APPENDIX
GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE'S
REPORT ON PREPARING FOR THE HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF POSSIBLE
MILITARY ACTION AGAINST IRAQ
MEMORANDUM FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
1. The Government welcomes the International
Development Committee's report on humanitarian contingency planning
for Iraq. We welcome in particular how quickly the Committee was
able to carry out its inquiry and publish its report. The report
has played a valuable role helping to raise awareness of the humanitarian
risks facing the Iraqi people, and reminding the international
community of its responsibilities.
2. Since the Committee's report was published,
military action has started. Government priorities include ensuring
that the military campaign is as swift and carefully targeted
as possible, and working with the UN and international community
to help meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and start
to reconstruct the country as quickly as possible. In doing so
we will apply the lessons learned in previous crises.
3. A detailed response to the committee's conclusions
and recommendations is set out below.
Recommendation A. "We recommend that DFID
immediately issues a statement outlining its basic humanitarian
contingency plans. This would be a useful source of information
for humanitarian actors and would also provide reassurance that
adequate importance has been attached to the humanitarian consequences
of military action (paragraph 8)."
4. The Secretary of State for International Development
issued a written statement to the House of Commons on 13 March.
This is attached at Annex 1.
Recommendation B. "Notwithstanding the difference
of opinion between UN and NGOs, and understanding the need for
confidentiality, we urge DFID and the UN, where possible, as a
principle to provide confidential briefings to NGOs to facilitate
effective planning (paragraph 10)."
and
Recommendation C. "There is a pressing need
for a mechanism for coordinating the UK humanitarian response
so that UK NGOs can be connected with the UN, the military and
local NGOs to facilitate information sharing between all relevant
actors (paragraph 11)."
5. DFID has regular discussions and meetings
with UK-based NGOs involved in humanitarian support for Iraq,
both in London and in the region. Meetings also involve NGOs that
are considering possible humanitarian interventions.
6. The Government considers coordination and
the sharing of information amongst all humanitarian agencies and
donors essential to effective humanitarian response. The UN has
the lead role and their mechanisms for doing so are well established.
It is important that UK NGOs are fully involved in such international
coordination, rather than in UK-specific arrangements. DFID is
supporting UN OCHA in the establishment of its Humanitarian Information
Centre (based in Larnaca), to help facilitate effective coordination
for Iraq, and has provided an information management specialist
to the Centre.
Recommendation D. "It is clear is that the
scale of funds needed will be massive, given the dependency of
the majority of the Iraqi population on the OFF programme which
delivers $5 billion worth of commodities into the country in each
six month phase, the food element of which costs $250 million
a month to maintain. (paragraph 12)."
and
Recommendation E. "If delivery of food through
the UN Oil For Food Programme (OFF) does breakdown it will affect
the 60% of Iraqis to whom the programme currently delivers, two-thirds
of whom have no other source of food. Even in northern Iraq, where
the WFP have trebled the ration to allow stockpiling, a food crisis
would spread to northern Iraq within three months and would be
severely worsened by a likely influx of internally displaced persons.
Humanitarian contingency planning must take account of the serious
risk that at least 40% of the population will be without any source
of food in the absence of OFF rations. (paragraph 14)."
7. We agree that it is essential to ensure that
the Oil for Food Programme is re established as soon as possible.
DFID has been fully engaged for many months in trying to get the
international community to face the humanitarian risks of military
action in Iraq, and to make preparations. Many international agencies
have been making contingency plans but did not wish to be seen
to be doing so because many of the countries to which they were
accountable were strongly hostile to the prospects of military
action. There has been close collaboration between DFID and the
Ministry of Defence to minimise the humanitarian impact of any
conflict. One of our aims has been to minimise damage to the infrastructure
on which the OFF distribution network depends, in order that it
can be re-established as quickly as possible after any conflict.
8. DFID has already set aside £90m which
will take up most of the DFID contingency reserve to help provide
for immediate humanitarian relief. This includes £20m committed
to UN agencies and NGOs for their contingency planning and the
prepositioning of food and other supplies. The Government has
made clear the importance it attaches to humanitarian relief for
the Iraqi people and the reconstruction of the country after conflict.
Further discussions about the resources needed to meet these commitments
are proceeding urgently.
Recommendation F. "A new Resolution on OFF
is needed to allow the UN Secretary General to take executive
control as soon as hostilities begin (paragraph 16)."
9. The Government agrees. We are working towards
a new resolution on these lines with the UN Secretariat and other
Security Council members. The resolution would authorise the UN
Secretary General and his designated representatives to provide
humanitarian assistance throughout Iraq using the resources available
under the OFF Programme. We expect a draft resolution to be tabled
shortly.
Recommendation G. "It is to be noted that
the current mandate for OFF ends on June 3rd 2003 (paragraph 16)."
10. The Government is aware of this.
Recommendation H. "As we have already commented,
there may be problems with the delivery of existing Government
of Iraq contracts. Detailed planning around how a replacement
supply of food to OFF can be provided is necessary as is consideration
of how such a supply can be channeled through existing delivery
mechanisms. Consideration has also to be given to alternative
food distribution options, given the risk that local delivery
outlets may not be operational (paragraph 20)."
11. Humanitarian agencies have been making contingency
plans for bringing in food to Iraq while the OFF may be disrupted.
These include prepositioning of supplies, pre-booking of trucks
for transportation, and agreements established with neighbouring
countries on access routes. The World Food Programme (WFP) is
the lead agency and is being supported with DFID funding. WFP's
current appeal for preparedness funding is almost fully met.
12. The UK military is drawing up plans to provide
immediate humanitarian relief in line with its obligations under
the Geneva and Hague Conventions until the UN and other specialist
agencies are able to do so, supported with advice from DFID humanitarian
specialists. We will promote the use of existing distribution
and delivery mechanisms wherever possible.
Recommendation I. "Planning for sites for
IDP and refugee camps must include planning for the provision
of water, sanitation, and health care. Food and non-food items
such as tents should be pre-positioned at camp sites. Camp planning
must also take careful consideration of the risk of injury from
unexploded ordnance and landmines. (paragraph 23)."
13. The Government agrees. The UN have been working
with Iraq's neighbouring countries on planning for possible refugee
influxes. Preparations have been made on the basis of the UN's
contingency planning estimates of possible population movements
which cover a wide range of possibilities. Relevant UN agencies
have expertise in all the areas identified by the Committee and
have prepared accordingly. DFID has provided £1.75m to UNHCR
for their preparations to support refugees. UN agencies have agreed
that the International Organisation for Migration will take a
lead on internally displaced people; the International Committee
for the Red Cross will also play a major role. DFID has provided
£8m to WFP, £2m to UNICEF, £1.5m to ICRC, £1m
to WHO and £250,000 to IOM for their preparations, including
for support to internally displaced people.
Recommendation J. "Military planning should
seek to minimise humanitarian consequences. However, it is inevitable
that there will be damage to Iraq's infrastructure. It is therefore
essential that sufficient medical supplies are available to deal
with any outbreak in disease. Vaccination programmes should be
carried out now to minimise casualties. Provision must also be
made to address the potential lack of clean drinking water and
sanitation services (paragraph 25)."
14. The Government shares the Committee's concerns.
The UK military is clear that every attempt must be made to minimise
humanitarian consequences. The importance of infrastructure—especially
for water and sanitation—has been fully recognised by the
military and plans have been developed to provide, where necessary,
emergency water and electricity supply.
15. DFID and other donors are supporting the work
of WHO, ICRC and NGOs to position medical stocks in the region
for use in areas of greatest need. A vaccination programme has
recently been undertaken by the UN. As priorities and access dictate,
the UN will continue to conduct such programmes for refugees,
IDPs and the civilian population. WHO assesses that a combination
of UN agencies, NGOs and the ICRC have medical supplies to meet
the emergency needs of half a million refugees or other people
acutely affected by conflict for three months in Iraq, and for
150,000 in surrounding countries. Supplies for three months for
another 750,000 people are also on call in the region. Inevitably,
risks remain, including deliberate actions that may be taken by
the Iraqi regime to create humanitarian problems.
Recommendation K. "In preparing to prevent
the outbreak of ethnic conflict in Iraq the UK Government should
remember the experience of Afghanistan where an initial "my
enemy's enemy is my friend" approach led the US to support
regional power holders, thereby fuelling warlords and creating
barriers to security and stability. The best case scenario for
military action would involve Iraqi surrender with central authority
structures remaining intact. However, it is essential that in
planning for the possible humanitarian consequences of military
action the worst case scenario, involving ethnic conflict, is
considered. Safe havens could be a useful mechanism for preventing
ethnic conflict but it essential that there is clear identification
of who will be safe inside havens and how they will be protected.
(paragraph 28)."
16. The risk of ethnic violence following conflict
is a serious concern. Military and humanitarian planning is informed
by this risk. The establishment of safe havens may not necessarily
be the best approach. The objective will be to create a secure
and safe environment for all Iraqis so that people do not want
to move. This will require a focus on quick stabilisation of areas
coming under coalition military control, especially where the
risk of ethnic conflict is highest.
Recommendation L. "Ideally, international
and Iraqi health workers would be trained in how to deal with
the human impact of chemical or biological weapons and would receive
the same immunisations against biological weapons that are offered
to military personnel. The UN has discarded the option of providing
protective suits for its staff because they will be impractical.
In any case UN staff would be withdrawn at the outset of any chemical
or biological attack. Specialist clothing and equipment are prohibitively
expensive, putting them beyond the reach of most agencies. Every
effort must be made to ensure that information on the supply of
protective clothing is provided. Giving information on weapons
capability is an extremely difficult area for the military but
it is one where there needs to be serious cooperation between
the military and UN agencies and NGOs (paragraph 29)."
17. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) provide
advice and training to the humanitarian community on chemical
and biological weapons use and protection. The coalition military
will provide security information (including on the disposition
of munitions and, if appropriate, areas of contamination) to the
humanitarian community through the Humanitarian Operations Centre
based in Kuwait. This will assist humanitarian organisations to
determine the permissiveness of the environment in which they
wish to operate. The Government does not believe that most NGOs
are adequately trained, prepared or equipped to play a significant
role in responding to a chemical or biological weapons attack.
Recommendation M. "Even without a further
UN Security Council Resolution authorising military action, the
UN will still be able to operate in Iraq under its humanitarian
mandate (paragraph 30)."
18. The Government agrees. It is the Government's
policy to support the work of international humanitarian agencies,
particularly those of the United Nations, to take the leading
role in responding to humanitarian emergencies, regardless of
the legal or political circumstances.
Recommendation N. "It is important that the
UN should have the lead role in a post-conflict Iraq as soon as
possible. There is a real danger that donors and NGOs would not
play a full part in the post-conflict reconstruction of Iraq if
the country were administered by a military governor (paragraph
31)."
Recommendation R. "This underlines the case
for having a lead role for the UN planned for the aftermath of
hostilities. (paragraph 36)."
19. The Government agrees. A UN mandate will be required
to provide legal authority for the reconstruction effort, and
to make possible the engagement of the International Financial
Institutions and the wider international community. The Government
is at the forefront of efforts to ensure that a suitable UN mandate
is put in place and is holding regular discussions with key partners
to achieve this. The Secretary of State for International Development
visited New York and Washington on 19-20 March to take forward
these issues with UN, IFI and US officials.
Recommendation O. "A second Security Council
Resolution has been proposed but it is designed mainly to reinforce
Resolution 1441. The draft makes no provision for humanitarian
relief. We believe that the Resolution should take account of
the likely humanitarian consequences of military action. Subsequent
to any armed conflict, a further Resolution will be needed to
make provision for changes to the OFF programme to allow for its
continuation during and after a conflict. It should also set down
what the UN's role will be after a conflict. In Afghanistan we
saw the importance of the role played, in the early days, by the
UN Special Representative in balancing different interests and
championing and safeguarding the rights of civilians before, during
and after military action. Iraq will also benefit from a Special
UN Representative. We believe that an appointment should be made
immediately, regardless of the plans of the US military for the
post-conflict stage (paragraph 32)."
20. The first part of this recommendation has been
superseded by events. The Government agrees that further UN Security
Council Resolutions are needed to amend OFF and to establish post-conflict
arrangements with a strong role for the UN. We are working hard
on these. (See responses to recommendations F. and N.) The UN
already has a Humanitarian Coordinator for Iraq, Mr Romero Lopes
de Silva. Discussions about the UN's role in Iraq after conflict
include consideration of how the UN's work would be coordinated.
Recommendation P. "We believe that one area
in which the military could play an important role is policing
and protection. We urge the military to develop plans to provide
such protection, where requested, for humanitarian work if they
have not already done so. There have been reports of a plan which
will include the deployment of UN peace keeping forces, or monitors.
We endorse this proposal. (paragraph 35)."
21. The need for the maintenance of law and order
has been fully appreciated and incorporated into campaign planning.
The military is however unable to provide an absolute guarantee
of protection to the humanitarian community. Specific requests
for protection from the UN on behalf of the humanitarian community
will be dealt with on a case by case basis and within military
capability. We have not heard of any credible plans for the deployment
of UN peacekeeping forces or monitors and believe that any such
deployment is unlikely.
Recommendation Q. "Military/humanitarian
cooperation is an extremely difficult area. But the difficulties
have to be resolved now before any fighting begins (paragraph
36)."
22. The Government agrees that military/humanitarian
dialogue is essential, although we acknowledge the sensitivities
involved on both sides and the respect that has to be accorded
to military and humanitarian mandates. The coalition military
has set up a mechanism for dialogue by establishing, with the
Government of Kuwait, a Humanitarian Operations Centre (HOC) in
Kuwait City to act as a focal point for information exchange with
the humanitarian community. For those organisations not present
in Kuwait, or unwilling to work through the HOC, information exchange
should be possible through the UN's Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) which has a presence in Kuwait
and the region.
23. The Humanitarian Operations Centre is facilitating
visa entry and customs clearance for NGOs into Kuwait and plans
to provide security information to the humanitarian community
to enable them to assess whether conditions allow their access
into the country. We support this dialogue and information provision,
which we hope will help the humanitarian community to take over
from the military in the provision of assistance to those in need
as soon as the situation allows. We recognise and will uphold
the importance of independent humanitarian action.
Recommendation S. "Based on the evidence
we heard, the scale of the humanitarian need may well exceed the
capacity of the international system. (paragraph 37)."
24. The potential scale of need in Iraq is enormous.
19 million people are currently dependent on Oil For Food handouts,
and many are dependent on electrically-pumped water and sanitation
systems. Even with more time, no preparation would be enough to
cope with the scale of the worst-case scenarios, including the
possible use of chemical and biological weapons on the civilian
population. That is why it is so important to minimise those risks.
The Government is committed to doing so.
Recommendation T. "Despite pledges being
made to a UN emergency fund at a conference in Geneva on 15-16
February, the indication is that the scale of humanitarian need
will drastically outweigh the funds available and that there is
a severe lack of funds available immediately for planning and
preparation. (paragraph 38)."
25. The Geneva meeting, held on 15-16 February, was
not a donor pledging conference but an information-sharing meeting,
hosted by the Swiss Government. The initial UN appeal in January
for contingency planning requirements sought $38m. The level of
requirements was later revised and a subsequent UN appeal for
$123m was announced on 18 February. At 20 March, donors have committed
$94 to UN preparedness measures.
26. To date, DFID has committed £13m to the
UN contingency preparedness appeal (16% of the total requested).
We are considering a further contribution and will make an announcement
shortly. We understand that the UN plans to launch a separate
Flash Appeal for around US$1.9bn in the event of conflict. We
will consider and respond to this swiftly and generously, as needs
dictate.
Recommendation U. "We are concerned that
the international system lacks the financial and resource ability
to cope with multiple crises around the world and echo the statement
made by CARE International that: "We are, as the Secretary
of State's written evidence pointed out, very, very worried about
the loss of publicity of very serious humanitarian disasters which
are in place at the moment in Southern Africa, in East Africa
and we now have West Africa with the disruption in Côte
d'Ivoire". (paragraph 39)."
27. The Government shares this concern. The humanitarian
community is overstretched with so many crises around the world,
including in Afghanistan, the West Bank/Gaza, southern Africa,
Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is critical that these crises are not
overlooked and DFID has made clear it will not divert resources
from other crises to provide support for Iraq.
Recommendation V. "We call on the UN to clarify
with Iraq's neighbours their attitude to accepting refugees in
the event of armed conflict, whether or not they have signed the
refugee convention. (paragraph 40)."
28. The UN has discussed with all Iraq's neighbours
their willingness and ability to assist refugees crossing national
borders in the event of conflict. Iraq's neighbours are mostly
cooperating fully with humanitarian agencies in preparing for
the possibility of refugees. It is critical that all Iraq's neighbours
fulfil their legal and moral obligations in the event of large
population movements.
Recommendation W. "Although Clare Short told
us that humanitarian considerations must be paramount, there are
still concerns that this will not be the case. Christian Aid's
Roger Riddell said: "I am worried about a line of questioning
which suggests we do the war and then worry about the humanitarian
consequences afterwards. The Geneva Conventions require that those
who engage in military activity focus on civilians right from
the start". Clare Short told the House that the: "simplistic
view that we should get on with the war, after which my Department
and a few people can clean up, is ill-informed. I and my Department
have been fully engaged in trying to get the world to face the
humanitarian risks and make preparations". The Prime Minister
told the House that there needs to be: "a humanitarian plan
that is every bit as viable and well worked out as a military
plan". We fully concur, but have yet to be convinced that
this is the case (paragraph 41)."
29. The Government is strongly committed to ensuring
that we urgently relieve the suffering of the Iraqi people. In
our view, the overall level of preparedness of the international
community to cope with the humanitarian challenges which may lie
ahead in Iraq is not as great as it could be. We will continue
to play a leading role in encouraging and supporting a comprehensive
international response to the needs of the Iraqi people by those
agencies best placed to do so. We will focus, in particular, on
efforts to ensure that the UN is both funded and enabled, through
Security Council resolutions, to play a leading role. And we will
use our own human and financial resources, through DFID and—when
appropriate—the UK military, to ensure the direct delivery
of humanitarian assistance, retaining flexibility to deploy these
resources where they are most needed.
Secretary of State for International Development
21st March 2003
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