House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence

WRITTEN EVIDENCE

18. Memorandum submitted by ActionAid

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.1 ActionAid believes that urgent action is required on a number of critical WTO issues—in particular on TRIPs, implementation, services, agriculture, process, new issues, technical assistance and capacity building and special and differential treatment—if Doha is to be a genuine development round. However, little if any progress has been made on any of these issues. For example, implementation issues remain a priority for developing countries but many issues remained unresolved.

1.2 Progress on agricultural negotiations is slow and currently some proposals—for example from the EU—show no signs that export subsidies will be phased out and that domestic subsidies will be substantially reduced.

1.3 Whilst many developing countries continue to oppose the introduction of new issues, the developed countries continue to push for their inclusion. Developing countries remain concerned that new rules on investment, for example, will undermine development by removing controls that countries place on inward investment. Developing countries are also concerned that their inclusion will severely limit their already stretched negotiating capacity within the WTO. New issues should not be part of the Doha agenda.

1.4 There is an urgent requirement that the review of the TRIPS Agreement clarifies that there should be no patents on genetic resources for food and agriculture. Rich countries must also honour their Doha commitments that the Agreement does not and should not prevent countries from taking measures to protect public health.

1.5 If Doha is to become a development agenda, it is also imperative that the principles of special and differential treatment and non-reciprocity are at the heart of the WTO. This would include, as a matter of urgency, the introduction of a development box within the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA).

2. INTRODUCTION

2.1 ActionAid[1] welcomes the opportunity to submit evidence to the House of Commons International Development Committee Inquiry on Trade and Development: Aspects of the Doha Agenda. We particularly welcome the focus of the Inquiry relating to aspects of the WTO's Doha agenda and member states' commitments to making this round of trade negotiations a "development round". However, we also believe that the issues chosen for consideration by the Inquiry make it far too narrow, and that for Doha to be a genuine development agenda the Inquiry should also be looking at other key concerns, including process, implementation, TRIPs, new issues and services.

2.2 For Doha to be a genuine development agenda, it must address the most pressing needs of the world's poorest countries and of the world's most vulnerable communities. The Doha Ministerial Declaration (and the other agreed texts at the end of the Ministerial) fails to do this. Developing countries argue that their priorities in the WTO (for example implementation issues) continue to be marginalised at the expense of developed country interests (for example, new issues and services). Wide income disparities have also accrued from the Uruguay Round. Developed countries were the main beneficiaries whilst least developed countries (LDCs) and sub-Saharan African countries are estimated to have been net losers from trade. Predictions from a further round of trade liberalisation suggest that the income generated will again be very unevenly distributed with only marginal net gains in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. [2]These imbalances must not be allowed to continue.

2.3 ActionAid's submission will attempt to address the many issues that should make up a development agenda. We have given particular attention to the four priority issues identified by the Committee whilst adding a further section on TRIPS (food security and health). We have given particular emphasis on the three areas where ActionAid has most competence, namely agriculture (see section 4), TRIPs (see section 5) and New Issues (see section 8).

3. THE DOHA AGENDA—WILL IT BE A DEVELOPMENT ROUND? [3]

3.1 ActionAid does not accept that a "one size fits all" approach to trade liberalisation through the WTO will ultimately be of benefit to all developing countries. Whilst the WTO extends special treatment in trade agreements to developing countries, this amounts to no more that providing additional time to implement agreements rather than ensure they can implement trade policies that are consistent and appropriate to development objectives. WTO processes should also be more open and transparent so as to ensure the full participation of developing countries. For these reasons, ActionAid believes that there needs to be substantial reform of the WTO, and revision of the Doha Ministerial Declaration and the other agreed texts at the Ministerial for Doha to be a genuine development agenda. At a minimum, such an agenda must address the following issues immediately.

3.2 Implementation: Outstanding issues regarding the implementation of certain agreements from the Uruguay Round must be resolved. For example, developing countries have had difficulties in the implementation and obligations of the TRIPS and TRIMs Agreements. There must also be immediate implementation of the proposals for growth-on-growth increase in quota levels for developing country textile exports (bearing in mind that WTO members are already required to abolish all quota restrictions on textiles by January 2005) and procedural improvements in anti-dumping so to put an end to the abuse by developed countries of anti-dumping disciplines as a protectionist measure.

3.3 Agricultural goods: All forms of export subsidies should be eliminated immediately and trade distorting domestic production subsidies should be phased out as soon as possible. A development box should be introduced in the Agreement on Agriculture, providing developing country governments with the flexibility to protect their small farmers from dumping. The Marrakesh decision should be overhauled and implemented. Developed countries should grant all LDC exports tariff-free and quota-free access to their markets.

3.4 Services: Developed countries and the WTO Secretariat should respect the demand from many developing countries for a full and thorough assessment of the GATS Agreement and the Agreement to be revised accordingly.

3.5 Non-agricultural goods: The world's poorest countries have demanded that a full and thorough assessment of the development implications of non-agricultural market liberalisation in developing countries is conducted prior to the start of any negotiations. This is essential in order to minimise the negative impacts on their economies of market access negotiations for non-agricultural goods. Developed countries should grant all LDC exports tariff-free and quota-free access to their markets.

4.1 Dumping in the agricultural sector is the sale of exported products in third markets at less than the cost of production in the exporting country. Dumping from the North is possible because export subsidies bridge the gap between high internal EU prices and lower world prices (as in sugar) and direct payments bridge the gap between higher costs of production in the EU and the lower world price (as in wheat). Dumping has three main effects; depressing world prices, displacing developing country exports out of third markets and undermining local domestic production in developing countries because producers cannot compete against cheap imported products. This is having a devastating impact on farmers, often driving them from the land, depriving them of livelihoods and seriously undermining food security.[4] [5]

4.2 It is against this background that, in agriculture, the Doha Ministerial declaration called for:

— substantial improvements in market access (see section 6);

— reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies;

— and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support.

4.3 According to the outgoing Director General of the WTO Mike Moore, as well as many developing country governments, reducing the levels of agricultural subsidies in rich countries is the "number one element of a true development agenda"[6] As part of the renegotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture, the EU is the main user of export subsidies and trade-distorting domestic support and thus the EU's position with regards these subsidies will be instrumental in determining whether Doha will be a development round.

Export Subsidies

4.4 The EU proposes to reduce the value of export subsidies by 45% from its final bound commitment from the Uruguay Round (which was 7,448 million euros). The EU's actual expenditure following the Uruguay Round is as follows:

(Million euros) 1996-97 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01

Actual outlay 5,565 4,361 5,336 5,614 2,763

% below final
bound level Not applicable na na na 63%

4.5 Whilst the value of export subsidies is coming down (consistent with WTO and CAP commitments), the current proposal on export subsidies would in effect commit the EU to do nothing in a new round that it is not already doing (ie the EU would be able to maintain the current level of export subsidies on the most sensitive products such as dairy, sugar and meat). One of the reasons for this is that during the Uruguay Round the EU negotiated favourable reference years and high final bound levels. Vast quantities of export refunds—both by value and volume—will be available to exporters to dump onto the world market, particularly developing countries.

Domestic Subsidies

4.6 The EU proposes to reduce its Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) by 55% from its final bound commitment from the Uruguay Round (which was 67 billion euros). The EU's actual and estimated expenditure following the Uruguay Round is as follows:

(Billion euros) 1997-98 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01* 2001-02* 2002-04* Post 2004

Actual outlay 48 47 50 40-42 37-40 30-34 35+

% below final
bound level na na na 37-40% 40-45% 49-55% 48%

Estimated for EU-25 in line with Agenda 2000 reforms

* Estimated for EU-15 in line with Agenda 2000 reforms

4.7 Figures for 2000-01 onwards have yet to be notified to the WTO but the reforms to the CAP under Agenda 2000 will have further decreased AMS support ("amber box" in WTO language). As such, ActionAid strongly believes that the current AMS is substantially below 48 billion and this will fall again when further reforms (particularly to the dairy and sugar sectors) are forthcoming.[7]

4.8 But equally significant is that there is no mention in the EU proposal of the blue and green boxes. Whilst AMS support is coming down, the EU is progressively moving domestic support away from AMS support (amber box) to direct payments (blue box) so that, in effect, the overall level of subsidies remains largely the same. [8]Whilst the current review of the CAP proposes a move away from direct payments to decoupled payments (essentially a further move of subsidies out of the blue into the green box)[9], ActionAid believes that the effect will again be the same and such subsidies will continue to distort production and trade and lead to dumping.

4.9 In conclusion, as with export subsidies, the current proposal on AMS domestic support would in effect commit the EU to do nothing in a new round that it is not already doing. Again, one of the reasons for this is that during the Uruguay Round the EU negotiated favourable reference years and high final bound levels. Vast quantities of domestic subsidies (whether in the amber, blue or green boxes) will be available to enable producers to sell at less than the cost of production and for exporters to dump low-priced products onto the world market, particularly developing countries.

Food Aid

4.10 Whilst food aid is not specifically covered by the WTO's AoA (although the EU is calling for tighter disciplines on food aid within the WTO), when agricultural production levels are high and world prices are depressed, rich countries have dumped the surplus in developing countries in the form of food aid—this too, distorts local markets and can be a disincentive to production.

4.11 The necessity of relief food aid to mitigate nutritional stress resulting from natural or man-made disasters is undisputed. However, it requires careful management to meet the needs of the most affected groups and avoid disincentive effects on local agricultural production. Of the different types of food aid the most controversial one is programme aid, which consists of commodities provided to a recipient government or its agent for sale on the local market. Normally it is not targeted towards those parts of the population which are most affected by food insecurity. It may even impinge on the food security of farmers in recipient or nearby countries as it depresses prices and discourages local production. Programme aid (or aid in kind) is also often used to dispose surpluses of the donor countries and is not responsive to the needs of recipient countries. Project food aid provided on a grant basis to specific target groups is less problematic but in most cases not the most efficient way to provide assistance to vulnerable groups. In addition, whilst the EU, as the second largest donor, has made significant steps to reform its food aid, the USA still ties all food aid to exportable surpluses. A significant share of the aid is administered by the US Department for Agriculture (USDA) and aims explicitly at stabilising the domestic market and open new export markets for US producers.

4.12 The shortcomings of programme food aid and the increased need for relief food aid is increasingly recognised by the large majority of countries and reflected in the patterns of international food aid flows. However the international institutions are not yet reflecting these developments appropriately. ActionAid therefore proposes to transform the World Food Programme (WFP) to become the central organisation for monitoring and administering international food aid flows. It should introduce a detailed Code of Conduct for the design and implementation of food aid programmes, stressing the importance of community involvement in programme design and management.

4.13 Only food aid provided by the WFP itself or by organisations adhering to the Code of Conduct should be considered as genuine food aid. All other aid flows should be considered as subsidised exports and phased out under the disciplines of the WTO. The Food Aid Convention should be transformed into a commitment of the major donors to provide the WFP with sufficient resources to run its programmes. These should preferably be cash transfers.

4.14 For Doha to be a genuine development agenda, ActionAid calls for:

— The Marrakesh Decision of 1994, which promised transitional support to compensate food importing developing countries for any rise in food prices, should be overhauled and made operational.

— Food aid should be provided by a transformed WFP or by organisations adhering to a Code of Conduct. The Food Aid Convention should be transformed into a commitment of the major donors to provide the WFP with sufficient resources to run its programmes. These should preferably be cash transfers.

5. TRIPS (FOOD SECURITY AND HEALTH)

5.1 ActionAid has included a section on TRIPs because of its critical importance to food security and public health issues in developing countries.

TRIPs and Food Security

5.2 Patents on the genetic resources for food and agriculture (GRFA) will accelerate the corporate takeover of the seed sector (see accompanying ActionAid briefing Crops and Robbers). Patents promote the consolidation of global seed and agri-chemical businesses, concentrating power over seeds and seed choices in a very few hands. ActionAid's analysis shows that patents and other forms of intellectual property protection on the genetic resources for agriculture can decrease farmers' access to seed, reduce efforts in publicly funded plant breeding, increase the loss of genetic resources, prevent seed sharing and threaten the livelihoods of poor farmers. In addition, the increasing shrinkage of the genetic base is responsible for greater risk of crop failure and thus food security.

5.3 ActionAid also believes that intellectual property rights are inappropriate in relation to living organisms and indigenous knowledge. The TRIPs Agreement has made it possible for companies to patent and exploit the traditional knowledge and local genetic resources—usually plants and medicines—of poor communities worldwide. In the developing world, genetic resources, food security and indigenous knowledge are intricately linked, with the holders of indigenous and community knowledge also the users and preservers of the genetic resources.

5.4 Claiming private property rights—through patents—on plants, processes and knowledge developed over centuries by generations of farmers has serious food security implications not least for the 1.4 billion farmers worldwide who rely on farm saved seed. The recent Commission on Intellectual Property Rights recently concluded that a "one size fits all" approach does not work in the area of intellectual property, and that countries with varying levels of development need flexibility in their policy-making arena. Hence developing countries should not be obliged to provide patent protection on GRFA.

TRIPs and Public Health

5.5 In the four years since the committee last looked at the impact of the WTO on the world's poorest nations, an entirely new area has come to light where trade rules are having an impact on the poorest people of the world. The importance of the role of patent protection in restricting (or increasing) access to medicines had not been recognised at that time but has since come to dominate much debate in the TRIPS Agreement.

5.6 The idea that the health of the population is solely an outcome of economic well-being has finally been exploded by the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health[11] which concluded that "The burden of disease in some low-income regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa, stands as a stark barrier to economic growth and therefore must be addressed frontally and centrally in any comprehensive development strategy. The AIDS pandemic represents a unique challenge of unprecedented urgency and intensity."[12]

5.7 Doha reaffirmed the rights of poor countries to use existing TRIPS provisions to compulsorily license patents or parallel import patented medicines. It also committed the WTO to identify a solution by the end of 2002 to the anomaly that allows for production but not importation of generic copies of patented medicines that would otherwise be out of the reach of these countries. There is significant evidence that competition between patented and generic copies have increased access to medicines in some of the poorest countries. Under the TRIPs Agreement, several producer developing countries—such as India—will have to stop exporting generic medicines when they become TRIPs compliant in 2005. ActionAid notes with great concern the failure to reach an agreement allowing a systematic, comprehensive and meaningful solution by December 2002.

5.8 In addition, ActionAid retains serious concerns about the implementation of TRIPS and the impact this is currently and will have on access to patented drugs in poor countries with significant health problems. There is evidence that additional pressure is being put on many LDCs to introduce TRIPS-compliant legislation far in advance of their current deadline of 2016. Further, that pressures from Northern governments as well as the technical support provided, are leading to fuller and more restrictive legislation than is currently required under WTO Agreements. [13]

5.9 ActionAid is concerned that the UK Government has not taken a lead in fighting for trade rules to promote the interests of least-developed countries, particularly those with high-prevalence HIV epidemics, and has instead sought solutions that are being frustrated by the interests of the pharmaceutical industry (UNAIDS Accelerated Access Initiative, UK Working Group on Increasing Access to Essential Medicines in the Developing World). However we enthusiastically congratulate DFID for establishing the independent Commission on Intellectual Property Rights and welcome its report and urge the committee to endorse its findings and support its swift implementation.

5.10 To make Doha a genuine development agenda, ActionAid calls for:

— The review of the TRIPs agreement should include an assessment of the agreement's developmental impact with a view to allowing developing countries greater flexibility in determining the length and scope of patents from a public interest perspective.

— The review of TRIPs Article 27.3 (b) must clarify that there should be no patents on genetic resources for food and agriculture.

— As part of special and differential treatment (and also the implementation agenda), TRIPs deadlines for all developing countries should be based on their achievement of development milestones, not arbitrary dates.

— Rich countries must honour their Doha commitments that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent countries from taking measures to protect public health. In particular, restrictions should be lifted on the export of drugs to developing countries which do not have the capacity to produce cheap generic equivalents.

6. MARKET ACCESS

6.1 In the main, ActionAid will confine its comments here to the agricultural sector.

South-North Market Access

6.2 Increased market access to developed countries for developing countries' agricultural exports will not automatically solve the problems faced by low income producers. To contribute most effectively to poverty reduction in developing countries, market access to the developed world must work in favour of the poor, protect small-scale producers and be environmentally benign. Wherever possible, it should facilitate added-value in situ (ie exports should be in processed form). Often however the reverse is true. Many exports, particularly from Asia and Latin America, are from large-scale intensive production. For example from monoculture plantations that have often been developed at the expense of small-scale producers, are environmentally damaging, and are largely controlled by transnational corporations and products are mostly exported in the raw form. Little of the benefit trickles down to those most in need. [14]Current market structures mean large companies, and not the poor, stand to benefit the most from any reductions in developed countries' trade barriers. ActionAid believes that further research is required to ensure that greater market access in the North is truly pro-poor and pro-development.

6.3 However, ActionAid does welcome last year's "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative to open EU markets to exports from the least-developed countries because it is specifically targeted at the world's poorest nations. But intensive lobbying by powerful agricultural interests succeeded in delaying the full liberalisation of sugar, rice and bananas. In the case of sugar, this means that some of the most efficient producers and poorest countries in the world will continue to see their access to EU markets restricted until 2009. The loss of export opportunity is significant: if Mozambique had unrestricted access to EU sugar markets, as originally proposed, Oxfam estimates that it could have been earning up to $106 million by 2004. To highlight concerns raised above, the EBA only covers raw cane sugar (similar to the preferential access granted to sugar from the ACP countries): refined sugar imports are tightly controlled, limiting opportunities for value-adding in a country like Mozambique which already has refining capacity.

6.4 The way in which the EU implemented the EBA also brings into question the priority the EU gives to development compared to its own agricultural interests. In order to make room for EBA sugar imports from the least developed countries, Europe has only marginally cut back its own sugar beet production. The bulk of the costs of increased least developed countries' access has fallen on the developing country ACP suppliers who have seen their quotas cut to the value of $105 million.

6.5 To make Doha a genuine development agenda, ActionAid calls for:

— Developed countries should grant all LDC exports tariff-free and quota-free access to their markets.

— Full and immediate access to EU markets for all products exported from the least developed countries through the "Everything But Arms" (EBA) initiative as originally proposed by the European Commission.

— The elimination of tariff escalation and peaks in developed countries.

— Improved market access in terms of the simplification of complex tariff structures in the North.

— A full and thorough assessment of the development implications of non-agricultural market liberalisation in developing countries is conducted prior to the start of any negotiations.

— Developed countries to review and research how access could be improved to Northern markets so as to address poverty issues in the South, but at the same time to protect the environment and small-scale, resource poor farmers. For example, to ensure that increased exports do not lead to large scale, corporate-controlled intensive production which often displaces small-scale farmers from the land; to promote value-added processing in the South; and to identify sectors for export that are labour intensive and of benefit to small-scale producers.

North-South Market Access

6.6 Trade liberalisation through the Agreement on Agriculture has already opened up developing country markets with devastating impacts. US maize into Mexico and the Philippines; EU skimmed milk powder into Jamaica, Kenya, India and the Dominican Republic; and EU wheat flour exports to Indonesia. There is clearly an urgent requirement for a development box within the AoA to enable developing countries to protect small-scale producers and to develop their own agricultural sectors, particularly if producers in North are able to continue subsidising exports.

6.7 To make Doha a genuine development agenda, ActionAid calls for:

— The introduction of a development box in the AoA.

— A full and thorough assessment of the development implications of non-agricultural market liberalisation in developing countries is conducted prior to the start of any negotiations. This is essential in order to minimise the negative impacts on their economies of market access negotiations for non-agricultural goods.

7. SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT

7.1 WTO Agreements contain provisions which give developing countries special rights (so-called "special and differential treatment" provisions). In the main these have amounted to longer time periods for implementing agreements and commitments, lower reduction commitments or exempting certain countries. ActionAid believes that the current S&DT provisions are inadequate and this is amply illustrated in the Agreement on Agriculture.

7.2 S&DT within the AoA needs to be radically overhauled. A number of developing countries have proposed the "development box"[15] This is in response to food security in these same countries being undermined by the Agreement on Agriculture. Whilst developing country markets are now more open to products from the North, northern exporters at the same time are subsidising production to the tune of $300 billion per annum. Much of this produce is dumped. The production of food security crops and products—such as maize in the Philippines and Mexico and milk products in India, Jamaica, Kenya and the Dominican Republic—are being undermined by cheap imports from developed countries.

7.3 The development box would have three underlying principles. The first is that it would only apply to developing countries. Secondly, it is specifically targeted at small-scale farmers (also termed low-income, resource poor farmers). Thirdly, government would have the flexibility (positive discrimination) within the AoA to "protect" food security crops and ultimately to assist in the redevelopment of the agricultural sector. Instead of having to cut tariffs and domestic support, the development box would permit governments to raise them.

7.4 To make Doha a genuine development agenda, ActionAid calls for:

— The introduction of a development box in the AoA.

— S&DT measures to be mandatory, legally binding and enforceable.

— A Framework Agreement on S&DT should be developed so as to enshrine the concepts of S&DT and non-reciprocity at the heart of the WTO. Trade liberalisation must not be allowed to undermine the national policy and development objectives of developing countries. In particular, S&DT should go beyond the provision of longer transitional periods for developing countries to implement the same rules as industrialised countries, and should take the form of positive discrimination within the rules in favour of developing countries and in line with their level of development.

8. CAPACITIES

8.1 WTO processes and negotiations are dominated by a few powerful countries or trading blocs and many delegations continue to be excluded. Imbalances in the WTO system prevent developing countries from adequately participating and influencing international trade and their negotiations. The main concerns include the following:

— At the end of 2001, the average size of a developing country WTO mission in Geneva is 3.51 people compared to 7.38 for developed countries. This affects their capacity in negotiations and to promote their national interests. In addition, 20 least developed and developing countries have no permanent mission in Geneva.

— The number and frequency of open-ended meetings, which have increased in the context of on-going negotiations, have also negatively affected the participation of developing countries, and have not been matched by greater technical and/or financial assistance. There are far too many meetings with overlapping schedules.

— Green room procedures have become an integral part of the negotiating procedure at Ministerials (and elsewhere in the WTO). They are usually by invitation only and dominated by developed countries; invariably only a few key developing countries are asked to participate. Key negotiating decisions are taken at Ministerials in these "rooms" (and at, for example, mini-ministerials). Other countries are entirely excluded.

— Whilst rejecting new issues in principle, many developing countries also believe that an extended remit post-Doha and at Cancun will severely restrict their ability to negotiate effectively across an increasing number of issues, particularly when some implementation issues have yet to be addressed. It is estimated that the post-Doha work programme may have increased by as much as 50%.

8.2 Capacity building thus must address a number of related issues; resources, the timetable, process (ie green rooms), and the expanding remit.

To make Doha a genuine development agenda, ActionAid calls for:

— Training and capacity building should also be targeted at national ministries and departments and the wider participation of civil society. This should be a central feature of the Doha commitment on technical co-operation and capacity building (TCCB) after full consultation with developing countries.

— The capacity of Geneva-based missions needs to be strengthened considerably.

— Green room processes should be scrapped in favour of an open, transparent and fully participatory negotiating process. New issues should be dropped as many developing countries will be unable to participate in negotiations on such a broad agenda or implement new obligations.

9. IN CONCLUSION

9.1 If the WTO and member states wish to present the Doha round of negotiations as a development agenda, as this submission has shown, a significant number of issues need to be addressed. However, ActionAid does not believe that any of these issues are being progressed to a sufficient degree to make Doha a development round. Indeed, specific "development" issues—such as special and differential treatment, implementation (inc. textiles and anti-dumping), and TRIPS and public health—were supposed to be decided by the end of 2002. This has not happened and timelines in the agricultural negotiations are set to slip past the crucial date of 31 March 2003 due mainly to the intransigence of developed countries.

9.2 Clearly, the priorities of developing countries and the world's poorest people continue to be marginalised compared to the interests of the developed world. WTO members—particularly in the developed world—must act to ensure that Doha becomes a genuine development agenda.

ActionAid

January 2003

SUPPORTING EVIDENCE:

"Farmgate" ActionAid Policy Paper, September 2002—

www.actionaid.org/ourpriorities/foodrights/farmgate.pdf

"Crops and Robbers" ActionAid Policy Paper, October 2001—

www.actionaid.org/resources/pdfs/crops—robbers.pdf

1 ActionAid was founded in the UK in 1972 and is part of ActionAid Alliance with sister organisations in Ireland, France, Italy, Spain and Greece. The Alliance works in over 40 countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. ActionAid is now one of largest international development agencies, working with over seven million of the world's poorest people. Back

2 World Bank, 2002. Global Economic Prospects 2002. Washington. Back

3 Much of this section is taken from A Genuine Development Agenda for the WTO. A joint paper by CAFOD, Save the Cildren, ActionAid, Oxfam, Christian Aid, World Development Movement, Traid Craft, World Vision, ITDG and the Fairtrade Foundation. January 2002.

3.6 New Issues: Developed countries and the WTO Secretariat should respect the consistent opposition of many developing countries to WTO negotiations on new issues.

3.7 TRIPs: Rich countries must honour their Doha commitments that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent countries from taking measures to protect public health. In particular, restrictions should be lifted on the export of drugs to developing countries which do not have the capacity to produce cheap generic equivalents. In addition, the review of TRIPS Article 27.3(b) must clarify that there should be no patents on genetic resources for food and agriculture and that the deadline for TRIPS compliance for all developing countries should be based on their achievement of development milestones rather than arbitrary dates.