From crisis response to food security
and sustainable livelihoods
23. If people and communities are to escape
from poverty traps and move towards food securty and sustainable
livelihoods, they must be enabled bothto cope with crisis-related
risks and to make the risky investments which are needed to climb
out of poverty. (Paragraph 103)
We agree. In Malawi, encouraging progress is being
made on risk mitigation through crop diversification, promotion
of supplementary irrigation and support to small enterprise development
made possible through income from public works employment. The
success of such efforts will depend on the extent of the government's
commitment to sound governance and good macro-economic management.
In other countries food for work and cash for work programmes
may provide the opportunity to expose communities to more intensive
agricultural production. Investments in small-scale irrigation
supported by donors and NGOs are also being tested in Zimbabwe
and Zambia. This is a beginning and it builds upon existing knowledge,
but it will provide alternative income streams and nutritional
sources for families in drought-prone areas. Basic infrastructure
development and training as a component of drought relief programmes
provides the initial investment that communities themselves are
unable to supply while reducing the risk.
The role of agriculture in rural development
24. DFID itself does not have a "strategy"
for agriculture, because—DFID argues—"it is too
diverse a subject", in relation to which developing countries
must themselves take the lead. Instead, DFID has recently published
an "issues" paper which discusses the role of agriculture
in improving the livelihoods of poor people. We fail to see why
agriculture is any different in this regard from other sectors
such as education, and urge donors such as DFID to encourage their
partner governments in southern Africa to take agriculture seriously,
and to provide the necessary financial and technical support.
Donors should not be active in all sectors—they should work
to their comparative advantages—but given its considerable
policy influence in the region, we believe that DFID has a responsibility
to ensure that agriculture is not neglected by governments in
southern Africa. (Paragraph 106)
DFID agrees that it is important that Governments
give due attention to agriculture. Our approach to raising the
overall profile of agriculture in PRSPs is set out in our response
to Recommendation 62 below. DFID does not support the development
of a DFID-specific agriculture strategy for Africa. Agriculture
is defined and managed to national priorities which are quite
different in neighbouring countries, who have very different contexts,
potential and objectives. DFID's policy is to support these national
priorities within the framework of Poverty Reduction Strategies
rather than to earmark finances and develop donor strategies for
specific sectors. Consistent with this, DFID bilateral assistance
for education, health and agriculture in Africa is all programmed
and discussed at the national level. Contrary to the implication
of the Committee's Recommendation, that there are no overarching
DFID strategies for education and health linked to bilateral priorities
or expenditure in Africa.
25. We disagree with DFID that meeting the
needs of the rural poor does not necessarily mean focussing on
their agricultural capacity. We believe there is a risk that agriculture—which
is the key component of rural livelihoods for millions of people
in southern Africa, and the basis for growth and development—will
continue to be neglected. (Paragraph 108)
DFID agrees that agriculture is a key component of
rural livelihoods in Africa and central to poverty reduction efforts
but does not believe that meeting the needs of the rural poor
can be achieved by focusing exclusively on their agricultural
capacity. This approach is the basis of the DFID "Sustainable
Livelihoods Approach" which looks holistically at the assets,
opportunities, institutions and processes by which poor people
make living. This approach shows that the ability of poor people
to strengthen their livelihoods through agriculture is dependent
on more than just improved agricultural techniques. This does
not mean neglecting agriculture but, as DFID's Agriculture paper
argues, donors can sometimes be more effective by tackling a range
of legal, institutional and customary obstacles than by focusing
on agricultural techniques. A good example is the poorest group
in Africa — poor rural women. Women's rights to land tenure,
their inability to raise credit in some areas, their time lost
through disease, care provision or other burdens, such as water
collection, are commonly greater constraints to their agricultural
development than agricultural technology or extension services.
26. If poverty reduction and food security
is to be achieved in southern Africa, agricultural investment
must not be neglected. Rather than despairing at the hitherto
poor performance of agriculture, donors must help to put in place
the institutional environment which is needed to support agricultural
investment and make it deliver significant poverty-reducing returns.
Donors should support the re-building of agricultural extension
services which were undermined as donor support to agriculture
decreased. (Paragraph 109)
We partly agree. Effective agricultural investment
will be crucial to poverty reduction efforts and donors have a
role in supporting efforts to increase such investment. However,
the responsibility for developing an institutional environment
supportive of such agricultural investment lies with national
governments. DFID believes that each country should decide on
its priorities to do this. The role of donors is twofold. Firstly,
to help countries define priorities as part of Poverty Reduction
Strategy Processes and, secondly, to provide support to respond
to those priorities. In the case of agriculture, this wider approach
is needed as, in many cases, the institutional barriers are not
directly related to agriculture or food security. They include
such issues as weak macro economic management, financial services
and transport infrastructure. Donor supported national plans may
well include rebuilding extension services. However, rebuilding
government extension services will not always be appropriate or
practical and should not be promoted as a universal solution.
DFID's approach is therefore to support countries in making their
own informed decisions and not to promote such specific solutions.
27. The development of a cash-crop economy
and export businesses can play an important role, not least in
transferring technology to developing countries, but for widespread
poverty reduction and livelihood enhancement the focus must be
on small and medium scale agricultural producers. (Paragraph 110)
We agree. DFID believes that a sound development
strategy can include developing both competitive large scale agribusiness
as well as broad support for small and medium scale producers.
Safety nets and social protection
28. We applaud DFID for its role in supporting
the design of Malawi's National Safety Nets Strategy. We urge
DFID to do its utmost to ensure that the strategy is put into
practice, that the different elements of the strategy are integrated,
and that, where appropriate, safety nets strategies are developed
throughout the region. (Paragraph 111)
DFID continues to play a leading role in the roll-out
of the Malawi National Safety Nets Strategy. Technical assistance,
training and equipment is strengthening relevant central and local
Government departments and improving coordination between them
and donor and NGO partners. Although the suspension of Direct
Budget Support has placed some constraints on funding through
the Government budget, donors, including DFID, are continuing
to support individual programmes that fall within the Safety Net
Strategy. Agricultural input support, public works employment
and humanitarian feeding are the most significant components.
Direct welfare transfers to the most vulnerable are becoming more
important as HIV/AIDS impacts on households increase and work
is expanding on the issues of targeting and appropriate types
of such benefits.
29. We endorse the recommendations made by
UN-OCHA, which as well as encouraging support for food-for-work
and food-for-asset-creation programmes—include increasing
support to school feeding programmes to reduce withdrawals of
children and promote enrolment and attendance. (Paragraph 112)
We agree. DFID's supplementary feeding programmes
at schools in Zimbabwe have been instrumental in ensuring that
children remain at school. While this type of intervention has
immense benefits during crises it can only be institutionalised
as part of a wider PRSP or social protection programme targeted
to vulnerable localities and groups. Where there is clear evidence
of very acute malnutrition then UN-led interventions would be
encouraged. In Malawi significant programmes have already started
through NGOs and the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF), covering
both food for work and food for assets, including agricultural
inputs. These supplement existing cash for work programmes. School
feeding programmes are also underway, but studies already show
that these must be supported by improvements in teaching standards
and school facilities if significant effects on attendance and
performance are to be achieved. This may also provide an entry
point for support to AIDS orphans.
30. We consider that a general maize subsidy
is likely to strike the wrong balance between short-term relief
and longer-term development. [ . . .] In addition, given the likelihood
of corruption in the sale of the Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR),
and the possibility that a general maize subsidy might be diverted
to buy votes at forthcoming elections or leaked through resale
to neighbouring countries where prices are higher, we are not
confident that a general maize subsidy is the most effective way
of combating poverty and improving food security. It is essential
that efforts to meet the short-term needs of communities do not
undermine longer-term development. [. . .] Targeting assistance
to the most needy is the most effective way of spending scarce
resources, and is likely to minimise the risk of profiteering
by elites. We remain concerned at the likely impacts of the general
maize subsidy in Malawi, and share DFID's frustration at the World
Bank's lack of consultation during the design of the scheme. (Paragraph
114)
We agree. DFID and other bilateral donors have expressed
concern, at both country and headquarter level, over the failure
of the World Bank and the IMF to take full account of donor views
and of on-going technical work on targeting of subsidies and mechanisms
for their implementation. The general subsidy has led to sale
of less than 20% of the Government's commercial imports suggesting
little positive impact on maize accessibility for the poor, The
poor sales will have potentially serious impacts on the national
budget due to lack of cost recovery. The remaining high level
of stocks may also affect the maize market in the forthcoming
harvest period.
31. We are not a committee of inquiry into
the complexities of the sale of Malawi's Strategic Grain Reserve,
but such episodes do cast light on issues of governance and accountability.
Greedy and corrupt officials in positions of responsibility must
not be allowed to profit from the sale of a country's grain reserve.
As such, we trust-—although the removal of Gilton Chiwaula
from the Anti-Corruption Bureau does not fill us with confidence—that
the continuing inquiries will uncover what happened in Malawi,
and that appropriate actions will be taken. (Paragraph 115)
We agree. Results from the independent audit of the
1999-2002 grain sales should be available by early May 2003. These
will supplement the efforts being made, with technical support,
to develop more transparent systems for management of the Strategic
Grain Reserve. The recent tendering of 50,000 tonnes offered to
private sector traders was a model of transparency and provides
hope that real progress can be made in Malawi.
32. Properly managed grain reserves, coupled
with the holding of options to purchase grain on commodity markets,
must be part of future food security strategies in the region.
Further—whilst it is important that the maintenance of grain
reserves does not take too large a slice out of scarce governmental
resources—we do not think it realistic to expect strategic
grain reserves to operate on a full cost-recovery basis. (Paragraph
116)
State-operated grain and food reserves are subject
to political bias and are used more often to manipulate markets
than to ease shortfalls in supply. Where grain reserves are operating
the ideal would be systems that are as cost effective as possible.
However, it is recognised by those involved that full cost recovery
is not likely and that some social costs to governments and donors
will have to be accepted.
In 2002, the considerable grain reserves in private
sector silos in South Africa acted as a regional reserve and were
the prime source of most commercial purchases within the region.
For countries in the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) these
stocks provide a reserve at no cost to the governments. Sales
from these private-sector reserves were transparent, market driven
and imposed no financial burden on the state, unlike most parastatal
grain reserves. As demand increased the private sector placed
orders for yellow maize outside the region. The wider use of options
and forward contracting on regional and national commodity trading
exchanges will reduce the risk of regional shortages. However
there is a desire amongst governments to control the grain trade
rather than leave the function to the private sector. The grain
trade is politically sensitive and is regarded by countries as
a special case with private sector trading treated with suspicion.
The expansion of food security related trade requires an enabling
policy environment across trading partners. As the primary regional
grain producer, South Africa has an interest in encouraging policy
change. This is a high priority for SADC and the need for progress
was again emphasised at a regional conference in Botswana in March
2003.
33. Public works programmes must be designed
carefully. [ ...] In many ways, local people, including intended
participants and beneficiaries, may well be in the best position
to advise on the most effective form of payment and should be
involved fully in the design and implementation of such schemes.
Public works programmes must take account of local situations
and gender relations, and other measures must be taken to support
those who cannot work. For instance, labour intensive public works
programmes are entirely inappropriate for people living with HIV/AIDS,
the infirm, and women with child-care responsibilities. But we
believe that public works programmes provide an excellent way
of linking short-term relief to longer-term development and urge
DFID to support such schemes wherever communities in southern
Africa have spare labour. (Paragraph 119)
We agree. In Malawi the experience from both NGOs
and MASAF is contributing to development of programmes which combine
the benefits of infrastructure improvement and increased earning
power to provide both individual household earnings and local
enterprise development. In Zambia, WFP and donor collaboration
resulted in almost 500 000 people using some form of Conservation
Farming on their own land. Where food was available it was provided
to NGOs who used it as payment for work done but, more commonly,
seeds and fertiliser were provided to those who had prepared part
of their land using a range of conservation farming techniques.
The impact this had on yields this year is being assessed but
if successful such programmes, which directly benefit farming-families,
will play a key role in any future food and cash for work programmes.
Clearly those without access or unable to utilise land will not
benefit from such schemes. They require a different approach within
a wider social protection programme. In Lesotho, the EU are funding
a cash for work road scheme. However, such schemes do take time
to design and require intensive supervision.
34. Targeted Inputs Programmes can play an
important role in achieving food security. To do so they must
be part of a longer-term rural development strategy which, over
time and where possible, reduces dependence on free inputs, making
inputs more affordable and accessible by raising rural incomes
and promoting rural development. We urge DFID to continue its
support for Malawi's Targeted Inputs Programme, and to work with
other Governments to examine whether such schemes—with carefully
planned exit strategies—might enhance their food security
and longer-term development prospects. (Paragraph 122)
We agree. Comprehensive evaluation of the five years
experience of input programmes in Malawi is feeding into the discussion
of the future of such programmes, whether in Malawi or elsewhere.
They have provided a cost-effective "kick-start" to
agricultural recovery and intensification. However, they form
only one of the range of interventions necessary for an integrated
approach to rural poverty alleviation and food security. Their
role is being incorporated into the forth-coming National Food
Security.
35. Donors and governments in southern Africa
urgently need to find ways of making yield-enhancing inputs (fertiliser
and seeds) accessible to smallholder farmers at affordable prices.
The free distribution of inputs, whether universal or targeted,
in Malawi or elsewhere, is a useful interim measure but does not
provide an appropriate model for a sustainable long-term solution
to food insecurity. An alternative proposal made to us by Stephen
Carr, to amend the existing rural public works programmes so that
participants are paid with vouchers for agricultural inputs, rather
than in food or cash as at present, should be seriously considered.
(Paragraph 123)
We agree. In Malawi, DFID and other donors are considering
with Government, MASAF and NGOs how the local experience of "inputs
for work" can feed into the evolution of existing input programmes.
Key to these discussions is the implication of scaling up such
a programme toward national coverage in the 32,000 villages in
Malawi. This will require realistic assessments of availability
of appropriate public works activities and of the institutional
capacity for the management of both the public works and the voucher
systems.
36. Short-term assistance and focused safety
nets must contribute towards longer term goals of improving governance,
reducing dependency, nurturing functioning and equitable markets,
developing infrastructure, and increasing agricultural productivity.
Finally, effective social protection strategies, whilst addressing
short-term needs, must—by including plans for the phasing
out of certain forms of assistance such as free inputs programmes
where possible—look to a future where such measures are
employed less frequently and less widely. (Paragraph 124)
Agree. The development of the National Safety Net
Strategy in Malawi may provide a useful experience. This was developed
through wide consultation with stakeholders and recognises a need
for a range of interventions for different categories of beneficiaries.
As one of four pillars, it is firmly embedded within the Poverty
Reduction Strategy, which ensures it priority for allocation of
both donor and Government resources. DFID is leading in efforts
to provide an effective institutional framework for implementation
and for its evolution to respond to changes in local social and
economic conditions.
Opportunity ladders
37. We believe that the open-pollinated varieties
(OPVs) which require few inputs, and which farmers can store and
re-use, are more appropriate for poor smallholder farmers than
hybrid and genetically-engineered varieties which require annual
repurchase and could tie poor farmers into costly relationships
with powerful transnational seed companies. (Paragraph 127)
We agree. The recent FANRPAN meeting in Botswana
recognised the need to ensure removal of technical and regulatory
constraints to the use of OPV seeds across the SADC region. Recommendations
from the meeting will be laid before the Council of Ministers.
DFID is providing technical and financial support to Malawi to
help multiplication of such seeds, working with the Ministry of
Agriculture, seed companies, NGOs and farmers, both commercial
and smallholders.
Most farmers use their own retained seed. In several
countries only hybrid maize can be sold commercially. In Zimbabwe,
OPVs can be grown but can only be sold outside the country. These
regulations effectively bar small-scale growers from selling clean
tested but locally produced maize as seed, unless it has passed
rigorous quality and purity tests The regional meeting in Gaborone
recognised the need to ensure removal of technical and regulatory
constraints to the use of OPV seeds across the SADC region. Recommendations
from the meeting will be laid before the Council of Ministers.
However several countries are likely to resist the move, influenced
by local scientific opinion backed by the seed industry lobby,
which sees the introduction of OPV as a retrograde step. DFID
however, is providing technical and financial support to Malawi
to help multiplication of such seeds, working with the Ministry
of Agriculture, seed companies, NGOs and farmers, both commercial
and smallholders. Elsewhere in the region DFID is willing to support
the production of drought-resistant seeds such as sorghum and
cowpeas as there is a shortage in the region at a time of increased
interest amongst farmers.
38. We would like DFID to explain its plans
for making affordable fertiliser available to smallholders in
southern Africa, in both the short and longer-term. (Paragraph
128)
DFID has no immediate regional plan to make affordable
fertiliser available to farmers in southern Africa. The scale
of need is beyond the ability of a single donor. DFID will however
support efforts to expand cash crop production where appropriate,
and adding local value, which can provide income for farmers to
purchase inputs, including fertiliser. Research and pilot programmes
have indicated that farmers will purchase fertiliser for food
crops where it is packaged in small quantities. DFID will work
with the private sector, governments and the NGOs in attempts
to ensure that packaging is more appropriate for the small producer.
DFID will also work to encourage price reductions through competition
in supply. We will also continue our efforts to reduce distortions
from production subsidies in Europe and North America. We will
also continue assistance to reduce transport costs through road,
rail and port improvements, eg the support given by DFID Malawi
to the improvement of the Nacala trade route.
39. Climatic uncertainty, drought or erratic
rainfall, is an increasingly important source of vulnerability
in southern Africa, and one which should be addressed by developments
in irrigation. Just as price-smoothing in maize markets can reduce
one form of vulnerability, making maize prices less erratic, more
predictable and more affordable, so too can irrigation and "rainfall-smoothing"
or "rainwater-harvesting" reduce vulnerability. (Paragraph
129)
We agree. Irrigation is being promoted throughout
the region and several countries, including Malawi, have already
developed national strategies. Successful expansion of irrigation
will depend on adoption of a commercial approach to ensure the
costs of water supply are recovered and therefore the supply is
sustained. Unfortunately, large-scale schemes have too often been
government controlled, heavily subsidised and dependent upon expensive
pumping systems to supply water. Farmers were expected to grow
uneconomic crops such as maize as a contribution towards national
self-sufficiency rather than utilising scarce water resources
to diversify into high value crops. Many of these schemes have
fallen into disrepair as governments have reduced spending and
farmers can no longer afford to maintain the system. Small farmer-managed
schemes have been more successful and in Zimbabwe supported by
a number of donors including DFID. Micro-irrigation systems suitable
for small plots using treadle pumps have proven popular in east
and central Africa and are being promoted by the private sector
and NGOs across the region. Selection of appropriate cash crops
and focus on marketing systems has been shown to be at least as
important as the choice of technology.
40. Historical imbalances in land ownership
do need to be corrected, but land reform programmes must be planned
and implemented carefully, legally, with adequate consultation,
and as part of poverty reduction strategies. We strongly endorse
DFID's support for a regional technical facility to take forward
land policy issues at a regional level within SADC. (Paragraph
130)
We agree the case for land reform in Zimbabwe is
overwhelming, and it is regrettable that there has not been greater
progress since independence. The problems in Zimbabwe clearly
indicate that orderly reform of land ownership depends on sound
policies, founded on consultation with stakeholders, supported
by political will to ensure the provisions of policy are applied
equitably and with recognition of impact on the local economy.
Although Malawi has developed a new Land Policy which has been
widely recognised as fair and forward-looking, successful implementation
with donor support will require strong political commitment to
the provision of the policy.
41. We agree with Christian Aid, that support
should be provided to enable commercial and government credit
institutions to provide rural credit, and urge DFID to increase
the support it offers to this sector in southern Africa. There
is a role too for farmers' associations such as National Smallholder
Farmers' Association of Malawi (NASFAM) in improving smallholders'
access to agricultural inputs and credit, provided they have the
ability to reach and serve the very poorest farmers. (Paragraph
131)
Wide experience indicates successful, sustainable
smallholder credit schemes depend on production and marketing
of cash crops within a sound economic and political environment.
There have been more failures in rural credit schemes than successes
as drought or crop failures lead to non-payment and a build up
in arrears. In addition, high interest rates combined with default
have seriously undermined programmes in several countries in the
region. Donors are considering expansion of support to farmer
associations, which combine savings with credit, and which also
organise farmers for input supply and marketing of production.
The growth of NASFAM in Malawi, to serve over 100,000 small-holders
offers a promising model.
42. We support strongly Clare Short's efforts
to reform the FAO, and in particular its approach to food security,
but encourage the FAO's critics to be realistic in their expectations
of what the FAO can do within its resource constraints. They should
not undermine the important work which the FAO does in promoting
and developing international standards, and in providing agricultural
advice for hard-pressed developing countries. Nevertheless, if
the FAO is not—in the absence of sufficient governmental
capacity—the right organisation to be involved in agricultural
extension, improving agricultural productivity and encouraging
diversification, we wonder which organisation is. (Paragraph 133)
No single organisation can provide effective agricultural
support services. These require co-operation between a range of
civil society, private sector, NGO and Government bodies. Precise
arrangements will vary between countries and should be developed
locally, within the framework of a PRSP where possible. DFID's
position is not to seek to undermine FAO's role but rather to
persuade it to focus on its comparative advantage and remit. This
lies in policy advice, standards and statistics not in the co-ordination
and implementation of agricultural services. FAO can play an important
role in improving information systems, based on its high level
of both in-house and call-down expertise. This can support policy
development, promotion of existing technologies, identification
of new problems and strengthening of early warning and monitoring
systems.
43. Price stability and food security—enabling
better management of the risks associated with crises—is
fundamental to efforts to develop a sustainable market economy.
Food—insecure households are risk-averse households; risk-averse
households do not make the investments needed to move beyond subsistence.
John Winter of DFID said: "We would, of course, like to see
an open market in maize within the region." If the appropriate
institutions were in place to ensure that sufficient maize was
provided at prices which the poor could afford, we would agree.
Currently, they are not. Without advocating any particular form
of intervention, we believe that the principle of guaranteeing
access to affordable food for the poor at all times is one that
should be re-instituted and followed. (Paragraph 136)
We agree. Mr Winter was advocating transparency rather
than the abolition of subsidies (and the response to Recommendation
44 confirms DFID's view that targeted subsidies are often justified).
The risk that large scale subsidies pose are covered in the answer
to Recommendation 30.
44. The potential of using targeted food subsidies
as an alternative to the unsustainable and inefficient consumer
price subsidies of the past should be explored. DFID has recent
experience with a pilot scheme of targeted "flexi-vouchers"
in Malawi. Perhaps the lessons learned from this initiative could
be expanded and incorporated into larger safety net programmes
at the national or even regional level. (Paragraph 137)
We agree and will disseminate lessons as they emerge.
45. DFID should support southern African governments
and SADC in their efforts to encourage the emergence of new and
more effective "hybrid institutions", which involve
the state and the private sector in the regulation of staple food
markets. It is not clear what sorts of systems might be able to
deliver both price stability at appropriate levels, and the coordination
and protection needed to nurture fragile market development. But
it may be worth exploring the idea of private companies tendering
for franchises to deliver specific services—including food
supplies—at predetermined, and if necessary supported, prices.
(Paragraph 138)
We agree, although how such systems will evolve will
be country specific and will be adopted at different rates by
countries in the region. Many governments view the private sector
with suspicion and hostility and much needs to be done to overcome
this before a true private sector/state partnership can develop.
46. We believe that some diversification into
production of cash crops for export is desirable and were pleased
to hear in Malawi of DFID's support for efforts to develop export
capacity and know-how through the Integrated Framework. There
are however important limitations and obstacles. Cash crop production
is not a panacea, particularly for land-locked countries such
as Malawi. In addition, a shift to cash crops will not in itself
guarantee food security—the fundamental basis for development
beyond subsistence levels—for rural communities. (Paragraph
139)
Cash crops could provide an additional source of
economic growth for Malawi, though its difficult transport links
will limit this. We agree that cash crops alone will not, though,
deliver food security in the foreseeable future.
47. The major obstacle to export-led growth
is of course that of limited market access and the highly hypocritical
maintenance of export subsidy regimes in the EU and US. perhaps
the best thing that developed countries could do to improve the
prospects of developing countries such as those in southern Africa
would be to practice what they preach, improving market access
and eliminating export subsidies, at the same time as helping
to build developing countries' export capacity. We urge DFID and
the UK Government as a whole to step up its efforts to persuade
our European partners that fundamental reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy must to be a priority. In addition, consideration should
be given to the role of a "development box" in allowing
developing countries to maintain subsidies for essential food
security reasons. (Paragraph 140)
We agree but note that several of the countries affected
by the crisis have, in theory, already been granted duty and quota
free access to EU markets for all exports under the EU Everything
but Arms or "EBA" initiative. DFID supports the removal
of EU domestic subsidy, improvement of EBA (e.g. through better
rules of origin and harmonisation of EBA with other trade agreements)
and removal of non tariff barriers such as inappropriately high
EU import standards.
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