essential works to security sector departments within the ATA for example are under-funded. The Law and Order Trust Fund (which funds the Afghan Police Force) needs $121 million for the year to March 2004 but currently has only received $11 million-9% of the required amount (see para 1.12). The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund requires $600 million to meet its recurrent costs for this year, but to date has only received $63 million-10.5% of the required amount. The UN programme itself needs $728 million for its work in Afghanistan for the 2003-04 year, yet to date it has only received $220 million (30.2% of the funds required)[13]. Furthermore, "the scale of assistance in post-Taleban Afghanistan . . . was dwarfed by the appeals and pledges for Iraq"[14].

2.3 Part of the reason for the late delivery of the funds is almost certainly due to the fragile security in Afghanistan. It is also the case that the ATA's government and financial institutions lack absorptive capacity. The international community needs to re-commit itself to Afghanistan for the long term and show that it is willing and able to deliver on the rhetoric of the last two years[15]. Christian Aid's partner organisations report a growing feeling in Afghanistan that the international community has failed the country over the past year, and they fear that this will contribute to renewed instability.

2.4 Recommendation: The UK Government should actively support a threefold increase in financial contributions from the international community for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and should increase its own contributions accordingly. Furthermore, the UK Government should urge the international community to disburse the amounts of money it has pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan as a matter of importance, in order that the ATA can meet its recurrent obligations and consolidate on the reconstruction efforts that have been made to date.

3. SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

General

3.1 The price of wheat (the staple diet for most Afghans) in Herat province is at an all time low of 5 Afs ($0.1) per kilo[16]. The price of wheat is so low because:

3.1.1 The current harvest of rain-fed wheat is likely to produce a bumper crop for this year, which is likely to depress local prices.

3.1.2 The WFP is still introducing imported free wheat into the region, which is depressing prices and providing a major disincentive to local farmers to grow and market their own produce.

3.1.3 The WFP refuses to purchase wheat grown locally so that it can utilise donations of wheat provided by the international community.

3.1.4 Local traders are currently importing cheap wheat from neighbouring Pakistan, Iran and Turkmenistan, further undermining local commerce.

3.1.5 Levels of remuneration from opium far outweigh the reduced levels of remuneration from wheat. This is one reason why the growth of opium has spread to non-traditional opium growth areas including Herat, Badghis and Ghor.

3.2 Furthermore, the cost of delivering WFP wheat to Herat province is more than three times the cost of purchasing locally produced wheat[17].

3.3 There has been a significant increase in the regions where opium is being grown and, as a result, it is projected that the output of opium is likely to be higher for this year than even 2002 (levels of opium production increased by 1,800% in 2002[18]).

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND WHEAT DISTRIBUTION

3.4 There was substantial rainfall during the 2002-03 winter and spring, resulting in an increase in agricultural production in the western provinces. The 2003 harvest is estimated to be 64% higher in volume terms than the 1978 harvest, the last year of normal production before the start of the 23 years of civil war[19]. In spite of farmers' loss of livestock during the height of the drought and the lack of/access to farm power, productivity also increased due to the increased amounts of aid agency-distributed wheat seeds, fertilisers, and tools and equipment, as well as enhanced agricultural training, establishment of farmers' institutions for collective decision-making and cooperation. Neither the regional or national government nor UN dispersal contributed significantly in these areas.

3.5 The WFP has continued to import substantial levels of wheat into the western regions, despite the representations to Herat-based WFP representatives, by Christian Aid partner organisations. This wheat has either been distributed freely to those areas/villages that are deemed to be particularly vulnerable, or the wheat has been distributed as part of food for work programmes being run by the WFP. However, potential workers are now demanding two and even three times as much food for the same amount of work they were doing in 2001[20], indicative of the increasing availability of locally produced food.

3.6 Despite requests from local farmers, Christian Aid's partner organisations and regional governors[21], WFP has refused to stop the influx of wheat from international donors or purchase locally produced wheat.

3.7 Recommendation: the UK Government should use its influence to persuade WFP that providing free externally produced wheat, without adequate local needs assessments to the western regions is undermining local commerce and therefore impeding the regeneration of the region.

OPIUM PRODUCTION

3.8 Due to the lack of financial return in marketing locally produced wheat and other foodstuffs, some farmers are being encouraged to cultivate poppy instead, thus further undermining sustainable, legitimate livelihoods. With returns between $415 (20,000 Afs) [22]and $600 per kilo of opium gum, it is unsurprising that farmers turn to poppy to provide an income. "Of course it [cultivating opium] bothers me, but we have to cultivate it in the current situation where we've had to borrow money, sell household items and don't have enough to eat"[23], said one villager from the northern province of Faryab. In 2002, UNODC reported that opium production had increased by 1,800%. This is considered to be due in part to the little social or familial stigma attached to growing opium, uncoordinated and sometimes ill advised efforts directed at eradication and because local land owners and powerholders had pro-actively campaigned for farmers to grow opium. Early indications suggest that there is likely to be another significant increase in cultivation reported for this year.

3.9 In Faryab, WFP workers said they have observed the greatest poppy cultivation occurring in areas where they distributed wheat most vigorously[24]. Those villagers who now cultivate poppy and who had previously traveled to pick up WFP wheat, said that they were no longer inclined to make the effort to collect this wheat. They were newly flush with opium profits (averaging $7 per day, compared to $2 per day for work in the local wheat market) and they wanted the WFP wheat only if it was delivered it to them.

3.10 Traditional areas for producing poppy are Helmand, south Farah, Kandahar and Badakshan provinces. Worryingly, our partner organisations have indicated that there has been a spread of poppy production to the areas where they operate. For example, the practice of growing opium poppy spread for the first time into the highland central/western Afghanistan province of Ghor and to Herat and Badghis. Encouraged by processing and trafficking interests in the neighbouring province of Helmand, the production of opium offers an extremely attractive cash crop alternative to the farmers of these underdeveloped regions who suffer from continuing low wheat prices (exacerbated by the WFP policy of undermining local production and trade). The growth of opium is encouraged by officials, appointed by both the ATA and regional governors alike, many of whom are profiting from opium production and traffic in the provinces. A high-ranking anti-narcotics official recalled discussing the problem with a US general who "asked me if I could give him a list of these officials who were involved. I told him it would be easier if I listed officials who weren't involved. That would be a shorter list"[25].

3.11 The Helmand dealers use community development techniques to encourage poppy cultivation. Thus they offer to supply a motor cycle in return for the first kilo of opium gum, so that entrepreneurs could go on to higher earnings by spreading more seed and engaging their own sub-contractor growers. The short growing seasons at Ghor's higher altitudes (which permit only two crops to be harvested in the six month season), means that the practice has now spread rapidly into Herat and Badghis provinces.

3.12 Against the backdrop of these developments in the production and marketing of opium, Christian Aid is in the process of reviewing appropriate responses to the phenomena of increased global narcotic production at both programme and policy level. We look forward to engaging with the Committee at a later date on this issue.

4. CIVIL SOCIETY DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION

Bonn Agreement

4.1 Under the 5 December 2001 Bonn Agreement, the ATA is due to oversee the completion of two key events for the country's future within the next year: the drafting of a constitution and the holding of "free and fair" elections across the country no later than June 2004[26].

Constitution

4.2 Regrettably, the legal framework for the constitution making process has not been developed as rigorously or robustly as it should have been. The first ATA decree relating to the process of constitution-making was issued in April 2003—some 10 months after the Emergency Loya Jirga met to discuss the constitution-making process and eight months before a Constitutional Loya Jirga is due to be held to discuss the draft constitution. As a result, the drafting process has not been as rigorous or participative as it might otherwise have been, as the scope and depth of the tasks required the process to have been carried out over 18 months period rather than be squeezed into an eight month time frame. There is little doubt that the quality, participation and public confidence in the process has been undermined.

4.3 Our partner organisations (along with others, such as the Afghan Civil Society Forum) have carried out a number of civic education and awareness projects focused on the Constitution-making process. The initial feedback from beneficiaries is that these initiatives have been extremely positive and well received with many participants stating that this has been the first time that they have been given the opportunity to input into the constitution-making process. However, due to illiteracy rates (64% of the adult population are judged to be illiterate[27]—though rates are far higher in rural areas), in-depth understanding about the constitution-making process is often a slow process. Regrettably, with four months to go until a Constitutional Loya Jirga is held (if the Bonn Agreement timetable is to be adhered to), there still remains considerable lack of knowledge amongst rural populations in Afghanistan (ie 90% of the country?) about what a constitution is, what it ought to and will contain, who will attend the Constitutional Loya Jirga and represent their views. These problems need to be addressed as a matter of urgency or the timetable in the Bonn Agreement amended to ensure sufficient engagement of the people in this crucial process.

4.4 The Constitution Commission (commissioners hand picked by President Karzai) has still not released the first draft of the Constitution for Afghanistan. This means that substantial debate amongst Afghans about the content of the constitution has not even begun yet and raises concerns about whether villagers' views on the draft will even be heard and inputted into the wider national debate. Deeper and more longer lasting concerns abound in relation to what will happen after the constitution is ratified: how can the ATA introduce and enforce a constitution in the regions, when it has little authority there? How will the constitution decrease the influence of the powerholders in the regions? To what extent should the constitution be publicly accepted when no-one has yet seen a draft?

National Elections

4.5 According to the Bonn Agreement, the first UN-sponsored elections in Afghanistan are due to take place before June 2004[28]. Due to the deteriorating levels of security, lack of funding and lack of a realistically planned timetable for elections to take place, it is optimistic in the extreme to expect the timeframe to lead to free and fair elections. Arguably, it is neither realistic nor desirable for the elections to occur at this time due to serious concerns about intimidation of party politicians, lack of public awareness and weaknesses of political parties.

4.6 Afghans widely view the June 2004 scheduled elections as a panacea for their ills. One of our local partners expressed the view that "most villagers think that if elections are held according to the request of the Afghan nation, it will solve most of our problems. If not, it will increase the problems of the people"[29]. There is real concern however that until the process of disarmament of the local militia and private armies of the powerholders is commenced, the results of the elections may be fettered or even pre-determined. Until such time as these concerns are materially addressed by the ATA, further consideration should be given as to whether the Bonn Agreement timetable is realistic and whether all of the necessary levels of education, security and logistical preparedness are sufficiently provided for.

Civil society

4.7 The role of civil society in these historic events should be of significant importance. Christian Aid has a number of concerns about the current top-down approach to events that will determine the course of Afghans' lives. If the aim is to put Afghans in the driving seat, [30]then the imposition of an unrealistic timetable for these key determinant events is the wrong way to ensure Afghan ownership of the process. There is an urgent need to give priority to the development, deepening and extension of Afghan civil society, and to ensure that civil society is mobilised to input into the constitutional process and the development of a sustainable democratic state. Christian Aid welcomes the commitment to Afghan civil society contained in the August 2003 version of its Transitional Country Assistance Plan for Afghanistan. At present, Afghanistan does have an emergent and, in part, vibrant indigenous civil society, even if years of conflict and the present insecurity have silenced a generation and imbued a culture of fear. It is essential that efforts go into helping build up, extend and deepen Afghan civil society organisations, in order that a more influential and broad-based civil society (as well as regional powerholders) can "come inside the tent"[31].

4.8 Some Afghan NGOs already operate nationally and some have operated continuously since the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. One of their roles now, as key mobilisers, catalysts and voices of civil society, is to hold the ATA to account for its actions and service delivery. While Christian Aid supports strengthening the ATA and welcomes the fact that DFID has begun to engage with the issue of how the ATA remains accountable to the Afghan population. Ministers of state for the ATA themselves recognise the importance of civil society in national development, indicating that the ATA will not be able to implement its own plans for sectoral service without NGOs (due to capacity, resources, access, etc). If NGOs are needed to implement ATA programmes, Christian Aid (and we presume DFID) would prefer that Afghan NGOs act in this role, rather than international NGOs.

4.9 Recommendation: The Secretary of State for International Development should be urged to reinforce her department's Transitional Country Assistance Plan's commitments to Afghan civil society by ensuring that funds are allocated to a concrete programme aimed at supporting the building and expansion of civil society.

4.10 Education and awareness building of rural villages about the conflict and the elections has not happened under the ATA's guidance or co-ordination. Any civic education that has taken place has been completed on an ad-hoc basis by Afghan organisations that have had the capacity and knowledge to administer such programmes. If local organisations had not galvanised themselves to undertake such work, there would have been an even larger shortfall in the nature and extent of education and awareness that Afghan populations have received on vital contemporary issues. Concerning issues as fundamental as the inauguration of a new constitution, it is surprising and worrying that so little consultation of civil society has occurred and so little awareness raising about the process or content has happened.

<mv-1p0>5. CONCLUSION

5.1 On 6 May of this year, UN Special Representative Ambassador Brahimi said, "There are many signs that the security situation throughout Afghanistan is worsening, precisely when the next phases of the Bonn process need it to improve. There is a real, but still avoidable, risk that the Bonn process will stall if security is not extended to the regions"[32]. Five months have elapsed since the Ambassador made those comments and, if anything, deterioration in security across the country has occurred, with little if any substantive attempts to provide comprehensive, national security.

5.2 Effective security remains the core building block without which both the reconstruction and the political transformation of Afghanistan cannot take place. Without freedom of movement, accessibility and an independent assessment of the needs of the population, the reconstruction process cannot begin in earnest, never mind be successfully completed. Without freedom of thought, expression and information, education and awareness raising to inform political choices, and the movement to create viable national institutions, the political transformation of Afghanistan cannot occur.

5.3 In July 2003, UK Foreign Secretary, Rt Hon Jack Straw MP said "We are completely committed to remain in Afghanistan for as long as you want us to help you build this country into a stable and prosperous community . . . There is something more powerful than guns and armies and police. It is called the spirit of democracy, or resolving arguments by political processes, not by killing each other"[33]. Regrettably, until such time as law and order and security are restored, it is unlikely that a truly democratic process, with freedoms of speech, political thought and movement, will develop or flourish.

5.4 As a consequence, Christian Aid believes that UK Government policy should be modified as follows:

5.4.1 The UK Government should sponsor a UN resolution that allows an expansion of the ISAF mandate so that ISAF troops can operate outside of Kabul, even if such a role is limited to securing key urban areas and transport networks outside of Kabul.

5.4.2 The UK Government (as part of the US-led Coalition of forces) should reconfigure the PRT mandate, so that PRTs adopt an exclusive security role and do not engage in reconstruction activities.

5.4.3 The UK Government should actively support a threefold increase in financial contributions from the international community for the reconstruction of Afghanistan and should increase its own contributions accordingly. Furthermore, the UK Government should urge the international community to disburse the amounts of money it has pledged for the reconstruction of Afghanistan as a matter of importance, in order that the ATA can meet its recurrent financial obligations and consolidate on the reconstruction efforts that have been made to date.

5.4.4 The UK Government to use its influence to persuade WFP that providing free externally produced wheat without local needs assessments to the western regions is undermining local trade and therefore the regeneration of the region.

5.4.5 The Secretary of State for International Development should be urged to reinforce her Department's Transitional Country Assistance Plan's commitments to Afghan civil society by ensuring that funds are allocated to a concrete programme aimed at supporting the building and expansion of civil society.

September 2003

1 Rumsfeld quoted as saying ". . . we're at a point where we clearly have moved . . . to a period of stability and stabilization and reconstruction activities. The bulk of this country today is permissive, it's secure . . .", CNN, 1 May 2003, "Rumsfeld: major combat over in Afghanistan". Back

2 Swiss Peace has calculated that there have been 188 serious security incidents every month since December 2001. Swiss Peace, FAST Update, Afghanistan, Quarterly Risk Assessment, March-May 2003. Back

3 Scott Baldauf, Afghan Violence Snares Civilians, Christian Science Monitor, Reliefweb, 21 August 2003, http://www.reliefweb.int/w/Rwb.nsf/o/14680af843948d97c1256d8900504d48?Open Document Back

4 For example, 30 people were killed outside the Hotel Spinzar in September in 2002, four Germans with ISAF were killed in June 2003, there have been grenade attacks on UN buildings since December 2001, the Pakistan Embassy was mobbed on 8 July 2003. This is alongside the petty criminality and corruption of "normal" Kabul life. Back

5 Swiss Peace, FAST Update, Afghanistan, Quarterly Risk Assessment, March-May 2003 and Dec 2002-March 2003. Back

6 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan Continues to Support Taliaban, ABC Television's Mark Corcoran exposes Pakistan's ongoing collusion with terriorist, Excerpts from Foreign Correspondent's latest program on Afghanistan (Australian Broadcasting Corporation Television)-11 July 2003. Back

7 SCHR position paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance, Action by Churches Together (ACT), September 2002, www.act-intl.org Back

8 Scotland is 78,133 square Kilometres; comparison between Scotland and Mazar-e-Sharif province confirmed during meeting with DfID representatives on 20 August 2003. Back

9 UN-IRIN, NATO takes over ISAF command, IRIN/Relief web news, 11 August 2003. Back

10 Figure calculated by establishing current levels of recruitment (5,000 according to Victoria Burnett, National Army takes shape in Afghanistan, Financial Times, 7 August 2003) in the time elapsed since Bonn Agreement signed (December 2001) and rolling this figure out. Back

11 Owais Tohid, Cops go crooked in Kabul as pay and training lag, Christian Science Monitor, 3 July 2003. Back