APPENDIX 4
Memorandum submitted by Carlos Barahona
and Sarah Levy, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Consultants
to DFID and the Malawi Government for the 1999-2000 Starter Pack
and 2000-01 and 2001-02 Targeted Inputs Programmes
ABOUT US
1. We have carried out 13 nationwide research
studies in Malawi since 1999. They include surveys, participatory
studies and case studies. They cover smallholder farming, food
security, free inputs, market linkages, farmers' livelihoods and
coping strategies, cultural values, poverty and population size.
All the study reports, data and other analysis are available on
CD-ROM (the Free Inputs Programmes M&E Archive 1999-2002)
from ourselves or from DFID-Malawi. We believe that this archive
is the most comprehensive collection of information available
on these subjects.
MAIN POINTS
2. The main points that we would like to
make to the inquiry can be grouped under the headings: the scale
of food insecurity; the reasons for under-production of food;
natural and human causes of the crisis; the need for a medium-term
rural development strategy; sustainable agriculture; and taking
the evidence seriously, including response to early warnings.
These topics are explored in the following paragraphs.
3. THE
SCALE OF
FOOD INSECURITY
The food crisis of 2002 was not a one-off event.
The evidence suggests that it will be repeated in 2003 and in
future years (see paragraph 5 below). How many people are likely
to be affected in 2003? Our food security survey—the only
such nationwide survey in 2002—shows that 45-50 per cent
of smallholder farm households faced extreme hunger in the period
from February to April 2002. Depending on which population figures
you believe, this implies that between 4.3 and 5.8 million people
in rural areas were seriously short of food in the 2002 lean period[11].
Malawi has a production deficit of around 780,000 tonnes of maize
in 2002-03, compared with some 600,000 tonnes in 2001-02 (see
paragraph 7 below). Therefore it seems likely—unless large
amounts of food can be imported—that some 4-6 million people
in rural areas will be affected in 2003.
4. Our research shows that most smallholder
farmers in Malawi are extremely poor and not self-sufficient in
maize. In the lean period, they are net purchasers of maize.
We found that 86 per cent of rural smallholder households bought
maize in the 2002 lean period. Their purchasing capacity was massively
eroded by the increase in prices. We believe that policies
that help to keep maize prices low are pro-poor policies.
5. THE
REASONS FOR
UNDER-PRODUCTION
OF FOOD
Maize is the main staple food crop in Malawi.
In the context of infertile soils and degraded seed stocks that
is found in much of the country, crop yields are very low without
improved seed and fertiliser. Farmers are aware of the need to
buy these inputs, but our research found that in 2000-01 and 2001-02,
two-thirds of smallholders could not afford to do so. The
key reason for under-production of maize is that smallholders
cannot afford to buy inputs. For each season that they continue
to lack inputs, production will be insufficient to meet the needs
of the population, food prices will rise sharply and crises will
result.
6. NATURAL
AND HUMAN
CAUSES
The smallholder sub-sector accounts for around
nine tenths of total maize production in Malawi. Smallholder farmers
were hit by agricultural liberalisation in the 1990s and a sharp
increase in the price of fertilizer (owing mainly to depreciation
of the kwacha) in 2000-01. In addition, in 2000-01 and 2001-02
they faced the scaling down of the free inputs programme which
had provided support and helped sustain maize output in 1999 and
2000.
7. We can clearly distinguish between the
contribution of the weather factor and free inputs to total maize
production in Malawi in recent years. The 1998-99 and 1999-2000
seasons were good, while the 2000-01 and 2001-02 seasons were
moderate/poor in weather terms. In the 1999 and 2000 harvests,
underlying production of maize reached 1.65 and 1.86 million tonnes
respectively and universal Starter Pack provided additional output
of around 500,000 tonnes and 350,000 tonnes respectively. In the
2001 harvest, underlying production fell to 1.42 million tonnes.
Starter Pack—renamed the Targeted Inputs Programme (TIP)—was
cut from 2.86 million beneficiaries (universal) to 1.5 million
beneficiaries in the 2000-01 season and contributed only around
75,000 tonnes to the 2001 harvest. Maize prices rose sharply.
In 2002, underlying production of maize fell further, to 1.28
million tonnes, and TIP, further scaled down to 1 million beneficiaries,
contributed around 40,000 tonnes.
8. THE
NEED FOR
A MEDIUM-TERM
STRATEGY
We believe that in addition to humanitarian
relief efforts and reforms of certain government bodies, an effort
is needed to tackle the medium-term problem of under-production
of food. There is no doubt that enabling smallholder farmers to
grow enough food to feed themselves is much cheaper than importing
it, particularly when the whole Southern African region is affected
by food scarcity. Universal Starter Pack is a proven, efficient
method of achieving food security, and food security is clearly
a pre-requisite for the success of any poverty reduction and development
efforts.
9. However, Starter Pack should be part
of a broad rural development strategy which would eventually reduce
dependence on free inputs. In our view, the Government of Malawi
should give priority to developing a medium-term rural development
strategy focusing on the smallholder sub-sector. The strategy
should include measures to improve smallholders' livelihood opportunities
and incomes, as well as Starter Pack.
10. Donors should differentiate clearly
between medium-term strategy and crisis interventions. Many of
the donors hold the view that Malawians should decrease their
dependence on maize. This is an unpopular argument with Malawians,
who have a strong cultural preference for maize. There is a valid
argument for diversification on food security grounds. However,
the short-term reality is one of high dependence on maize. During
the 2002 food crisis, telling starving people to "eat something
else" when very little was available at affordable prices,
as some donors did, was unhelpful.
11. SUSTAINABLE
AGRICULTURE
The medium-term strategy should include:
— Injection of good maize and legume
seed via Starter Packs.
— Village maize seed banks for Open
Pollinated Variety (OPV) maize seed multiplication, as part of
future free inputs programmes.
— Crop diversification to reduce risks
of failure for farmers and combat over-dependence on a single
food crop (maize).
12. TAKING
THE EVIDENCE
SERIOUSLY, INCL.
RESPONSE TO
EARLY WARNINGS
In our view, more needs to be done to ensure
that evidence from research is taken on board by policy makers,
donors and other stakeholders, and that appropriate action is
taken as a result.
13. The Malawi Government and some of the
donors—in particular the EU Food Security Office—did
not take the early warning signals about food crisis seriously
in the 2001-02 season. As a result, much valuable time and many
lives were lost. Development activities were undermined as poor
Malawians focused on trying to meet immediate food needs. There
is a need to create a system for translating early food
crisis warnings into action. The system should agree on indicators
which would ring alarm bells—such as a low maize harvest
and sharp increases in key food prices.
14. Finally, there is a need to continue
to collect reliable evidence about food security. Various donor
missions which visited the country in March 2002 found a lack
of reliable data. In the past three years, we have trained a team
from the Ministry of Agriculture to carry out our surveys to internationally
acceptable standards. We believe that it is important that the
Ministry "institutionalise" it by setting up an Agriculture
and Food Security M&E unit comprising these trained personnel.
Carlos Barahona, Senior Statistician, Statistical
Services Centre, The University of Reading
Sarah Levy, Economist, Calibre Consultants (UK)
October 2002
11 The conservative estimate is based on the 1998
census. Our research suggests that the 1998 census undercounted
the rural population. Back
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