7. Supplementary memorandum submitted
by Christian Aid
1. Since Christian Aid submitted its Memorandum
to the Committee on 15 May, some developments have occurred which
alter the detail of our assessment of the situation in Iraq. These
developments and Christian Aid's response to them are explained
below. Christian Aid stresses that the points raised in our earlier
submission remain relevant. We would therefore ask the Committee
to consider both our original Memorandum and the following Addendum:
SECURITY
2. Christian Aid staff who have visited
Iraq over the past two weeks confirm that poor security remains
the overriding concern for the majority of Iraqis we have interviewed.
But Christian Aid acknowledges that crime levels in Baghdad have
improved since the increased deployment of US troops in the city
from the week beginning 19 May. It appears that US military personnel
are now starting to adopt methods used by British military personnel
that have proved relatively successful in Basra. These include
foot patrols, proactive face-to-face contact with civilians in
the streets, and attempts to engage with local committees and
traditional leaders.
3. On the other hand, there is little room
for complacency. Violent incidents involving arms and resulting
in loss of life are still occurring on a daily basis. Concern
remains about the security provided to key civilian installations.
The World Food Programme reports that they now have pipelines
and transport ready to deliver fresh supplies of foodstuffs to
warehouses across Iraq in preparation for the WFP's reactivation
of the Oil for Food Programme in June. But food distribution could
be delayed because of WFP's continued dissatisfaction with the
level of security provided by the US/UK Forces to food warehouses.
4. The decision taken by the US Office for
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) on 24 May to dismantle
the Iraqi army and dismiss 500,000 soldiers is particular cause
for concern. There appear to be no rehabilitation/reintegration
or employment programmes for these soldiers, the absence of which
could quickly create frustration and disaffection.
5. Moreover, it appears that no effort was
made to disarm these soldiers of their rifles before they were
dismissed. Indeed, in spite of the earlier announcement of an
arms amnesty, ORHA recently ruled that Iraqis (including ex-soldiers)
are now expressly permitted to keep rifles, including powerful,
automatic AK47 assault rifles of which there are plenty amongst
the Iraqi civilian population.
6. In Christian Aid's view, the Iraqi army
must be reconstituted, reformed and retrained with the utmost
speed. The possible consequences of not doing so are vast, given
the proliferation of arms in the population at large. There is
also an urgent need for an integrated Demobilisation, Disarmament
and Reintegration (DDR) programme which would provide rehabilitation,
retraining and employment opportunities for those soldiers not
reinserted into a new army.
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
7. ORHA's decision announced in mid-May
to dismiss the top four layers of Ba'ath Party personnel in public
positions could also have a destabilising impact on Iraq's security.
It is already having a paralysing impact on the administration
of basic services. The removal of the top tiers of management
in a highly centralised state administrative structure and the
failure to replace these tiers with experienced personnel are
proving a major obstacle to the rehabilitation of Iraq's basic
services.
8. It is essential that the Occupying Powers
address the impact of their deba'athification strategy and resist
relying on international NGOs to get Iraq moving again. UN and
humanitarian agencies have played a key role in providing emergency
humanitarian relief in recent weeks and NGOs will play a major
role in the future in promoting devolved, community-based development/reconstruction.
But NGOs have neither the capacity nor the coverage to substitute
for the State in the provision and wholesale reconstruction of
Iraq's dilapidated electricity, water, sanitation, education,
and health services.
CHRISTIAN AID'S
RESPONSE TO
THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION
1483
9. Christian Aid welcomes the fact that
UNSC resolution 1483 on Iraq was finally passed on 22 May. This
will enable the UN to engage more effectively in rehabilitation
and reconstruction efforts, and will help reduce the authority
vacuum as well as the blockages in civil administration that have
plagued Iraq's recovery since Saddam was removed. Nevertheless,
Christian Aid questions whether on its own and without the necessary
action proposed above, the resolution will give the UN the "central
role" to which the Prime Minister had publicly committed
himself. We trust that the UNSC Resolution 1483 will at least
allow for effective cooperation between the US government's Office
for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Affairs (ORHA) and UN agencies—cooperation
which has been absent in past weeks. But this cooperation will
depend on ORHA's willingness to actively engage the UN Secretary
General's new Special Representative and UN agencies in its plans.
10. Christian Aid's specific concerns about
the UNSC resolution are as follows:
— It provides little concrete detail
with regard to the processs for the formation of an Iraqi interim
administration, prior to the longer term goal of establishing
a democratically elected government. For example, it contains
no timeframe for when such an interim administration will be created
and gives little indication as to how. It merely says that it
will be formed by the "people of Iraq with the help of the
Authority [Occupying Powers] and working with the [UN] Special
Representative." Christian Aid staff on the ground confirm
that in many towns, Iraqis have formed their own local committees
and are vesting legitimacy in local political leaders. These initiatives
could provide the basis for transferring interim political power
to Iraqis at local and national levels.
— It gives little explicit authority
to the United Nations in administering the reconstruction of post-war
Iraq. On the contrary, the leading role is given to the Occupying
Powers with the role of the UN limited primarily to that of coordinating
the humanitarian and reconstruction activities of UN agencies
and NGOs. The resolution states that the UN's Special Representative
will "work[ing] intensively with the Authority [occupying
powers] . . . to restore and establish national and local institutions
for representative governance" and that the UN Special Representative
will "work[s] with the people of Iraq" over the formation
of a transitional administration. But this is far from giving
the UN a central role in the political transition process.
— It passes control of the disbursement
of oil revenues from the UN to the Occupying Powers, reducing
the role of the UN to representation on the International Advisory
and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq (into which
oil revenues are to be paid). Christian Aid believes that giving
such pivotal decision-making powers to the Occupying Powers in
both controlling Iraq's oil revenues and in shaping the future
of the industry is likely to reinforce a widely held perception
in the Middle East that US/UK policies in Iraq are being informed
and crafted by their own interests in accessing Iraq's enormous
oil reserves. Christian Aid believes oil revenues should be managed
by the UN until a legitimate Iraqi authority is in place.
— There is no explicit recognition
of Iraqi representation on the International Advisory and Monitoring
Board. Moreover, the resolution obliges the Occupying Powers to
do no more than "consult" the Iraqi interim administration
on the allocation of oil revenues. In Christian Aid's view, the
Iraqi interim administration should have some decision-making
power in the use and allocation of oil revenues. It is also essential
that decisions about these revenues should be taken transparently—whoever
is responsible for managing Iraq's oil revenues—so that
the Iraqi population can be assured that oil revenues are being
used to benefit the Iraqi nation as a whole and can hold those
in control of oil revenues to account if revenues are not being
used for these purposes.
OIL FOR
FOOD PROGRAMME
11. Christian Aid welcomes the provision
in the 22 May UNSC resolution for the extension of the UN's Oil
for Food Programme for another six months (after which point all
funds in the UN-controlled escrow fund will be transferred to
the Development Fund created by the UN resolution). Unemployment
is high and most Iraqis, especially poorer people, remain dependent
for their sustenance on food rations and other essential items.
However, it is essential that ORHA and UN agencies make viable
plans for meeting the population's food needs after this six month
period, given that many Iraqis will still not have the means to
support themselves by that point. In the longer term, a future
comprehensive rehabilitation plan should include incentives to
expand the domestic production of basic foodstuffs to replace
the high level of dependence on external food aid.
RECOMMENDATIONS
— In the short term, there is an urgent
need for the Occupying Powers to fully address the ongoing problems
with security and law and order on which Iraq's rehabilitation
and reconstruction depends.
— An integrated demobilisation, disarmament,
and reintegration (DDR) programme must be drawn up and the Iraqi
army reconstituted and reformed to reduce the destabilising threat
posed by the recent wholesale dismantlement of the army.
— UN agencies and ORHA must draw up
plans for ensuring Iraqis' basic needs are met after the Oil for
Food Programme comes to an end in six months' time. In the longer
term, a strategy is needed to reduce Iraqis' dependency on external
food aid and stimulate local agricultural production.
— The tone (if not the substance) of
the UNSC resolution of 22 May implies that the UN will play a
more active and central role in Iraq's political transition and
reconstruction from now on. The UK government must do everything
in its powers to facilitate such a role for the UN. The UN not
only has extensive experience of transitional processes but is
also seen as a more neutral body by Iraqis than the Occupying
Powers.
— The US and UK governments must make
public their plans for the creation of an Iraqi Interim administration
made up of a broad spectrum of Iraqis who have legitimacy amongst
the Iraqi population.
— Once an Iraqi interim administration
is created, it should be given representation on the International
Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund into which
oil revenues are to be paid. Both the UN and the Iraqi interim
administration should have decision-making powers over the allocation
of oil revenues. Decisions over the use of oil revenues should
not be confined to the Occupying Powers.
2 June 2003
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