GATS: Maintaining the right to
regulate?
109. Services and trade in services are increasingly
important to developing countries.[237]
At Dhaka recently, LDC trade ministers noted that the services
sector is the "fastest growing component of GDP growth in
many LDC countries", and that along with generating economic
benefits services play an important role in achieving social and
economic development objectives.[238]
Services, provided by the public and the private sector, have
a vital role to play in development and poverty reduction. Private
sector involvement in service provision, properly regulated, is
essential to improving the supply of public services and the lives
of poor people. As Pascal Lamy explained, the idea that the developing
world is a landscape of high-quality efficient providers of public
services which the developed world is seeking to undermine by
forced privatisation is pure fantasy.[239]
110. The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
was established in 1995. GATS seeks to establish a framework of
legally-binding multilateral rules, which, by increasing certainty,
security and transparency, and guaranteeing market access, will
make it easier for firms to sell their services in foreign markets.[240]
GATS commits member governments to undertake negotiations on specific
issues and to enter into successive rounds of negotiations to
progressively and—effectively irreversibly—liberalise
trade in services. Restrictions which apply to foreign but not
domestic firms must first be listed, and then progressively removed
as liberalisation proceeds.
Negotiations on services began in 2000
and were incorporated into the "Development Agenda"
at Doha, where Ministers declared that "negotiations on trade
in services shall be conducted with a view to promoting the economic
growth of all trading partners and the development of developing
and least-developed countries."[241]
The Declaration recognised the work that had already been undertaken,
reaffirmed the guidelines and procedures for negotiations, and
reiterated the need for appropriate flexibility to be granted
to developing countries.
111. The GATS Agreement differs from most other WTO
agreements in two ways. First, it is designed to work through
a bottom-up or positive-list approach. Countries choose which
sectors to liberalise, and to what extent to liberalise them.
Second, negotiations proceed through requests and offers. Countries
make requests to other countries to open up particular sectors,
and countries make offers to open up particular sectors. These
offers and requests then become the subject of bilateral bargaining
between requesting and offering countries. At Doha, countries
were invited to submit requests to other countries for GATS commitments
by 30 June 2002, and to respond with offers by 31 March 2003.
Cancún is to be a stocktaking exercise, and negotiations
are to be completed as part of the Single Undertaking by 1 January
2005. Thirty WTO members have tabled GATS requests. The US and
the EU made detailed requests of many countries for market access
commitments in most services sectors. Some developing countries,
including India, made requests of developed countries in relation
to the temporary movement of labour. By 30 June 2003 twenty-seven
had submitted offers. Only one is an LDC (Senegal); the vast majority
of the rest are developed countries.[242]
Also in June, a group of 26 developing countries described progress
as moderate, and suggested that there was a need to increase the
number of requests and offers.[243]
112. GATS has come in for severe criticism from many
NGOs, particularly as regards its possible impact on the provision
of pro-poor public services.[244]
But from a development perspective the positive-list approach
to liberalisation makes GATS perhaps the best-designed WTO Agreement.
Patricia Hewitt reported to us that GATS is seen by most developing
country governments as "a model of a trade agreement precisely
because it is bottom up and it allows governments to determine
the pace and the extent of market opening for themselves",[245]
a view which was endorsed with some reservations by Lakshmi Puri
at UNCTAD.[246]
But the NGO campaign on GATS persists. Patricia Hewitt described
it as a dialogue of the deaf,[247]
suggesting that the NGOs do not understand GATS and that whilst
their criticisms may have been warranted in relation to the mid-1990s
proposal for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment, in relation
to GATS their fear is unfounded.[248]
113. Some critics claim that GATS will lead to privatisation.
The Government on the other hand asserts that "it is totally
a matter of legal fact that GATS does not and cannot require any
government, whether it is us or one of the poorest countries in
the world, to privatise public services or indeed to open markets
that a government does not want to open."[249]
This is true. GATS cannot force the privatisation of public services;
indeed services supplied exclusively by public authorities are
excluded. In addition, the Government emphasises that "properly
regulated private sector participation in public services can
sometimes provide increased efficiency and investment which brings
real benefits to poor people."[250]
We concur with this too. But that is not the end of the matter.
114. GATS does not force privatisation, but if that
option has been selected then it will be "locked-in"
by GATS. The provision of such certainty is part of GATS' raison
d'être. Some NGOs fear that GATS may lock-in privatisation
policies that developing countries have been pressurised to implement
as a condition of receiving financial assistance from the International
Financial Institutions (IFIs). Some NGOs are concerned too that
if countries privatise or partially privatise the provision of
public services this may make such services a legitimate target
for GATS requests.[251]
Public services are excluded from GATS, but the situation as regards
services delivered through public-private partnerships is less
clear. Both of these issues—locking-in privatisation and
opening up public services for GATS requests—are legitimate
concerns which raise important issues about the coherence of policies
followed by the WTO and other international organisations. A further
coherence issue concerns the crediting of developing countries
within the GATS negotiations for liberalisation undertaken "autonomously"
and at the behest of the IFIs. These are not insurmountable problems,
but they do demand the vigilance of the UK and others who are
keen to ensure that GATS really is development-friendly.
115. Critics of GATS are also concerned that a country
making GATS commitments will effectively surrender its right to
regulate the provision of services in those sectors which are
part of its GATS commitments. The Government denies this, pointing
out that GATS recognises explicitly the right of governments to
regulate for national policy objectives. The Government argues
that national treatment—the requirement that domestic and
foreign enterprises are treated in the same way—does not
remove a country's right to regulate. Rather it means that whatever
level and type of regulation a country decides upon must apply
equally to domestic and foreign firms.[252]
This is a helpful clarification, but it should be noted that some
developing countries, including the Least Developed Countries,
regard the right to discriminate in favour of local firms as important.[253]
116. GATS guarantees governments' right to regulate.
But, Article VI.4 of GATS does require countries to develop rules
aimed at restricting their domestic regulation to measures which
are "not more burdensome than necessary." This may limit
the right to regulate. Whether or not GATS will limit a country's
right to regulate in a pro-poor manner would seem to hinge on
whether such regulation is deemed "more burdensome than necessary."
The UK Government supports the development of a "necessity
test" and proposes to add to GATS some wording which will
require that a regulatory measure be proportionate to its objective.
Judgements will need to be made about necessity and proportionality.
Such judgements need not rule out pro-poor regulation. But to
address the concern that judgements made by the WTO's dispute
settlement panel may not be development-friendly, any tests of
necessity and proportionality must leave space for nationally-determined
pro-poor development policies.
117. For its supporters the architecture of GATS,
and what they perceive as the WTO's democracy, will ensure that
developing countries are not unduly pressured into making liberalisation
commitments. As Patricia Hewitt insisted: "The whole GATS
process depends on governments making requests and then governments
making offers. Obviously nobody has to accept a request if they
do not want to."[254]
GATS is designed to allow developing countries to choose the scope,
speed and extent of liberalisation. And in a multilateral forum,
developing countries perhaps have more power to refuse requests
for market opening. But the critics of GATS dispute this.[255]
They point out that whilst GATS is an opt-in process, its aim
is progressive liberalisation. So, as Ambassador Ransford Smith
put it: "the freedom that you thought you had is precisely
what is being targeted when you next negotiate."[256]
They also suggest that in practice GATS boils down to a series
of bilateral negotiations. These points are true, but they are
aspects of GATS to which WTO members willingly signed up. And
at present there is no evidence of developing countries having
been forced to accede to requests. As Mauro Petriccione of the
European Commission noted: "I think that the history of the
original GATS negotiation—and what we are seeing across
the board in the Doha development agenda—shows that our
ability to twist the arm of developing countries, even if we wanted
to, is not what it is said to be."[257]
118. If countries are to gain benefits from the GATS
negotiations—making sensible offers and requests, and refusing
requests that are not in their best interests—they must
be able to make well-informed decisions. This requires that a
country is able to determine its interests and the likely implications
of agreeing to liberalise, and has the capacity to understand,
follow and participate in complex negotiations. Given the complexity
of GATS, and the detailed requests made by the EU and others,
there are serious concerns about whether developing countries
have the capacity and information to make well-informed decisions
about GATS. LDC trade ministers recently drew attention to their
"difficulties in addressing complex issues of Services negotiations
due to a lack of institutional and human capacities", calling
for this to be factored in to the process of making requests of
and negotiating with the LDCs.[258]
We are concerned about the ability of developing countries
to handle negotiations on GATS and urge the UK and its developed
country partners to seek to ensure that developing countries can
participate effectively (see paras 129-134). A rushed process,
with developing countries unable to follow negotiations, will
not make for a development-friendly outcome, and would be detrimental
to the long-term health of the multilateral trading system.
119. The Government has played an important role
in building the capacity of developing country negotiators. This
is very welcome. The Government is also supporting an assessment
of GATS by UNCTAD.[259]
This too is very welcome although it remains to be seen whether
this will satisfy the GATS Guidelines' request for an "assessment
of trade in services on overall terms and on a sectoral basis",
so that the negotiation process can be revised in the light of
this assessment.[260]
Nevertheless, along with UNCTAD, the Government is to
be applauded for its commitment to assessing GATS and for its
tentative acknowledgement that there may be some lessons to be
learnt from how GATS operates in practice.[261]
There is perhaps some hope that the "dialogue of the deaf"
on GATS might be replaced by a more useful conversation. NGOs
have a responsibility in this regard too; to portray GATS and
its implications as fairly and accurately as possible, and to
shift the balance of their commentary from outright condemnation
to constructive advocacy.
120. Developing countries are particularly interested
in progress with what is termed Mode 4 of GATS.[262]
Mode 4 concerns the trading of services through temporary migration.
Recent research suggests that a visa scheme allowing three percent
of the OECD labour force to be provided by the temporary movement
of labour would produce economic benefits for developed and developing
countries amounting to between $150 and $200 billion.[263]
Progress on Mode 4 has been painfully slow. In the Dhaka Declaration,
the LDCs noted that there had been—"virtually no liberalization
of markets for cross-border labour services."[264]
Security concerns post-September 11th may hamper progress
on Mode 4, and care will be needed to minimise and compensate
for the loss of skilled and trained personnel from developing
countries, but the potential benefits for developing countries—particularly
if the developed world were to offer market access to low-skilled
labour—cannot be ignored. We intend to return to this issue,
the relationship between migration and development, in a future
inquiry. In the meantime we urge the Government and the EU
to consider seriously developing country requests on Mode 4.
121. If attention is paid to how GATS works in
practice, it could fulfil its promise of being the WTO's most
development-friendly agreement. It could provide a model for other
agreements. But for this to happen, WTO members need to ensure
that the development-friendly architecture of GATS is translated
into development-friendly outcomes. Otherwise GATS could
join the TRIPS Agreement in being regarded as little more than
a burden for many developing countries. The UK and the EU have
a huge responsibility. If GATS is to fulfil its promise, the UK
and the EU must ensure that the right to regulate includes the
right to regulate for development as well as to provide a welcoming
business environment. They must ensure that this right is supported
by the IFIs. They must not put undue pressure on developing countries
to make liberalisation commitments. They must seek to address
capacity constraints. And they must—in return for market
access commitments for their service providers—make progress
on Mode 4.
Commodities: Sustaining livelihoods?
122. It is not the role of the WTO to stabilise prices
or sustain livelihoods, but a report on trade and development
cannot neglect the crisis currently facing commodity producers.
Commodity dependence and extreme poverty, particularly amongst
the LDCs, are very much linked and "commodity dependency
continues unabated."[265]
Coffee provides a good example. More than 50 developing countries
depend on three or fewer commodities for at least 50 percent of
their export earnings. In Uganda, a quarter of the population
depends in some way on coffee production. In Ethiopia, coffee
provides more than half of export revenues; in Burundi, the dependency
ratio is more than 80 percent.[266]
123. The crisis for commodity producers is that the
share of commodities in world trade has been declining for at
least 50 years, and prices have been falling and remain volatile.
The price of coffee beans has fallen by nearly 50 percent in the
past three years to a 30-year low.[267]
The world market for coffee has expanded from $30 billion per
year in the early 1990s, to $60 billion in 2000-01, but the developing
countries' share of this revenue has shrunk from around $10 billion
to just under $6 billion. Not only are developing countries earning
a smaller share of the coffee market, they are also earning less
in absolute terms.[268]
Lower export earnings means lower growth, lower investment in
basic public services, and less development. For coffee-farmers'
families lower earnings means less money to buy food and schoolbooks,
less money to pay for health services, increased insecurity, and
less money to invest in alternative livelihoods.
124. The immediate cause of the situation facing
coffee growers is low, declining and volatile export earnings.
The deeper cause is the nature of the international coffee market:
excess supply and a buyer's market, resulting in low prices and
a small share for those at the bottom of the commodity chain.
The supply of coffee has increased as a result of new producers
such as Vietnam, being encouraged to move into coffee by the World
Bank, and technological change which allows the use of lower quality
beans. At the processing level, the market is dominated by a small
number of companies including Kraft, Nestlé, Procter and
Gamble, and Sara Lee. Each of these firms is in a powerful position
to dictate the terms of trade down through the commodity chain.
Oxfam reports that Nestlé makes 26p profit for every £1
of instant coffee sold,[269]
whilst coffee growers receive only 6 pence.[270]
125. A long-term solution to the commodity crisis
is for developing countries to reduce their dependence on a small
number of commodities by diversifying their economies, and exporting
products which can earn them more, and more stable, revenue. A
medium-term solution would lead to commodity-dependent countries
and smallholders receiving a higher income for their efforts.
Various measures have been suggested but as Oxfam acknowledges
there is no magic policy that will solve the coffee crisis overnight.
First, as Sainsbury's and Co-operative Retail particularly explained
to us, niche marketing of products on the basis of their being
produced in particular places or in particular ways (including
organically), and fair trade can provide higher prices to farmers.[271]
Second, actions taken to reduce the supply and increase the quality
of coffee may also increase the prices received by farmers; this
indeed is something that coffee-producing governments have agreed
to do under the auspices of the International Coffee Organisation.
Nestlé supports this move. Third, coffee-producing countries
should be encouraged and assisted to move up the commodity chain
by adding more value to their coffee prior to its export. As the
Prime Minister of Ethiopia explained, when coffee prices fall
it is the people at the bottom of the commodity chain who suffer
most. If Ethiopian producers could move to the "softer end"
of the market, they would fare better.[272]
Fourth, although there is little support for such a step given
their previous perceived failures, international action might
be taken to stabilise the price of commodities through the sort
of international commodity policies supported by UNCTAD and others
in the 1970s.
126. The WTO has a marginal role to play in relation
to these measures. But by tackling tariff escalation the WTO could
enable coffee producers to add more value prior to export. As
Franz Fischler intimated, rather than protecting Nestlé
and other companies, the EU and other developed country markets
should be tackling tariff escalation.[273]
Tariff reduction would also open up possibilities for coffee-producing
countries and farmers to diversify into other areas. Reducing
tariffs and protection on dairy, sugar, bananas and cotton would
provide new and improved trading opportunities for many developing
countries, and reduce countries over-dependence on such a narrow
range of commodities.
127. The WTO is not central to tackling the commodity
crisis, but a development-friendly agreement on agriculture which
reduced tariffs, tackled tariff escalation and provided processed
coffee and other goods from developing countries with easier access
to Northern markets, would enable countries to better address
the crisis. This illustrates the need for coherent and coordinated
policies at international and national levels. Donors should commit
themselves to assisting commodity-dependent countries and farmers
to increase their productivity, to add more value, and to diversify
their activities. And, to increase coherence further, serious
consideration should be given to linking the debt service schedules
of commodity-dependent LDCs to changes in commodity prices which
are beyond their control.
167 Q 489 [Rob Davies, South African National Assembly] Back
168
Q 460 [David Willers, South African Sugar Association] Back
169
UNCTAD, Back to basics: Market access issues in the Doha agenda,
2003, p. 27. Back
170
Ev 5, para 23 [HMG memo] Back
171
This issue, whilst important, is not a key issue for Cancún.
We will return to it in a post-Cancún report. Back
172
Ev 285, para 8 [CREDIT memorandum]. In correspondence with the
Committee, Oliver Morrissey of CREDIT confirmed that "It
would be fair to say that trade taxes rarely account for less
than 15% of government revenue and often account for over 50%
in sub-Saharan African countries." Back
173
Ev 116 [Save the Children memorandum] Back
174
WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, para 16 - see footnote 3. Back
175
Ev 250, para 3.4 [ActionAid memorandum] Back
176
Q 83 [H.E. Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic
of Ethiopia] Back
177
Q 489 [Rob Davies, South African National Assembly] and Ev 139
[Co-operative Retail memorandum] Back
178
Q 383 [Charles Gore, UNCTAD] Back
179
Q 489 [Rob Davies, South African National Assembly] Back
180
WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, para 42 - see footnote 3. Back
181
Second LDC Trade Ministers Meeting, Dhaka declaration, 2 June
2003, p. 5, para 5-see footnote 84. Back
182
Q 92 [H.E. Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic
of Ethiopia] Back
183
Ev 23, answer 4 [DFID response to written questions] Back
184
DFID, India Country Strategy Paper, p. 1. Back
185
Ev 285, para 7 [CREDIT memorandum] and Ev 262, para 29 [Action
for Southern Africa memorandum] Back
186
Q 497 [Rob Davies, South African National Assembly] Back
187
Q 324 [Richard Eglin, WTO] Back
188
ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children and
World Development Movement, Unwanted, unproductive and unbalanced:
Six arguments against an investment agreement at the WTO, May
2003, p. 7. Available at http://www.oxfam.org.uk/policy/papers/argumentswto/sixarguments.htm Back
189
WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, paras 20. 23. 26 and 27 - see
footnote 3. See also ICTSD and IISD, Doha Round Briefings Series,
Singapore Issues, February 2003 - see footnote 133. Back
190
Ev 7, paras 34-37 [HMG memorandum] Back
191
The Federal Trust, Expanding WTO rules? June 2003, p. 9-see footnote
81. Back
192
Ev 1, para 3 [HMG memorandum] Back
193
HMG, UK Government briefing on the proposed WTO agreements on
investment and competition, 16 June 2003, p. 2. Available at http://www.dti.gov.uk/ewt/ukgvt.pdf Back
194
Second LDC Trade Ministers Meeting, Dhaka declaration, 2 June
2003, p. 14 - see footnote 84. See also WTO, The Doha agenda:
Towards Cancún, Communication from Argentina, Bolivia,
Botswana, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Malaysia,
Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand,
Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe, 6 June 2003, (TN/C/W/13), p.
3 - available at http://www.wto.org Back
195
Q 116 [Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry] Back
196
Q 47 [Elaine Drage, DTI] and Ev 26, answer 12 [DFID response to
written questions] Back
197
Ev 26, answer 12 [DFID response to written questions]. See also
The Federal Trust, Expanding WTO rules?, June 2003, footnote 3
- see footnote 81. Back
198
Second LDC Trade Ministers Meeting, Dhaka declaration, 2 June
2003, p. 15, para 30a-see footnote 84. Back
199
ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children and
World Development Movement, Unwanted, unproductive and unbalanced:
Six arguments against an investment agreement at the WTO, May
2003 - see footnote 188. Back
200
Ev 7, para 34 [HMG memorandum] Back
201
Ev 291, para 17 [CBI memorandum] Back
202
World Bank, Global Economic Prospects, 2003, p. 133. Available
at http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gep2003/ Back
203
HMG, UK Government briefing on the proposed WTO agreements on
investment and competition, 16 June 2003, p. 7-see footnote 193. Back
204
Ev 26, answer 12 [DFID response to written questions] Back
205
Q 365 [Carlos Fortin, UNCTAD] Back
206
Q 78 [Michael Bailey, Oxfam] Back
207
ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam, Save the Children and
World Development Movement, Unwanted, unproductive and unbalanced:
Six arguments against an investment agreement at the WTO, May
2003, p. 3 - see footnote 188. Back
208
HMG, UK Government briefing on the proposed WTO agreements on
investment and competition, 16 June 2003, p. 8-see footnote 193. Back
209
Ev 7, para 35 [HMG memorandum] - "development" was underlined
in the original document. Back
210
HMG, UK Government briefing on the proposed WTO agreements on
investment and competition, 16 June 2003, p. 8-see footnote 193. Back
211
Q 517 [Valerie Amos, Secretary of State for International Development] Back
212
Ev 36, section 4 [CAFOD memorandum]; Ev 256, section 8.1 [ActionAid
memorandum]; Ev 126, section 4 [World Development Movement memorandum];
Ev 51, para 57 [Oxfam memorandum]; and Q 72 [Claire Melamed, Christian
Aid] Back
213
Q 517 [Valerie Amos, Secretary of State for International Development] Back
214
Second LDC Trade Ministers Meeting, Dhaka declaration, 2 June
2003, p. 14, para 28 -see footnote 84. Back
215
Ev 26, answer 12 [DFID response to written questions] Back
216
Q 153 [Pascal Lamy, European Commission] Back
217
Q 53 [Duncan Green, CAFOD] Back
218
Q 359 [Carlos Fortin, UNCTAD] Back
219
Q 491 [Rob Davies, South African National Assembly] Back
220
Q 517 [Valerie Amos, Secretary of State for International Development] Back
221
The Federal Trust, Expanding WTO rules?, June 2003-see footnote
81. Back
222
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating intellectual
property rights and development policy, 2002, p.174. Available
at http://www.iprcommission.org/ Back
223
Ev 6, para 31 [HMG memorandum] Back
224
In 2001 the UK Government took the highly commendable step of
establishing an independent international Commission on Intellectual
Property Rights. The Commission reported in September 2002 and
the UK Government responded in turn in May 2003. We will consider
the report, the Government's response and wider issues concerning
IPRs in a post-Cancún report. Back
225
Ev 6, para 31 [HMG memorandum] Back
226
International Development Committee, Third Report of Session 2002-03,
The humanitarian crisis in Southern Africa, HC116, paras 141-153.
Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmintdev/690/690.pdf Back
227
WTO, Ministerial declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 14 November 2001, (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2), para 4 - available
at http://www.wto.org- see also Ev 6, para 33 [HMG memorandum] Back
228
WTO, Ministerial declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, para 6. Back
229
Ev 253, para 5.7 [ActionAid memorandum] Back
230
WTO, Ministerial declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, para 6. Back
231
Q 508 [Baroness Amos, Secretary of State for International Development] Back
232
Q 501 [Rob Davies, South African National Assembly] Back
233
Q 118 [Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry] Back
234
Ev 314, section 5 [Quaker Peace and Social Witness memorandum] Back
235
Q 157 [Pascal Lamy, European Commission] Back
236
Ev 250, para 3.7 [Oxfam memorandum] Back
237
Such claims are not made in the evidence we received, but the
close relationship between GATS and privatisation is a key theme
of some NGOs' campaigning. The World Development Movement's "Sale
of the century" national tour is one example. Back
238
Second LDC Trade Ministers Meeting, Dhaka declaration, 2 June
2003, p. 6, para 9 -see footnote 84. Back
239
Q 155 [Pascal Lamy, European Commission] Back
240
Q 116 [Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry] Back
241
WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, para 15 - see footnote 3. Back
242
Communication from WTO. Countries are: Argentina, Australia; Bahrain;
Canada; Chinese Taipei; Czech Republic; European Communities and
its Member States; Fiji; Hong Kong, China; Iceland; Israel; Japan;
Republic of Korea; Liechtenstein; Macao; China; Mexico; New Zealand;
Norway; Panama; Paraguay; Poland; Senegal; Slovenia; St Christopher
and Nevis; Switzerland; United States and Uruguay. Back
243
WTO, The Doha agenda: Towards Cancún, 6 June 2003, (TN/C/W/13),
p. 2, paras 11 and 12-see footnote 194. Back
244
Save the Children, GATS and water: The threat of services negotiations
at the WTO, 2003 - available at http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/campaigns/trade/GATSandwater.pdf-
see also Ev 118 [World Development Movement memorandum] Back
245
Q 120 [Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry].
See also Q 43 [Elaine Drage, DTI] Back
246
Q 406 [Lakshmi Puri, UNCTAD] Back
247
Q 120 [Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry].
It seems to us that it is not a dialogue of the deaf, but a dialogue
devoid of trust. The Government suspects that some NGOs are anti-WTO,
anti-liberalisation and perhaps anti-capitalist; some NGOs think
the government is excessively pro-business. Back
248
Q 522 [Valerie Amos, Secretary of State for International Development] Back
249
Q 120 [Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry] Back
250
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/News/files/gats_brief.htm Back
251
Ev 269, section 6 [Bretton Woods Project memorandum] Back
252
Q 43 [Elaine Drage, DTI] Back
253
Second LDC Trade Ministers Meeting, Dhaka declaration, 2 June
2003, p. 7, para 12b-see footnote 84. Back
254
Q 122 [Patricia Hewitt, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry] Back
255
Q 254 [John Hilary, Save the Children] Back
256
Q 424 [H.E. Ransford Smith, Jamaican Ambassador to the UN in Geneva] Back
257
Q 185 [Mauro Petriccione, European Commission] Back
258
Second LDC Trade Ministers Meeting, Dhaka declaration, 2 June
2003, p. 7, para 11-see footnote 84. Back
259
Ev 5, para 25 [HMG memorandum] Back
260
ICTSD and IISD, Doha Round Briefings Series, Services, February
2003, p. 2-see footnote 133. Back
261
HMG, UK Government briefing on the proposed WTO agreements on
investment and competition, 16 June 2003, p. 10-see footnote 193. Back
262
Ev 266, section 10 [Bangladesh Parliament Secretariat memorandum] Back
263
World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2003, p.168. Available
at http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gdf2003/ Back
264
Second LDC Trade Ministers Meeting, Dhaka declaration, 2 June
2003, p. 7, para 10-see footnote 84. Back
265
Q 370 [Carlos Fortin, UNCTAD] Back
266
Ev 46, para 29 [Oxfam memorandum] Back
267
Oxfam, Mugged: Poverty in your coffee cup, 2002, p. 2. Available
at http://www.maketradefair.org/assets/english/mugged.pdf Back
268
Q 388 [Charles Gore, UNCTAD] Back
269
Oxfam, Mugged: Poverty in your coffee cup, 2002, p. 26-see footnote
267. Back
270
Ev 47, para 32 [Oxfam memorandum] Back
271
Q 273 [Terry Hudghton, Co-operative Retail] and Q 274 [Tony Sullivan,
Sainsbury's] Back
272
Q 87 [H.E. Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic
of Ethiopia] Back
273
Q 205 [Franz Fischler, European Commission] Back
