Examination of Witnesses(Questions 61-79)
THURSDAY 6 MARCH 2003
MR ROSS
MOUNTAIN, MS
ANUPAMA RAO
SINGH AND
MR NICOLAS
OBERLIN
Mr Battle
61. Thank you for coming. It is very helpful
indeed that you are here. Could I give apologies on behalf of
our Chairman, Tony Baldry, who is not able to be here this morning.
The rest of us are here. We are trying to carry out a brief but
detailed inquiry into the humanitarian consequences of any possible
military action against Iraq. Obviously, your voice and contribution
is crucial to our understanding of this, so we do appreciate your
taking the time and trouble to be here. We have a series of questions
that cover a range of areas that have been of concern to us: food
aid, refugees, possible arrangements you have made already and
where we are up to.
(Mr Mountain) First of all, I would like
to introduce my two colleagues. Then I would like to make a short
presentation to give you an overview so that you can see the different
elements in context, if you would allow that.
62. That would be helpful.
(Mr Mountain) First of all, may I introduce on my
right Ms Anupama Rao Singh, who is currently the Deputy Director
of Programmes for UNICEF in New York but was from 1999 to 2001
Head of the UNICEF office in Iraq. On my left is Nicolas Oberlin,
who is the Regional Programme Adviser for the World Food Programme.
You did ask us to try and bring along a range of agency colleagues,
and I am very pleased that I have been able to bring these colleagues
from two of the main operational agencies. First of all, we are,
of course, very pleased to have the opportunity to come and share
information with you on the state of contingency and preparedness
planning that we in the United Nations have been undertaking.
You will be all too well aware, I am sure, that the position of
the UN, the Secretary General, is that war is not inevitable in
his view, and war is always a humanitarian or a human catastrophe,
and a course that should only be considered when all other possibilities
have been exhausted, and when it is obvious that the alternative
is worse. That is the institutional position. However, as a matter
of precaution in carrying out the functions that are obviously
the responsibility of the different United Nations agencies, we
have been doing contingency planning for some time against the
eventuality that there will not be a peaceful outcome. You will
be aware though that, because of the delicacies in terms of international
perception, we have had to do this in a fairly low-key fashion.
The concern has been that people do not get the impression that
the United Nations is preparing for war; that is not the case.
However, having said that, what we have been doing has involved
the whole of the international humanitarian community. It has
been a coherent effort that we are pleased to say has brought
together the Red Cross movement, who we have very close contact
with, and the non-governmental organisations—I am happy
to come back to that—both through their representatives
at the international level, the international consortia, and most
importantly at the country level. You do not need me to rehearse
that the situation in Iraq even prior to any additional intervention
is one of significant humanitarian need. I am happy to come back
to that if you like, but the situation even before anything happens
is that the population is, of course, suffering considerably.
We have basically three sets of potential "clients",
if I may: the refugees, of course, or asylum seekers, people seeking
to leave the country in that eventuality; third-country nationals
is the second; and the third would be those inside the country.
I would suggest to you that the latter is the most important element
for us to focus on at this stage, those who are internally displaced
and those who, as we came to know in Afghanistan, are in fact
internally stuck, people with significant humanitarian needs inside.
Up until recently we have been fairly optimistic about the needs
of those in the three northern governorates. However, in the light
of recent political developments, we have some concerns now about
the impact that there may be in that part of the country. We have
organised—as a system—in terms of strengthening the
capacities that there are to support the Resident Co-ordinators
and the agencies in all of the countries surrounding Iraq. In
addition, we have brought together a regional office against the
eventuality that international UN staff will need to be evacuated
from Iraq, and that headquarters is in Larnaca. Rather uniquely,
in advance of any intensification of the crisis, the Secretary
General has approved the designation of a regional humanitarian
co-ordinator, Ramiro Lopez de Silva, who will, should the eventuality
occur, be located in Larnaca with a team from the agencies and
others. In fact, two of us have just come back from a meeting
in Larnaca yesterday in relation to preparedness efforts. I would
like to give you a quick idea of the different sectors that are
being catered for. That is why I felt it would be useful at the
beginning to give you this bit of an overview. Refugees, of course:
led by UNHCR. Third-country nationals: lead International Organisation
for Migration. Internally Displaced Persons: the Office of the
UN Co-Ordinator for Humanitarian Affairs in Iraq. Food: World
Food Programme; Health and Medicine: World Health Organisation;
Shelter, Habitat, with UNOPS and IOM. Water and sanitation is
UNICEF. Nutrition is UNICEF. Education is UNICEF. Fuel, a major
problem that we are concerned about: again the Office of the Humanitarian
Co-Ordinator. Electricity: the UN Development Programme. Mines
and unexploded ordinance: UN Mine Action Service. Environment,
oil spill potential and so on: UNEP and OCHA. Protection: ICRC
is of course very much concerned, but also the Office of the Humanitarian
Co-Ordinator (and UNICEF on children). Military/civil liaison:
OCHA. Security: UNSECOORD. We also have a range of tools that
will be employed to provide support to all the humanitarian community:
a Joint Logistics Centre to deal with logistical aspects, bottlenecks,
how you get the supplies in and so on (lead WFP); a Humanitarian
Information Centre, again, what is happening where, who is doing
what, what the needs are (OCHA); a Humanitarian Air Service to
try and link the different points around Iraq and prospectively
in the future inside (WFP); and communications (WFP/OCHA). The
final point I need to make, Mr Chairman, is the issue of funding.
I have outlined to you in a very skeletal fashion some of the
preparations that are being made by the UN and indeed the humanitarian
system at large. You are aware of, and indeed I will pass to you
a document that came out a couple of weeks ago in relation to
the financial needs for preparation. We were looking early on
for $37 million, then for $122 million, and the funding that has
been made available has been largely from borrowing from internal
agency sources and the Central Emergency Revolving Fund that is
established within OCHA. Even those that have pledged—and
there are now pledges of about $40 million—have unfortunately
not been forthcoming with cash. We have very much welcomed a recent
pledge by the Secretary of State of £3.5 million for preparational
activity, but you should be aware that the amount of resources
that are available is simply inadequate. The figures that we are
giving as targets are in relation to the preparedness phase.
We need to be aware that if we are getting into the next phase,
the sums are extremely large. We will be putting out a Flash Appeal
as soon as any emergency, any conflict, breaks out. I do need
to particularly flag the future of the Oil For Food programme.
In stark terms, that programme will, for all intents and purposes,
cease to be operative at the outbreak of any conflict, once UN
observers have been evacuated. This programme provides in food
terms about 470,000 tonnes of food to every man, woman and child
in the country every month. In addition, it of course provides
support for health, water and sanitation, education—the
range of aspects. The food distribution alone is done through
about 45,000 agencies in the centre/south. This is run entirely
by the Iraqis. In the north where WFP takes direct responsibility
for implementation it is through another 10,000 agents. If that
is disrupted—and if there is a conflict it will be disrupted—you
will understand the consequences. We estimate at the moment that
household food stocks are between four and six weeks on average.
It is estimated that if the Security Council were prepared to
take steps to change the existing arrangement—the resources
belong to the Iraqi Government—it could take from six to
eight weeks for a transfer of functions. If we had to start anew,
it would take a minimum of three to four months. That is of major
concern to us. Finally, we need to be concerned not just during
the combat phase. This has consequences for the long term. The
Iraqi people have, as you will be aware from other evidence, lost
all coping capacity. Sixty per cent of the population depend entirely
on the Oil For Food programme rations while for the remainder
it constitutes 80% of their daily needs. This will not end with
the conclusion of any conflict, no matter how short. One also
has to worry about who is going to pay for the civil service afterwards.
At present they are being paid by the Government of Iraq. We very
much appreciate this opportunity of interacting with you. I did
have the opportunity of seeing the evidence given by the Secretary
of State, which I thought was extremely useful in outlining the
role that the United Nations seeks to play. We are happy to respond
to your questions.
Ann Clwyd
63. I have just come back from northern Iraq,
so I know some of the things people there have raised, which I
might raise with you later on during the course of the session.
I wonder when you actually started planning. Was there a date
last year when you decided that you must start to plan for humanitarian
consequences?
(Mr Mountain) We started planning probably very low-key
about a year ago. Again, I need to put this in the context that
where there are difficult circumstances, as in what is happening
in southern Africa or western Africa, we try and look ahead and
see what the requirements might be of the United Nations. So we
started in a very low-key way approximately a year ago. I would
say we started in rather more robust fashion about six months
ago.
64. I imagine your main problem was, as you
have said, that you had to be low-key, and you had be aware of
the sensitivities of all the UN member governments. Were you only
able to plan internally or were you also able to plan in conjunction
with some of the countries that you thought might be assisting
in the process, such as the UK for example, or the US?
(Mr Mountain) The internal planning was very much
internal at the beginning. Informal contacts have been taken with
a number of countries, including, if I may say so, the countries
surrounding Iraq, who will obviously be very much concerned at
a later stage. We have had very low-key and rather more recent
contact with the UK and the US, and other donor governments.
65. Shortage of funds is a theme we have heard
many times. Obviously that is always a problem for the UN. We
have seen it in so many similar situations. Does the knowledge
that you ultimately get the funds affect your planning, or do
you plan on the basis that you only have X amount of money as
of this time?
(Mr Mountain) If we had planned on the basis of only
working with the money we had received, we would not have done
anything until a couple of weeks ago. What we have done is that
each of the UN agencies has borrowed from their own internal resources,
where they have them. Some agencies, one in particular, have had
a very tough year and do not have much. Most agencies do not have
very much. Then they have borrowed from the Central Emergency
Revolving Fund, which OCHA manages. These are loans, I repeat.
The amounts of money that have been advanced from these sources
have been modest. I have to note that we also need to deal with
other Government colleagues on Auditing and Finance Committees
who are concerned with over expenditure. And we have had to deal
also with some governments that have said, "OK, if it happens,
we will make money available to you immediately any conflict occurs—."
Indeed, one important donor has said it will even allow for retro-active
financing. However, if it does not happen, the agencies involved
are caught without cover. We have tried to be as transparent as
the circumstances would allow in saying to the donor community,
"I am sorry. We are doing our very best, but without the
necessary resources, we cannot do the stockpiling. We will not
be able to deal with the kinds of numbers we fear may need assistance."
If I may say so, I believe the UN and the humanitarian system
is really quite well prepared in terms of having its organisation
in place,—but in a sense, we are all dressed up with no
coach to take us to the ball! To take WFP, who can certainly speak
for themselves, in terms of the replacement for the Oil For Food
programme, they have the 9,000 trucks that have been identified
as being required to move the vast tonnage—but there is
no food to put on them! The stockpiles we have been able to establish—I
will not take up your time now by running through them—are
a minor proportion of the mid-case scenario that we fear. We have
tried to say from the beginning to the donors—because we
are aware that on the one hand there is a sensitivity and on the
other hand there is the expectation that the UN and the international
community will be prepared, as indeed we wish to be—"I
am sorry. Those are the limitations we have had to work with."
Tony Worthington
66. Can I get clear the role of the UN overall?
It looks very confusing to me. In the newspapers yesterday there
was a set of accounts about the role of the UN that was very similar
to what you have just said, but if you look at the United States,
and I am not talking about newspaper reports but a report to the
US Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Under Secretary Douglas
Feith, it made a statement—this was not conjecture; this
was factual—about the US position, that they had set up
this Department of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,
that they would be inviting UN organisations, coalition parties
and NGOs to join in and support this, that accountability to the
President for what they call "coalition officials" would
be through Donald Rumsfeld and Tommy Franks, that the general
in charge, General Garner, is there. This is not conjectural,
as I say, but sounds like a totally alternative way of dealing
with the same issue. I do not understand it.
(Mr Mountain) I am obviously not here to talk on behalf
of the United States, but I do have before me a fact sheet which
was issued by the White House that has come to us where they indicate
their general approach to humanitarian assistance preparations.
They indicate here that they will "rely primarily on civilian
relief agencies, facilitating operations of international organisations
and NGOs," and so on. The pre-positioning that they have
done themselves is not enormous compared to the potential need.
The US has indicated that it will make a number of contributions
to UN agencies, and those figures are included in the roughly
$40 million I mentioned just now. Again, that money, like money
from most, is not yet to hand in all cases. I believe that there
is concern, and I believe that they are aware of what the United
Nations is endeavouring to do on the humanitarian side as a precautionary
measure, but further than that I am afraid I cannot go.
67. It is my view that in a post-conflict situation
the UN should be in charge. We have argued that we should go through
the UN route and that the UN should be in charge in the way that
you have described, but I want to be clear: that is not agreed
as yet.
(Mr Mountain) You will understand that at this stage
what we are talking about is contingency planning, preparedness
planning. One has not got to actually implementing any of these
plans at this stage; we have simply put them in place. I do need
to emphasize that the United Nations is making its plan on the
basis of the United Nations mandate, and it is on that basis that
we are proceeding.
68. The US position I have described is accurate,
is it not?
(Ms Singh) I just wanted to supplement what Ross has
said. I think presently, if you look at the UN's role in Iraq,
there are three elements to it. First of all, we, like most of
the operational agencies, have an obligation to respond to humanitarian
needs that may emerge, simply because the mandate of the UN Charter
expects us to do so. But the Oil For Food programme as it exists
now is basically a programme that has been established by the
mandate of the Security Council, and we expect that any role for
the UN beyond immediate humanitarian response would be subject
to Security Council discussion and resolution on the issue. So
we are basically waiting to hear what is expected of us in the
more long-term perspective.
69. I accept that, but can you confirm that
what I am saying is correct, that there has been a presentation
to the US Foreign Relations Committee as I described, that this
is a totally different approach, that the humanitarian relief
would be overseen by the USA?
(Mr Mountain) I am sorry. I cannot confirm that. I
can tell you, for example, that what we have heard is that Assistant
Secretary of State, Gene Dewey, has said the multilateral system
is at the centre of any humanitarian response. The message that
we have been getting through informal contacts has been that they
expect or wish the United Nations and the humanitarian community
to continue to play a lead humanitarian role, not inconsistent,
of course, with any eventual responsibilities that may come under
the Fourth Convention on the responsibility of the Occupying Power
in any eventuality. So I am sorry; I cannot confirm that that
was what was said to a US Committee. The contacts that we have
had have led us to believe that they would seek to co-operate
with the United Nations.
70. Has there been any contingency planning?
One would think in a situation like this that someone would have
been pencilled in to head it up, a Brahimi-type figure.
(Mr Mountain) On the humanitarian side, not only has
somebody been pencilled in, but somebody has been named. This
is the fellow who at the present time is the Humanitarian Co-ordinator
in Iraq, who has now been named to be in charge of the total operation,
including in the surrounding countries, in dealing with the humanitarian
aspects. We have even set up, as I mentioned, a hub in Larnaca,
Cyprus, which will have representation of all the key UN agencies
as well. So we have certainly moved ahead with our continency
planning to that extent.
71. But that is just humanitarian; there is
no civil administration appointment.
(Mr Mountain) No. Obviously, we would need to work
through such structures as are there, but the United Nations has
not at all got into the idea of a civil administration role post
conflict. That again, as Anupama has just said, would require
the Security Council to decide on that, of which the United Kingdom
is a member, of course.
Mr Walter
72. You have just used the phrase that you have
been "led to believe" that they would co-operate with
the UN. In the interests of joined-up government and on the basis
that you are preparing for a contingency, and the most likely
contingency if there is a conflict is that the US will be the
Occupying Power and will make up the military administration there,
would it not have been logical that you should have had detailed
discussions with the United States, and particularly the United
States military, as to how they perceive this administration would
work and how you see your role in fitting in with them?
(Mr Mountain) We have briefed donors, including the
United Kingdom and the United States, and others, on several occasions,
as well as holding follow-up discussions on humanitarian aspects
with our partners. There have been limited discussions also with
military personnel in accordance with our standard approach that
recognises that if we were to go into Iraq in a conflict situation,
we would need to be able to deal with all parts of the equation.
So there have been contacts, indeed. That does not relate to us
supporting another agenda. It is a UN agenda, it is UN leadership,
but if another party is planning to do something separately, it
is not for us to stop them.
73. But you have said that 60% of the Iraqi
population depend on the Oil For Food programme and that would
cease when the first tanks roll over the border. If that is the
case, if the US has not made provision for the food programme,
and you have made provision but you have not actually discussed
it with the US, surely there is a bit that needs to be joined
up here so that we do not have starving people on the streets
of Iraq.
(Mr Mountain) I do not want you to get the impression
that we have not spoken to the US about the Oil For Food programme.
That has certainly been front and centre. Nicolas may wish to
make further comments on it, but just as we are telling you in
detail now about the consequences of the Oil For Food programme
being interrupted, we have most certainly told the US and others
about the consequences of that eventuality.
(Mr Oberlin) The focus is moving from what I understood
was the post-conflict civilian administration to the UN's response
to the emergency situation, which we seem to be focusing on now,
as far as the Oil For Food programme goes. In that particular
case, the emergency response, we have discussed this with the
United States, but we are talking of half a million tonnes of
food a month, we are talking about 58,000 food agents in Iraq
who are now distributing the food to 25 million people every month.
So we have looked at how we could maintain this food distribution
system in the immediate aftermath of a conflict, but it is not
something that the United Nations could take over. It is the Iraqi
Government that is implementing the food distribution system for
the most part, and it is not something we do, feed 25 million
people every month. We did make contingency plans to make sure
that this is not interrupted for a few months, but beyond that,
it will have to be worked out in detail, and it is certainly not
a responsibility that the United Nations and the World Food Programme
can take. It is beyond our capacity.
74. There will be no Iraqi Government, so we
presume the United States will do it.
(Mr Oberlin) That is for them to say, or whatever
administration will be in place at the time.
(Mr Mountain) We are not trying to duck your question
here, but it is up to the Security Council to decide. The Oil
For Food programme has been laid down, as you know, after very
intricate discussions with all parties concerned, and the assets
are the assets of the Iraqi Government. They do the contracting.
The UN oversees it in the centre/south and implements it in the
north. There are other dimensions of this as well. One dimension
is, for example, that 25% of the Oil For Food assets go for compensation,
and one can speculate that if the Security Council so decided,
it might be possible to postpone the payment of some of that compensation
for a while, in order to make sure that resources were available
to ensure that the enormous amount of money and goods that will
be required are available. We have done our contingency planning,
initially taking into account the other emergency aspects which
come from dislocation, displacement, injuries and so on. But having
to take into account the whole of the Oil For Food programme,
which is feeding every single person in the country, is an extraordinary
undertaking, and we are not equipped for that. We are equipped
to pick up on it. The World Food Programme has the 9,000 trucks;
but this does not happen from one day to the next; we do not have
the food; we do not have the money for the food. We have certainly
made it clear to those in a position to respond, the dimensions
of the need.
(Mr Oberlin) In addition to the capacity problem,
food and transport for just a month is about $250-300 million.
That is in addition to the capacity problem. We have a huge problem
of financing that, and until such time as a new system is in place,
not only in terms of civil administration for the country, but
in terms of the framework, the Security Council resolution about
financing the post-conflict reconstruction, we cannot envisage
being able to get hold of $250 million every month, and that is
just food and transport, not to mention the huge structure that
would have to be put in place. We cannot imagine being able to
find that sort of funding on a monthly basis. This is why we are
not looking too far down the road.
(Mr Mountain) A six-month tranche of the Oil For Food
programme delivers of the order of $5 billion worth of commodities
into the country. That is exclusive of the costs of the civil
service, which is paid separately by the Iraqi Government, or
for internal transport and so on. The figures we are talking about
here are huge. Certainly in humanitarian terms they are huge.
In military terms they perhaps may be seen in a rather different
perspective, but they are very high.
(Ms Singh) If I can make a couple of points to supplement
what has been said, first of all, the Security Council has approved
the Oil For Food programme up to 3 June, so it legally can continue
up to 3 June, but the issues that we are addressing here are,
since the 59% account, as it is called, for the south and centre
is administered by the Government of Iraq, who would administer
it in a possible post-conflict situation? For the continuation
of the programme, one of the key things we need to look at is
resource availability, liquidity, which means that oil production
has to continue or resume as soon as possible for revenues to
be built up, and in sectors other than food, our resources available
under the Oil For Food programme are imported supplies. There
are elements of the cash component that would be required in order
to use the supplies effectively in addition to the issue of salaries
of the local entities who actually manage the programme. When
the DSG and SG gave an informal briefing to the members of the
Security Council about a week ago, they made very clear that they
felt we were certainly looking at at least some of these issues
that we think need to be addressed. They said that any of the
members of the Security Council that want to have more detailed
informal discussions are welcome, and that we would be happy to
deal with them, but the issue seems to be that within the Security
Council at this point there is a great sensitivity about whether
it is too premature to have a discussion on the implications of
a possible crisis on the programme. We will be ready to have a
dialogue with whoever wishes to on this.
Mr Battle: It is a difficult conversation.
The themes and areas we are looking at run together. Chris's question
links to the points you have just mentioned.
Chris McCafferty
75. It is really further to the point on Oil
For Food programme. You have made it clear that you have enormous
concerns about how that programme would continue. In fact, I think
in your introductory remarks you said it would cease to be operative
on commencement of hostilities, and in response to my colleague
Ann Clwyd, you also said that stockpiles were a minor proportion
of what you felt was needed in a mid-range scenario. I would draw
your attention to the USAID website, where they are saying quite
clearly that they intend to work with international organisations
to maintain a countrywide ration system on an emergency basis
and support displaced persons. Could you comment on that? That
is part of their website "reliefweb", USA contingency
plans for humanitarian assistance in Iraq. That seems to rather
fly in the face of what you are saying, that you believe it is
not possible. We have heard that there is seven months' worth
of food supplies that have already been purchased through the
Oil For Food programme and that USAID is prepared to ensure continued
distribution of that food. That certainly supports what their
website is saying. Could you explain that to us?
(Mr Mountain) I would be happy to try. Let me simply
say that the Oil For Food programme is an immensely complicated
mechanism, and it has been the subject of very close discussions,
in fact, over the last two weeks, which I am pleased to say Nicolas
was involved in. As Nicolas said, there have been discussions
with the US on how that programme might be picked up—and
he can go into further detail on that—but at this stage
it is not picked up. There are two ways. One would be a resolution
in the Security Council that would give the Secretary General
authority to manage that programme. There are various dimensions
of that. The second would be to assume that the programme would
be discontinued, and that therefore it should be replaced, and
supplies started de novo. Those that are running the programme—and
I tried to touch on this in my introductory remarks—indicate
that if there was a handover by the Security Council to the Secretary
General, the time taken to reorganise all the supplies would be
probably of the order of 6-8 weeks. If it was a new programme
where you had to get new orders in, it could take up to 3-4 months.
Those are the basic facts of the situation. At the moment there
is discussion but nothing is organised at this stage. The pipeline
does not automatically become somebody else's. There are $10 billion
worth of pipeline at this stage, of which $4 billion is immediate
humanitarian requirements, food, health and water supply. But
these are deals that are being done between the Iraqi Government
and individual suppliers.
(Mr Oberlin) There are a few ways to look at your
question. As Ross has just mentioned, there is the legal issue
to start with, because the Government of Iraq is now contracting
supplies for the entire amount, except for the three northern
governorates, and that includes food, and in the case of food,
the three northern governorates are included. So we are confronted
with a situation where food is on its way, but it is on its way
against contracts which are between the Government of Iraq and
suppliers, which the United Nations happen to see because of the
sanctions issue and the payment issue, but we have no way of getting
involved in that until the Security Council resolution changes
that, if it can. All we can look at is what is on its way. In
terms of the assistance we could provide, there are a few issues.
One is an issue of pipeline, because our interest, so to speak,
in diverting or being able to use what is now in the pipeline
is aimed at this pipeline not being interrupted. As Ross says,
should it be interrupted, it would take a long time to start again
with the lag time for procurement of commodities. That is one
of our big interests in trying to be able to use the food that
is on its way. You mentioned that there is seven months' worth
of food in the pipeline. Our estimate is that it is closer to
two or three months', depending on the commodities in the food
baskets. Having said that, again, we do not have access to that,
and it would have to await a Security Council decision. We are
nevertheless trying to locate this food. We do not even know whether
it is on its way because, again, it is an issue between the supplier
and the Government of Iraq. We are trying to figure out as much
as we can also in terms of transport alternatives, because 60%
of this food is now coming in through the port of Umm Qasr, which
we think might not be used during and after conflict. All these
plans we are making, but this food is not ours at the moment.
(Mr Mountain) We welcome the commitment of the US,
if that is a commitment. I am afraid I did not find it in the
fact sheet.
76. It is under "Food and Nutrition."
"USAID will ensure the nutritional needs of the population
are met through food availability and distribution" and "We
will work with international organisations to maintain a countrywide
ration system on an emergency basis and support internally displaced
persons." It is quite clear.
(Mr Mountain) We welcome that. It is not in place.
77. Do you need a Security Council resolution
to alter the Oil For Food programme in a time of conflict?
(Ms Singh) Absolutely.
78. Could I widen this out? Ross, you said in
your introduction that Iraqis already have a significant humanitarian
need. Given the apparent difficulties of obtaining a further Security
Council resolution, do you see any difficulties for the UN if
there is not a second resolution, or would in fact the UN's position
be easier if there was not one?
(Mr Mountain) We are talking about a different resolution.
79. I recognise that. I am just saying, you
responded by saying that that second Security Council resolution
is necessary to change the Oil For Food programme in a time of
conflict. What I am now saying is, can we widen this out away
from that? You have made the point about the significant humanitarian
problem. We know that there is an enormous food shortage in Iraq.
What I am now asking is, if there is not a second Security Council
resolution about going to war, would that put the UN in a very
difficult position in terms of its humanitarian remit or would
it in fact be easier for you because you would not be seen as
being politically partial?
(Mr Mountain) Our approach is based on the humanitarian
responsibilities of our different agencies. Whether there is a
second resolution or not, if there is a conflict, we will need
to do essentially the same tasks, and worry about how we reach
the vulnerable populations inside Iraq. Clearly, if there is a
conflict, the Oil For Food programme stops, so relating that to
the current condition of the Iraqi population, that condition
will immediately worsen, independent of any effects of the conflict.
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