APPENDIX VI
GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS
FROM THE QUADRIPARTITE COMMITTEE RELATING TO THE 2001 ANNUAL REPORT
ON STRATEGIC EXPORT CONTROLS
Requests for information on individual licences
| 1. | Angola
| Details of all SIELs issued and an explanation of why they (in particular all wheel drive vehicles, and equipment for operating aircraft in confined areas) are believed to be compatible with both the UN arms embargo, and Government restrictions relating to countries intervening in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
See attached tables (not printed)
The exports were compatible with the relevant embargo and restrictions. The UN embargo on UNITA prevented the export of arms to Angola, except through named entry points. These entry points were determined by the UN to be under Government control and so the risk of diversion to UNITA was considered to be extremely low. All items were licensed for export through these named entry points and were therefore not caught by the arms embargo. We assessed there to be no clear risk that goods licensed for export to Angola would be used in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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| 2. | Bahamas | Details of SIELs for components for assault rifles, components for general purpose machine guns, components for semi-automatic pistols, components for submachine guns.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 3. | Bahrain | Details of SIELs for body armour, components for assault rifles, components for submachine guns, general purpose machine guns (4), semi-automatic pistols (3), small arms ammunition, weapon sights.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 4. | Bolivia | Details of SIEL granted for equipment employing technology.
See attached tables (not printed)
A licence was issued for dual use goods for a major Bolivian telephone company ***. We have no end user concerns.
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| 5. | Burundi | Details of the SIEL granted for body armour. Why was this SIEL considered to be compatible with the UN arms embargo and Government restrictions relating to countries intervening in the Democratic Republic of Congo?
See attached tables (not printed).
This was for use by UN personnel in Burundi for personal protection. The UN embargo on Rwanda only applies to the sale and supply to neighbouring states if arms are for use in Rwanda. We assessed there to be no clear risk that equipment licensed for export under this SIEL would be used in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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| 6. | Cambodia | Details of OIEL for body armour, military helmets, etc.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 7. | Channel Islands
| Details of SIELs and OIELs for items on the military list. Explanation of the Channel Islands' legitimate need for armoured fighting vehicles, components for combat helicopters, components for submachine guns, and 11 submachine guns.
See attached tables (not printed)
***
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| 8. | China (except
Hong Kong)
| Details of the SIEL granted for components for body armour. Was the potential use of the goods for internal repression considered? Why did the UK interpretation of the EU arms embargo not cover this SIEL?
See attached tables (not printed)
Both licences were for bomb suits specially designed for bomb disposal purposes only. The UK interpretation of the EU embargo, set out in HMG's memorandum to the Quad Committee of 26 February (relevant extract at Annex A), did not prohibit this export. We assessed there to be no clear risk that this equipment might be used for internal repression.
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| 9. | Colombia | Details of SIELs for body armour, military helmets, smoke hand grenades.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 10. | El Salvador |
Details of licence granted for anti-riot shields, and why the Government believed that the export would not be used for internal repression.
See attached tables (not printed)
El Salvador has come a long way since the end of the 12-year civil war in 1992. Since then, the country has made considerable progress in reconciling the one-time warring factions and in moving forward the democratic process. There is no longer any systemic abuse of human rights although social and economic rights remain *** deficient. The greatest threat to stability remains the high level of violent crime and the poor state of public security, with almost daily kidnappings, extortion and armed robberies. All evidence suggests that the police use their equipment in a responsible manner.
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| 11. | Eritrea | Details of the SIELs granted for body armour and military cargo vehicles. Were these licences granted after the expiry of the EU and UN arms embargoes?
See attached tables (not printed)
These licenses were issued after the UN and EU embargoes on the export of arms to Eritrea (and Ethiopia) were lifted in May 2001.
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| 12. | Guatemala |
Details of licence granted for body armour, and why the Government believed that the export would not be used for internal repression.
See attached tables (not printed)
*** ballistic protection vests and helmets were licensed for use in demining programmes. We assessed there to be no clear risk of use for internal repression. We have no end-use concerns.
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| 13. | Hong Kong |
Details of the following SIELs: anti-riot shields, body armour, components for general purpose machine guns, components for submachine guns, devices for initiating explosives, direct view imaging equipment for the use of weapon sights, extended temperature range integrated circuits, general purpose machine guns, gun mountings, handcuffs, military firing sets, military helmets, mortar bombs, rifles, shotguns, submachine guns, technology for the use of submachine guns, weapon sights.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 14. | Hong Kong |
Details of the following OIELs: No. 14—shotguns and sporting rifles; No. 19—military explosives; No. 20—military firing sets etc; No. 22—sporting rifles etc; No. 23—CS hand grenades ia.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 15. | India | Details of all SIELs granted for items on the military list.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 16. | India | Justification of the decision to allow the export of components and production equipment for Hawk jets to India. Please also identify which of the SIELs for export to India are for components and production equipment for Hawk jets.
The Foreign Secretary wrote to the Quadripartite Committee on 19 September to clarify the Government's position on the possible export of Hawk aircraft to India (copy attached to annex), and the approval of a Open Individual Export Licence for Hawk components and production equipment in September 2001. We were satisfied that India would deploy Hawk in its intended role as a training aircraft.
Details of all SIELs issued to end users in India have already been provided to the Committee.
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| 17. | India | Details of SIELs for components for furnaces, furnaces and maraging steels. Comment on risk of diversion to WMD programme.
See attached tables (not printed)
***
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| 18 | Indonesia | Details of SIELs for armoured all-wheel drive vehicles, components for aircraft cannons, components for combat aircraft.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 19. | Iran | Details of SIEL for beryllium. Comment on the possibility of diversion to Iran's WMD programme, and a description of legitimate end uses of the export. Comment on why the Government believes that the export of any quantity of beryllium is allowed under the UK and EU arms embargoes.
See attached tables (not printed)
10g of beryllium is considered too low a quantity to have utility in a WMD programme. ***
There is no EU arms embargo on Iran. Export of beryllium is permitted under the UK arms embargo, which prohibits the transfer (i) to military end-users of all goods on the military list and (ii) of all goods in Category 0 of Annex 1 of EC Regulation 1334.
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| 20. | Iran | Details of SIELs for furnaces and maraging steel. Comment on risk of diversion to Iran's WMD programme.
***
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| 21. | Jordan | Details of SIEL for equipment for the use of airborne electronic warfare equipment.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 22. | Jordan | Details of OIEL No. 7: Unmanned air vehicles, etc.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 23. | Kazakhstan |
Details of SIELs for furnaces and components for furnaces.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 24. | Kyrgyzstan |
Details of SIEL for materials containing natural uranium.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 25. | Maldives | Details of SIEL for fragmentation hand grenades. Comment on expected end-use of the export, and on potential for their use as a component in land mines.
See attached tables (not printed)
The intended end use was for security purposes by ***. There is no evidence to suggest that this equipment would be used as a component in land mines. The Maldives are a State Party to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (the `Ottawa Convention').
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| 26. | Nepal | Details of SIELs for 6,780 assault rifles, and for grenade launchers.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 27. | Pakistan | Details of all SIELs granted for items on the military list.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 28. | Pakistan | Why was it considered that licences for components for large calibre artillery, components for surface to air missile launching equipment and production equipment for large calibre artillery would not be used in regional conflict or for WMD proliferation programmes?
There were no WMD concerns over these items. We assessed there to be no clear risk of aggressive use ***.
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| 29. | Pakistan | Details of SIEL for furnaces. Comment on risk of diversion to WMD programme.
See attached tables (not printed)
In line with Tony Lloyd's statement of 10 July 1998, which was superseded by Ben Bradshaw's statement of 15 March 2002 (both at Annex B), the Government considers the risk of diversion for all ELAs to Pakistan very carefully. This*** furnace is *** of low utility to a WMD programme, the risk of diversion was not considered significant.
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| 30. | Philippines |
Details of SIELs for anti-riot shields, assault rifles (100), body armour, components for assault rifles, components for body armour, components for combat aircraft, components for general purpose machine guns, components for sniper rifles, components for submachine guns, components for tanks, general purpose machine guns (40), military helmets, submachine guns (100), technology for the use of assault rifles, technology for the use of general purpose machine guns, technology for the use of sniper rifles, technology for the use of submachine guns, weapon sights.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 31. | Sierra Leone |
Details of SIELS issued for items on the military list. Why does the Government believe that to grant these licences was not a breach of the UN arms embargo?
See attached tables (not printed)
All SIELs were issued for exports to UN peace keeping forces or***. *** and UN peacekeepers are exempt from coverage of the UN arms embargo.
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| 32. | Somalia | Details of SIELs issued for items on the military list. Why does the Government believe that to grant these licences was not a breach of the UN arms embargo?
See attached tables (not printed)
Military List items were licensed for export for the use of the Halo Trust, an NGO which has specialised in demining. Licences were granted given the humanitarian nature of the exports.
At the time of this decision, a resolution was being prepared and was subsequently put forward by the UK. The resolution was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 19 June 2001, (UNSCR 1356(2001)).
UNSCR 1356(2001) grants exemption from the restrictive measures of UNSCR 733(1992) for protective clothing, (including flak jackets and military helmets) temporarily exported to Somalia for use by UN personnel, representatives of the media and humanitarian and development workers and associated personnel for personal use only. It also states that the restrictive measures imposed by UNSCR 733(1992) do not apply to the supply of non-military equipment intended solely for humanitarian or protective use, as approved in advance by the UN Somalia Sanctions Committee.
The UK was therefore instrumental in allowing these humanitarian exemptions to increase the objectivity and effectiveness of UN sanctions.
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| 33. | South Africa |
Details of SIELs for combat aircraft, components for combat aircraft, components for military training aircraft, equipment for the use of combat aircraft, military aero-engines, military transport aircraft.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 34. | Sri Lanka |
Details of licences granted for: grenade launchers, technology for the use of grenade launchers, sniper rifles (75), components for sniper rifles, small arms ammunition, special forces craft, and weapon night sights.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 35. | Sri Lanka |
What steps are taken to ensure that exports of inertial equipment using accelerometers and gyros are not diverted to WMD programmes?
HMG considers that inertial equipment is being used legitimately in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has no WMD programmes and we do not have concerns over goods exported to Sri Lanka being diverted to a WMD programme outside the country.
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| 36. | Sudan | Details of SIEL issued for military cargo vehicles. Why does the Government believe that to grant this licence was not a breach of the EU arms embargo?
See attached tables (not printed
A licence was issued for the export of a military listed tanker for use in the refuelling of light civilian aircraft at Khartoum airport, including those aircraft operated by UNICEF, WFP and the ICRC, all of which are working to alleviate the suffering in Sudan. The Government believes the licensing of this export is consistent with the EU common position on arms exports to Sudan. The licensing of this export was announced to Parliament (official report HC 975W, 15 October 2001).
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| 37. | Syria | Details of OIEL No. 4, Equipment for the use of submachine guns, etc.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 38. | Tajikistan |
Details of the OIEL, with an explanation in layman's English. Other countries with similar OIEL descriptions include Jordan, Uzbekistan. Are these multiple destinations for the same OIEL?
See attached tables (not printed)
***
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| 39. | Tanzania | In evidence to the Committee on 21 March 2002, the Foreign Secretary said "I can confirm that in December 2001 Her Majesty's Government approved two licence applications for the export of air traffic control equipment to Tanzania" (Q 28). Please identify how these two SIELs are described in the 2001 Annual Report, and give details.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 40. | Uganda | A SIEL for ML6 was refused, while an apparently similar licence (for armoured all wheel drive vehicles) was permitted. Details of both applications, and an explanation of why the one was allowed and the other not.
See attached tables (not printed)
***
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| 41. | Yemen | Details of OIEL No. 2: Components for combat aircraft and helicopters etc.
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 42. | Handcuffs |
Details of SIELs for export to Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, New Zealand, Sweden and the USA. Description of handcuffs requiring an export licence, comment on the expected end-use of these exports, and their potential for use in ways which infringe human rights. Comment on end-use monitoring of exports of handcuffs. Description of shackles (including handcuffs) which are prohibited for export. Details of any applications for licences to export handcuffs or shackles which were refused during 2001, or since.
See attached tables (not printed)
All handcuffs with a locking circumference of 240mm, or greater, require a licence to be exported from the UK.
On the issue of end-user controls the Government remains committed to carrying out end-use monitoring where this will genuinely add value to our efforts to minimise the risk of misuse and diversion. However, the Government's policy is to focus efforts at the export licensing stage. Carrying out effective risk assessment on end-users before making the export licensing decision is the surest way to prevent UK arms falling into the wrong hands. In this respect, we have made clear that we will take account of the risk that exports could be used for internal repression or international aggression, and existence of risk of diversion to an undesirable end-user. In determining whether any such risk exists, we take into account all reliable information on end-users of potential concern, including reporting from our overseas posts, other countries and Non-Governmental Organisations.
Handcuffs were licensed for export to reputable organisations *** in Canada, New Zealand, Australia and the USA. The handcuffs were for use either in escorting or transporting prisoners. There was no clear risk of use for internal repression in any of these cases. Handcuffs licensed to *** were also for use in escorting prisoners.
In Sweden's case,*** sets of handcuffs were exported. The export licence application makes it clear that *** are the UK company's authorised distributor, and that the handcuffs were to be used for demonstration purposes.
We carefully assess the risk of such handcuffs being used as manacles, in contravention of the Government's ban on the export of such items. We would not grant a licence if there were a clear risk of such misuse.
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Refusals and Revocations
43. Details of all SIEL and SITL applications refused
and SIELs and SITLs revoked, in a form that allows reasons for
revocation or refusal to be matched to individual licences/applications.
See attached tables (not printed)
44. Details of all OIELs revoked (or amended to exclude
a destination or certain goods), in a form that allows reasons
for revocation to be matched to individual licences.
See attached tables (not printed)
Appeals
45. Details of all appeals considered in 2001, and
those outstanding for longer than 60 days at 31 December 2001.
See attached tables (not printed)
FURTHER REQUESTS
FOR INFORMATION
ABOUT SPECIFIC
COUNTRIES:
| 46. | Hong Kong |
How does the Government reassure itself that SIELs and OIELs granted for Hong Kong which might fall within the EU arms embargo on the rest of China are not diverted to mainland China?
We retain confidence in Hong Kong's export control regime which is independent from that of the mainland under the "One Country, Two Systems" policy. Recently a UK export control team visited Hong Kong (6-7 November), the third in a series of visits since the hand-over. The team visited the airport, main container terminal and Lok Ma Chau land border to inspect procedures and held talks with the licensing and enforcement authorities. The team confirmed that Hong Kong retains a solid and well-organised licensing system with reliable export controls. Where appropriate the British Consulate-General in Hong Kong carries out end use monitoring of certain goods that would not be approved for export to mainland China.
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| 47. | Hong Kong |
In response to written questions on the last Annual Report, the Government stated: "for the export of strategic goods for military end-use, we concluded that, in order to fulfil our obligations under the EU embargo, goods which we would not approve for export to the Chinese armed forces in mainland China should not be permitted for export for military end-use in the HKSAR." Given that the first category of goods covered by the embargo is "lethal weapons such as machine guns", how does the Government explain its decision to grant SIELs for a variety of lethal weapons (including machine guns) for export to Hong Kong?
***
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| 48. | India and
Pakistan
| Which licence applications have been refused and licences revoked on Criterion 4 grounds, in 2001 and since?
See tables attached in response to questions 43 & 44 (not printed)
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| 49. | Indonesia |
What steps does the Government take to ensure that the goods licensed for export to Indonesia are used in a way which is compatible with human rights and fundamental freedoms?
Senior members of the Indonesian Government and Armed Forces have given assurances that UK-supplied military equipment will not be used for offensive action or to infringe human rights.
Indonesia is a large archipelago. HMG have consistently informed the Indonesians that any reports received from NGOs and other independent organisations will be brought to the Indonesians attention and we expect the Indonesian government to take appropriate action. The Indonesians have consistently assured HMG that any reports of violations would be thoroughly investigated.
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| 50. | Indonesia |
Comment on reported use of Hawk aircraft for internal repression in Aceh, and elsewhere in Indonesia.
We have no evidence that Hawk Jets have been deployed to intimidate the separatist movement in Aceh. The only confirmed report of intimidation by Hawk jets was in July 1999 when a single Hawk jet flew twice at low level over East Timor. Hawk jets have never been used in a ground-attack or offensive role anywhere in Indonesia.
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| 51. | Indonesia |
What steps does the Government take to ensure that goods licensed for export to Indonesia are not diverted to use by terrorists?
We have access to information from *** sources, media reporting and reports from NGOs based throughout Indonesia. The Indonesians have consistently informed us that they would investigate fully any alleged abuse of military equipment. We take this information into account when assessing export licence applications for Indonesia.
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| 52. | Indonesia |
Which SIELs accounted for the increase in the total value of all SIELs from £2 million in 2000, to £15.5 million in 2001?
See attached tables (not printed)
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| 53. | Israel | What accounted for the increase in the value of SIELs approved for Israel from £12.5 million in 2000, to £22.5 million in 2001? Were SIELs approved for items previously covered by OIELs?
The rise in SIEL applications in 2001 may have resulted in part from removal of Israel from a number of OIELs, under which a lot of equipment was previously licensed for exported. That decision was taken in the light of the worsening situation in Israel and the Occupied Territories.
The Government has always made clear that the rise or fall in the number of export licence applications issued and refused does not necessarily reflect a change in policy.
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| 54. | Israel | Would licences approved in 2001 for general purpose machine guns, submachine guns and anti-tank missiles not have been approved had the applications been received after the Government's statement of 15 April 2002? Which of the licences to Israel cited in the 2001 Annual Report have since been revoked or amended to reduce coverage?
See attached tables (not printed)
The Government cannot make hypothetical decisions. All relevant export licence applications continue to be rigorously assessed on a case by case basis against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria, taking account of the circumstances prevailing at the time and other previously announced Government policies. The criteria clearly set out the Government's commitment to take account of the risk that exports might be used for internal repression or affect regional stability. The outbreak of the intifada, continued Israeli incursions in the Occupied Territories and the Israeli breach of its assurance that UK originated equipment would not be used in the Occupied Territories have all been factored in to the Government's current export licensing policy. Since the outbreak of violence in the Occupied Territories in September 2000, HMG has taken account of Israeli military tactics in its licensing decisions and continues to keep the situation under close review.
***
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| 55. | Jordan | Measures taken to ensure that military exports are not diverted to Iraq.
Although Jordan has a close relationship with Iraq, we do not believe the Jordanian Government would divert military equipment there. However, we regularly seek clarification of details given in the end-user declaration, via our Embassy in Amman, to help with our assessment at the licensing stage. When necessary we have sought specific assurances from the end-user about the end-use of equipment.
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| 56. | Singapore |
What steps has the Government taken to satisfy itself that goods licensed for export to Singapore are not diverted to undesirable end-users, and that the OIELs issued do not lead to diversion?
The Government believes that the surest way to prevent diversion is to refuse an export licence when there is an unacceptable risk of diversion or misuse.
We scrutinise all applications on a case by case basis to ensure there is no identifiable risk of diversion; this involves tight end-use restrictions and compliance checks. We have no current concerns about the diversion to undesirable end-users of goods licensed for export to ***. But we have made clear to *** that any diversion of UK supplied equipment would be a matter of serious concern.
***
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| 57. | Tanzania | Has the export of the air traffic control system to Tanzania now taken place, in whole or in part?
When export is complete, exhausted licences are returned to the DTI. To date, the DTI has not received the exhausted licences for this equipment.
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| 58. | Turkey | What steps does the Government take to ensure that none of the goods licensed for export to Turkey are used for torture or internal repression? The Governments position on the use of goods licensed for export to Turkey in regions under state of emergency.
In considering licences for Turkey, we closely examine the human rights record of the end user and the stated end use of the goods and similar equipment against reports of torture or internal repression. The FCO and its posts draw and evaluate information from a number of sources including NGOs, the Turkish Government and EU partners. The British Government is also working with law enforcement agencies in Turkey to encourage the further development of modern policing standards and respect for human rights.
The Government has no specific guidelines for goods exported to Turkey which may have been used in regions under emergency rule (licences for Turkey do not specify where goods will be used). However, the human rights record of the end user and the likelihood of the goods being used in regions under a state of emergency were factors taken into account when licences were considered against the Consolidated Criteria. Emergency rule was lifted on 30 November 2002.
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| 59. | United Arab
Emirates
| What steps has the Government taken to satisfy itself that goods licensed for export to the United Arab Emirates are not diverted to undesirable end-users, and that the OIELs issued do not lead to diversion?
HMG closely scrutinises all export licence applications to the UAE, including OIELS, on a case by case basis against the Consolidated Criteria and other announced Government policies. This includes assessing the existence of risk of diversion.
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| 60. | Zimbabwe | What measures has the Government taken to ensure that military exports to countries in southern Africa are not diverted to Zimbabwe?
The UK imposed a national arms embargo on Zimbabwe in May 2000. All export licence applications for countries in the Southern African region are rigorously assessed on a case by case basis against the consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria. Those criteria include the "existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions."
The Government remains of the view that the most effective way to prevent diversion of UK equipment is by rigorous assessment at the export licensing stage. However, where we believe that it will add genuine value to the licensing process we will also consider carrying out end use monitoring in appropriate circumstances.
South Africa is our main export market in the Southern Africa region, and has recently introduced a sophisticated export control regime. On 17 October 2002, the South African Parliament passed the National Conventional Arms Control Bill, giving formal recognition to the role of the National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC) which was created in 1995. The NCACC regulates and controls South African conventional arms sales. It must comply with the annual reporting requirements of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, and provide Parliament with a copy of the report. It must also release to the public an annual report on all conventional arms sales concluded during the preceding calendar year.
Both reports must include the names of the importing countries, and the type, quantity and value of the arms., although the public report may exclude the quantity if so specified in the sales contract.
Exports to Angola, mainly consisted of equipment for the oil industry. The few military exports were monitored closely by overseas post, from 1997 there has been a UN arms embargo against UNITA. Under these rules licences have to name an end user and a point of entry and we check on a case by case basis whether there is a risk of diversion elsewhere. The UN arms embargo was lifted on 9 Dec 2002 and the EU is expected to follow suit in late January 2003.
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Application of the criteria
61. How has the threat from international terrorism affected
the application of criterion 5? Were any licences refused/revoked
on criterion 5 grounds in 2001, or since?
The Government has always taken seriously the threat of terrorism
in its consideration of licence applications against Criteria
5 and 6 of the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing
Criteria. Since 11 September 2001, there has been an increased
emphasis on this aspect.
The Government's approach on arms export policy in the light
of UNSCR 1373 on Terrorism was set out in the Foreign Secretary's
response to a Parliamentary Question from Mr Roger Casale MP (13
December 2001-hc975w, reproduced at Annex G to the 2001 Annual
Report)[attached in annex]. In his written answer, the Foreign
Secretary made clear that the Government believes there is no
need to amend the consolidated criteria in order to comply fully
with the terms of the resolution.
Details of all export licence applications refused in 2001,
together with the reason for refusal, are set out in the attached
tables.
Information on refusals for the whole of 2002 is not yet
available as it is currently being collated and verified.
62. What has been the outcome of the Foreign Secretary's
promise to look again at the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports
in the context of the threat from international terrorism (Q 25,
21 March 2002)?
On 27 June 2002 Matthew Hamlyn, Head of Parliamentary Relations
and Devolution Department, wrote to Paul Evans, Clerk of the Quadripartite
Committee. In this letter he set out the Governments response
to this question.
63. What extra measures has the Government taken in the
light of the increased threat from international terrorism since
September 2001 to ensure that exports of controlled goods are
not diverted to terrorists?
Given our history of dealing with terrorism at home, the
Government has always been aware of the threat that terrorists
pose and has always subjected to a high level of scrutiny any
applications involving items which might potentially be of particular
use to terrorists. As the Foreign Secretary's response to of 13
December 2001 (Official Report, Column 975W) makes clear, the
Consolidated Criteria already specifically addressed the terrorist
threat.
The Foreign Secretary also made clear that the Government
is taking additional steps to strengthen our export controls.
The Export Control Act gives the Government a number of new powers,
which will help improve our ability to prohibit the transfer of
arms or related technology to terrorists. The UN Firearms Protocol
and the OSCE information exchange on the marking of small arms
will also help keep small arms out of terrorists' hands by helping
to trace weapons flow and to combat the illicit manufacture and
trafficking in firearms.
In addition, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001
includes clauses to strengthen the provisions relating to chemical,
nuclear and biological weapons to prevent their use, production,
or possession and participation in unauthorised transfers of these
materials.
The Government has also played a leading role in efforts
to add concerns about terrorism to the objectives of the arms
export control regimes and in meetings of relevant experts in
the Wassenaar Arrangement on initiatives to strengthen export
controls as part of the fight against terrorism.
64. Which Department takes the lead in considering whether
licence applications are compatible with Criterion 7?
All Departments involved in the licensing process have a
role to play in the rigorous assessment of export licence applications
against the consolidated criteria. However, the principal responsibility
for assessing risk of diversion falls to is the DIS in MOD, while
the FCO advises on end-use monitoring.
65. How many applications (absolute numbers and percentage)
were considered by DfID in 2001? About how many applications did
DfID express concern? Which applications were these?
See attached table (not printed)
In total, 201 Standard Individual Export Licence (SIEL) applications
were referred to DFID in 2001. Overall, there were 204 referrals,
but this figure includes cases that were re-circulated. The number
of cases referred to OGDs in 2001 was 9,458. DFID was therefore
consulted on 2.1% of SIEL applications referred to OGDs. It has
not been possible to determine the absolute number of Open Individual
Export Licence applications considered by DfID in 2001.
The Government made clear in its response of 28 October 2002,
that the Secretary of State for Trade & Industry, acting through
the Export Control Organisation, takes decisions on applications
in the light of the advice received from certain other Government
Departments. Such advice falls into the category of "internal
discussion and advice", the disclosure of which would harm
the frankness and candour of internal discussion, and as such
is exempt from disclosure under Part II, Exemption 2 of the Open
Government Code of Practice on Access to Government information.
66. In 2001, for how many licence applications that were
refused was Criterion 8 a relevant consideration, recognising
that a licence application may be refused for a combination of
reasons?
Criterion 8 considerations were not a component in any decisions
to refuse licences during 2001. The Government remains committed
to sustainable development as defined in Criterion 8 of the consolidated
criteria. The changes to the Export Control Act during its passage
through Parliament and the recent review of procedures for assessing
relevant export licence applications is evidence of that continued
commitment.
67. Given the absence of licences that have been refused
on Criterion 8 grounds, could the Government describe a scenario
in which Criterion 8 would provide a reason for refusing a licence?
The Government cannot make hypothetical assessments. The
Consolidated EU and national arms export licensing criteria makes
clear that "An export licence will not be issued if the arguments
for doing so are outweighed by the need to comply with the UK's
international obligations and commitments, by concern that the
goods might be used for internal repression or international aggression,
by the risk to regional stability or by other considerations as
described in these criteria". The procedural arrangements
for assessing relevant export licence applications were Criterion
8 might be an issue is set out in the Secretary of State for Trade
& Industry written reply to Mr Norman Lamb MP of 26 October
2002, Official Report, c. 310-311W.
68. Comment on whether alleged corruption in contracts
for the supply of controlled exports could invoke Criterion 8
The Government is committed to working with our international
partners and the business community to ensure that there is effective
action both here and abroad to tackle the problem of corruption,
as the UK's ratifications of the OECD Convention on Combating
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act 2001 make clear. However, it is not a factor
which is directly relevant to the assessment of ELAs against the
Consolidated Criteria.
69. Details of any Government to Government transfers
of military equipment in 2001 that do not appear at Table 6 of
the Annual Report.
In addition to the transfers of equipment made in Part III
of the Annual Report (including table 6), other Government to
Government transfers of military equipment in 2001 comprise the
disposal of a small number of minor items that are listed below
and a number of items gifted by the Government (See the answer
to Question 72).
1 Secondary Surveillance radar—Denmark
1 Bulldog TMk1 Trainer Aircraft—Malta
1 Strafe Bomb Scoring equipment—Germany
4 Watchman Radar Autonomous Displays—Finland
3 Rapier Part Task Trainers—Australia
70. An explanation of the continuing transfer programme
of Challenger I Main Battle Tanks to Jordan, 88 of which were
exported in 2001.
The Al Hussein Project was established in 1999 to transfer,
wherever possible as a gift, surplus Challenger 1 Main Battle
Tanks to the Jordanian Armed Forces. It was agreed that, subject
to Parliamentary approval, a package of surplus equipment should
be offered to Jordan as a tangible gesture of support to King
Abdullah II following his ascendancy to the throne of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan.
The case for gifting the equipment was approved by Parliament
and an MOU has been established between the two governments to
underpin the transfer.
71. An explanation of why 233 No. Mk 46 torpedoes were
transferred to the United States in 2001.
The torpedoes were transferred to a US company in completion
of a contract signed in 1990.
An explanation of the torpedoes entry in the table headed
"Government to Government transfers of surplus major equipment
and small arms" is included in the response to Question 91.
72. Details of all military equipment gifted by the Government
since January 2001.
Information on military equipment gifted by the Government
to other States is being included in a letter from Dr Lewis Moonie,
Under Secretary of State for Defence, in response to a Parliamentary
Question tabled by Llewellyn Smith MP. A copy will be placed
in the Library of the House and brought to the attention of the
Clerk of the Committee.
73. What are the procedures for informing Parliament of
the gifting of military equipment by the Government?
HM Treasury has delegated authority to individual government
departments to gift items valued at less than £100K. Parliament
is notified of all gifts that are either novel and contentious,
or valued at £100K or over. This is done by means of a Departmental
Minute.
74. Why was prior parliamentary approval for gifts to
Nepal in December 2001 and March 2002 not sought under the Departmental
Minute process? Why was it not possible to allow 14 days to pass
between the presentation on 22 July of a Minute regarding the
gifting of military equipment to Nepal and the gifting of that
equipment? Why was it not possible to present the Minute to the
House of Commons before 22 July? Why was it thought appropriate
to use the Conflict Prevention Pools to fund the gifting of two
Mi-17 support helicopters and other military equipment to a Nepalese
military intelligence support group within the Nepalese army?
The gifts made to Nepal in December 2001 and March 2002 should
have been notified by means of a Departmental Minute, but due
to an oversight, were notified retrospectively in the Departmental
Minute laid on 22 July 2002. This oversight is regretted, and
occurred because of confusion over whether equipment funded from
the Global Conflict Prevention Pool needed to be treated as a
gift. However, there was earlier Parliamentary visibility of
this support to Nepal, mention of which was made in the response
to a PQ (Hansard, 10 January 2002, Col. 957).
It was not possible to give the usual 14 days notice because
Parliament rose for the Summer Recess on 24 July and did not return
until 15 October. Additionally, the insurgency in Nepal made
advisable speedy gifting of the equipment.
The Departmental Minute was laid as soon as possible following
the decision to gift, and the drawing up and staffing of the necessary
paperwork. This was on 22 July.
The helicopters are being supplied as part of the package
of assistance for Nepal under the British Government's Global
Conflict Prevention Pool. *** The conflict prevention package
also includes measures to strengthen human rights protection and
the application of international humanitarian law, and reform
of government security structures. The conflict prevention initiative
is part of the British Government's continuing commitment to assisting
the government and people of Nepal in resolving the conflict in
the country where the insurgency has resulted in a large number
of killings.
The agreement between the British Government and the ***
restricts the use of the helicopters exclusively to logistical,
medical and ongoing humanitarian tasks of which the *** is being
asked to undertake an increasing number. Furthermore, combat
or attack roles are excluded for the lifetime of the aircraft,
including the fitting of weapons, allowing soldiers to fire from
the doorways whilst airborne or the dropping of ordnance.
75. On 31 July 2002, the Secretary of State for Trade
and Industry announced that the Government has also decided to
make procedural changes to the F680 process. Rather than as previously,
commenting through the FCO, the Department for International Development
will be invited formally to comment directly on F680 applications.
(26 September 2002, c 333w). Will DfID comment on F680 applications
on the same terms as it comments on licences for strategic exports?
Is it for DfID to decide on which F680 applications it wishes
to comment?
Yes on both counts. As was the case when DFID commented on
F680 applications through the FCO, they will comment on all applications
in which Criterion 8 may be a concern. DfID will routinely comment
on all F680 applications that relate to the current list of IDA
countries as published on the DTI website. They may also comment
on any other application, as either DFID or the Government as
a whole deem it to be appropriate.
When industry voluntarily submit F680 applications, these
invariably relate to the early stages of a marketing campaign.
As such companies are often unable to provide the full information
on possible final exports at this stage. However, the advice of
Departments involved in the F680 process is given against the
terms of the consolidated criteria as it is for export licence
applications. The Committee will of course recall that F680 clearance
neither constitutes a licence nor pre-judges the final licensing
decision.
Small arms
76. At an international level, what progress has been
made in monitoring, regulating and reducing the illicit trade
in small arms and light weapons? What is the follow-up meeting
to the UN Conference of 2001 on small arms and light weapons expected
to achieve?
The UN conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in all its Aspects in July 2001, and the adoption
of a comprehensive Programme of Action of national, regional and
global initiatives were major achievements. Since the conference
the priority has been to put policies into practice through concrete
and co-ordinated implementation on the ground. Main international
activities include: weapons collection, management and destruction
programmes; assistance in setting up and implementing new regional
and country-specific agreements, improving controls and transparency
and supporting civil society and NGOs.
The UN Firearms Protocol, signed by the UK in May 2002, creates
international controls on the movement of firearms. This will
help prevent transfers reaching criminal groups and terrorists.
The agenda for the first biennial follow up meeting in 2003,
is still under discussion and the UK is contributing to the process.
The chair envisages a feedback meeting focusing on progress of
implementation of the UNPoA. Although action orientated, it would
not have a negotiating mandate. Whilst recognising it is a review
meeting the UK and others consider it would also be useful to
push forward where possible on areas left unresolved at July 2001—(i)
export control, (ii) brokers, (iii) assistance to developing countries.
A conference hosted jointly by the FCO/DFID/MOD was held
on 14-15 January 2003, in London and attended by over fifty nations
and representatives of international organisations and NGOs.
The Secretary of State for International Development and Foreign
Office Minister addressed the delegates. The focus was on strengthening
export controls for a range of small arms producer and exporter
countries. The aim was to build consensus on minimum standards
on exports of SALW prior to the 2003 UN Biennial meeting of states
on small arms. These were sensitive issues that the Government
considered would benefit from further work following the UN Conference
on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its
Aspects in 2001. The meeting discussed ways of taking forward
work an international agreement to control the activities of arms
brokers. There was general agreement on the need for effective
export controls on small arms.
77. In the Committee's most recent report we expressed
our concern that "the UK Government's enthusiasm for small
arms initiatives at the regional and international level is not
going to be fully expressed in the provisions of the Export Control
Act" and said that we would return to this issue (paragraph
105). To what extent has the Export Control Act addressed the
issue of trafficking in small arms and light weapons?
The new controls that the Government will be introducing
on trafficking and brokering under the Act, combined with work
by the UK and others to promote action to regulate the activities
of those engaged in brokering, in accordance with the UN Programme
of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, will help to reduce
the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Under the secondary
legislation to be introduced under the Act, controls on trafficking
and brokering in military equipment (ie equipment on the UK's
Military List whose export is already controlled) to all embargoed
destinations, and in torture equipment or long-range missiles
to any destination, will apply to UK persons wherever they are
located. Controls will also apply to trafficking and brokering
in military equipment to any destination where all or any relevant
part of a controlled activity takes place in the UK.
78. What steps has the Government made to bring forward
analysis of the OSCE's information exchange on the marking of
small arms?
In January 2002 the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC)
completed an extensive and useful analysis of an information exchange
carried out by OSCE participating States in 2001. This exchange,
which included information on national marking systems and national
legislation and current policy on export practice, was supported
by the UK. The Government has continued to work with the CPC and
with other OSCE participating States to enhance the quality of
the information exchanged. Work on a Best Practice Guide on SALW
marking is underway. This, together with other SALW Best Practice
Guides, is due for completion in 2003. The UK is taking seriously
the information exchange and is fully committed to the Best Practice
Guide project.
ITAR
79. The 2001 Annual Report notes that "high level
meetings and exchanges" during 2001 suggest a practical way
ahead. But the Government's response to the Committee's last report
simply says that "Negotiations are continuing and the Government
hopes that they will reach an early and positive conclusion".
Is there any concrete progress to report on the proposed waiver
of ITAR? What are the continuing obstacles to an agreement?
Progress has been made with the US Administration during
the course of 2002. However, while both Governments are committed
to reaching a positive conclusion, the Committee will appreciate
that there are a number of complex issues to be resolved. Not
least among these are some differences to achieving the same non-proliferation
and export control objectives within the legislative framework
of the two negotiating partners.
Licensing process
80. Why did performance in processing SIELs by individual
Government Departments other than DTI and the ECO worsen during
2001? What steps are being taken by these Departments to improve
performance?
The Government is committed to provide an effective and efficient
service to industry. However, such service is not always reflected
by the headline performance target. An example is the effect of
efforts made to reduce the number of longstanding cases that were
previously in the system., Because of the way performance is measured,
clearance of long standing cases (which entails the factoring
into the performance statistics of the longer processing times
for these cases at the time they are finalised) has the effect
of reducing the overall performance figure, even if performance
on other applications is as good or better than for previous accounting
periods. Thus, the greater the number of long standing cases finalised
in a given period, the worse the overall performance figure is
likely to be. Similarly the target does not take account of fluctuations
in the volume of applications received.
Departments continue to take steps to improve performance,
including the addition provision of extra staff resources, and
are currently reviewing the targets and the processes undertaken
as part of the Government review.
81. When did the ECO adopt internal targets that 90% of
SIEL applications should be processed in 60 working days and 100%
within 120 working days? Applying these targets retrospectively,
how did the ECO perform in 2001?
The DTI has not been able to establish when these internal
targets , were first introduced. However, we believe they have
been in place for at least four years.
In 2001, 91.5% of SIELs were processed by the ECO within
60 working days and 96.9% within 120 working days.
82. How does the ECO monitor compliance with OIELs? How
often are compliance checks made? How many compliance checks were
made in 2001? How many irregularities did these checks uncover
and what was the nature of these irregularities?
The Compliance Officers of the Export Control Organisation
(ECO) routinely monitor exporters' adherence to conditions on
Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) and Open General Export
Licences. They aim to visit holders of OIELs allowing the export
of military equipment annually, and those of OIELs covering dual-use
equipment every two years. When visiting companies, Compliance
Officers assess generally the systems that companies have in place
to ensure compliance with export controls. In this way, as well
as ensuring compliance, Compliance Officers play a major role
in raising and maintaining awareness of export control issues
and rules within companies. During each visit, Compliance Officers
also assess compliance with the specific conditions on licences
by auditing the documentation that companies are required to keep
for each export.
***
F680 forms
83. What progress has been made in improving the F680
database? How will the improvements affect the way in which F680
applications are processed?
The MOD expects to implement a new version of the F680 database
in the first half of 2003. It should produce a more efficient
and more customer responsive service. In time, further developments
should also allow companies to apply for F680's over the Internet.
Such improvements are expected to reduce the time taken to process
applications, and reduce the scope for any duplication and errors
in the system.
Six-Nation Framework agreement
84. Has any further thought been given to how Global Project
Licences will be reported in future Annual Reports?
We expect that Global Project licences will be reported in
a similar manner to the way in which we report on OIELs in the
Annual Report. There will be an equivalent level of transparency.
It is anticipated that a GPL will be issued in the near future.
Content of the Annual Report
85. Would it be possible to publish in future Annual Reports
data on the maximum quantity of goods/technology to be exported
under each SIEL, on a similar basis to the information already
provided on small arms?
HMG believes that this would add little value to the Report.
It would indicate the maximum quantity authorised, rather than
the quantity exported (not necessarily the same). The Report data
would be less digestible, as it would be necessary to report quantities
under each individual SIEL. This proposal would also carry significant
resource implications.
86. Would it be possible to publish in future Annual Reports
data on the maximum value of goods/technology to be exported under
each SIEL, in bands rather than at exact value to protect commercial
confidentiality?
As for q.85, HMG believes providing information in this format
could be misleading, in that the authorised value might not match
the value of the goods eventually exported. The proposal would
also result in additional resource implications.
87. What information on end users of goods exported under
SIELs will be included in future Annual Reports? In the Annual
Report for what year will this information first be included?
(In a Committee Stage debate on the Export Control Bill, the Government
gave an assurance that the Annual report will provide details
of end users of equipment. (Hansard, Standing Committee B,
Export Control Bill, Sixth sitting, 18 October 2001, col. 153))
The Minister's remarks during the passage of the Export Control
Bill were consistent with the Government's position, namely that
it will publish, in its Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls,
information on licences issued and refused by end user destination.
The Government's position remains unchanged. Information on specific
end users is commercially confidential and exempt from disclosure
under exemptions 13 & 14 of the Code of Practice on Access
to Government Information.
88. Could the summary data provided in Table 1 of the
Annual Report on the reasons for refusal or revocation of SIELs
and SITLs be expanded to provide information on the nature of
the goods concerned and/or the countries to which the goods were
intended for export?
HMG believes that the refusal table should not be expanded
to include information on the nature of licensed goods and destination.
This would be sensitive from foreign policy and WMD proliferation
viewpoints, and could provide commercially sensitive information
to alternative suppliers. Even though refusals are already reported
under individual destinations, there is a difference in degree
of sensitivity between this and collating them alongside the reasons
for refusal in the refusal table.
89. Could information on all existing OIELs be made public,
possibly on the DTI website? Could information in the Annual Report
on amendments to existing OIELs indicate the nature of the amendment,
and which OIEL is affected, rather than simply describing the
OIEL as amended?
A significant amount of information on existing OIELs is
already included in the Annual Report. To publish all information
on existing OIELs would raise concerns over UK exporters' and
third parties' commercial confidentiality, and confidentiality
in relation to defence, security and international relations.
The Government endorses the view of the previous Quadripartite
Committee that we should avoid disclosure, which would harm the
UK's competitive position. In addition, the Government is concerned
about the additional resources required to maintain a public database
of all existing OIELs. This diversion of resources would inevitably
have a detrimental impact on other areas of export licensing.
However, the Government made clear in its response of 28
October 2002 to the Quadripartite Committee that it will "consider
whether there are better ways in which information about Open
Individual Export Licences might be presented". This consideration
is still underway.
90. Could future Annual Reports include accessible information
about the export of small arms and light weapons, including those
exports covered by OIELs?
The current EC tariff codes do not enable the Government
readily to provide more accessible information on actual exports
of small arms and light weapons, beyond that which is already
published in its Annual Reports. In the continued absence of any
agreement by the EC to insert additional subdivisions within the
tariff subheading dealing with small arms and light weapons, the
Government is considering the practicalities of including further
information on the export of small arms and light weapons, including
those exports made under OIELs, as part of the work on the Annual
Report for 2002.
91. Please could an up-to-date erratum list for the 2001
annual report be provided.
As the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls makes clear
there is always some small risk of human error in the compilation
of such a large body of data. Since its publication in July 2002,
the following errors have been identified in the Annual Report.
(i) The entry for beryllium, licensed for export to India,
was incorrectly reported. The Standard Individual Export Licence
application was in fact refused.
(ii) Two Open Individual Export Licences, which were revoked,
or whose coverage was amended by the exclusion of Israel, were
inadvertently omitted from the Report with the following ratings:
(iv) ML10, ML11 and PL5017
— Table 6 (p 371) should be entitled "Government
to Government transfers and sales of surplus major equipment between
1 January and 31 December 2001."
Parliament was informed immediately that the errors were
identified in written Parliamentary replies of 31 July 2002 and
15 October 2002.
December 2002—February 2003
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