Memorandum submitted by Save the Children
UK
1. Save the Children UK (SC UK) has worked
in Iraq since the end of the Gulf War. We work in the Kurdish
Northern Governorates (Iraqi Kurdistan) and implement reconstruction
and development work. We currently employ a total of 60 national
staff, and have one expatriate post. Our programme works entirely
through national partners. SC UK is recognised as the leading
international NGO (INGO) working in North Iraq, both from the
point of view of operational capacity and analysis.
2. Based on our experience in North Iraq,
SC UK is deeply concerned about the consequences of military action
in Iraq. Our assessment is that war would cut a lifeline that,
as indicated below, barely sustains the Iraqi people at present
and that the international community would be unable to cope with
the scale of such a humanitarian emergency.
3. For a number of years, SC UK has been
calling on the UN Security Council and the Government of Iraq
to act upon their joint responsibility to improve the design and
implementation of the Oil For Food Programme (OFFP), and thereby
mitigate the vulnerability of the Iraqi population. Recently the
situation has been gradually improving but much more still needs
to be done to reduce entrenched poverty and dependence.
4. Conflict in Iraq would not only reverse
the recent positive trends but would almost certainly cause the
breakdown of the existing infrastructure of support, leaving millions
of Iraqis entirely dependent on external aid with even less security
than the current assistance they receive through OFFP.
5. At present, there is no funding, and
little preparedness planning or overall co-ordination, for such
a scenario. SC UK knows from experience that only detailed advance
planning, combined with good co-ordination and information sharing,
can avoid wasteful duplication and gaps in emergency response.
Furthermore, it seems evident that neither the UN nor military
actors will be able to appropriately respond alone to the scale
of humanitarian needs. It is therefore of considerable concern
that guarantees have not been given to humanitarian actors about
future access to populations in need or about the maintenance
of the independence and impartiality of humanitarian actors—and
thus of their ability to operate.
THE SITUATION
OF CHILDREN
IN NORTH
IRAQ
6. Children's rights in North Iraq have
been set back by the impact of decades of conflict, under-investment
and poverty. After the death and destruction visited upon the
region in 1991, Iraqi Kurds suffered from a double embargo under
both UN sanctions on Iraq and an internal blockade on goods from
Centre/South Iraq destined for North Iraq. During 1994-98, internal
conflict among Kurdish factions led to large population movements
and Islamic insurgents have once again brought insecurity to parts
of Suleimaniyah Governorate since the summer of 2001. The region
is protected internationally but its authorities have little decision-making
power or ability to improve children's lives. Most revenue of
the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) is derived from taxing the
diesel trade to Turkey which has recently resumed.
7. Kurdish Iraqis survive on UN assistance,
meagre public sector salaries and illegal trade (mainly smuggled
goods—cigarettes, alcohol, electronic goods and auto parts—from
Turkey, Iran and Baghdad-controlled Iraq). The UN provides houses
for internally displaced persons (IDPs), distributes mechanical
and other farm inputs, sustains the supply and distribution of
medical and food items, builds schools and roads, clears mines
and sets up wells, generators and electricity lines.
8. The majority of Kurdish households remain
too poor to buy locally produced poultry, fish or meat and have
to rely on the imported food-ration and medical supplies, both
of which arrive in transit through Baghdad. Recently pulses, the
main source of protein, have been scarce in the food ration under
OFFP and hard to find in the local markets, where poor families
have been forced to sell a portion of their rations in order to
afford other essentials. Food staples sold in Kurdish Iraqi markets
largely consists of resold food rations. Seventy per cent of Iraqi
Kurdish society is urbanised, with little or no access to home
grown food supplies.
9. In winter, temperatures in North Iraq
range between -5 and +5 degrees Celsius, with heavy snowfalls
in the mountain ranges spanning Iraq's northern international
borders. Even in the summer, a dilapidated communication and transport
infrastructure is a major obstacle to accessing services and the
distribution of goods—especially for rural populations.
According to a recent FAO survey, 70% of villages are 4 km from
a paved road and 25 km from district towns with secondary education
and medical facilities.
10. As a result of these multiple problems,
child mortality and morbidity figures in North Iraq remain a cause
for concern. Recent improvements have resulted from the introduction
of the OFFP its subsequent enhancement (such as the cash component),
complemented by the work of UN agencies and the presence of a
small number of international NGOs. For their survival, Kurdish
children depend on all these programmes to run efficiently with
sufficient funding, regular supplies, professional staff and efficient
distribution.
11. More recently, public sector salaries
have been cut in some sectors and fuel imports from Centre/South
Iraq have been curtailed causing prices to rise rapidly. In the
event of conflict it is hard to see how families can continue
to survive for more than a few weeks without OFFP handouts and
associated services.
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
12. SC UK has no knowledge of overall UK
Government contingency plans for humanitarian assistance during
and after a conflict with Iraq. However, DFID recently called
a meeting with UK NGOs already working in, or interested in future
work in, Iraq. The NGOs have undertaken to prepare a co-ordinated
response to DFID outlining their capacity to respond and their
need for funding and support in co-ordinating planning.
13. SC UK is in regular informal contact
with DFID over the use of an existing £60,000 budget line
for emergency preparedness (for droughts, harsh winters and other
disasters) embedded in the current £2.7 million development
grant to SC UK agreed in 2000. SC UK advocated for such preparedness
measures after the region experienced conflict in 1991, internal
fighting in 1996, repeated harsh winters and three years of drought
in the region 1999-2001. Under this grant, SC UK has undertaken
a range of activities towards improving emergency preparedness.
These include the setting up of Emergency Co-ordination Local
Response Committees, which are designed to bring together the
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) representatives, local authorities,
INGOs, UN agencies, and local NGOs. These Committees are however
non-functional at present, due to a lack of pro-active engagement
and differing political agendas. As a result, there is no functioning
co-ordinated emergency preparedness in North Iraq.
14. In January 2002, SC UK published the
findings of its Household Economy Approach study detailing the
levels of poverty and food ration dependency and thus the vulnerability
of the Kurdish population in North Iraq to external shock. Since
the summer of 2002 SC UK has, in response to the findings of the
study and a changing political situation, included specific preparations
for armed conflict in its own plans to address humanitarian needs
arising from external shock. These include provisions for the
survival of displaced persons and capacity-building measures to
ensure particular attention is paid to child protection. SC UK's
emergency advisers have repeatedly visited the region and conducted
assessments and training and carried out logistical preparations
together with local staff. However, due to resource limitations,
no additional staff members have yet been hired to supplement
the existing staff in preparation for dealing with the humanitarian
consequences of any military action.
15. SC UK is thus one of two INGOs in North
Iraq[7]
that have been able to systematically address and carry out emergency
preparedness measures. Our strategy is to maintain our normal
programme to the extent possible and switch staff and partners
to addressing emergency needs as required and as allowed by security
considerations and humanitarian access. The £60,000 emergency
preparedness budget line mentioned above has been used to purchase
supplies and put in place distribution logistics sufficient for
2,000 displaced families.
16. SC UK's local staff are Kurdish. They
form a strong and committed team with an exceedingly good understanding
of relief and development issues. Many have lived and worked in
the Centre/South. We anticipate that, if and when conditions allow,
they will extend their activities to the northern areas of the
Centre/South and might also form the core of a national team to
be based in Baghdad.
17. SC UK is a member of the International
Save the Children Alliance, which has adopted a regional response
plan. However, no agreements have been signed with other governments
in the region or with UN agencies, specifying the terms of reference
of Save the Children's response. This would require clear UN leadership
in co-ordinating funding and preparedness.
18. Ministries in both KRG administrations
seem ill-prepared for addressing emergency needs. Repeated demands
on INGO funding, technical input, and planning advice have been
made. On inspection, sites identified by the authorities for IDP
camps still remain empty fields. The internal co-ordination between
ministries leaves a lot to be desired.
19. Co-ordination between the two Kurdish
parties cannot be taken for granted in the event of a disruption
to the current humanitarian and political situation. Both parties
appear to place great store in some prospective military actors'
ability to afford protection and humanitarian relief. At the same
time, other potential parties, such as the Turkish military forces,
to a possible military conflict in North Iraq are viewed with
profound suspicion, which would preclude any effective co-operation
on emergency response.
20. UN agencies on the ground have been
required to develop their own contingency plans without the involvement
of KRG or INGO participation. WFP retains significant control
over food ration distribution in North Iraq, but only in planning,
warehousing and oversight (although WFP warehouses are poorly
guarded). The actual distribution and registration (ration card)
process is carried out in co-operation with Kurdish Ministries
of Trade and individual municipalities. A non-registered family
receives one monthly food ration and usually manages to register
within two weeks if all documentation is duly received and processed.
This process applies to new-borns, deaths, marriages, divorces
and "translocations".
FINANCE FOR
HUMANITARIAN NEEDS
21. Per capita aid levels to Iraq in the
last decade have been extremely low. The UK Government, for example,
has only contributed around £115 million since the Gulf War
in 1991. [8]Since
its start six years ago the OFFP has delivered less than 50 cents
(US) of imported material supplies per capita per day to the Iraqi
population.
22. The OFFP Distribution Plan for the current
6-month phase ending June 2003 foresees a total of $4.93 billion,
of which $1.27 billion (-$200 million/ per month) alone is needed
to maintain food security in Iraq. The programme is affected by
cumulative funding shortfalls, excluding the food sector, of $4.5
billion, while a substantially smaller amount remains unspent.
The continuation of the OFFP is predicated on continued Iraqi
oil liftings, revenue generation and supply of goods. This process
involves a number of key Baghdad ministries in addition to the
Central Bank of Iraq. Any change to this process would need a
Security Council Resolution and acceptance by relevant Iraqi interlocutors.
23. Furthermore, Iraq will enter any post
sanctions era with vast external claims on its financial resources:
over $100 billion of foreign debt; over $200 billion of Gulf war
compensation claims; and $100 billion of claims by Iran for its
war losses. If to this bill of $400 billion were to be added the
replacement cost of infrastructure and other assets destroyed
in the course of the Gulf war[9],
we would arrive at a figure of financial requirements which is
far beyond the capacity of the Iraqi oil sector to generate.[10]
CONSEQUENCES OF
CONFLICT
24. The withdrawal of UN staff and salaries
will immediately affect how the rural economy and urban infrastructure
operates. There will be an immediate decline in local cash resources
as a result of this and the impact of border closures on illegal
trade. The situation will be further complicated by limited access
by relief agencies and additional burdens resulting from likely
IDP influxes from Kirkuk, Mosul, and other areas. All this will
mean that the region will be on the brink of crisis until the
summer harvest and economic aid can reach it.
25. The survival of many Iraqi Kurdish children
will be in grave doubt if they themselves are forced to flee an
attack or have to survive the complete breakdown of the food and
health systems. INGOs, the UN and local authorities would find
it very challenging to meet their needs even in a favourable security
environment.
26. SC UK, with a staff of 60, considers
that it could only operate effectively if the following conditions
could be satisfied (an assessment is made against each item of
the likelihood of these conditions obtaining):
— There is no attack, conventional
or chemical, on North Iraq; Uncertain.
— Expatriates or Kurdish NGO staff
are not the target of isolated reprisal attacks; High Risk.
— Security allows for travel on roads
by car; Possibly with armed guards—not by night/limited
radius.
— Roads are in reasonable condition;
Uncertain—Allied forces use; winter; bombing.
— Radio, telephone and satellite communications
function to some degree; Unlikely in the immediate aftermath of
military operations commencing and uncertain thereafter.
— There are substantial funds available
for an emergency response; No funds currently available.
— Cash in some currency (eg the US
$) can be readily spent locally, at least for supplies and salaries;
Difficult to assess because of steep dollar inflation and convertibility
problems.
— Non-food items can be bought locally
or trucked in through Turkey or Iran; Highly unlikely in the first
weeks, unimpeded access doubtful in longer term.
— There is fuel for trucks, cars and
generators; No storage, shortages likely.
— There is agreement with those in
effective control over the region on the independence and impartiality
of SC UK's operations; May differ according to area—unlikely
in Kirkuk.
— Local authorities and populations
in need agree to work in partnership with us; Highly likely.
— Information sharing for rapid needs
assessments and response takes place between INGOs, UN agencies,
KRG ministries, and local authorities; Capacity constraints, poor
history.
27. This long list assumes, of course, that
humanitarian needs do not begin to outstrip the collective capacity
to respond. An inflow of large numbers of displaced persons from
Centre/South would put significant pressure on that capacity,
especially as such people could not be absorbed into existing
communities. Equally, a prolonged absence of the food ration,
an inability to distribute to remote communities or the outbreak
of disease, such as measles, in crowded conditions with concomitant
breakdown in electricity and sanitation facilities would add dramatically
to the need for assistance. Most generators have little fuel reserves
and Dohuk governorate relies on Centre/South Iraq for electricity.
28. The population of North Iraq has vivid
memories of the events in 1987-89 (Anfal and Halabja), 1991 (ruthless
Iraqi action against the Kurdish uprising) and 1996 (Government
of Iraq intervention at the invitation of Kurdistan Democratic
Party and the ensuing two years of civil war between the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan and the KDP) as well as the decades of sporadic
conflict before. Rumour and isolated reports of bombing or fighting
could lead to a mass exodus to the countryside and international
borders, especially if such incidents involve the use of non-conventional
weapons. Families will be at very high risk after they flee their
homes. Children could be killed or maimed by landmines if they
are trapped at international borders and prevented from seeking
safety and refuge. The borders with Iran and Turkey are some of
the most heavily mined areas in the world.
29. In the course of an invasion and its
aftermath, internal disagreement over such matters as international
funding or the Kurdish share in Iraq's oil revenue, disputes over
Kurdish-populated Iraqi territory—including those parts
not currently under Kurdish control (eg oil rich Kirkuk)—or
over the region's political status or the use of proxy forces,
and, finally, international abandonment could all prevent a concerted
response from taking shape in North Iraq. Any combination of these
factors could forestall an effort to co-ordinate a joint emergency
response and to lay plans for the subsequent recovery of this
region.
HUMANITARIAN-MILITARY
RELATIONS
30. Impartial humanitarian access to endangered
populations is paramount to saving lives. It is not negotiable
as a political or military tool. Humanitarian agencies must be
able to operate impartially and independently, responding on the
basis of need alone.
31. The state or non-state actors controlling
access must ensure that:
— humanitarian agencies are allowed
safe access to all populations at risk and in need;
— borders are open to receive refugees
in accordance with international law;
— all populations are allowed safe
access to seek and receive assistance;
— refugee and IDP camps remain under
civilian control;
— populations seeking refuge are not
forcibly detained in camps.
32. SC UK has real concerns that political
and military leaders are expecting that humanitarian action in
Iraq will be an integrated part of the war effort and subsumed
under military control. By definition, military actors cannot
deliver impartial humanitarian assistance on the basis of need
when they are fighting a war. When parties to a conflict engage
with civilians in a combat context, through any range of activities,
including delivery of relief supplies, they are using the civilian
population to achieve their military aims.
33. Humanitarian agencies can only engage
with warring parties according to tightly defined parameters,
maintaining distance and neutrality. Humanitarian agencies must
engage according to the same rules with all parties, otherwise
humanitarian actors will immediately lose their neutrality and
legitimise one or the other of the parties.
CONCLUSION
34. SC UK is deeply concerned at the possibility
of renewed and intensified armed conflict in Iraq. In the event
that North Iraq becomes embroiled in hostilities, the consequences
could be disastrous. Thousands might flee and millions would be
in need. Many could die from the fighting and from an inability
to survive on their own, particularly if they are out of the reach
of relief agencies. The fragile gains in the humanitarian situation
achieved in recent years could be erased for years to come.
35. Even if there were to be no military
action against Iraq or a direct attack on North Iraq in the event
of a conflict, Kurdish children and their families would still
face the collapse of an already stressed economy. In the short
term, all food, fuel and medical needs would have to be met externally.
Income levels would drastically decline for the foreseeable future,
further undermining local markets. Children could become subject
to abuse and exploitation, such as using them as smugglers, which
is already occurring across the Kurdish-Iraqi internal line of
control.
36. In North Iraq, it is imperative that
Kurdish Iraqi children are protected against any physical or psychological
harm and that their rights to basic services are safeguarded by
all actors. The UN has a clear protection mandate and should have
a leading role in humanitarian activities under terms negotiated
with local authorities and parties in control over the population.
37. SC UK believes that the choice for the
UK and other governments is not between sanctions and war, but
between policies that kill innocent Iraqi civilians and those
that protect them. We believe it is the legal and moral duty of
members of the UN Security Council to channel maximum effort towards
a peaceful resolution of the current crisis.
Save the Children UK
February 2003
7 The other is Peace Winds Japan. Back
8
Evidence submitted by the Secretary of State, the Rt.Hon. Clare
Short MP, to this Committee. Back
9
United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)
Humanitarian Action Donor Update: Iraq 14 January 2003. Back
10
Abbas Alnasrawi, Oil, Sanctions, Debt and the Future, Conference
Paper, 2001. Abbas Alnasrawi is Professor of Economics at the
University of Vermont. Available at http://www.casi.org.uk/info/alnasrawi.html. Back
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