Letter to the Clerk of the Committee from
Mr Ross Mountain, OCHA-Geneva
Let me first express my thanks to the International
Development Committee (IDC) for the opportunity to meet with you
at the Houses of Parliament. Let me also commend you for the importance
that you have placed on the Oil-For-Food Programme (OFFP) in the
body of your report. (Incidentally, I should point out at this
juncture that the population has even greater dependency on the
programme than is pointed out in your document. Indeed, 60% of
the Iraqi population depend in totality on OFFP for survival while
the remainder are reliant on the programme for upwards of 80%
of their household income. In addition, were the programme to
cease, crisis would come to the north [and south] of Iraq significantly
sooner than you have indicated).
Further to our conversation with regard to the
amendments suggested for the report on the "Possible humanitarian
consequences of any possible military action against Iraq"
published by the International Development Committee (IDC) of
the British Parliament, I would like to highlight a number of
issues that I felt were not adequately represented regarding the
interaction the UN has maintained with the humanitarian community
on coordination and information sharing efforts and preparedness/response
planning.
While reading through the sections of the report
supplied to us for our review and comment, I was concerned to
note that the information contained within gave particular emphasis
to the apparent "lack of leadership in co-ordinating planning
and preparation for possible military action in Iraq". I
noted that the IDC has chosen to highlight comments made by the
Director of the Save the Children Fund UK that imply that the
UN has effectively not established a leadership role with regard
to preparedness planning and that this factor will contribute
to a poor response by the humanitarian community in the event
of crisis in Iraq.
Within the context of preparedness/response
planning I believe that it should be pointed out that the humanitarian
community—not just the UN—have attempted to prepare
themselves in the region, as they are able, while severely restrained
by a lack of funding support from the international donor community.
While it is true that some funding has been made available—and
I can only speak on behalf of the UN here—it remains wholly
insufficient to ensure that an adequate level of response is made
available to assist any vulnerable populations in the event of
crisis in Iraq. As a result of the limited donor support thus
far, many UN agencies have had to draw on their own limited emergency
funds or borrow from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF)
managed by OCHA to enable them to attain minimum levels of response
with regard to commodities in place. To enhance this point, it
should also be appreciated that donors have been unwilling to
fund the humanitarian community for similar reasons as the humanitarian
community have been restricted in discussing preparedness/response
activities in public for fear of giving the impression that they
believe in the inevitability of war in Iraq.
Within the context of limited funding, the humanitarian
community has worked towards developing a comprehensive preparedness
and response mechanism across the region that will attempt to
provide support to refugees/asylum seekers, Third Country Nationals
(TCNs) and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the event of
crisis. The response system, as it exists, endeavours to provide
adequate coverage across all sectors (Food and Nutrition; Heath;
Shelter; Water and Sanitation; Education; Protection; and Mines
and UXOs) and attempts to involve all members of the humanitarian
community in the region. The UN has also attempted to focus efforts
on other sectors (Environment, Civil-Military Liaison, Fuel and
Electricity supply) that, while not being mainstream, will be
vital to the stabilisation and maintenance of humanitarian programmes
both during and immediately post-emergency. To further streamline
a UN response, inter-agency services have also been established
to burden-share certain collective responsibilities such as logistics,
communications and information.
While it is true that because of the political
sensitivities and the fear of giving wrong impressions coordination
and information flow have not been overt, this does not imply
that they have not occurred. Indeed information flow is ongoing
at all levels. Discreet planning for a crisis in Iraq has been
ongoing for many months and has included government consultations
as well as dialogue and meetings between UN agencies, ICRC, IFRC
and NGO consortia. While the UN at the HQ level has generally
not engaged NGOs bilaterally for discussions, information has
been consistently provided through representative NGO bodies thus
empowering them to provide information to their relevant members
either on request or as those respective bodies saw fit. I should
point out that UN/NGO interaction has been strong at the field
level, particularly in Jordan, where NGO concentration is currently
the greatest. To keep those governments in countries neighbouring
Iraq abreast of preparedness/response planning activities, meetings
have been undertaken in Geneva and New York with the respective
permanent missions as well as directly with governments in the
region.
To ensure that the executive heads of UN agencies
are aware of developments, the Deputy Secretary General chairs
a regular meeting in New York to brief on the latest developments
as well as providing a forum for policy issues to be discussed.
Coordination for preparedness and response is now being undertaken
from the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq's (RHCI) Office
in Larnaka, Cyprus. The RHCI now reports directly to the Emergency
Relief Coordinator (ERC) in New York to ensure strong links between
the field and UN HQ.
In closing, let me reiterate our appreciation
for the opportunity to interact with members of your committee.
Such interaction between government and the UN is, I believe,
an essential process in furthering the understanding of UN efforts
[and that of the humanitarian community] to best prepare for humanitarian
response whether it is in Iraq or in other parts of the globe.
Ross Mountain,
Assistant Emergency Relief Coordinator and Director
OCHA-Geneva
March 2003
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