10. Memorandum submitted by HelpAge
International
HELPAGE INTERNATIONAL'S
WORK IN
IRAQ
HelpAge International is a global network of
not-for-profit organisations with a mission to work with and for
disadvantaged older people worldwide to achieve a lasting improvement
in the quality of their lives. HelpAge International has been
supporting vulnerable older people and their families in the Kurdish-administered
region of northern Iraq since June 1997, moving gradually from
a relief focus to a more developmental approach.
HelpAge International is the only organisation
in northern Iraq that works specifically with and for older people,
co-operating with both international and local non-governmental
organisations to research and consult on feasible and viable livelihood
activities for older people and their families.
Our research and experience over the last decade
shows that older people's needs, views and experience are frequently
ignored or marginalised in humanitarian emergencies and programmes
of reconstruction and rehabilitation. As older people are among
the poorest groups in most societies, they are also among the
most vulnerable. However, if supported, they can play an important
part in the recovery of their families and communities. Having
developed a programme working with older people in northern Iraq
prior to the recent war, we will make every effort to ensure that
older people are included among the vulnerable groups whose needs
now require urgent attention. We will urge that they be listened
to and their needs into account in the process of rehabilitation
that is now beginning in Iraq.
ADEQUACY OF
PLANNING AND
RESPONSE DURING
CONFLICT
— Prior to the war, planning for a
humanitarian response in the event of conflict was made difficult
by the political climate, which did not allow for open and clear
discussion of what response would be required. During the war,
this was compounded for most INGOs by lack of access to Iraq.
When the main military campaign came to an end, the humanitarian
needs were not on the scale or of the order predicted, but a very
difficult information and operational environment hampered a more
measured response based on assessments of need. Changing objectives
for both operational and donor agencies have further complicated
forward planning.
— During the conflict, there was a
marked lack of co-ordination between the agencies involved in
humanitarian response. The various players were geographically
separated: UNOCHA was based in Larnaca, Cyprus; INGOs were mainly
located in Amman, Jordan; and the Humanitarian Operations Center
(HOC), staffed mainly by the US and UK military personnel, was
in Kuwait with the coalition forces. Most INGOs did not register
with the HOC.
Some planning for a co-ordinated humanitarian
response did take place in Amman, involving some of the INGOs
and UN agencies but this was largely overtaken by events. Hence
no co-ordinated response from the UN and INGOs was immediately
possible. During the critical period after the military capture
of Baghdad and cities to the north, the absence of security also
slowed the INGOs' ability to get into the field and conduct the
necessary needs assessments.
While the coalition military forces were willing
to work with individual UN humanitarian agencies such as WFP and
WHO, no formal role was assigned to the overall UN structure until
UNSC Resolution 1483 was passed on 22 May. Therefore, during the
war and for more than a month thereafter, there was effectively
no co-ordination between the UN and the occupying military forces.
Furthermore, individual UN agencies were assigned lead roles in
tasks that were not within their usual mandates and for which
they were poorly equipped and had no obvious experience.
Initially emergency aid distribution mostly
fell to the military, which is not best equipped to distribute
humanitarian assistance. There is reason to question the appropriateness
of the way military forces initially distributed rations at random
from the back of trucks, which sends the wrong messages and is
very inefficient.
— In the areas that had been under
Kurdish administration, where HelpAge International has been working
for six years, there was very little fighting. The exceptions
were some initial shelling along the lines with Iraqi forces and
a US/Kurdish attack on the Ansar al-Islam group located near the
Iranian border, which damaged or destroyed homes in the Hawraman
area near Halabja. The difficulty of responding to immediate needs
in the Kurdish-controlled areas was rather due to the constant
population movements within the region, as people left the main
cities in anticipation of possible attacks.
HelpAge International withdrew its expatriate
staff several weeks before the war, but national staff continued
to work through the duration of the conflict, maintaining, where
possible, ongoing programmes (mainly in Dohuk governorate) and
responding to the needs of older people and their families who
were on the move.
THE POST-CONFLICT
RESPONSE
— The war itself did not, as many had
anticipated, trigger a humanitarian catastrophe with large-scale
population displacements and severe damage to the infrastructure.
Rather, the "melting away" of many key Iraqi military
units and of the Ba'athist leadership left a power vacuum.
Much of the additional damage to the already
decrepit infrastructure, especially water and sanitation and electricity
generation systems, resulted from the uncontrolled looting of
government and other property in many parts of the country, which
followed the collapse of the government. Health facilities were
also exposed to looting and attack. In most parts of the country,
a rising crime wave further encouraged people to acquire and carry
arms.
— The key characteristic of the current
situation is uncertainty—both for the Iraqi population and
for international organisations and INGOs attempting to plan work
for the future in Iraq.
There appears to have been a lack of forward
planning on the part of the Coalition forces to deal with the
possible collapse of government structures. Even after the Office
of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA—now
the Office of the Coalition Provisional Authority—OCPA)
was established in Baghdad, it was slow to put in place mechanisms
to ensure that basic services could function. At the same time,
the unchecked looting and insecurity further discouraged the restoration
of normal life. This raised concerns that, especially in Baghdad
and its environs, the occupying forces were not fulfilling their
obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention to ensure that
the civilian population has security and access to basic services.
The current lack of a central authority and
functioning ministries has made rational use of resources even
less easy, in a country that has lived for several decades under
a highly centralised form of administration.
— In the areas that were under Kurdish
control before the 2003 war, little has outwardly changed. But
the solutions to the longer-term issues of governance in the region
remain unclear, both in the three governorates of Dohuk, Arbil
and Sulaimaniyah which have been under Kurdish control since 1991,
and in the adjacent governorates of Kirkuk and Nineveh (which
includes the city of Mosul).
In Kirkuk and Mosul, uncertainty is compounded
by considerable ethnic tensions between Kurds, Turcomans and Arabs,
focused particularly on claims to property, resulting from the
previous government's policies of Arabization in these governorates.
Immediate economic problems are the result of
the climate of crisis that existed prior to the war and further
exacerbated by the interruption of ration deliveries, salary payments
and regular trade since mid-March. Prices have also risen substantially
in the Kurdish-administered areas mainly because the value of
the local currency, the so-called `Swiss' dinar, has fallen from
6 to 4 dinars = US$1.
— For the whole country, the short-term
needs are those frequently reiterated by aid agencies and by Iraqis
themselves: first, to create a climate of security in which Iraqis
can feel safe to move around and conduct their business and in
which systematic delivery of humanitarian assistance can take
place. Among the humanitarian needs, the key priorities are the
restoration of water, sanitation and electricity, along with restoration
of the health service to working order. The establishment of
security, restoration of employment and regular payment of salaries
are also required, along with the reinstatement of pensions and
other social payments, ensuring regular payment and access for
all those who are currently eligible.
The restoration of the Oil for Food (OFF) programme
for a final six months and the lifting of economic sanctions on
Iraq will hopefully improve the economic climate. But the rebuilding
and rehabilitation of the infrastructure and the economy, damaged
by many years under sanctions and by war, is a long-term task.
RECONSTRUCTION NEEDS
AND RESOURCES
— Reconstruction of the physical infrastructure
in Iraq is only one step that is required. Long-term planning
is of critical importance. Restoration of social services depends
upon the establishment of functioning ministries and the development
of a policy framework for the reform of the service sector including
a review of all aspects of healthcare and social provision. There
is a need for considered strategies that address the long-term
needs of the population within the broader framework of developing
democracy . In particular this should include support to local
structures both of government and civil society.
Iraq had relatively well-developed social provision
by the state, but this system has not only been undermined by
a decade of sanctions but in many respects its "top-down"
approach will not be appropriate in the new context.
— A new approach should reflect the
expressed needs of the Iraqi people and develop healthcare and
social services that are appropriate, affordable and accessible
to the population as a whole, including the most vulnerable groups.
This would require the involvement of communities, civil society
organisations (as and when they develop) and local authorities
as well as central government. It would also involve retraining
and upgrading of skills for staff who have been cut off from developments
in medical technology and information systems for more than a
decade.
Among these most vulnerable groups are older
people, many of whom have suffered severely during the years of
sanctions from the decline in service provision and shrinking
or non-existent welfare and pension payments. Those who have lost
their families through war, state repression or migration are
especially likely to be at risk. Under the previous government,
only a limited number of people (mainly men) received public sector
state pensions. The welfare benefit system for the most vulnerable
did not operate in the Kurdish controlled areas, and, like all
social payments, was seriously devalued during the last decade.
Health services are often not accessible and
affordable to the poorest members of society, including older
people and those with disabilities. An important element in rebuilding
the health services would be to review and update age care practice
and provision, and the appropriateness of service delivery to
older people.
From HelpAge International's experience of health
care and social services in the Kurdish-administered north in
the late 1990s, shortage of funds was a major problem, but so
was the lack of outreach services that would meet the needs of
those who cannot easily reach clinics or offices in urban centres.
To promote such outreach programmes, changes would be required
in the training of staff and the organisation of services, not
just larger budgets.
— Another aspect of reconstruction
is to rebuild livelihoods, moving away from current situation
where well over half the population has become dependent on food
rations. The first step is to restore the salaries of those working
in the state sector, and to create conditions for the revival
of existing business, trade and agriculture. In the longer run,
the shrinkage of the economy under sanctions needs to be reversed
in order to expand employment opportunities. During the last decade,
a large scale "black" economy developed, and it seems
likely that the breakdown of order since the fall of the government
has perpetuated this trend. Until a revival of legitimate economic
activity is achieved, the dangers of an economy with a large "black"
sector remain.
— There has been little clarity as
yet on the structures through which INGOs will be able to work.
In the short term, this will depend to a great extent on the relationship
between the Coalition Provisional Authority and the UN agencies,
since it does not appear that any independent Iraqi authority
will emerge in the coming months.
It seems that physical reconstruction and some
organisational restructuring will largely be funded through Iraqi
oil revenue channelled to private companies. Iraq has a skilled
and until recently, well-educated workforce, so that the main
role for INGOs would probably be in facilitating the development
of civil society and providing support through training and capacity-building.
So far, the focus of funding to INGOs has been
largely on emergency response. The need is for targeted, long-term
funding for activities that support a general rehabilitation strategy.
And it is that which is missing at present.
A donor round table conference on reconstruction
may be an appropriate forum to hammer these issues out; otherwise
there is a danger of piecemeal approaches being taken by the various
interested parties. The June 24 technical meeting in New York,
bringing together the UN, the international funding institutions
and the CPA might be an appropriate forum from which to start.
The UK government, through DFID, has a clear
role to play in assuring coherence of approach between the major
donors, multilateral agencies and IFIs as it inserts experienced
civil servants in the OCPA.
10 June 2003
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