APPENDIX 4
Memorandum from the Campaign Against Arms
Trade
1. The Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT)
is opposed to all military exports, but recognises that, despite
its negative effects on human rights, security and the economy,
the arms trade will not end overnight. As an interim measure,
therefore, CAAT is seeking an export licensing policy with an
emphasis on restraint, especially on exports to governments which
violate human rights, or to countries in areas of conflict.
2. CAAT will be responding to the Department
of Trade and Industry's Consultation, but welcomes your Committee's
inquiry which will help to ensure that the implications of the
draft Orders are fully understood. This submission represents
CAAT's preliminary thoughts on the subject. These will be reviewed
in the light of the evidence given to your Committee and of your
deliberations.
Transfer of technology and provision of technical
assistance
3. Today, many types of weapons can cause
death and destruction on a vast scale. Limiting the new controls
on technology transfer "by any means" to nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons as well as missiles capable of their delivery
does not address the problem of weapons' proliferation in general.
4. Increasingly, arms sold by UK-based companies
are produced under licence in the purchasing country or elsewhere.
An amendment to the Export Control Bill addressing this Licensed
Production of Goods Overseas was tabled in the House of Lords
on 7 February 2002. Responding, before the Amendment was withdrawn,
Lord Sainsbury said: "It is clear that licensed production
does not take place unless there is some transfer of technology
or knowledge, and the way we can control that is by licensing
the technology and knowledge, which is greatly strengthened in
the Bill."
5. It is unfortunate that the draft Orders
limit the scope of these controls to particular types of weapons.
CAAT would urge that such controls apply to all licensable equipment.
Trade in military equipment
6. CAAT is most disappointed that the draft
Orders fail to live up to the 2001 Labour Party manifesto commitment
to introduce "a licensing system to control the activities
of arms brokers and traffickers wherever they are located".
7. Limiting full extra-territorial controls
to transfers (a) to embargoed destinations, and (b) of long range
missiles and of equipment for which there is evidence of its use
in torture, is inadequate. Destinations not subject to an embargo
can be lucrative markets for arms brokers. There are many types
of weapons, beyond those listed, which can cause great devastation
or which can assist in the violation of human rights. Cluster
bombs are an example of the former; armoured personnel carriers
of the latter.
8. Adopting the Orders as drafted will simply
serve to move the brokers across the Channel or, if similar European
Union-wide regulations of this kind are later brought into force,
further afield. Full extra- territorial controls are essential
to stop unscrupulous dealers and trafficking networks relocating
and continuing their businesses with impunity.
9. CAAT believes it is important that shipping
agents are brought within the remit of the Orders.
10. Difficulty of enforcement is not an
adequate reason for not controlling all arms brokering activities.
Many brokers will want to continue doing business that the UK
government would consider legitimate. They are likely to abide
by the regulations.
11. It is not an argument to say that arms
traffickers won't know what the law is. As with those employed
in any business, they will know it is imperative to keep abreast
of changes in specialist legislation.
12. The cost of introducing extra-territorial
controls on all transfers should also not be an issue. The money
is well spent if it curbs conflict, as this will save on the need
for reconstruction and emergency assistance as well as on support
for refugees.
Open General Trade Licences
13. With regard to the Open General Trade
Licence, CAAT has concerns about the source and destination countries
listed in paragraph 4.33. In particular, at present, CAAT would
like any trade involving Algeria, Indonesia, Israel and Turkey
to be controlled.
Trade fairs
14. CAAT is unclear about the distinction
made in the Consultative Document, paragraphs 4.38 to 4.43, with
regards to activities undertaken at trade fairs. An explanation
of the difference, perhaps with examples, between "arranging
sales" and "purely marketing activities" would
be helpful.
15. It is vital that overseas citizens be
subject to the same regulations as UK citizens whilst engaged
in trading activities while visiting the UK. CAAT would, therefore,
prefer option A on page 37 of the Consultative Document. The example
given for Option C is somewhat alarming. If an employee of a French
arms company can continue to make deals at the Farnborough Airshow
to export from France to a third country without regulation from
the UK, this seems to foreshadow national boundary and arms fair
hopping by arms companies and dealers.
Disclosure of information
16. Article 21 of the draft Export of Goods,
Transfer of Technology and Provision of Technical Assistance (Control)
Order and Article 14 of the Trade in Controlled Goods (Control)
Order strictly limit the disclosure of information made in the
course of the export licensing process. CAAT believes that paragraph
three of the two Articles should be redrafted so that the presumption
is for disclosure, rather than, as present, for the converse.
17. It is unclear how these Articles would
affect your Committee's examination of (a) some licences after
they have been granted, and (b) your efforts to be granted prior
scrutiny of them.
Penalties
18. The penalties described for violation
of the Orders apply only to individuals. CAAT would like the responsibility
for obeying the regulations extended to the managers and directors
of the companies. By making them personally liable under criminal
law and making the UK company itself face prosecution, and the
prospect of having its goods seized or assets sequestrated, the
message of corporate responsibility for adherence to export control
rules would be reinforced.
11 March 2003
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