Examination of Witnesses (Questions 60-79)
THURSDAY 27 FEBRUARY 2003
RT HON
JACK STRAW
MP, MR EDWARD
OAKDEN AND
MR TIM
DOWSE
Tony Worthington
60. Can I turn to the helicopters in Nepal and
the gift? I think we both accept that the way that information
came out, there was an oversight at the time in that it was not
given to the House. I think it was at the end of a session just
before a recess. I must admit, I was surprised about helicopters
being given to the Nepal Government as a gift. Then obviously
there comes into question for what purpose the helicopters were
used. Among the things that it says is "logistical purposes"
which can mean anything. These were Russian helicopters that were,
I think, used for troop carrying. I believe that they were sent
in a hurry because the Nepal Army had lost helicopters, they had
been shot down. I think there is an issue there about whether
that is an appropriate use for a gift, and whether it should be
under the heading of "gift". I think the other issue
which is there is that it was funded out of—I have lost
the name.
(Mr Straw) The Global Conflict Prevention Fund.
61. Yes, the Global Conflict Prevention Fund
of which there are two. It does not sound like being appropriate
for a global conflict prevention fund, if its purpose was mainly
in support of war. Another issue to put in there is that I believe
you chair one of the Global Conflict Prevention Funds, and that
the Secretary of State for International Development does the
African one. If you go onto the websites for the two, there is
much more openness on the African website about what the money
is used for, in comparison with the Foreign Office one. I wonder
if you could look at that?
(Mr Straw) I will certainly look at that as well.
I chair the Cabinet ministerial committee that deals with Nepal.
There are two. There is the Sub-Saharan Africa Global Conflict
Prevention Pool and then there is the rest of the world one. Clare
Short chairs the Sub-Saharan Africa one and I chair the other
one, and then there are some specific ad hoc ministerial committees
one in respect of Nepal, another in respect of Afghanistan, another
in respect of Sierra Leone which I chair. The Global Conflict
Prevention Pool, amongst other things, is specifically for providing
military equipment, as well as many other things, where we judge
that that is a means to prevent conflict. That is the case in
Sierra Leone and it is also the case in Nepal. The requirements
in Nepal are classic candidates for funding under the Global Conflict
Prevention Pool, because you have there a very, very serious terrorist
insurgency. You also have a fragile government which is the subject
of considerable criticism. We have had to take a strategic decision
about how best we can support Nepal, against a background, number
one, that it is important that we should not allow countries,
where we can, to descend into insurgency and terrorism—and
we all know what can happen there—but number two, that if
we do, the consequences are not only pretty grave for that country,
but also for surrounding countries, including in this case India
which has a very natural regional interest in the stability of
its neighbours. So we as ministers have come together—and
this particularly applies to Clare Short, Geoff Hoon and myself—and
have worked through what I think is a pretty coherent strategy
for support for Nepal. Part of that is obviously humanitarian,
it is good governance, it is diplomatic and political support,
but also—and we have looked at this in considerable detail—it
includes the provision of these helicopters and other military
support. Yes, in order sometimes to prevent wider conflict, you
have to arm armed forces and make sure they are effective, because
one of the major problems leading to the insurgency has been the
lack of equipment, some lost through accident and others through
lack of training by the Royal Nepalese Army. If I may say so,
I am very happy to justify the use of the money, but that is not
directly the issue you want to pursue.
62. I do not really have a quarrel with the
purpose of it, although there is a conflict in what you said about
arming people for insurgency, arming people in these situations,
with what is said in our information, which is that they are not
being used for arms, for waging a war.
(Mr Straw) No. We are not arming them for insurgency.
The helicopters are not armed. We are providing them for the Royal
Nepalese Army, and they are restricted to logistical, medical
and ongoing humanitarian tasks. Of course, if you are saying to
me indirectly, "Isn't that assisting in the combat capability,
not directly but indirectly, of the Royal Nepalese Army?",
yes is the answer, it must be the case, because if you enable
them to get their troops there, if they are able to be extracted
more quickly for medical support, of course that assists their
capability, but I still think it is justifiable.
63. But it should be made transparent.
(Mr Straw) It is.
64. It should be made transparent that that
is what one is doing, one is assisting the Nepalese Army in the
conduct of its war. That is not conveyed by the expression "Global
Conflict Prevention Pool".
(Mr Straw) No, I am really sorry, Mr Worthington,
I do not accept that. Unless one is a pacifist—and I respect
those who do take that view—then I think that it is accepted
that in order to prevent conflict, you have to use force in many
circumstances, and that is certainly true in Nepal. It is impossible
to prevent this insurgency from these Maoist terrorist groups,
who are vicious beyond belief, without both a military strategy
alongside, as we have been urging on the Nepalese Government,
and a political, governmental human rights strategy. One of the
things we have sought to do in the British Government since these
pools were established on the initiative of Clare Short and Robin
Cook in the first Parliament, is to bring together the combined
resources of various government departments here and to develop
a single strategy which we then apply.
65. Finally, could you undertake to have another
look at the issue of the information which is given out? My memory
is that on the Africa pool you can see how the money has been
spent, but not so on the Foreign Office one.
(Mr Straw) I am happy to do that.
Sir John Stanley
66. Foreign Secretary, I declare that I am Chairman
of the Britain Nepal All-Party Parliamentary Group, a wholly unremunerated
office. In that capacity, I would wish wholly to endorse what
you said about the viciousness and brutality of the actions which
the Maoists take, but I want to focus on the conditions under
which the gift of helicopters has been made. As very often in
life, what looks in Committee Room 15 to be an entirely sensible
and rational statement of ministerial policy does not always actually
have the effects intended on the ground. The policy is to restrict
the use of helicopters exclusively to logistical, medical and
ongoing humanitarian tasks. I would just like to focus your attention
on the medical dimension. Foreign Secretary, I do not know whether
your officials have advised you that when the Maoists go into
attacks on usually district headquarters, the two top priority
targets are first of all, of course, to murder all police officers
and members of the Royal Nepalese Army, target one; target two
are the available medical supplies. If you were able, by any chance,
in your incredibly busy schedule, to see the excellent Channel
4 programme on 21 February "Nepal Raising the Red Flag",
you would have seen vivid testimony of that. It was also featured
in the Observer newspaper. Medical supplies are a top currency
as far as the terrorists are concerned. They want the medical
supplies for their own use. They are also a key means of basically
securing the cooperation and coercion of the civilian population,
and they are a means of extorting money and gifts in kind for
their operations. Therefore, I wish to ask you, if these British-gifted
helicopters are used to deliver medical supplies on a large scale,
under the existing well-established pattern of Maoist terrorism
the places to where they are delivered are going to become absolutely
top targets for the Maoists. I am speaking for real. You may laugh.
(Mr Straw) No, I am not laughing.
67. They are going to be top targets. Unless
the delivery of these medical supplies is accompanied by hugely
greater security for those medical supplies, you are going to
be gifting medical supplies and everything that goes with them
to the Maoist terrorists.
(Mr Straw) You are very well informed on the matter,
Sir John. Allow me to look into that and come back to you.
Chairman: Let us move on.
Mr Khabra
68. For the whole year from September 2001 to
September 2002 the Government denied issuing a licence to export
parts—
(Mr Straw) Hawks, yes.
69. —aircraft equipment and production
equipment to India. It then acknowledged it did, in September
2002. How was this oversight possible, and what measures have
been taken to ensure that such an oversight cannot recur? That
is one question, but I want to ask you another question. How does
the Government ensure that its activities in promoting the British
arms industry do not in any way prejudge, and are not seen to
prejudge, decisions on licence applications? Is it conceivable
that a licence for their export could be refused, even after the
Prime Minister has urged the Government of India to buy Hawk aircraft?
(Mr Straw) On your first question, Mr Khabra, when
I came last year I said that the application for the export of
Hawk aircraft to India had been received. It was incorrect, and
it was an entirely innocent inadvertence, because there had not
been an application for the aircraft, but there had been an application,
which had been approved, for components and production equipment
to make up the aircraft, so amounting to the same thing. As soon
as I discovered this error, I wrote to the Committee and have
since put it on the record of the House. As to how these things
happen, certainly I am not perfect, and I apologise for that,
but that was the background to this. On your second point, the
licence that had been issued will enable there to be, as I recall—but
I will double check this—the export of the sale which British
Aerospace, BAES, is seeking with the Government of India, which
sale has not yet been finalised by the Government of India, I
believe.
(Mr Dowse) Yes.
(Mr Straw) There we are.
Chairman
70. The press tell us that the Prime Minister
has been urging the Indian Government to buy Hawk aircraft.
(Mr Straw) So have I.
71. Fine, then the unity of Government is demonstrated
by this brief exchange. Is it conceivable in these circumstances
that a licence for their export could ever be refused?
(Mr Straw) We would judge any outstanding licence
applications on the criteria, just as the existing ones have been,
just that.
(Mr Dowse) That is essentially the case. The contract
that is under negotiation, but has not been finalised, would involve
production of Hawk aircraft in India. The licences that were approved
in September 2001 were for production equipment and components.
No exports have taken place against those licences, because the
contract has not been signed. They were approved at that point
in order that British Aerospace could move very quickly to meet
delivery schedules if and when the contract is signed.
(Mr Straw) Mr Berry, if there are outstanding applications,
they will be considered against the criteria. Would either the
Prime Minister or I have been urging on the Government of India
the merits of Hawk, if we believed that the sale of Hawk would
be contrary to the criteria? No, of course we would not. It is
an entirely legitimate part of British ministers' role overseas
to support British industry, including British defence industries,
and I am totally unapologetic about my very active support for
all British industries, including the British defence industry.
For reasons which this Committee well understand, I cannot, when
I go to talk to a minister about a particular defence sale or
prospective sale, say that of course a licence will be forthcoming,
because that would be quite improper, but neither would I ever
in any circumstance go and canvass for a sale if I thought, on
the information as at the time that I was making those representations,
that the licence was likely to be refused.
72. Clearly there is a very delicate balance
here. On the one hand, it could be argued that in promoting, quite
legitimately, UK exports—take the case of Hawk to India—you
are effectively prejudging. You can say to people, "Well
the licence has not been granted", but you are the Foreign
Secretary, so the reasonable assumption is that if you have been
satisfied that should an application be made it will be granted,
they can be satisfied that should an application be made it will
be granted.
(Mr Straw) In the case of the Hawk anyway, it is hard
to see on what basis any outstanding licences will be refused,
given the fact that we have already agreed licences for the components,
so it amounts to the same thing. The criteria are there. They
have to be applied objectively and reasonably and with integrity,
but they are applied by the same ministers who also have responsibilities
to make representations to support British industry. That is entirely
proper, it seems to me, and we are accountable for how we apply
them. But in the real world, in the case of Hawk actually, the
circumstances have not arisen with me, because some of these licences
were going through in any event. But sometimes a licence has not
been granted. As I say, I know what the criteria are, so do officials.
I would not dream of canvassing for a sale if I thought the application
for a licence was going to be refused. The company concerned—most
of these companies are quite rational—would not have wasted
their time pursuing a sale in those circumstances.
73. You assume your view on that, Foreign Secretary,
would be shared by the other three Secretaries of State who have
responsibility?
(Mr Straw) Yes is the answer. Hawk, after all, is
hardly secret, if you want to sell a Hawk or if British industry
wants to sell a Hawk to the Indians.
74. Briefly, you are saying that of course before
you promote a particular export to a particular country, you would
satisfy yourself in your own mind that this would not be in breach
of the export control criteria, because otherwise you would not
do it. My question was simply, presumably therefore that means
you consult the other three Secretaries of State beforehand, because
it is things where the Government presumably will not collectively
be promoting?
(Mr Straw) Sure, where appropriate. Sometimes these
are questions which do not arise, because it is perfectly obvious
that it is a sensible thing to do, and there is not any remote
argument.
75. It is obvious to some, but it is not obvious
to everyone.
(Mr Straw) Mr Dowse is saying we have been trying
to sell Hawk for 20 years, and it is perfectly open. Mr Hoon,
when he is over there—
76. Yes, I do not think anyone doubted that.
I do not think that was the issue at stake.
(Mr Straw) And the Deputy Prime Minister.
Sir John Stanley
76. Foreign Secretary, can you tell us whether
the apparent change of arms export policy from Britain to Algeria,
as reflected in our Ambassador's interview in the Algerian press
on 26 January, reflects the wishes of the British Government to
give assistance to the Algerian Government in their very, very
serious internal security situation they face, or whether it is
due to the British Government's wish to secure more fuller cooperation
from the Algerian Government in dealing with and receiving information
about the potential terrorist threat inside the UK from those
of Algerian nationality and background?
(Mr Straw) My understanding, first of all, is that
the Ambassador did not make any statements about possible arms
export licences. I say that is my understanding. I have not seen
the newspaper interview, neither have I seen any report by the
Ambassador as to what he exactly said or did not say, but that
is my understanding at the moment. The Committee may also like
to know that as part of its role in supporting British defence
industry winning export business, two Defence Export Sales Organisation
officials paid a short visit to Algiers, the first in ten years,
to explore the scope for the British Government to do business
there. The visit was cleared in advance with the Foreign Office
and the British Embassy. During discussions with the Algerian
officials the requirements of the export licence system were made
clear, and no commitments were made on either side. No contracts
were signed during the visit. Any proposal to supply Algeria with
defence equipment would be subject to normal export licensing
procedures. I may say too—and we know what the criteria
are—that they would also take into account in this particular
case the statement that I made to Roger Casale on 17 December
2001 about how I intended to apply the criteria where there were
terrorism issues concerned.
78. Where you refer to terrorism issues, can
you just address my question?
(Mr Straw) I was trying to.
79. In terms of the British Government going
down this path—which one can wholly understand, given where
we are—is the motivation in relation to internal security
inside Algeria, or given the fact of the Algerian connection with
the ricin discovery in London, is it related to the threat of
Algerian terrorism inside this country?
(Mr Straw) No. I have seen a good deal of information
about the ricin problem and so on, but at no stage have I seen
any piece of paper suggesting that there should be some improvement
in our defence sales to Algeria because we needed intelligence
cooperation. However, what we do want is better, more normal relationships
with Algeria. We have had an Ambassador there. We also want to
see an improvement in the Algerians' human rights record, but
we certainly need cooperation with them on counter-terrorism.
That is very important. What often happens is that when you try
improve relations with a country for one reason, you end up improving
them with the country on a much wider agenda. You will also be
aware, Sir John, that Brian Wilson, the Energy Minister, was out
there recently. So as relations improve, a much broader agenda
opens up.
Chairman: We need to move into confidential
session for a brief period. Could I thank the public for their
attendance. Perhaps they could leave us as quickly as possible
so that we can move into a brief confidential session. Thank you.
The Committee sat in private
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