Memorandum submitted by the Department
for International Development
INTRODUCTION
1. The UK is firmly committed to supporting
Afghanistan's reconstruction effort, and has provided considerable
diplomatic, military and development resources to this end. Some
progress has been made but a huge amount remains to be done. This
memorandum summarises the main achievements of the international
development effort during 2002 and sets out the key issues in
moving to tackle longer-term development challenges.
The challenge
2. Afghanistan matters. The international
community brought down the regime that gave shelter to some of
the world's most destructive terrorists and caused deep suffering
to the people of Afghanistan. We have a significant interest in
supporting the establishment of pro-poor governance in Afghanistan.
3. Afghanistan is one of the world's poorest
countries. Accurate data are hard to come by, but it is clear
the country has appalling social indicators, with some of the
world's highest child and maternal mortality rates, lowest literacy
rates, and a life expectancy estimated of just 44 years. Only
23 per cent of the population has access to safe water and 12
per cent to adequate sanitation. Disability is common: a legacy
of landmines and other ordnance of war. Prior to November 2001,
government health and education services had already all but disappeared,
and essential infrastructure was in serious need of rehabilitation.
4. The UK's objective, broadly shared by
others, is to help support a stable and secure Afghanistan restored
to its rightful place in the community of nations and enjoying
mature relations with its neighbours. Afghanistan needs a self-sustaining
economy, strong institutions and a broad-based, multi-ethnic regime
committed to eradicating terrorism and eliminating opium production;
reducing poverty; respecting human rights, especially those of
women and other minority groups; and honouring the country's other
international obligations.
5. This will take time, and considerable
external support. At the Tokyo conference in January 2002, bilateral
and multilateral donors pledged a total of $4.5 billion (about
£2.9 billion) over five years, for both reconstruction and
continuing humanitarian needs. The UK pledge was £200 million
(about $285 million).
6. It is essential that donors remain committed
to Afghanistan over the long term; make good their pledges; and
work to ensure their mechanisms are appropriate for meeting the
basic needs of the very vulnerable. At the same time there is
a need to build up the capacity of the Afghanistan Transitional
Authority to deliver longer-term economic and social development.
Progress so far
7. There has been important progress since
Afghanistan was liberated from the Taliban in November 2001. Meetings
at Bonn (December 2001) and Tokyo (January 2002) agreed processes
for political transition and external assistance respectively.
An Interim Administration was appointed for an emergency six-month
period, and a broad-based Transitional Authority subsequently
elected by the Emergency Loya Jirga for a two-year period from
July 2002. The Afghan Government has prepared a National Development
Framework, setting out policy commitments and priorities for reconstruction.
An Afghanistan Aid Co-ordination Authority (AACA) has been established
to manage external assistance. Security has been largely established
in and around Kabul.
8. Considerable resources have been disbursed
through the United Nations agencies, the Red Cross movement, international
financial institutions, bilateral donors, and non-governmental
organisations. These efforts have focused on meeting continuing
humanitarian needs, whilst laying the foundations for longer-term
development. School buildings, factories and government buildings
have been refurbished; roads have been repaired; and a back-to-school
campaign has provided basic education facilities for three million
boys and girls. Basic shelter, food and advice have been provided
to the 1.7 million refugees who have returned to Afghanistan in
2002.
9. Significant challenges remain. The UN
World Food Programme estimate that six million people are likely
to remain dependent upon food aid over the coming year. This is
despite recent UN reports that cereal production in Afghanistan
is up over 80 per cent on last year's drought affected crop. The
livestock population may have declined by as much as 60 per cent
since 1998, leaving large numbers of pastoralists destitute. Targeted
food aid therefore remains an important component of humanitarian
support. The predominant role of this assistance is to support
vulnerable populations in rebuilding the asset bases of their
livelihoods by spending less of their cash resources on basic
food, as well as improving diet.
10. For the longer-term development needs
identified at Tokyo, a series of investment programmes covering
agriculture, education, health, water and transport and communications
have been developed collectively by the World Bank, Asian Development
Bank, United Nations Development Programme and other donors. Policy
advice and other technical assistance has been provided to line
ministries, including public health, education, finance and rural
reconstruction.
11. The progress in terms of visible results
has until very recently been frustrating. However a number of
key infrastructure initiatives are now at last under way. They
include repair of the Salang tunnel which is expected to remove
critical winter road bottlenecks cutting off Kabul from seven
provinces and two countries (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), and repairs
of electricity transmission and distribution networks across the
country. Labour intensive public works schemes (such as repairs
of rural roads, midsize irrigation schemes) are further expected
to create jobs for several hundred thousand people during the
winter. The World Bank-supported National Solidarity Programme
is expected to fund projects in 600-800 communities by summer
2003.
12. The United Nations Assistance Mission
for Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established recently as a further
mechanism to co-ordinate international donor support. Although
this has had some success in mobilising resources, a key question
is whether the UNAMA model will work for taking forward Afghanistan's
reconstruction in the future. An Implementation Group meeting
to be held later in October will provide an opportunity to review
the success of the reconstruction process so far, and identify
the major challenges for the coming year.
Key development challenges
13. On the economic side, Afghanistan's
main priority is to establish sound revenue collection and public
expenditure management systems. This is essential for the delivery
of effective public services, stimulation of local economies including
through public works, and establishing the necessary legal and
institutional infrastructure for economic activity to flourish.
Work has begun within the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank
to strengthen payments and accounting systems and improve revenue
collection through customs reforms. A new currency was introduced
on 7 October. This should help strengthen the Afghan Transition
Authority's control over fiscal and monetary policy.
14. On the social side, UNICEF confirm that
almost three million children have enrolled in over 6,500 schools
since March 2002. The second phase of their Back-to-School campaign
is due to begin shortly and is expected to target a further 1.2
million children. Access to basic health services for most of
the Afghan population, however, remains severely limited. Humanitarian
and development agencies—primarily WHO and UNICEF—are
focusing on disease prevention and control through immunisations
and outbreak response, obstetric and trauma care, supplementary
feeding programmes, and increasing access to safe water and sanitation.
Some successes should be noted: eight million children between
six months and 12 years have now been immunised against measles
(80 per cent of target population); tens of thousands of new water
points and latrines have been constructed; and training programmes
are under way to enable professionals working for the Ministry
of Public Health to act as national trainers in emergency obstetric
care.
15. The key to Afghanistan's reconstruction
is the establishment of security and law and order. The deployment
of international troops for the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) has had a positive, stabilising impact. But this
has only been felt in and around Kabul. The challenge is to achieve
the same result across the country. This will require the building
up of Afghan security sector institutions (police, customs, intelligence,
judiciary, armed forces) and demobilisation of existing militia.
Support for their reintegration into civilian life and work through
the development of alternative livelihood opportunities will also
be essential. This means creating the necessary policy and legislative
conditions for new income and employment opportunities, especially
access to credit; and stimulating economic activity through public
works programmes.
16. The creation of Afghan national security
forces and institutions is a major challenge and requires political
commitment by all parties in Afghanistan and the continued and
coherent support of the international community. Progress has
been very slow. But there are signs that the Afghan Government
is beginning to address these issues and, with the support of
lead nations[1],
is embarking on the process of regional engagement in the reform
of the security sector. We are working with the Afghan Government
to ensure that there is a comprehensive and coherent approach
to the creation of accountable and sustainable security forces
and judicial services and to prevent a return to conflict.
RESPONSES TO
THE INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE'S
QUESTIONS
Question 1: What are the ongoing humanitarian
needs, how adequately are they being addressed, and for how long
will humanitarian assistance be required?
17. The humanitarian situation within Afghanistan
remains serious. Approximately six million people are currently
benefiting from humanitarian assistance, and will require food
aid during 2002-03, despite local increases in food production.
Humanitarian appeals are relatively well funded but needs are
likely to increase with the coming winter.
18. The World Food Programme currently faces
a shortfall of just over 100,000MT of cereals and continue to
appeal to donors to help meet this gap. Non-cereal requirements
are covered through to the end of this year. Existing non-governmental
organisations, who have access to 80 per cent of the country,
are likely to undertake most of the food distribution. The UN
Joint Logistics Committee (UNJLC) has identified locations needing
particular attention with regard to access in winter—mainly
in the Central Highlands, the North and North East. Agencies,
including WFP, UNHCR and UNICEF, are in the process of pre-positioning
food and non-food items in these areas. It will be important that
key roads are kept open to ensure distribution throughout the
winter and to respond to disease outbreaks or severe malnutrition.
The estimated cost is $6 million.
19. Given the large numbers of refugees,
internally displaced and vulnerable people, it is likely that
Afghanistan will require basic humanitarian assistance for some
time. A current challenge is to design such programmes in such
a way that they help provide the basis for longer-term reconstruction,
and at the same time avoid creating humanitarian aid dependency.
It will therefore be important to assess Afghanistan external
assistance needs in the round—avoiding compartmentalisation
of "humanitarian" and "reconstruction". This
comprehensive approach is what the Afghan Transitional Administration
has been seeking to follow.
Question 2: Are humanitarian needs and reconstruction
efforts adequately resourced?
20. Of the $1.8 billion pledged for 2002,
about $820 million (45 per cent) has so far been disbursed. The
emergency programmes of the main UN agencies are well-funded (UNHCR
90 per cent, WFP 75 per cent, UNICEF's 71 per cent). But the UN
estimates that a further $790 million is needed to meet humanitarian
and recovery requirements up to December 2002. At the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Steering Group meeting on 26 September, the Afghans
reported funding shortfalls for fiscal 2002 (ie to 31 March 2003)
of $166 million for the recurrent budget and $550 million for
investment priorities. These latter estimates may prove ambitious,
given Afghanistan's still limited absorptive capacity, and the
Ministry of Finance's reluctance so far to accept concessional
lending from the international financial institutions.
Question 3: Is the co-ordination between donors,
non-governmental organisations and the new administration helping
to ensure that humanitarian needs and reconstruction efforts are
carried out efficiently and effectively?
21. Co-ordination of the donor effort has
only been a partial success. The Ministry of Finance and Afghanistan
Aid Co-ordination Authority have played an important role in trying
to ensure that pledges are in accordance with budget and National
Development Framework priorities, but this has been difficult.
Refinement of the National Development Framework will further
help to prioritise reconstruction requirements and guide donor
efforts. It is planned that Implementation Group meetings will
bring together representatives of the Afghan Transition Authority,
donors, UN agencies and NGOs at regular intervals.
22. There is some way to go in certain key
areas. For example, there is a lack of a clear agency lead on
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) activities
and also on Livelihoods. There is also a lack of capacity within
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to take a more
pro-active role in assisting the Afghans to plan and monitor reconstruction.
For their own bureaucratic reasons, a number of bilateral donors
are opting to support projects through their own implementation
mechanisms, thereby raising transaction costs and straining the
limited absorptive capacity of the ATA.
Question 4: What constraints does the difficult
operating environment place on development work? How does this
affect the expectations of what can be achieved in the next five
to ten years in Afghanistan?
23. Collectively, the donor community needs
to support the ATA to extend their remit across the country in
order for reconstruction to progress more rapidly. Large parts
of the country remain under the control of warlords, making the
operational environment very difficult. ATA ministers and officials
are vulnerable to attacks from hostile groups. Vice-President
Hadji Qadir was killed in July. There have been a number of other
assassination attempts, including on Karzai himself.
24. Donors face numerous practical challenges.
Many have found it difficult to recruit personnel to work in Afghanistan
on a permanent basis to supply skills that are unavailable locally.
Data on the economy and on social indicators are poor, making
programming difficult. Accommodation and reliable telephone services
are often not available. Travel outside Kabul is often impossible.
Only when the ATA has extended its remit across the country will
these problems be more fully overcome.
Question 5: How does local politics influence
the priorities and targeting of development work?
25. Getting the provinces to co-operate
with the centre is an enormous challenge. Some negotiation has
taken place with warlords to try and secure their loyalty to the
new Administration, but progress has been slow. A number of warlords
provide services to the public, and are reluctant to turn over
their revenue to an administration that has no track record of
service delivery.
26. The Bonn process has offered a good
opportunity for sustainable political change in Afghanistan. The
traditional Loya Jirga that elected the Afghan Transitional Administration
has helped to ensure a broad representation of interests within
government as reconstruction has progressed. The constitution
making process is a further opportunity to helping to promote
provincial co-operation with the centre. But donors are inevitably
focusing their initial reconstruction efforts on those areas that
are more secure and readily accessible.
27. There are no easy answers. Some believe
that only outside military force will undermine the power of the
warlords. Targeting external assistance in Provinces that have
established a good relationship with the centre (on revenue collection,
on disarming, on access for humanitarian supplies) could also
help the ATA extend its authority across the country. This issue
may be discussed in the margins of the Implementation Group meeting.
Question 6: Are local people, particularly women,
being given sufficient opportunity to play a significant part
in the future development of their country and are they being
empowered to do this effectively?
28. As was highlighted earlier in the paper,
much of the humanitarian and reconstruction effort will utilise
local labour as a strategy for creating jobs and protecting livelihoods.
29. The role of women in the reconstruction
process was particularly emphasised at Tokyo. Women make up a
large proportion of the poorest. Some progress has been made at
the political level. For example, 160 women were selected to be
representatives at the 1,501 member Loya Jirga held in Kabul in
June 2002, and there are now two female ministers. UNIFEM is working
with the Ministry of Women's Affairs to help develop a national
gender strategy. The Human Rights Commission, headed by a woman,
also has a role to play. A number of humanitarian and development
programmes specifically target women and girls, and this is beginning
to bear fruit. For example, of the three million children that
have been enrolled under the back-to-school campaign, 30 per cent
were girls. Under the Taliban, girls had been banned from attending
school.
Department for International Development
October 2002
Afghanistan: DFID Plan
| Outputs | DFID Inputs
| Others' Inputs |
| Economic Management | |
|
| — basic governance and public expenditure management systems established.
| Technical assistance to the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank.
| World Bank's Emergency Public Administration Programme.
|
| — revenue base broadened, with receipts transferred to the centre.
| Contribution to Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.
| World Bank work on civil service reform. |
| — civil service reformed, including agreement on pay levels, staff numbers and a functioning Cabinet Office system.
| Possibility of DFID staff secondment to World Bank.
| IMF work on tax policy and administration.
|
| — Central Bank functions |
| |
| — Afghanistan helped to take advantage of preferential access to EU markets.
| Study on market access (completed). | IMF's team of Resident Advisers in the Central Bank.
|
| Security Sector Reform |
| |
| — UN and Transitional Administration adoption of coherent SSR reform framework and programmes.
| Financial support from Global Conflict Prevention Pool.
| US lead on army. |
| — accountable military and police forces established, subject to the rule of law and under appropriate civilian control.
| Advice on overall SSR framework and its component parts, including on DDR programme design and implementation and on judicial reform (ongoing).
| German lead on police. |
| | Italian lead on judiciary.
|
| — effective DDR programme implemented.
| | Japanese/UNDP lead on DDR.
|
| — effective and independent judiciary established
| | |
Political process |
| |
| — successful outcome to Emergency Loya Jirga.
| Targeted support to Brahimi-led political process.
| Other donors' contributions to ELJ process and beyond.
|
| — transparent and effective constitutional reform process under the Transitional Administration.
| "Beyond Brahimi" lesson-learning study (completion by end 2002).
| |
| Constitutional study (completion by end 2002).
| |
| Study of effectiveness of interaction between political and humanitarian actors (completion by end November).
| |
| Humanitarian and Recovery |
| |
| Needs of the most vulnerable people met, including:
| Continuing support to:
— WFP (food provision).
| Other donor contributions to humanitarian agencies.
|
| — emergency food assistance to vulnerable populations.
| — UNICEF (primary education). |
|
| — rehabilitation of the education system for girls and boys.
| — UNMAS (mine/unexploded ordnance clearance and awareness).
| |
| — reduction in the threat from landmines and unexploded ordnance.
| — UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, ICRC, NGOs (basic needs, country-wide).
| |
| — protection of and assistance to vulnerable groups inside Afghanistan, including children, women, disabled, internally displaced
| — UNDP (employment regeneration).
| |
| — employment regeneration. | — WHO (emergency health care); TA to Ministry of Public Health (capacity building).
| |
| — delivery of emergency health service packages.
| Continuing support to UNHCR (for voluntary return and support programmes) and to NGOs.
| |
| Refugees | Continuing contributions to IOM.
| EC's Refugee Reintegration programme. |
| — basic needs met in Iran and Pakistan.
| Continuing support to regional refugee programmes.
| |
| — returns facilitated at a rate which Afghanistan can absorb, including voluntary returns from the UK.
| | |
| Alternative Livelihoods |
| |
| — sustainable livelihood opportunities created, including for current members of the militia, poppy farmers and returning refugees.
| Contribution to ARTF (see above). | World Bank's Community Empowerment and Public Works programme.
|
| Advice to FCO and other donors on alternative livelihoods programmes (ongoing).
| EC's Refugee Reintegration programme. |
| Support to key agencies/NGOs/Transitional.
| EC's Rural Development programme. |
| Effectiveness of External Assistance
| | |
| — coordination of external aid improved.
| Support to Authority for the Coordination of Assistance (ongoing).
| |
| — pledges translated into firm commitments.
| Participation in IG meetings, and local Support Group coordination (ongoing).
| |
| Lobbying of other donors (ongoing).
| |
| Secondment of senior official to UNAMA.
| |
| Possibility of DFID secondments to World Bank.
| |
1
G 8 meetings on the Security Sector in Afghanistan have established,
with the endorsement of the ATA, lead nation roles. These are
the US-military forces; Germany-Police forces; Italy-Judiciary;
Japan (with UNAMA) DDR programmes; and UK-narcotics. The UK has
also been engaged in supporting the newly formed National Security
Council. Back
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