4. Memorandum submitted by CARE International
THE HUMANITARIAN SITUATION IN IRAQ IN THE
AFTERMATH OF WAR
SUMMARY
The key issue facing Iraq in general, and Baghdad
in particular, is the establishment of law and order. There is
at the moment no widespread acute humanitarian crisis in southern
and central Iraq. However, all the makings of such a crisis are
in place and unless urgent action is taken we will see serious
hunger, widespread disease and a further breakdown of Iraqi society
in the coming weeks.
The United Nations must take the lead in the
international effort to support the rehabilitation of Iraq. If
the US and UK do not allow this to happen, they will fail to unite
the Iraqi people in the nation-building challenge that faces them.
EFFECTS ON
CARE'S OPERATIONS
1. CARE International is operating in and
around Baghdad. The climate of insecurity affects all walks of
life. Ordinary people cannot go about their daily business for
fear of being attacked or caught in cross-fire, and will not leave
their homes unattended in case of looters. Most shops are not
opening so as not to become targets of crime.
2. The security situation is such that our
activities are sporadic—in some locations we are able to
undertake rehabilitation of infrastructure and delivery of relief
supplies, in others we will not risk the safety of our staff or
supplies. In a situation where the easy pickings for looters are
nearing exhaustion, agencies such as ours are becoming the next
targets.
3. CARE itself cannot operate effectively
as our vehicles and warehouses are under constant threat from
armed gangs—we have already had two vehicles stolen at gunpoint
and a warehouse guard shot in the leg. As a stop-gap measure it
is possible to decrease the profile of our work by visiting project
sights by taxi, but this in turn exposes project staff to insecurity
near sensitive coalition military sites. Criminals can move freely
around Baghdad but humanitarian workers cannot.
NO CRISIS
. . . YET
4. In short, CARE—in common with other
agencies engaged with the reconstruction effort—remains
under tight security constraints and cannot operate at anywhere
near its capacity for lack of mobility, telecommunications or
coordination.
5. Food supplies in Baghdad are not yet
at a critical stage. This appears to be due to significant stockpiling
that occurred prior to the war, which is now somehow making its
way onto the market. There is also fresh food coming in to the
city, but prices are escalating. The situation outside Baghdad,
where there were fewer opportunities for stockpiling, is likely
to be worse.
6. While water is available—albeit
erratically—in most parts of Baghdad and elsewhere, the
state of the sanitation system is more worrying. Iraq's water
and sanitation sector is highly centralised. Water authorities
in the governorates are responsible for everyday operation and
maintenance, but all other functions—technical support,
staffing, salaries, supply of spare parts and equipment—were
carried out from Baghdad.
7. In anticipation of the war, the Iraqi
water authorities provided every governorate with enough fuel,
chlorine and spare parts to maintain its water infrastructure
for three months. No more than one month's worth of supplies remain,
and staff have not been paid for two months. Outbreaks of cholera
have been already reported in some southern towns and, with the
onset of summer and soaring temperatures, the risks increase.
8. The health system is already under severe
strain and will be simply unable to cope with any epidemic resulting
from the breakdown of the sanitation system. Hospitals need protection
from looters, restoration of equipment and supplies, and administrative
systems for running the facilities, paying wages and managing
caseloads.
9. Because of the insecurity we have not
been able to do a detailed vulnerability analysis, but prima
facie it is clear that some sectors of the population will
start feeling acute food shortages by June. These will be the
poorer households that were unable to stockpile as many supplies
before the war, and who have no resources to access the supplies
that are now on the market.
10. The fact that the food pipeline has
not been re-established to date is cause for alarm. There have
been some highly publicised deliveries of food, as well as of
medical supplies and fuel, by WFP, CARE and other agencies, but
at nothing approaching the scale that will be necessary when domestic
food stocks run out.
11. Again, lack of information and coordinated
planning is acutely felt. The fact that there is no clarity about
the prospects of the restoration of food supplies leaves the international
community open to accusations of either conspiracy (they know
what is happening but they're not telling us) or incompetence
(they don't know how to fix what they have broken). Either way,
any goodwill that the coalition may have earned in their status
as "liberators" will wear thin if the everyday problems
of existence—insecurity, food shortages, and lack of clean
water—are not solved soon.
12. One looming issue for the restoration
of food imports is that all members of the Iraqi population have
in the past been entitled to a heavily subsidised food ration.
This is clearly unsustainable and an arrangement that will need
to be phased out, but this cannot happen overnight. If in future
food is going to be targeted to certain groups, based on vulnerability
or other criteria following a comprehensive needs assessment,
there is likely to be a grave backlash in the short term from
people who believe their entitlement has been suddenly taken away.
This can only be avoided if a food supply pipeline of the scale
previously in place can be established hand-in-hand with a comprehensive
programme to re-establish domestic Iraqi food production.
WHO'S
IN CHARGE
HERE?
13. The Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian
Assistance (ORHA) has taken upon itself the mantle of coordinating
the international response. This body has no clear mandate for
its operation and is staffed by a confusing mixture of military
and civilian appointments. Housed in one of Saddam's former palaces,
it is operating as if in a bunker, impenetrable to outside contact
and with no avenues for dialogue with NGOs and civil society actors.
While we have had sight of an organisational chart for staff of
ORHA, our staff in Baghdad have found it impossible to make contact
with any of them.
14. We have been able to get some access
to ORHA through the AusAid representative and are hoping to be
able to use the good offices of DFID to be able to improve contacts.
DFID has made funds available for the humanitarian effort but
the ability to spend those funds effectively is under question
if there are no adequate coordination mechanisms in place and
insecurity remains rife.
15. It is not clear whether this lack of
transparency from ORHA is by design or a by-product of the climate
of insecurity. It may be that the intention is to create a forum
for liaison but the capacity to do so is not yet in place. Yet
time is not on our side and with every passing day the task ahead
becomes greater.
16. In the absence of any coordination with
ORHA the only contact that NGOs have with the occupying coalition
is through the Humanitarian Assistance Centre meetings (HAC),
which are principally a platform for the military force to share
their security concerns. HAC, however, has no operational systems
in place for practical coordination—such as, for example,
how they can be contacted from outside the military telephone
system. It is also apparent that HAC has failed to understand
the fine line that NGOs have to tread between being able to report
incidents of insecurity on the one hand and not acting as the
eyes and ears of the military on the other.
17. The lack of a strong United Nations
presence in post-war Iraq is becoming acutely felt. Military forces
have skills and aptitudes in certain areas. In Iraq they have
demonstrated that these include neither humanitarian assistance
nor civil administration. Their inability to maintain law and
order, which is clearly part of their core competence, is a sign
that they are stretched beyond their capacity. An entirely different
approach, based on a UN-led civilian administration, is needed
for the reconstruction of Iraq and the return of sovereignty to
its people.
18. Two types of organisation have been
quick to fill the vacuum in governance left by the fall of the
Saddam regime. The first is organised crime. Much of the looting
now under way is organised and appears to be tied into some form
of racketeering. Vehicle theft is almost certainly part of this,
as there are reports that many of the stolen vehicles from Baghdad
make their way north and then into Iran.
19. We have also heard rumours, which we
are unable to substantiate but which we feel bound to report,
of criminal activity of a more sinister kind. Numerous cases of
women and children being abducted has fuelled the fear that an
organised network in human trafficking is emerging. This would
have a devastating effect on a society where moral values are
strong and where there is a recent history of rigid social discipline.
20. A second type of organisation that has
come to the fore in recent weeks is the political groups which
are beginning to annex public infrastructure. A recent informal
survey revealed that political and/or religious groups are running
approximately half the public health clinics in Baghdad, many
of these with armed guards. While there is nothing inherently
wrong with community action to deliver public services, this may
turn out to be the starting point for building political or sectarian
power bases that will frustrate future nation-building. It does
not require a leap of imagination to see this process extending
to schools and/or food ration distribution points in the foreseeable
future.
21. In the early days of the occupation,
coalition forces appeared to condone reprisals against property
held by the old regime. This has unleashed a tide of pillaging
that is depriving Iraq of both the private and public assets it
will need to rebuild itself. Concerted international action now
can reverse the descent into anarchy.
22. This concerted effort needs to start
with restoring security, which in turn will allow immediate attention
to be given to:
— repair of physical infrastructure
such as electricity, water and sewerage;
— resourcing of hospitals and clinics;
and
— remuneration of essential public
sector staff such as health workers, teachers and administrators.
It should be recalled that the majority of Iraqi workers receive
no salary now that the Iraqi government, the biggest employer,
is no longer functioning.
THE VITAL
ROLE OF
THE UNITED
NATIONS
23. Issues around the legality or otherwise
of the occupation of Iraq are at this stage academic. The US,
with the UK as its close ally, is de facto the occupying power.
This carries with it the responsibility to restore order, guarantee
public services and set in motion a process for Iraqis to assume
control of their country. This responsibility, however, does not
extend to a right to rule the country and dictate the use of its
resources, as appears to be the tone of the United Nations Security
Council Resolution (UNSCR) draft resolution currently under debate.
24. As Iraq disintegrates into an increasing
number of factional groupings (at last count there were 70 political
parties in Baghdad) it is important to maximise the opportunities
for national unity. Many of these emerging groupings are philosophically
opposed to rule by the occupying coalition. Notwithstanding the
strong legal and philosophical arguments in favour of putting
the United Nations to the fore in the reconstruction of Iraq,
there is the practical observation that the occupying powers are
unlikely to be able to command the trust and confidence of the
Iraqi people.
25. It is a curious product of the events
of recent months that it is now up to the proponents of a strong
UN role to make their case, rather than the other way round. The
onus should be on those that would have it otherwise to make an
argument for the UN not to take the lead.
26. CARE's experience on the ground in Iraq,
as well as in other post-conflict situations, makes it clear to
us that only the United Nations has the capacity, credibility
and mandate to tackle the complex task ahead. They need to be
allowed to do so.
27. The original draft of UNSCR 1483 was
inadequate in the light of current circumstances. It proposed
too weak a role for the UN, taking refuge in equivocal terms like
"a vital role" when it is clearly intended for the power
to reside with the US/UK coalition (ambiguously referred to as
"the authority"). It failed to recognise the responsibility
of that coalition to ensure the safety and security of the Iraqi
people. And by proposing coalition control of Iraq's oil revenues
it played into the hands of those who would accuse the international
community of being more interested in the spoils of war than in
the welfare of Iraqi people.
28. CARE International and other NGO partners
campaigned strongly for strengthening of the wording of UNSCR
1483. The UN must now embrace the opportunity provided by the
resolution to ensure that it has the resources and capacity to
maintain de facto control, hastening the restoration of security
and dignity to the people of Iraq.
22 May 2003
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