APPENDIX IX
Further memorandum from Saferworld
The following submission is split into two sections
and a summary of questions:
SUMMARY OF
QUESTIONS
Section 1:
This section focuses on Saferworld's comments
on the Government's response to the Committee's report1[2]
and follows up on a number of the Governments responses in particular:
— Application of the consolidated criteria
to individual cases and countries (p 4):
— Application of Criteria on a case-by-case
basis;
— Guidelines on incorporation;
— Prior parliamentary scrutiny;
— Annex: End-use system in the
US.
Section 2[3]:
Saferworld will be publishing its Audit of the
Government's 2001 Annual Report on 27 February 2003. Saferworld
is sharing the contents of the Audit with the Committee in advance
of publication but we would be grateful if you could treat it
as confidential document until release of the Audit (00.00 hrs
27 February 2003).
This section contains the Executive Summary
of the Audit.
SECTION 1: SAFERWORLD'S
COMMENTS ON
THE GOVERNMENT'S
RESPONSE TO
THE COMMITTEE'S
REPORT[4]
The Licensing Process
(a) We recommend that consideration be given
to the Annual Reports indicating where a licence was refused or
revoked for equipment which had previously been given F680 approval.
(Paragraph 20)
The Government rejected this recommendation.
In the response the Government states that:
"The MoD routinely make clear to exporters
that advice received as a result of a F680 application does not
constitute an export licence, nor guarantee the approval of any
future licence application. . ."
The Government have emphasised that F680 approval
is in no way taken as a guarantee that an export licence will
be granted and that matching F680 enquiries and licence applications
is problematic as the specifications of the F680 may bear little
relationship to the eventual licence applications, and these are
viable arguments. However, the Government should still identify
all those cases where a link between an F680 enquiry and a licence
application can reasonably be drawn, as in the Tanzanian case.
The Government also state that:
". . . the form (F680 procedure) can also
act in place of an export licence for sales of defence equipment
by UK Government agencies to other Governments. These Government-to-Government
exports are considered case by case against the consolidated criteria."
If Government-to-Government exports are to be
considered case by case against the consolidated criteria, it
is not clear why it is the F680 process, rather than the standard
licensing process, under which this assessment takes place. Whether
or not a licence is formally granted (or refused), it would seem
more straightforward and consistent if applying the same standards
to do so through the same mechanism. It would also help to maintain
the distinction between the preliminary F680 process and the ultimate
decision to export.
Submitting these sales to a standard licensing
assessment could also help to improve their annual reporting:
deals could easily be included in the Annual Report with the same
level of information as per commercial sales, though with reference
to the fact that they are Government-to-Government transactions
(either within the main country listings or separately). If the
Government does not believe this can be managed within the context
of the Annual Report, consideration should be given to establishing
other reporting mechanisms to improve transparency in this area.
— If Government-to-Government exports
are considered on a case-by-case basis against the consolidated
criteria, can the Government explain why the F680 process rather
than the standard licensing procedure is used?
Application of the Consolidated Criteria to Individual
Cases and Countries
(e) In both cases relating to Sri Lanka and
Zambia, we expect some monitoring of end-use to assure the Government
that undertakings are being honoured and human rights violations
are not occurring, and we recommend that the Government report
on this monitoring. (Paragraph 50)
The Government does not state whether it will
undertake this monitoring, committing only to "monitor closely
the human rights situation in Sri Lanka and Zambia" and to
"maintain close contact with the Sri Lankan and Zambian authorities
and human rights NGOs." It also states that "we cannot
at this stage say whether British equipment was used, nor if it
were, whether it was misused. I will write to the Committee again
with further details."
The Government has effectively failed to respond
to the Committee's recommendations. Monitoring the human rights
situation is not the same as monitoring end-use. While it is possible
that monitoring human rights may on occasion reveal something
about the equipment used to commit abuses, it is no substitute
for actual end-use monitoring.
(See later section on end-use monitoring).
(g) We conclude that if the situation in
India and Pakistan in the Spring of this year did not engage Criterion
Four, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances short of all
out war which would do so . . ." (Paragraph 61)
The Government response states that:
"While it is true that the Foreign Secretary
did not personally consider all applications, he did take decisions
on a large number, and this established precedents for officials
to take into account when recommending decisions on subsequent
similar applications"
The Foreign Secretary has stated in a letter
to the Committee that he did not personally approve any licences
for exports to India and Pakistan in the two months to June 2002
(HC718, paragraph 60), a period when the situation between India
and Pakistan was extremely fraught and fluid. It is difficult
to understand how licensing decisions made previously could be
considered to have established workable precedents for this difficult
time. Saferworld recommends that the Government outlines more
clearly how precedents are to be applied in such circumstances.
— Will the Government outline how "precedents
are applied" during periods of a highly tense and rapidly
changing security environment, eg India and Pakistan?
(h) The Government's statement of the 15
April would appear to suggest that no weapons, equipment or components
which could be deployed aggressively in the Occupied Territories
would, for the time being at least, be licensed for export from
the UK to Israel. We recommend that the Government in its response
to this report confirms this case. (Paragraph 66)
The Government states that:
"When assessing export licences for Israel,
the Government will no longer take the Israeli assurances given
on 29 November 2000 into account. We do however continue to consider
applications for the proposed export of components from the UK
to Israel for incorporation into Israeli military equipment for
re-export to third countries. When assessing such applications
we take into account a recent re-assessment by our Embassy in
Tel Aviv of the risk that the Israeli government might try and
divert military equipment destined for a third country for their
own use. They do not believe there to be any cases in which Israeli
companies have broken their undertakings in respect of re-exportation
to the third-country end-users. Israel is a country where contractual
obligations are taken seriously."
It is welcome that the Government no longer
takes into account the Israeli assurances given on 29 November
2000. However, the Government has only gone half-way in terms
of its response to the failure of Israel to honour its written
guarantee. Rather than no longer considering the guarantee, when
assessing licence applications the Government should actively
take into account the fact that Israel's "word" with
regard to end-use commitments cannot be relied upon. Furthermore,
the notion that "Israel is a country where contractual obligations
are taken seriously" would appear to have been significantly
undermined by the breaking of this guarantee.
The reference by Government to a "recent
re-assessment by our Embassy in Tel Aviv of the risk that the
Israeli government might try and divert military equipment destined
for a third country for their own use" is of interest in
light of this failure to honour written obligations, and also
with regard to the new guidelines on "incorporation"
cases introduced in July 2002. While the guidelines appeared aimed
at cases where concerns might exist about exports to a second
country because of their use in a third, it would appear the Government
is here considering where it is the country of incorporation,
not the country of ultimate end-use, which is considered problematic.
These points raise a number of questions:
— Why was this re-assessment undertaken?
— What were the results of the reassessment?
— Are such circumstances already covered
by (criterion 7 of) the Consolidated Criteria?
— Does the Government consider the
new guidelines apply to these cases?
— Does the Government have any intention
to introduce additional guidelines?
(See further section in this submission on incorporation
and end-use.)
(k) The Defence Committee was assured during
the course of its inquiry into the Six Nation Framework Agreement
that there would be no reduction in transparency in licence applications.
(Paragraph 83)
The Government states that:
"The Government gave assurances in the 2001
and 2000 Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls that Global
Project Licences will be included in future editions of the Report.
We estimate that such licences will be reported for the first
time in the 2003 Annual Report."
Saferworld recommends that the Government set
out the form this reporting will take so that interested parties
(eg the Quadripartite Committee, NGOs, the defence industry etc)
can provide feedback.
(i) We recommend that the Government and
Saferworld (and other interested parties) should consult further
and report to us the outcome of those discussions by the end of
this year. (Paragraph 86)
The Government states that:
"The Committee has acknowledged the real
implications for cost and accessibility that are likely to result
from the inclusion in the annual reports of military and dual
use ratings as well as summary descriptions of items licensed
for export . . . the Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls
already sets the highest standards, both within Government and
around the world, in its openness and transparency . . . Nevertheless
the Government will discuss with Saferworld and other interested
NGOs as well as industry representatives, the question of including
ratings as well as summary descriptions in the annual reports."
Past Government Annual Reports provided ratings.
Reintroducing ratings would seem unlikely to be problematic. It
would have a small impact on report size, and the Government already
has this information at its disposal. However, as they stand summary
descriptions are frequently of limited value. Furthermore, while
recognising the potential costs, Saferworld recommends that the
Annual Report contains more detailed summary descriptions and
statements of end-use. This increased level of transparency would
actually have potential benefits to the Government. For example,
Saferworld has previously raised concerns about exports of small
arms to Morocco, which subsequently were revealed to have been
on use for a film set. Making the information available as a matter
of course in the Annual Report would serve to allay fears in a
number of cases.
Saferworld and the Government have not consulted
on this.
End-use monitoring
(p) We recommend that the Government should
consider the production of clear guidelines for, and clarification
of, the circumstances under which end-use monitoring should be
undertaken. (Paragraph 97)
The Government states that:
"We assured ourselves that licensing officials
systematically consider whether there is a need for Posts to carry
out checks on end-users when considering Export Licence Applications
(ELAs), and also consider whether follow-up monitoring would add
value to our efforts to minimise the risk of diversion . . . We
also ensured that procedures are in place to encourage best practice
in this area of risk assessment, including taking into account
or seeking information on these issues from civil society . .
. We do not consider that it is either practical or useful to
monitor the end-use of all military goods exported from the UK
over their lifetime with the end-user, particularly where we have
already satisfied ourselves of the end-user's integrity before
issuing a licence."
It is welcome that the Committee has recognised
the importance of end-use monitoring.
It is implied by the Government's response that
there are circumstances where it believes that end-use monitoring
could be useful, but it is not clear when this might be carried
out or how frequently a decision is taken that monitoring might
"add value."
The Government states that it considers information
provided by civil society. However civil society cannot be the
basis of a truly effective end-use monitoring system. For the
Government to fall back on such sources is an abdication of its
own responsibility. Furthermore, NGOs and/or the media do not
have the resources or in many cases the inclination to take on
such a role in any systematic manner. Indeed, attempting to do
so may endanger media staff or NGO personnel on the ground or
the programmes they are seeking to promote. Information from such
sources might usefully serve as complimentary to the Government's
own efforts, but it should be no more than that.
Moreover, the Government's claims that it takes
into account or seeks information from NGOs is not backed up by
experience; repeated warnings by NGOs of end-use abuses have in
the past been dismissed, eg with regard to reports of the use
of UK-made Hawk jets in Indonesia. Information provided through
official channels, eg via embassy personnel in-country, would
be much harder to ignore.
The Government states that it does not "consider
that it is either practical or useful to monitor the end-use of
all military goods exported from the UK." It has made this
point on a number of occasions, however most observers have never
called for such a system. End-use monitoring should be prioritised
to those countries and for those transfers that are in most danger
of diversion or misuse, through a targeted use of limited resources
against a matrix of likely risk factors, as is the case in the
US.[5]
Saferworld agrees with the Government that any
system of end-use control must contain thorough pre-export checks
and procedures. However, to minimise the risk of diversion or
misuse, the system must include provision for end-use monitoring
as well. In addition, the terms of the export licence must make
it clear that where breaches are revealed, the licence will be
revoked and all subsequent deliveries and support (eg provision
of spares or technical assistance) under the relevant contract
be suspended and no further licences approved until such time
as the Government is satisfied that the recipient will honour
future contractual obligations.
Saferworld considers that the Government is
giving mixed messages about the extent of end-use monitoring,
as highlighted in a recent question asked by Roger Berry MP:
Feb 12 2003 Export Licences
Mr Berry: To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs what measures will be taken by Her Majesty's
Government to ensure equipment exported under export licences
for HMX pellets and synchros used as an inspection tool on Tay
650 engines to power Fokker 100 aircraft will not be diverted
for military purposes for use by the Iranian military or security
forces. [94578]
Mr Mike O'Brien: The Government has made clear
its commitment to effective monitoring of the end-use of defence
exports, including to Iran. The most effective way to do this
is through rigorous assessment at the export licensing stage.
Both the synchros and the HMX pellets do have a possible military
use. However HMG is as satisfied as we reasonably can be that
both of these items are intended only for the legitimate end-use
stated. We judged that the risk of these goods being diverted
for use by the Iranian military was minimal
— Will the Government provide details
on the way it seeks information from civil society when assessing
end-use?
— Will the Government confirm that
it does not have a systematic "effective monitoring of defence
exports" and that "rigorous assessment at the export
licensing stage" does not constitute end-use monitoring?
Application of criteria on a case-by-case Basis
(s) We accept that the Government is obliged
to continue to assess each SIEL application on its own merits
against the consolidated criteria and on a case-by-case basis.
However, the Government has acknowledged that the cumulative effects
of exports to a particular destination could be a relevant consideration
in this assessment. To aid our review process, we recommend that
the Government should consider including in its Annual Reports,
data on the value and quantities of controlled goods for each
SIEL granted." (Paragraph 113)
The Government states that:
"Leaving aside the fact that the value and
quantities of goods licensed under each SIEL might well be commercially
confidential, such data would not necessarily give a full picture
of the cumulative impact of the destination country's arms purchases.
This is because any meaningful assessment cannot be made in relation
to UK exports alone, or one type of licence. Neither would it
realistically be possible to arrive at accurate figures for all
such imports, for example because figures for hidden expenditure,
and information on contracts (including overseas contracts) in
the pipeline will not be available; and purchases may be funded
by staged payments or as part of an offset arrangement."
The Government seems to be arguing against its
own decision to take into account the cumulative impact of licences
with regard to criterion 8 of the Consolidated Criteria, on the
grounds that the information upon which decisions are made is
less than perfect. While this is no doubt true and a cumulative
assessment may not arrive at a totally accurate figure, providing
this level of information would improve the quality of the inevitably
rough estimate that could be made.
The Government have argued that the value of
individual licences is commercially sensitive information which
should not be disclosed without permission of the exporter. However,
this could be addressed by showing the information as a "value
band" (eg value band A:<£250,000; B: £250,000-£1million,
C: £1million-£10million etc). At a minimum the Government
should provide the maximum value of each SIEL issued except where
commercial confidentiality or security issues give cause for concern.
Whilst the Government has acknowledged the need
to look at the cumulative impact against Criterion 8, there is
a strong case for extending this to the other seven Consolidated
Criteria.
For example, there was a significant increase
in 2001 in the value of licences issues to a number of states
for example Pakistan and Israel, which are involved in long-running
disputes.[6]
Whilst the Government may argue that each licence granted was
assessed rigorously against the Consolidated Criteria on a case-by-case
basis, it may be that under this system the "bigger picture"
is being lost. It may be that the increase in value/and or number
of licences to these countries is a statistical anomaly and is
not continued in subsequent years. However if future Annual Reports
reveal that this new level of licensing is sustained or even further
increased, the government should consider carefully its general
licensing policy in these cases. Saferworld recommends that the
Committee continue to recommend that the Annual Report contain
data on the value and quantities of SIELs. In addition, if future
Annual Reports reveal that there has been a further increase in
value/number of licences to countries where the cumulative impact
is a cause for concern, the Committee should undertake to monitor
these levels of exports to these and other destinations of concern,
on a confidential basis if necessary.
— Does the Government agree that it
would be possible to make an estimate of the cumulative impact
of exports and showing the information as a band value would overcome
commercial sensitivity concerns?
"Incorporation" and Collaborative Defence
Manufacturing
(w) We conclude that if paragraphs (b) and
(c) of the additional factors to be taken into account in licensing
decisions announced in the statement of 8 July were to be applied
on a "case-by-case basis", they would suggest that the
more insignificant a component is to a finished product, the more
likely it is to be approved for export, while at the same time
the more significant a component is to a finished product the
more likely it is to be approved for export. We recommend that
the Government explain more fully these apparently conflicting
considerations in its response to this report. (Paragraph 139)
The Government states:
"The statement makes clear that both (b)
and (c) are relevant factors to be taken into account in considering
incorporation cases. These factors cannot be viewed in isolation
however. The Government will look at all the relevant factors,
and the Criteria as a whole, and make an overall judgment based
on the specific circumstances of each individual case. As with
other licensing decisions, the Government accepts that some of
these decisions may be finely balanced."
The introduction of the new criteria announced
in July 2002 appears to alter the balance of the UK's arms export
control regime, as for "incorporation" cases the eight
restrictive criteria of the EU Code are now joined by five new
"permissive" criteria. The relationship between the
new guidelines and the Consolidated Criteria remains unclear.
It would appear that exports of equipment could now be permitted
that would not be licensed under Consolidated Criteria.
With regard to the contradiction that the Committee
raised concerning paragraphs (b) and (c) of the "additional
factors" announced in July 2002, Saferworld is not satisfied
that the Government has adequately addressed the concerns raised.
(y) We recommend that the Government clarify
. . . the relevance to the quality of export controls in the "incorporating
country" to licensing decisions relating to collaborative
manufacturing products. (Paragraph 141)
The Government states that:
"Criterion 7 will still be taken into account
in respect of the final destination where incorporation is not
involved . . . the statement does not apply to items to be re-exported
without being incorporated into other items. These would be covered
by Criterion 7."
The clear implication is that criterion 7 will
not be taken into account in incorporation cases. If this is the
case, this would be a severe retrograde step. Saferworld would
hope that the Government could clarify this point, ideally by
stressing that criterion 7 will carry no less weight in incorporation
cases.
(z) (cc) The Government statement of 8 July
claims that there is no common EU-wide policy about licensing
strategic exports where it is understood that the goods are to
be incorporated in products for onward export . . . (Paragraph
144)
The Government states:
"The Foreign Secretary's 8 July statement
is an elaboration of the Code as it applies to specific circumstances
which are not explicitly dealt with by the Code . . ."
The Government argue the new criteria was established
because the Consolidated Criteria did not cover incorporation
cases. While it is true that the defence industry is currently
undergoing rapid restructuring, incorporation is not a new phenomenon.
It is not true that the Consolidated Criteria
do not cover incorporation cases. Criterion 5 of the Consolidated
criteria explicitly authorises the Government to take into account
such factors as defence and security relationships ("while
recognising that this factor cannot affect consideration of the
criteria in respect of human rights and on regional peace, security
and stability"). Criterion 7 refers to the "risk that
the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported
under undesirable conditions." Furthermore the operative
provisions of the EU Code allow member states to take into account
economic considerations when judging licence applications, though
not at the expense of the criteria (operative provision 10) while
operative provisions 5 and 6 state that the criteria are to be
applied not just to complete weapons systems but also to military
and dual-use components.
— Will the Government confirm that,
contrary to statement made, the Consolidated Criteria do cover
incorporation cases?
The new criteria allowed the export of equipment
that under the Consolidated Criteria would most probably not have
been licensed for direct export (ie export to the US of Head-Up
Displays for incorporation in F-16 aircraft which will subsequently
be exported to Israel). As incorporation cases are expected to
become more common in future, this loophole threatens to get bigger
over time. The Committee should continue to look at this process
with great urgency. The driving force behind the new guidelines
was the Government's concern that the UK be seen as a reliable
defence partner to the US. Yet the US takes a far more restrictive
approach to the onward sale of weapons and military equipment
it exports. Under US law, recipients of controlled goods from
the US must seek the permission of the US Government before re-export.
It is clear that the US is willing to apply its veto rights when
it does not agree with particular requests for re-export. Saferworld
recommends that the UK Government does the same and encourages
other EU member states to do so as well.
Another approach would be for the UK to agree
a common approach to onward export with partner governments for
each collaborative defence project. Provision for such an arrangement
already exists under the six-state Letter of Intent/Framework
Agreement, whereby a preliminary White List of permitted export
destinations is to be agreed by the relevant partner governments
for each collaborative project.
Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny
(ff) "We conclude that several of the
cases that we have focused on in this report starkly illuminate
many of the shortcomings of retrospective scrutiny of licensing
decisions." (Paragraph 147)
(gg) "We recommend
that the Government, in its response to this report, come forward
with proposals for a system of prior parliamentary scrutiny of
export licence applications by a select committee, or committees,
of this House."
Saferworld agrees with the Committee's recommendations.
The Government have stated that the Prior Parliamentary
Scrutiny would:
"not be right in principle, and could not be
made to work in practice without having a materially adverse impact
on the efficiency and effectiveness of the export licensing process
and without causing significant damage to the competitiveness
of UK exports."
Saferworld has long called for a system of prior
parliamentary scrutiny and with other members of the UK Working
Group on Arms, has made a number of submissions[7]
that address the concerns that the Government has raised. The
UKWG sought advice from Matrix Chambers, which stated that there
is no constitutional impediment that would prevent Parliament
from legislating to give itself a role in scrutinising arms export
licences.
Saferworld notes the Committee's response to
earlier correspondence concerning a possible future "division
of responsibility" between the Quadripartite Committee and
a proposed Defence Export Scrutiny Committee (DESC):
"We do not agree with the UK Working Group's
analysis. It is our belief that the setting up of a statutory
committee along the lines of Lord Campbell Savours proposals would
almost inevitably lead to the withering away of the Quadripartite
arrangements. The risk would be that parliamentary scrutiny of
strategic exports would be reduced rather than enhanced . . ."
(Paragraph 168)
Saferworld supported the DESC proposal as providing
a first crucial step towards adequate prior parliamentary oversight
and on the basis that, following the model of the Intelligence
and Security Committee, it may have addressed the concerns raised
by the Government over prior scrutiny. However, Saferworld has
always favoured the proposals for prior scrutiny put forward by
the Quadripartite Committee, which allow for a greater level of
scrutiny and transparency than the proposals for a DESC. In light
of the reservations expressed by the Quadripartite Committee regarding
the possible consequences of a DESC, Saferworld expresses its
continued support for the continuation of the Quadripartite Committee
as currently constituted, and furthermore endorses the Committee's
call for increased parliamentary scrutiny of export licensing
decisions. Saferworld fully supports the Committee's conclusion
that:
"We do not accept the arguments of principle
raised by the Government against our predecessors proposals for
prior scrutiny. Nor do we find the legal arguments at all persuasive
. . . We consider that it is possible to devise a practicable
system of such scrutiny by our four committees or some new select
committee established for the purpose, within the constraints
set out by the Government, and we are willing to negotiate such
details." (Paragraph 169)
20 February 2003
Annex 1
US law places strict controls on the end-use
of exports of defence articles or services. Exporters must submit
a Non-Transfer and Use certificate with their export license application,
although end-use assurances can be documented in other ways, such
as a diplomatic note or an official letter. Although this certificate
does not require notification of specific prescribed or proscribed
uses, there is a general stipulation that use must comply with
US law, or be confined to those purposes specified in defence
agreements or treaties between the US and recipient governments.
Exporters must provide full details concerning the articles or
data being exported, and of the foreign consignee, end-user and
government, each of which must give an undertaking not to re-export
US-sourced defence articles or services without the prior approval
of the US government. This obligation also extends to states that
receive retransferred US weapons.
Since 1990, the US has had in place a systematic
end-use pre-export screening and post export monitoring programme
for commercial sales of controlled items. The Blue Lantern programme,
administered by the Department of State, uses a system of 20 specific
criteria or red flags (for example the requested equipment does
not match the known requirements or inventory of the foreign end-user)
and reporting by embassies, intelligence and law enforcement agencies
to highlight risks of diversion. Over 4,000 checks have been made
since the programmes inception, with 360 initiated in 1999. Of
those, typically 5% to 10% result in unfavourable results (8%
in 1999), which may lead to denials or revocations of licenses,
the imposition of sanctions or prosecution of export law violators.
Department of State officials believe Blue Lantern has a significant
deterrent effect on would-be diversion. However within the Department
of State the functioning of Blue Lantern is hampered by under-resourcing,
with the units involved in its implementation chronically understaffed.
The US Department of Defence has a legal obligation to establish
a similar programme for government-to-government sales, but has
experienced difficulties in carrying out the required end-use
checks and complying with its reporting requirements. However,
since the events of 11 September, greater importance has been
attached to end-use monitoring, and the resources devoted to this
programme have been increased.
In response to General Accounting Office reports[8]
and recommendations and congressional pressure, Department of
Defence has worked to reorganise or "enhance" its end
use monitoring programme (called Golden Sentry). The Golden Sentry
program is responsible for the overall end use monitoring of government-to-government
defence exports. The primary programme objectives are to ensure
that US origin defence exports are requested only by authorised
governments, are sent only to the authorised end-user, and that
these exports continue to be used as stated and approved[9].
Golden Sentry is to accomplish its monitoring in part through
so-called Tiger teams, comprising weapons and technology experts.
The teams are to annually conduct random in-country spot checks
on foreign government use of selected US exports.
Finally there is an end use monitoring system
run by the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) in the Commerce
Department. BXA reviews and approves license applications for
dual-use items and imposes necessary controls on licensed export
agreements.
After initial application reviews are undertaken,
there are three types of end-use checks that can be used by BXA:
pre-license, pre-shipment and post-shipment checks. On site end
use monitoring is almost always done by BXA agents who travel
to the field from the US, but are occasionally conducted by Foreign
Commercial Service Officers (FSCOs) attached to US embassies and
trained by BXA enforcement agents (at present there are only two
FCSOs, located in the Moscow and Beijing embassies[10].
2 Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2000,
Licensing Policy and Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny Session 2001-02-Government
Response October 2002. Back
3
Not printed. Back
4
Strategic Export Controls: Annual Report for 2000, Licensing Policy
and Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny Session 2001-2002-Government
Response October 2002. Back
5
See Annex 1. Back
6
See Saferworld audit of the 2001 UK Annual Report on
Strategic Export Controls. Back
7
See-Prior Parliamentary Scrutiny (UK Working Group on Arms
letter to the Quadripartite Committee, 24 April 2002) Prior Parliamentary
Scrutiny (UK Working Group on Arms submission to the Quadripartite
Committee, December 2001) House of Commons Defence Committee Seventh
Report Committees' Inquiry into the Draft Export Control and Non-Proliferation
Bill (May 2001, UK Working Group on Arms, Evidence Session, 25
April 2001) Refining Proposals for a System of Prior Parliamentary
Scrutiny of Arms Exports, January 2001. Back
8
See for example Foreign Military Sales, Changes Needed
to Correct Weaknesses in End-Use Monitoring Programme, General
Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on International
Relations, House of Representatives, August 2000. Back
9
How Little is Enough? US End Use Monitoring and Oversight of the
Weapons Trade, F Burke, Centre for Defense Information, January
2002. Back
10
Ibid Back
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