APPENDICES TO THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE
APPENDIX 1
Memorandum submitted by the Community
and Public Affairs Unit, The Archbishops' Council of the Church
of England
INTRODUCTION
1. The terms of reference of the Church
of England's Community and Public Affairs Unit (CPAU) require
it "to co-ordinate the thought and action of the Church in
matters affecting the life of all in society". The CPAU reports
to the Archbishops' Council and, through it, to the General Synod.
2. The CPAU warmly welcomes the decision
by the House of Commons International Development Affairs Committee
to launch an inquiry into the humanitarian consequences of possible
military action against Iraq. The CPAU notes that this inquiry
seeks to address the following issues:
(i) the adequacy of UK Government, United
Nations and International Community humanitarian contingency plans;
(ii) the implications of military action
for refugees and internally displaced people and the level of
preparedness of UNHCR and the International Community, especially
Iraq's neighbours;
(iii) the likely effect of military action
against Iraq on the sustainability of aid programmes and in particular
the oil for food and UN food programmes;
(iv) the risk of large scale ethnic fighting
leading to humanitarian disaster; and
(v) the risk of military action targeting
electricity and water supplies and the effect of this on provision
of water and sanitation.
THE CHURCH
OF ENGLAND
AND IRAQ
3. Before tackling some of these issues
it might be helpful to set out the range of the Church of England's
relationship with Iraq in particular and the region as a whole,
for it is information from these relations that has informed this
submission. The Anglican Communion, to which the Church of England
belongs, consists of some 500 dioceses around the world. The Episcopal
Church in Jerusalem and the Middle East covers Jerusalem, Iran,
Cyprus and the Gulf States, including Iraq. The Bishop of Cyprus
and the Gulf, the Rt Revd Clive Handford, remains in regular contact
with the Christian community in Iraq. He is supported in his ministry
by the diocesan companion link that exists between the Diocese
of Exeter and the Diocese of Cyprus and the Gulf. This facilitates
amongst other things the exchange of information and resources.
In addition a number of Church of England Mission Agencies such
as USPG and CMS have a strong historical presence with the Churches
of the Middle East, most noticeably in those countries bordering
Iraq. Strong links also exist between the Church of England and
the Middle East Council of Churches, an ecumenical body, which
has a number of ongoing development projects in Iraq.
4. Since the end of the Gulf War the Church
of England's concern over Iraq has focussed primarily on the perceived
humanitarian impact of sanctions. The Director of Coventry Cathedral's
Centre for International Ministry, Canon Andrew White, has visited
Iraq several times over the last few years. The Centre's work
has focused on retraining Iraqi doctors in the latest techniques
surrounding bone marrow transplants. In 2000 the Church of England's
Assistant Secretary for International and Development Affairs,
Dr Charles Reed undertook a six-week secondment to the United
Nations Development Programme in Iraq. This secondment involved
exposure to UN bodies such as UNICEF, WHO, UNDP, WFP and UNHCR.
It also provided the opportunity to observe the ongoing relief
work carried out by the International NGO community. Day to day
interactions with Iraqi citizens, while in no way comprehensive,
nonetheless provided valuable insights into household structure
and consumption, which provided a sample of the vulnerability
of differing sections of Iraqi society.
THE POTENTIAL
HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES
OF WAR
5. Given the fluidity of the international
situation it remains difficult to predict how the crisis will
unfold. A central concern in the current debate about the legitimacy
of military action against Iraq is the uncertainty about the scale
of the humanitarian consequences that might result, depending
on the duration and progress of the war, and the ability of the
international community to respond.
6. What is clear is that military action
against Iraq has the potential to lead to a serious worsening
of the humanitarian situation, which will require a concerted
and co-ordinated international response both in the short and
long term. Sanctions and the ration systems have already created
huge humanitarian problems. The initial impact of any military
action is likely to aggravate these problems.
7. Given the current vulnerability of the
Iraqi people any military action against Iraq must adhere to Protocol
I of the 1977 Geneva Convention, which prohibits any attack on
objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.
While international humanitarian law does not prohibit action
against transport or electrical instrastructures, such targets
in the case of Iraq would further increase the vulnerability of
the Iraqi people, which has reached a perilously dangerous level.
8. The combination of two major wars and
12 years of sanctions have contributed to the degradation of the
country's infrastructure, and with it, the Government of Iraq's
ability to meet the basic welfare needs of its people. Most of
the statistics are well known and do not need to be repeated here.
However, it is worth recalling some of the humanitarian problems
associated with this situation. They include:
(i) a failing health service that has been
exacerbated by the collapse in all other infrastructure systems;
(ii) a centrally controlled food distribution
system which has created ration dependency so making the population
more susceptible to internal and external shocks;
(iii) a dilapidated water and sanitation
infrastructure, which as recent UNICEF studies illustrate have
contributed to significant increases in water borne diseases over
the last two years, especially amongst children; and
(iv) a dilapidated electricity generation
infrastructure on which the water and sanitation situation depends.
9. The combination of these factors means
that the ability of significant sections of the Iraqi population
to cope with any disruption to the food distribution is negligible.
The strategies employed by most Iraqis to maintain some degree
of normality over the last 12 years has exhausted their ability
to respond to further shocks. While there have been some signs
of stockpiling of non-perishable food goods and water within privileged
sections of society, it must be doubtful whether the vast majority
of the population has been able to take similar precautions.
10. While it is true that President Hussein
has in the last few weeks increased the food ration system this
appears to be a short-term measure aimed at maintaining political
control rather than as part of any considered humanitarian contingency
planning. Given the limited food reserves that are held in warehouses
throughout the country it is unlikely such a strategy can be maintained
long term. Similarly in the event of war it is likely that such
food reserves, as exist, will be directed to those military units
engaged in conflict.
11. In the event of war, it is probable
that significant numbers of internally displaced people as well
as refugee movements will move to neighbour countries (Iran, Iraqi
Kurdistan and Jordan). At the time of the Gulf war there were
1.8 million Iraqi refugees. Given the level of poverty within
Iraq similar flows of refugees can be expected. If food shortages
were to occur, with some elements of Iraqi society faring better
than others, then this could heighten the possibility of large
scale ethnic turmoil breaking out in the country. If such a scenario
were to occur then it would make the implementation of any humanitarian
programme deeply problematic. Any use of chemical and biological
weapons would also severely disrupt any humanitarian programme.
12. The implication of these scenarios means
that there must be more extensive collaboration between military
and humanitarian planners than was experienced during the war
in Afghanistan.
RESPONDING TO
THE HUMANITARIAN
CONSEQUENCES OF
WAR AGAINST
IRAQ
13. Over the course of the last year the
Prime Minister has consistently said that his concern was not
with the Iraqi people but with its President. It is worth recalling
that at the time of the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan
the Prime Minister gave similar assurances that "the humanitarian
coalition to help the people of Afghanistan is as vital as the
military action itself". [Official Report, 4 October 2001;
Vol. 372, c.673.] A similar emphasis was made at the time of the
Kosovo conflict. However, while the Secretary of State for Defence
has repeatedly made announcements about the deployment of military
personnel and equipment to the Gulf, no similar announcements
have been made by the Secretary of State for International Development
as to the State of the Government's humanitarian contingency planning.
14. While there was a House of Commons debate
on the Government's humanitarian contingency planning on 30 January
2003, no further information, apart from the evidence given by
the Secretary of State for International Development to the House
of Commons International Development Committee on 12 February
has entered the public domain. Important questions still remain
unanswered. How will the UN's "Oil for Food" programme
work in a conflict situation? What measures are being put in place
to replace the programme if it is suspended for several months?
Given that the "Oil for Food" programme extends to infrastructure
requirements (ie medicines, transport, telecommunications, and
water supply) as well as food, how are disruptions to the supply
of such goods to be compensated?
15. There remains significant public anxiety
about the capacity of the international community to respond to
a further humanitarian crisis. The Government should be taking,
as a matter of urgency, every practical step to mobilise the international
humanitarian community to respond to any new crisis in Iraq. It
is evident that the international humanitarian community is already
under considerable strain given the food shortages in shortages
in Southern Africa, the horn of Africa and Angola. Five million
people in Afghanistan remain dependent on food aid, while the
humanitarian situation in the West Bank and Gaza continues to
deteriorate. If a humanitarian assistance programme is required
then this must be financed by new money rather than redirecting
aid from other parts of the world.
CONCLUSION
16. In conclusion it is worth noting that
the Church of England has already taken steps to examine its own
possible contribution to any humanitarian effort. While Christian
Aid will take the lead on behalf of its sponsoring Churches, the
Church of England has encouraged those mission agencies, which
have a presence in the region to be ready to provide emergency
assistance.
17. In addition the Church of England is
in regular contact with the Diocese of Cyprus and the Gulf as
well as the Episcopal Church in Jerusalem and the Middle East.
It is hoped that the Church will therefore be in a position to
continue to help meet some of the needs of both these dioceses.
Coventry Cathedral's Centre for International Ministry is considering
what resources it can make available to assist in building inter-religious
dialogue within Iraq following any conflict. Taken together these
are important resources, which the Church of England believes
will have benefits beyond the purely humanitarian.
18. In considering the different communities
in Iraq, attention needs to be paid to the minority Christian
Churches and their communities inside the country. Their situation
could worsen severely if they are seen by those of the majority
faith to be agents of a Western Christian assault on an Islamic
people.
Community and Public Affairs Unit
Church of England
12 February 2003
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