Examination of Witnesses(Questions 80-95)
THURSDAY 6 MARCH 2003
MR ROSS
MOUNTAIN, MS
ANUPAMA RAO
SINGH AND
MR NICOLAS
OBERLIN
Mr Colman
80. That confirms what the Secretary of State
said to us, which is the need for a third resolution to deal with
humanitarian position of the United Nations. Going back to the
Oil For Food programme, I was very impressed when I visited their
offices at the UN last November with colleagues in terms of the
tremendous work they were doing and the improved nutritional levels
that have been established over the last five years under the
programme. You have explained why you did not mention the Iraq
Programme in your family of UN agencies, but clearly they are
going to be very important should there be armed conflict, and
they would be brought in almost immediately, because you there
have a template on how to deliver humanitarian aid, which is precisely
what the UN has been doing. There is an article in today's Financial
Times on page 8 which says "Oil For Food programme system
may drive relief aid." Clearly, you have this six-week gap
which you have identified to us, but do you see after the six
weeks, if there were a new resolution going through the Security
Council, that you would use that template that is already there
to deliver, and I think you said the Secretary General would be
potentially the person managing the programme, and there were
dimensions to it. What is mentioned in the newspaper was particularly,
as you say, allowing the UN to handle the contracts, establishing
new entry points for goods, because they are currently limited,
and using free ports or bonded warehouses outside Iraq. Clearly,
you have not seen this particular article, but is this really
the way forward should there be a third resolution which deals
with humanitarian affairs?
(Mr Mountain) First of all, the OIP is, of course,
the Oil For Food programme, and indeed, the Humanitarian Co-ordinator
for Iraq is the main operative in Iraq at the present time for
that programme, and he will remain in charge as the regional co-ordinator
of this. So they are very much part of this and it indeed funds
the overwhelming bulk of programmes that go on inside. So they
will remain very much a part of this effort. In terms of the they
fund indeed the majority of programmes that go on inside. So they
will remain very much a part of this. In terms of the future of
the programme, the Security Council would need to take a position
on that, but we cannot assume that immediately everything would
go forward without a delay. It would still need time to transfer
the programmes, but that is the option.
(Ms Singh) Just to make a couple of points, to reconfirm
what Ross has said about the Office of the Iraq Programme being
intimately involved in these discussions and the fact that the
Deputy Secretary General does chair a steering group at the Under
Secretary level that includes both the Emergency Relief Co-ordinator
and Mr Benon Savan, and the heads of all the operational agencies,
who can now meet three times a week in order to discuss these
issues so that they are all working in conjunction with each other
both at the field as well as headquarters level. As far as the
Oil For Food programme and its relationship with humanitarian
assistance, I think we need to look at it at three levels. First,
irrespective of what decisions the Security Council may take about
who manages the programme in the immediate post-conflict situation,
if and when it happens, there is the issue that, even for the
resources that we are able to raise for preparedness, we would
need a certain flexibility of Sanctions Committee procedures for
agencies' own resources so that we are able to move staff around,
across the neighbouring countries, to procure, without having
to go through the rather time-consuming processes. So there is
a procedural issue there, irrespective of where the resources
come from. The next step is to say in the immediate aftermath,
for the immediate humanitarian requirements, what are the potential
resources available within the Oil For Food programme that could
be quickly deployed, and who would manage those resources until
such time as the Iraqi entities are able to resume management
of the programme? We do not know when that will be. That would
bring in the issues of contracts in the pipeline. I just want
to say that whether it is two months' supply or whether it is
six months' supply is often an element of how you look at contracts
in the pipeline. Basically, what happens is that a distribution
plan is approved in the beginning of a particular phase of the
programme, the government may put in a number of contracts for
Sanctions Committee approval, but then it is only when the letters
of credit are issued and we know that there is money available
in the bank to pay for those contracts that we know that the agreement
comes into force. So between the approval of contracts and letters
of credit being issued, you may find a bit of a gap, which may
often explain the difference between six months and two months.
We are looking at immediate procedural issues that would just
help the entire humanitarian community. Then we are looking at
some "quick fixes" that may be required to address the
interim, and then we would be having a more long-term or medium-term
look at the role of the Oil For Food programme in a post-conflict
recovery position.
Ann Clwyd
81. Could you clarify one point that was made
to me while I was in northern Iraq? They were complaining very
bitterly that $2 billion for Oil For Food was, they said, locked
up in a bank account which they are not allowed to use. Do you
know what is meant by that? They obviously mean an Iraqi Government
account, do they not? It is only 13% that goes to the UN.
(Mr Mountain) I am afraid I do not have any detail
on that, but clearly if there was money available that could be
used, we could certainly investigate that.
Tony Worthington
82. In the discussion so far we I think have
been making the assumption that there will be a UN-authorised
military initiative. What is your position if the United States
and, say, the United Kingdom go on their own? What is the legal
position and the administrative position about the giving of assistance?
Is it not changed radically by it not being UN-authorised?
(Mr Mountain) We do not expect that that eventuality
would affect us legally. That is for sure. On the one hand, we
have a general mandate to look after vulnerable groups, wherever
they are, and in a sense, that is the normal situation we face.
We did not need an authorisation to go into Sierra Leone. The
other side is that the initial resolutions of the Security Council
did specifically foresee the involvement of humanitarian actors
for food and health care, so we do not expect that that would
change the mandate or the need for us to be involved.
83. I know the need to be involved is there,
but in terms of your involvement, it would depend on power, in
the sense that it would be for the dominant power, which would
be the United States, if they went bilaterally, to invite you
in, because it is not a UN mandate, is it?
(Mr Mountain) Normally, in the civil wars that we
deal with, or the wars that we deal with, we do not have a specific
Security Council mandate, and we do not require one. We do have,
of course, security concerns, and if there are military forces
of whatever kind present, access to the population would require
us coming to an understanding with the military authorities, wherever
they be. There are, of course, the provisions of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which make it fairly explicit that occupying powers
and military forces should at least facilitate humanitarian actors
in providing support to the civilian population. That is one aspect
that is clear, and my understanding is that this is well understood
by the external actors that are likely to be involved in Iraq.
(Ms Singh) Just to supplement what Ross has said,
if it were to be military action not endorsed by the Security
Council, then under the Fourth Geneva Convention the Occupying
Power would have a legal responsibility for taking care of all
civilian needs, but as in other situations, the UN operational
agencies believe we have a humanitarian mandate, so we would try
and assist, but the primary responsibility and accountability
would be with the Occupying Power. The specific responsibility
that would be given to the United Nations, I think, in such a
situation could also still depend on whether the Security Council
wished the UN to take on a role over and above what we would normally
do as part of our humanitarian mandate.
84. We have covered quite a lot about co-ordination,
but one bit that is not covered is the role of the NGOs and how
they are linked into any operation. You have this great difficulty
about having to be very low-key and not make assumptions, and
if you bring in outsiders, it can go in all sorts of directions.
How are you anticipating involving the NGOs?
(Mr Mountain) First of all, it is true that we have
had to make our planning low key, and thank you for understanding
that. But I do want to say that from the very outset we have been
involving NGO consortia in the planning, and throughout the various
gatherings that we have had to pull together the preparedness,
low-key though they be, we have had NGO representatives in the
Geneva meetings we have had and so on. I chair the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee Working Group, which has been responsible for
much of this planning, which involves three NGO consortia, the
Red Cross movement, (both the Federation and the ICRC as permanent
observers) plus the International Organisation on Migration. That
has been the operational planning basis for this joint effort.
Perhaps more importantly, at the field level there has been much
greater involvement. I would like Anupama to say a few words about
what UNICEF in particular has been doing in terms of the sectors
they are responsible for, but let me just say emphatically that
we very much value and have found the partnership of non-governmental
organisations to be essential in dealing with any humanitarian
crisis, let alone the Iraqi prospect. Iraq has particular problems
because there are very few international NGOs and even operational
national NGOs in the region. The major concentration is in fact
in Jordan, where there are about 40 INGOs, many of whom are interested
in working in Iraq. In Iraq itself, the north has hosted quite
a lot of international non-governmental organisations. The south/centre
has only a handful. CARE is perhaps the biggest here and has a
wide coverage. But I have just done a tour of the region, and
I have been talking to the governmental authorities in Syria and
Iran as well as in Jordan about the importance of us having more
non-governmental organisations in to be our partners in programming,
particularly into Iraq, and I am very pleased to say that the
reaction has been very positive in those countries. Kuwait is
another country where my colleagues have been seeking to obtain
for NGOs the required access. We have very close links. I met
with all the NGOs, the few that were in the other countries as
well as the 40-odd in Jordan, and they have all been involved
and are being involved in such planning as is going on now at
the field level. Let me just take a specific example, if I may,
as to UNICEF, to describe particularly the water and sanitation
sector.
(Ms Singh) Maybe I could give just a sentence in context:
UNICEF has had a presence in Iraq since 1983 and we have been
working in Iraq since 1953 so we have a long experience of working
with local entities whether they are governmental or non governmental.
In the context of the preparedness planning, UNICEF has been asked
to lead in sectors of water and sanitation and nutrition, education
and child protection. Our regional director, Tom McDermott, who
is leading the whole preparedness exercise from our office in
Oman, Jordan, has organised sector co-ordination meetings so far
in each of these sectors where we have actually tried to bring
together all the UN agencies as well as the key international
NGOs who are already operating in that area or who wish to get
engaged to see who would be doing what, what could be a system
of sharing information, and making sure that all the agencies
complement each other. Just to give you a couple of examples from
that, as a result of the meeting that we had on the co-ordination
of water and sanitation Oxfam has offered to second and pay for
one of their persons who we think would be ideal to head up the
sector co-ordination group; we are taking the person on a one
dollar contract just to help out on some legal aspects of having
him as part of the group; in child protection we have had a meeting
with the UNICEF alliance, ICRC and IFRC, and have come to a very
good division of labour where ICRC would do the tracing and reunification
of unaccompanied children amongst IDPs and refugees if the situation
arises and UNICEF would take on the role of ensuring that children
who are in institutions—often juvenile detention centres
or homes for the disabled—do not lose out in terms of access
to food and medical services, so we have come to a clear division
of labour. Another example in terms of the actual operational
work that has been done in partnership is that in water and sanitation
we have felt that one of the preparedness activities that we could
do to minimise the potential impact of a crisis is just to make
sure that, for all the water and sewage treatment plants across
the country that have generators, there is a crash repair programme
of the generators so that if there is a breakdown of electricity
at least they could run for some time. ICRC has taken on the responsibility
of doing the crash repair of generators for the Baghdad area and
UNICEF has said that we would work with the local authorities
for the crash repair in areas to the south and centre outside
of Baghdad, so at both the planning and co-ordination level but
really at the nitty gritty of operation we are trying to work
as closely as possible with our partners, and we do have a clear
sense of who will do what in this.
John Barrett
85. Thank you for your paper on the funding
requirements. I have just had a quick scan through that and there
were a couple of items I wanted to ask a little bit more about.
You mentioned in your introduction that the pledges exceeded the
amounts so far committed. How do you hope to move fairly quickly
if military action does start to make sure that these pledges
are delivered? Also, you mentioned having a Flash Appeal. Is there
a plan B for financial requirement if it becomes a regional conflict,
in as much as a lot of this is to do with the war in Iraq and
a lot of the preparations are going on presumably on the basis
that neighbouring countries are relatively intact to be able to
support the humanitarian crisis within Iraq. If it becomes a regional
conflict is there a plan B being prepared?
(Mr Mountain) Thank you for the question on the finance.
Indeed pledges are more than commitments, that is for sure, but
frankly those sums are still only a drop in the bucket and I have
been emphasising this on each occasion I can. The target we have
put out is for three months' preparedness, but for operations,
as you are hearing, needs are dramatically more than that. Without
taking into account the Oil For Food programme that now will probably
need to be inserted into the appeal, we are talking of hundreds
of millions now. The amounts for operations are going to be very
high—so what are we doing for that? We are coming to talk
to the International Development Committee of the British Parliament!
We are also very much talking to our other donors and potential
donors. We are also, as you hear, talking to you about how the
Security Council might need to examine existing arrangements for
the Oil For Food programme in that regard. The Flash Appeal that
we are preparing at the moment which would come out after the
conflict would be for a very significant amount, but people really
do need to be aware of how much the humanitarian dimension really
is going to require to keep that going. Is there a plan B for
the rest of the region? We are aware that, if this conflict goes
on for a period of time and depending on its intensity and so
on, there could also be problems elsewhere. We will not be factoring
that aspect into the immediate appeal, although we are obviously
conscious of that possibility and need to take that it into account,
especially when we are looking at security arrangements. The fact
that we have established our hub in Cyprus is, in a sense, a reflection
of that. The actual requirements for humanitarian assistance will,
of course, be determined by the nature of the conflict—is
it going to be short? how many people will be displaced? and so
on—but as I tried to emphasise, it will not begin and end
with the conflict because the Oil For Food programme is going
to be dislocated at that stage so you are then going to have to
worry about the rehabilitation and subsequent stages. The population
of Iraq is so dependent on governmental mechanisms now for all
of its needs—thus is very unlike Afghanistan and we need
to see them in that perspective.
Ann Clwyd
86. On the question of refugees, I remember
in 1991 when Turkey closed its borders I was on the mountains
of Iran and Iraq at that time and I saw the plight of the people
fleeing. What arrangements have been made to get adjoining countries
to open their borders? What agreements have been reached, and
what further pressure can be put on those countries which have
not agreed to making those preparations?
(Mr Mountain) In terms of the borders, the one country
that has indicated that its borders are open is Syria. On the
basis of discussions that my UNHCR colleagues have been having,
and that I have been having, and others, we believe there is potential
in a number of other countries for them to open their borders,
at least to a reasonable number of asylum seekers. I think there
is more progress at the informal level than can be announced at
the official level. Coming back to the north, however, there is
a strong memory, as you say, of 1991 and we are having to redouble
our efforts to look at the potential that there will be rather
more internally displaced in that area than we had earlier anticipated
due to some of the comments, the statements and the policies that
have been announced over recent days. For people to move you do
not need something to happen: people will move on rumours of attacks,
of whatever nature—be it potentially chemical and biological
warfare, be it of an offensive from a particular source—and
there is now concern that we need to reinforce some of the provisions
that have already been put in place for existing IDPs in that
area as well as looking to deal with further potential outflows
of refugees who we think probably might head more towards Iran
than towards other borders.
87. Some people have already started moving
in northern Iraq to villages out of the main towns. I know there
has been some talk about safe havens or some sort of humanitarian
zones within the country but clearly that will not be sufficient.
I do not know even if it is desirable because we do not know the
extent to which people will have to flee.
(Mr Mountain) We have not been involved in any discussions
of safe havens. We, in common with the ICRC, do point out that
any forces involved in combat should be aware of the need to protect
to the maximum civilians and, indeed, civilian and humanitarian
facilities and structures, but we are not in the process of setting
up any safe havens.
88. Can I also ask you about existing UN camps
in northern Iraq which have been set up to receive those people
who have recently been ethnically cleansed from some of the Iraqi
cities simply because they are Kurds or other minorities? I visited
one of those camps just a week ago and I thought there were pretty
bad conditions: there was no fuel there, for instance. They had
run out and it was snowing and very cold. What is the problem
there right now with supplying basic needs like that?
(Mr Mountain) Unfortunately I do not have that detail.
(Ms Singh) Again, I do not have the details but I
would just say that in terms of how these things are organised,
in the north amongst the UN family, UNOPS is responsible for the
management of the camp facilities whether in public buildings
or whatever, and Habitat is responsible for rebuilding homes and
resettling IDPs as well as refugees—Kurds who may have returned
from Iran and the others. Notwithstanding that, we do realise
that things need to pick up there. Also, because in recent years
the Kurdish government has spent a lot of effort in encouraging
Kurds who had moved out of Iran to return to Kurdistan, there
has been a bit of an increased demand for these services than
perhaps the UN was able to cope with, but there are arrangements
in place where UNOPS handles immediate requirements and in the
meeting in Cyprus where both Ross and I were we had quite a few
discussions on how the UN needs to gear up for what is likely
to happen in the north. We could always make the assumption, it
is true, until about the last week or 10 days that the north would
remain pretty stable but it seems we can no longer be working
on those assumptions, and systems are in place to gear up for
internal displacement even within the north.
(Mr Mountain) Fuel is likely to be a problem all over
if there is conflict, and I did indicate that as an area that
we need to focus on. Fuel is cheaper than water at the moment
in Iraq, but if supplies break down generators will need fuel,
electric power stations need fuel, vehicles need fuel to move
around and so on; and we are worried about how we will manage.
All the supplies for the Oil For Food programme are transported
from the south, including to the north. So supplies of food come
through Baghdad, supplies of medicines come through Baghdad as
well, and constitute another dimension we are worrying about.
John Barrett
89. Moving on to the potential use of chemical
and biological weapons, do the UN staff on the ground have access
to protective equipment, and has the UN been involved in any training
programmes for its staff or Iraqi health workers?
(Mr Mountain) The policy that has been established
by the UN Security Co-ordinator, after long reflection and interaction,
is that in relation to chemical, biological and any eventual nuclear
threat we would need to get out of there; there is no way we could
operate in these conditions. There have been some awareness sessions—not
widespread, but people have been certainly informed of that policy.
That remains an area of some concern, of course, but there is
frankly very little we are able to do to deal with that. We do
have stand-by arrangements; there are several UN agencies or UN-affiliated
agencies that can deal with the different threats. There is the
Organisation for Prevention of Chemical Warfare based in The Hague
which is obviously a specialist on the chemical side; the World
Health Organisation has a network that can address issues relating
to biological warfare—and have stocks of smallpox, vaccine,
for example, and the IAEA, of course, would be the agency of reference
for the nuclear side. But we have no illusions about how we could
operate in such circumstances. We would need to move out.
Ann Clwyd
90. In the north, of course, the Kurds do expect
in the event of conflict that they may again be the targets for
chemical weapons. The fear is so great there that they are going
out to the markets and buying huge sacks of nappies—not
because they are people with babies but they look on them as a
sort of protective mask in the event of a chemical attack. I have
asked several times of our government ministers here what protection
is going to be offered to the Kurdish population who may very
well be at particular risk in the event of the existing government
taking revenge on its own population. They have continually been
asking for chemical protective suits and, again, I have no answers
for them—I have no answers here when I have asked the question.
I have rather been given a general answer that the Kurds will
get the fullest possible protection. They take that with a certain
amount of scepticism, and I wondered whether their particular
needs were being addressed by somebody?
(Mr Mountain) We are broadly concerned about this
but, frankly, there is very little we can do about it and certainly
it is not an option. We have considered and discarded the option
even for our own staff of having chemical suits. In the heat,
how long you would be able to stay in a suit is already a question.
I am not a specialist in these areas but obviously the thing to
do is to try and help people identify where the risk exists and
how they can get away from areas that are at risk, and that is
what we are endeavouring to do—though by no manner of means
have we been able to do this comprehensively, and I do not want
to give that impression. That is why you do not need anything
to happen to empty cities, as you were indicating. If there is
a fear of chemical or biological weapons use then people will
head away from built-up areas into the mountains, into the villages.
91. Do you know by any chance whether UN weapons
inspectors have gone to sites where the Kurds believe that rockets
are to be seen pointing towards them which have the capability
of having chemical warheads?
(Mr Mountain) I have no such information. I am sure
that my colleagues who are involved with that side would welcome
any such information, but I have no information at all.
(Ms Singh) Certainly we have no detailed information
as to the specific sites that inspectors have gone to, or are
planning to go to.
92. Is it possible for you to pass it on to
your colleagues?
(Mr Mountain) Absolutely. We through our system would
be happy to pass on any information that could be useful to them
in deciding. If you have specific information we can certainly
indicate where you might go to be in touch with the inspectors.
Mr Battle: We have had a good hour and
a half where we have asked you questions. Do any colleagues have
any questions that they feel have not been asked or want to ask
for further information on?
Mr Walter
93. Could I just ask one very brief one which
follows up slightly from Ann Clwyd's question about the Kurdish
areas? We had a lot of reports in the press here yesterday about
Turkish plans to occupy Kurdistan and I wondered whether, in the
scenarios that you were looking at, you had had discussions with
the Turkish government with regard to how they would deal with
the humanitarian situation in those areas post-conflict?
(Mr Mountain) We have had discussions with the Turkish
authorities about how we might access northern Iraq from Turkey
with humanitarian workers and supplies and how, for example, people
who are in that area might exit via Turkey if need be. We have
not gone further than that but we are aware of local concerns
which has given us cause to adjust our contingency arrangements
in the north.
Mr Colman
94. You talked about Iraq being different from
Afghanistan. Do you believe there are any lessons where things
have gone wrong in Afghanistan which now I hope are going right
that you are able to translate across to Iraq in terms of learning
how to do it better in terms of delivering humanitarian aid?
(Mr Mountain) I hope we all learn from each of these
crises although each of them, of course, is very specific in its
own right and that is why one of the things that we clearly need
to do is take full account of the Iraqi context. Water supply
in Iraq is provided in the urban areas through a tap—it
is not a matter of people going back to a well in their gardens
and thereby surviving electricity outages. For the water to come
there has to be a treatment plant and there has to be electricity,
so we need to deal with it in those terms. There are issues that
we need to deal with in any post-conflict side like how Iraqi
ownership is established and how they might manage their own assets
and so on. Those are the kinds of issues I think that we want
to pay more attention to and we have obviously been doing quite
a lot of that already in Afghanistan; also the importance of transparent
government and looking at the governance side as a whole. We have
learned also about partnership with new Government authorities
in Afghanistan which could have relevance also for Iraq. We are
looking at these kinds of macro issues as well as a number of
other aspects but we do believe that it is important that we try
to work with and preserve, if you will, the infrastructure of
government. It would be a major problem, to put it mildly, if
the existing infrastructure of government, the ministries and
so on, were to break down and thus we can see the importance,
for example, of payment of salaries afterwards. Having served
in Afghanistan (and not served in Iraq,) in Iraq you have an effectively
functioning governmental structure which is extremely valuable
for an eventual reconstruction and redevelopment programme. That
is very different from Afghanistan. That is why I did flag even
in my opening remarks the importance of determining who is going
to pay civil service salaries. It is Iraqis that run power stations
and do the distribution, and therefore it is important to preserve
and support those structures.
(Ms Singh) I have one supplementary point: I think
one of the lessons we are learning even in Afghanistan now much
to our great concern is that attention on certain countries tends
to wane pretty quickly in terms of resources. We hope that the
international community does not forget Afghanistan. There seems
to be an indication that that is happening, and hopefully it will
not be repeated again in Iraq.
Mr Battle: You will be encouraged to
know that our Committee recently just published the report on
an inquiry we did following up Afghanistan, and we do not intend
to drop our attention. East Timor, similarly. There is another
great crisis where the international attention moves away.
Mr Colman
95. Chairman, perhaps we could let our witnesses
have a copy of the report that we have recently made? It would
be perhaps interesting for them to see our critique of a month
ago.
(Mr Mountain) Thank you for that because, while we
are preparing for what might happen in the Middle East, there
is a lot going on in Africa.
Mr Battle: We are still there too! We
are the one Committee that tries to keep in touch with all these
matters. Can I thank you and your colleagues for answering our
questions and giving us some very helpful insight. It is a very
difficult situation and we all appreciate that but it has been
a very helpful session for us. Thank you for your time.
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