The inquiry and the report(s)
5. We announced our inquiry into "Trade and
development: Aspects of the Doha Agenda" on 26 November 2002,
and invited organisations with relevant experience or expertise
- and particularly those based in developing countriesto
submit written evidence. We intended to produce a single report
in July 2003, but mid-way through the inquiry we decided that
it would better serve our aims to extend the inquiry until after
the Cancún Ministerial, and to produce two reports. This
is the first of these reports, and is focused on issues which
are directly relevant for Cancún; other issues will be
addressed in a post-Cancún report.
6. Our aim in this report is not to provide a comprehensive
assessment of the relationship between multilateral trade rules,
national trade policies, trade and poverty reduction. The UK Government's
views on these matters are set out in its second White Paper on
International Development;[6]
alternative perspectives are widely available.[7]
Neither is it our aim to question the wisdom of WTO members seeking
to place the needs and interests of developing countries at the
heart of a round of negotiations which is based upon hard-bargaining
between states with vastly unequal resources, although we do consider
how this circle might best be squared. Rather, our aim is to maximise
the chances of the current round of WTO negotiations amounting
to a genuine development round, by influencing the UK Government's
input into the EU's positions before and at Cancún.[8]
Our second aim is to encourage the Government and through them
the EU to ensure that developing countries can play a full, active
and well-informed part in negotiations. In addition, we hope that
this report will inform our Parliamentary colleagues about Cancún
and the WTO's "Development Round".
7. We have made considerable efforts to listen to
the views of organisations and representatives from developing
countries, including pioneering the use of video-link technology
by a Select Committee for a public evidence session. In addition
to hearing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the South
Centre, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and
the World Bank - we have met or received evidence from Heads of
Government, Ambassadors, negotiators, parliamentarians, business
organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from Bangladesh,
China, Ethiopia, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa
and Thailand. But we make no claim to speak for them. Developing
countries, and people within those countries, hold a wide variety
of views about trade, development and the WTO. Their views must
be listened to and taken seriously within the WTO if there is
to be any chance of the "Doha Development Agenda" producing
a genuine development round.
8. In chapter two we examine the notion of a "Development
Round", explaining why one is needed, and outlining what
we believe are the necessary components of a genuine development
round. In chapters three and four we examine - for a range of
issueswhat was agreed at Doha; assess what the current
state of play is; examine the key issues; and suggest what the
UK Government should do to maximise the chances of a development-friendly
outcome. In chapter three our focus is agriculture, the most important
and most intractable of the issues. In chapter four we look beyond
agriculture, considering: non-agricultural market access; the
"new" or "Singapore Issues" of investment,
competition, transparency in government procurement, and trade
facilitation; Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS);
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and commodities.
Whilst chapters three and four include suggestions about what
should be done in particular issue areas to achieve a development
round, in chapter five we examine two other components which are
fundamental to a genuine development round: effective participation
by developing countries; and, the creation of development-friendly
rules. Finally, we emphasise the importance of policy coherence,
political commitment, and the opportunity and responsibility which
the UK has to provide leadership in making Cancún a successful
staging post in a genuine development round.
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