The politicisation of food aid
84. In some countries, especially Zimbabwe and
to a lesser extent in Malawi, there have been concerns over the
manipulation of food aid and commercial imports for political
objectives. We are aware too of the suggestion made in relation
to Zambia, that the methodology used for assessing food aid needs
is seriously flawed and "wide open to subjectivity and political
manipulation."[144]
We are not in a position to comment in detail on the methodology
for assessing need, but the importance of accurate, reliable and
trustworthy assessments, free of political manipulation, is clear.
As regards Malawi, it has been suggested to us that the scheme
agreed between the Government of Malawi and the World Bank to
deliver an untargeted food subsidy might be connected to forthcoming
general elections. In Zimbabwe, donors and relief agencies have
tried to operate independently of government interference, but
in a very difficult and even hostile context, as DFID explained:
The environment in Zimbabwe poses particular problems
for the relief effort. Against a background of deep political
polarisation and antagonism to the outside world, the Government
has not maintained an open dialogue with donors or civil society.
The extent and impartiality of Government plans to mitigate the
crisis are unclear. There are frequent complaints from the opposition
and human rights groups that the Government is using food as a
way of rewarding its supporters and punishing its opponents. Donors
have agreed that external food aid must be distributed through
impartial and independent channels. However, the authorities have
failed to facilitate the use of all available distribution channels.
The strict control on private sector imports, together with price
controls, has frozen the private sector out of the national response.[145]
85. The WFP is very careful to ensure that the
food aid that it provides is not diverted, but there are concerns
about the mis-use of the Grain Marketing Board's [GMB] supplies.
UN-OCHA noted that: "Politicisation of food distribution
is a major impediment to effective targeting in Zimbabwe. […]
There have been reports of specific examples of opposition members
being denied food assistance or access to the GMB-sold maize,
as well as cases of children from known Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) supporters being denied supplementary feeding at
school."[146]
UN-OCHA added that the Government has been "extremely reticent"
about the needs of Zimbabwean farm workers made vulnerable by
land redistribution, and has not supported relief efforts targeted
at these farm workers and their families, estimated at 175,000
households or around 950,000 people. In SADC's December 2002 Emergency
Food Security Assessment, it was noted that distribution of GMB
imports at the community level is inconsistent with reported imports
at the national level. National level figures indicate a surplus
of 200,000 MT while at sub-national levels 40% of communities
were reporting that cereals were not, or rarely, available from
the GMB or the market. This suggests, at best, that the distribution
of food within the country is very uneven. As SADC states: "The
discrepancy between reported import levels at the national level
and community availability of cereals warrants further investigation."[147]
86. Despite these difficulties, a fairly extensive
relief programme has been launched in Zimbabwe. Judith Lewis of
the World Food Programme told us that WFP was working during 2002
with ten NGOs in Zimbabwe to deliver 55,000 tonnes of food aid
per month. She also reported that the Executive Director of WFP,
James Morris, had told President Mugabe "that WFP [has] a
zero tolerance policy for political interference in its feeding
programmes."[148]
John Winter of DFID told us that DFID was contributing to the
WFP programme and was also running bilateral supplementary and
general feeding programmes in Zimbabwe, with its NGO partners.[149]
We applaud these efforts by the international community to
deliver effective relief programmes in the face of political indifference
or hostility by certain governments. DFID and its partners in
the international community must strive to maintain freedom from
political interference in their responses to humanitarian
emergencies, while at the same time ensuring that the humanitarian
imperative remains the overarching principle, irrespective of
the nature of the regime or difficulties in relationships between
international actors and national governments.
DFID's response
87. The principal objective of DFID's humanitarian
regional strategy for southern Africa has been "to support
efforts that enable vulnerable people to survive and cope through
the provision of life saving services and goods, while seeking
to establish the basis for recovery activities that promote sustainable
development."[150]
We were told that DFID's response to the crisis was "led
by the country offices", because the causes were "deeply
rooted in governance and economic and agricultural policy within
the countries."[151]
This country-level response was supported by DFID's regional Food
Security Adviser, based in Harare since April 2002, and by DFID's
Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD), which set
up a Unit in Johannesburg in September 2002.[152]
DFID's response has been extensive and varied (see figure 10);
by 25 February 2003 DFID's humanitarian assistance in the region
since September 2001 amounted to £141 million.[153]
88. If timeliness of response is assessed in
terms of humanitarian need, DFID was late to respond to the food
crisis in 2001/02. It was however the first donor to respond,
and has since demonstrated its commitment to ensuring that a similar
crisis is prevented in 2003 and future years. We have no doubt
that compared with the other donors, who shared DFID's concerns
about governance and corruption, DFID performed well. Indeed one
major donor, DANIDA, the Danish development agency, pulled out
of Malawi completely because of deteriorating relations with the
Government of Malawi. In a recent debate, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
of State, Sally Keeble, stated that: "In Malawi, the Government
and donors agreed in August 2001 that action needed to be taken,
but the Government decided not to ask for outside help. An emergency
was finally declared in February 2002."[154]
This is true, but it fails to explain what happened in the months
between August 2001 and February 2002, or to explain adequately
why DFID and its partners failed to act in late 2001 to prevent
or minimise the tragedy of early 2002.
Figure 10: DFID's response
| Country
| 2000/ 01
Regular
DFID
Spend
(£ m)
| 2001/ 02
Regular
DFID
Spend
(£ m)
| DFID Humanitarian Assistance
|
| Zimb-abwe
| 10.5
| 14.7
| DFID spend is expected to rise to £25 m in 2002/03. Zimbabwe has also benefited from Regional programmes amounting to £33m in 2003/04. DFID has pledged £47m since September 2001 for humanitarian assistance, using NGOs and UN structures to deliver assistance. The UK was an early contributor and is the second largest bilateral donor.
|
| Malawi
| 56
| 43
| DFID is the biggest donor (inc. multilaterals) contributing £62m, including suspended £25m budgetary support. As regards the immediate humanitarian crisis, DFID has spent approximately £34m on food import and distribution, provision of wages for employment on public works programmes, support to agricultural production and rehabilitation of rail and road links on the import corridors.
|
| Zambia
| 52
| 45
| DFID is a big player and contributes funds between five and eight percent of the Government of Zambia's expenditure. As regards the current humanitarian crisis, this year DFID has provided £16.1 million supporting WFP feeding programmes and the distribution through NGOs and the FAO of seeds and tools, and improving food surveillance systems.
|
| Leso-tho
| 2.5
| 2.7
| DFID is supporting the Government's PRSP process. At current forecasts DFID expect to spend approximately £4m on development assistance in 2002/03. As regards the current crisis, DFID responded with an immediate contribution of £1.5m for food through WFP and a later contribution of £0.5m. DFID has provided a further £1 million for essential development assistance for the worst affected areas with a Livelihoods Recovery through Agriculture programme. Under regional funding, DFID is supporting improvements to UNICEF's national surveillance system.
|
| Mozam-bique
| 30
| 40
| Donors fund some 50 percent of Government expenditure. DFID is the fourth largest donor and has a high level of policy influence, particularly through its provision of direct budget support. During the current crisis, DFID has provided just under £2m for interventions related to the drought and is considering a further £300,000. With other donors, and through the national agricultural development programme, DFID supported the distribution of input kits and seed fairs. DFID also funds a longer-term programme in Zambezia Province, in partnership with World Vision, which includes both agricultural and infrastructure development, and supports UNICEF and Red Cross supplementary feeding and food ration programmes and WFP food-distribution programmes.
|
| Swazi-land
| 1.3
| 1.1
| DFID's bilateral programme is declining as DFID moves to implement a new Southern Africa Regional Strategy. At current forecasts we expect to spend approximately £0.5m in 2002/03 on direct development assistance to Swaziland. DFID responded to the current crisis with a donation of £0.25 million through WFP. Under a regional programme, DFID is supporting UNICEF's national surveillance system. DFID is appraising further support for emergency water supplies building on DFID's current Rural Water Supply programme and possible support to SCF's contribution to the National Disaster Task Force.
|
Source: DFID - received on 13 February
2003
89. In the months leading up to the crisis in
Malawi, DFID was asked directly on at least three separate occasions—by
the Minister of Agriculture in Malawi, by concerned experts both
incountry and in the UK, and by international NGOs led by
SCF-UK—to respond to the signals of impending food crisis.
On each occasion, DFID declined to intervene. In late October
2001, DFID chaired a meeting at which Malawi's Minister of Agriculture
asked the donors for food aid to alleviate the shortfall in local
production. DFID declined this request, arguing that the maize-gap
should be bridged by a combination of other food-crops (especially
cassava), Strategic Grain Reserve stocks, commercial imports,
and food aid already pledged (15,000 tons from the EU).[155]
In November 2001, DFID Malawi claimed that there was no overall
shortage of food, giving the impression that there was "no
crisis".[156]
In December 2001, SCFUK appealed to DFID for funding to
launch an emergency programme for Mchinji District, but this request
was declined until the crisis had peaked, three months later.[157]
90. It seems highly likely that DFID was aware
of the unreliability of the Ministry of Agriculture's cassava
production estimates, and of the fact that the government had
sold most of the 165,000 MT of maize in the Strategic Grain
Reserve, leaving no grain stocks to draw upon.[158]
However, DFID claim they were unaware of the extent to which cassava
production was overestimated. The logistical constraints that
hampered the subsequent food import programme could not have been
predicted. DFID acknowledged that they did have "information
on crops, information from rural areas and information on prices"
in Malawi by August/September 2001, but argued that these sources
of information "did conflict".[159]
As John Hansell of DFID admitted: "there was a glitch in
Malawi with the early warning systems."[160]
The second reason given by DFID for what might be perceived as
its inaction was political: "a lot of the discussion with
government in the last quarter of last year was clouded by the
problem of what had happened to the national food reserve."[161]
91. Save the Children Fund UK applauded DFID
for being the first donor to respond to the crisis in Malawi,
but suggested several shortcomings in DFID's response across the
region. These included: DFID's inconsistent engagement with civil
society in different countries at different times; a lack of clarity
about where decision-making was taking place—at national,
regional or London level—which may have delayed DFID's response;
and unclear internal linkages between long-term development programmes
and emergency response, and between the functions of DFID country
offices and DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department.
As SCF-UK wrote: "It was unclear what triggers DFID were
using to prompt an emergency response, with its concomitant requirements
of appropriate scaling-up, urgency of response and the need to
view the crisis within a regional rather than specifically national
context."[162]
In addition, SCF-UK suggested that there were varying degrees
of commitment to the emergency and post-emergency recovery needs
of different countries; high commitment in Malawi and Zimbabwe,
but unclear commitment to Angola and Mozambique.
92. It is important not to lose sight of the
longer-term in responding to the emergency. In this context, SCF-UK
suggested to us that there may be a danger, in the current trend
towards budget support and away from donor financing of projects
and programmes, that the vulnerability of rural livelihoods may
be overlooked. That is, governments receiving budget support may
not prioritise sufficiently investment in rural livelihoods. As
SCF-UK wrote: "Whilst direct budget support to governments
is welcome, this should not be at the expense of livelihood support
initiatives (e.g. in Mozambique where no emergency response is
anticipated)."[163]
DFID—which endorses the move among the donor community towards
budget support—argued that food security, and rural livelihoods
more generally, must be better emphasised within Poverty Reduction
Strategies.[164]
We agree.
Genetically-modified
food aid
93. During 2002, it emerged that genetically-modified
(GM) maize, mainly provided by the United States, was included
in food aid shipments to southern Africa. The Government of Zambia
took strong exception and refused to accept GM food aid. They
felt that GM food aid posed potential health risks to the population,
and that if GM seeds contaminated local crops, Zambian export
farmers might be barred from access to European Union markets.
Referring to the latter possibility, Clare Short suggested to
us that: "I think in the early days when this was being argued,
representatives of the European Commission were not exactly active
in putting down the notion."[165]
94. In October, the Zambian government turned
away 18,000 tonnes of American maize, after also turning down
an offer by DFID to mill the food into flour so that it could
only be consumed, not planted. President Mwanawasa told the international
media: "I'd rather die than eat something toxic." Of
course, in the event of food shortage, it would be the poor and
hungry people of Zambia, rather than the President, who would
die. We take the view that Zambia's decision—and especially
the refusal to accept milled maize which could not possibly have
impacted on Zambia's future export potential as it cannot germinate—was
mistaken, particularly in the context of widespread hunger. This
issue hampered the relief effort to Zambia, as Clare Short explained
to us: "It meant that the humanitarian response was damaged,
there was food in the country, there were hungry people and they
were not allowed to eat it and, indeed, logistics had to be used
to take it out of the country when we had to find other food and
get it into the country."[166]
DFID's estimate of the cost of removing this food and importing
nonGM food was £25£30 million.[167]
95. International opinion on the food safety
and environmental risks attached to GM organisms (GMOs) is divided.
Even within the UK Government there are a range of views. Some
argue that scientific evidence has found no significant health
risks associated with consuming GM crops. Others claim that American
multinationals have cynically exploited recent food crises to
introduce GM crops into African diets and agriculture. At a meeting
about GM food aid on 27 November 2002, Michael Meacher, Minister
of State for the Environment and Agri-Environment, suggested that
countries were being pressured to take GM food for reasons of
GM politics, behaviour which he described as "wicked".[168]
Mr. Meacher's allegation was forcefully denied by the US Embassy.
Clare Short dismissed strongly such allegations in oral evidence.
She described the suggestion made by Greenpeace[169]—that
the US Government, USAID and the GM industry are using the famine
to force the introduction of GM crops—as "a complete
lie."[170]
She described fears that GMOs could pose risks to human health
as "myths", asserting that the World Health Organisation
has declared these fears to be "absolutely untrue".[171]
The Director General of the World Health Organisation (WHO), Dr.
Brundtland, stated on 28 August 2002 that GM foods "are
not likely to present human health risk". Dr. Brundtland
explained that "WHO is not aware of scientifically documented
cases in which consumption of these foods has had negative human
health effects", and concluded that "these foods may
therefore be eaten" and that southern African countries
should consider accepting GM food aid in the face of the humanitarian
crisis facing the region.[172]
We recognise that GM is a complex and fast-moving technology,
but we believe that the UK Government should seek to build a consensus
on the use of GM food aid, and agree a clear and coherent policy
on GM-maize if it is to succeed in persuading food aid recipients
of its benefits.
96. Under the terms of the Cartagena bio-safety
protocol, to which the UK is a signatory, national governments
are encouraged to develop their own regulatory framework for the
importation of GMOs, and informed agreement should guide any importation
decision. Zambia does not yet have a regulatory framework in place,
but took a precautionary stance against importing GM maize, highlighting
in particular the centrality of maize in local diets and livelihoods.
With better information, a different decision may have been reached.
In a country at risk of mass starvation, a different decision
certainly should have been reached. However, if the Cartagena
protocol is to be adhered to, poor countries as well as rich countries
must have the right to determine their position on GMOs, and to
apply the precautionary principle.
97. DFID and other donors—but not the
USA which is a non-signatory—are bound, under the Cartagena
Protocol on bio-safety, to respect the right of aid-dependent
governments to refuse genetically-modified commodities if these
are offered as food aid. We were pleased to hear Clare Short state
that: "We take the view under the Cartagena Convention, the
bio-diversity convention,[173]
that every country has the right to decide for itself whether
to import GM food or seeds and needs the capacity to be able to
think about it and make the decision in an intelligent way."[174]
It seems to us that this is at heart an issue of governance; an
accountable government, making decisions intelligently, would
surely not opt for a policy of rejecting GM food aid when many
of its citizens face starvation?
98. WFP told us that: "The lesson we are
learning is that we have to have a good, sound, solid discussion
about GM and the commodities that are available before we go into
humanitarian situations in terms of what governments will and
will not receive. We have to be very clear with our cash donors
that we are going to need more cash in the future. We cannot depend
on 50 per cent of commodities coming from the United States Government,
so we have to do a lot more effort and energy in discussions up-front
before we get into a humanitarian situation."[175]
Donors should make every effort to provide food and non-food
aid of a type and form acceptable to recipients. Looking beyond
the current emergency, donors should also make more concerted
efforts to source food staples locally as this is likely to be
nutritionally-appropriate and culturally-preferred, is less likely
to be genetically-modified, and will often be cheaper than shipping
food aid from Europe and North America. In regions like southern
Africa, where markets are relatively well-developed except in
the most isolated rural areas, more consideration should be given
to providing relief aid in the form of cash rather than food,
as this maximises choice and supports rather than undermines local
food producers and traders.
The humanitarian response:
Conclusions and lessons
99. There is no room for complacency, but
the humanitarian response has so far been a success.[176]
Overall, we commend DFID and its partners in the international
community for responding generously to the crisis in Southern
Africa in 2002, after a slow start and in the face of difficult
governance contexts in several countries. We
agree with Judith Lewis of WFP, that "the lack of emaciated
and starving people on our television screens should be heralded
as a success", rather than as proof that initial assessments
of need were exaggerated.[177]
We are reassured that every effort is being taken to avert famine
deaths and protect rural livelihoods in the crisis-affected countries,
and that the food security situation in Southern Africa is currently
under control. However, we agree too with the assessment made
by Rob Holden of DFID's Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department.
He stated that: "there has been good work done up to now
and food has got in but it is time to take stock, it is time to
make sure that where the need for food is required that should
continue but we need to take a more analytical, more strategic
approach making sure that the continuing operation is clearly
targeted, [that] it is based on assessed need and, more important,
[that] it does very minimal damage to people's recovery systems
and people's coping systems."[178]
100. It is highly likely that there will be
recurrent food shortages and subsistence crises in countries such
as Malawi and Zimbabwe in the next few years. Indeed, food shortages
are likely to continue beyond the March harvest, which, in many
countries is expected to be disappointing. We therefore urge
the donor community and its regional partners (governments, SADC,
NGOs and civil society) to establish contingency plans, such as
pre-positioning of food stocks in the region, technical support
to national safety net programmes, including better planned and
transparently-managed Strategic Grain Reserves, and greater dialogue
with the private sector to enhance coordination between public
and private food flows. Those responsible for ensuring food security
in the countries of southern Africa—including national Governments,
the SADC-Food Agriculture and Natural Resources Vulnerability
Assessment Committee, DFID, WFP and other bilateral and multilateral
donors, NGOs and community-based organisations active in poverty
reduction activities in the region—must establish clear
criteria for predicting food shortages, declaring humanitarian
emergencies, and mobilising relief resources. This requires institutional
strengthening and coordination. To this end, national governments
and their donor partners should consider establishing permanent
Food Security and Evaluation Units, probably located in Ministries
of Agriculture, which would liase closely with local Vulnerability
Committees. [179]
101. As for the longer term, steps must be
taken to reduce vulnerability to food production shocks. These
will include: encouraging diversification away from maize and
even out of agriculture for some of the population; providing
appropriate support to poor households affected by HIV/AIDS; and
where direct budgetary support is given, prioritising household
food security within Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes.
134 
