Examination of Witnesses(Questions 60-79)
MR CHRIS
AUSTIN, MR
TOM PHILLIPS
AND MS
JAN THOMPSON
TUESDAY 19 NOVEMBER 2002
60. Has it been discussed by NATO to your knowledge?
(Mr Phillips) No, I think the discussion in NATO has
been of what sort of support might be given to the lead nations
in ISAF, in terms of helping with force generation and things
like that. Those discussions have gone on, yes, so there is that
degree of NATO involvement, and at HQ level, as I have discussed,
the German/Dutch HQ is a NATO asset that will be used in the new
ISAF. So it is a live issue, but there is not going to be a NATO
force there.
61. You mentioned human rights abuses. The UN
High Commissioner for Human Rights was here last week. Now that
mass graves have been apparently identified in Afghanistan, he
expressed the desire to excavate those mass graves and he was
asking for help from the United Kingdom to provide protection
for those sites. And, of course, over the last few days some of
the people who gave evidence on film about what happened to prisoners
during that period have been themselves abused. It seems to me
that this is an issue which needs to be addressed because several
people again said to us in Afghanistan, "There will be no
peace without justice." Can I have your view on that?
(Mr Phillips) Yes, indeed. The same request was put
to us when the High Commissioner was here and we are considering
at the moment. I do not know how that is going to come out. There
are a number of factors, as you will understand.
62. What are you considering?
(Mr Phillips) The request for help with the protection.
As the investigation teams go in, as it were, he has made that
request to us as well. Clearly the allegations about mass grave
sites are very worrying to all of us and we welcome the statements
that Karzai and other members of his Government have made that
they will co-operate with investigations into these sites. We
have raised with the Afghan Interior Minister the alleged murder
of contributors to the recent Channel 5 documentary on events
in Shiberghan last November and he has agreed the matter is serious
and has undertaken to co-operate in the UNAMA/Afghan Human Rights
Commission investigation. Obviously it is for the Transitional
Authority and for the Afghan people themselves to decide how to
deal with past crimes, but we stand ready to play a supportive
role if we can identify a realistic one. We would expect the UN
to be at the heart of any investigation and we like the look of
their two-stage approach to investigations, which has been forensic
investigations and dignified re-burials now, to be followed at
a later stage, when the security situation allows it, by more
detailed witness interviews and investigations. That is the approach
we have been taking to date.
Mr Khabra
63. The stability and security of a country
partly depends on what is happening in the neighbouring countries.
In view of the elections which have taken place in Pakistan, it
has emerged that Taliban supporters have gained quite a lot of
political ground, and they are in a position of power now and
they have openly declared that they will be supporting the Taliban,
whatever element remains within Afghanistan or actually crosses
over the border into that North West part of Pakistan. It is definitely
going to have a disastrous impact on the political situation as
well as the security situation in Afghanistan. What are the worries
of the UK and the US Governments about this?
(Mr Phillips) You are right that there is a very sharp
perception of the relationship between what happens in Pakistan
and what happens in Afghanistan. I and Foreign Office Ministers
have talked to the transitional administration—President
Karzai—recently about this. In fact, I have been in Islamabad
myself in the wake of the elections talking to the Pakistani Government
and what they have told me is that they will continue to co-operate
with the war against terrorism and the reconstruction and rebuilding
of Afghanistan. President Karzai is, I think, hoping to reach
agreement soon on a declaration of regional non-intervention.
He trailed that idea at a recent summit in Istanbul. We would
certainly see that as a very helpful step forward and I hope there
would be movement on that front in the region. Our general message
to everyone in the region is that we expect them to play their
part in the reconstruction and rebuilding of Afghanistan. We certainly
do not think Afghanistan should be in any way a focus for regional
rivalries. That is a message we are carrying to everyone in the
region. Could I go back to a previous question. I had a point
on the human rights front. There are various ways in which we
are trying to help on human rights but just to pick up one project
from our Global Conflict Prevention Pool. We have come up with
£1 million to give to a joint project involving the Afghan
Human Rights Commission, UNAMA and the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights. This is going to be earmarked for human rights
education and human rights for women and institution building
and general project costs. We are seeking very actively to support
the human rights front.
Alistair Burt
64. Can I apologise for my absence at an earlier
meeting. Could I shift the focus of the Committee to the types
of development we are involved in and particularly the distinction
between institution and capacity development. Are we paying enough
attention to institution building as opposed to capacity building?
The Committee had the impression during their visit that there
might be a suggestion that in terms of bringing forward English
language teaching and helping people to understand Microsoft this
might be done at the time when they did not have access to desks
and filing cabinets. Is enough attention being paid to the basic
building blocks of governance?
(Mr Austin) I think both need to proceed in parallel.
The Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction
and Development and the Ministry of Health that we are directly
involved with through DFID have all been operating in buildings
that were either poorly resourced or in a poor state of repair
initially or have recently been refurbished, including by some
DFID funds. That is the kind physical institution building and
one of the six priority programmes for the government in its national
development framework is a kind of government buildings programme
around the country so that provincial and district administrations
and regional representatives of line ministries have somewhere
to base an office and organise their affairs. In parallel the
UN has organised a series of capacity building groups with each
ministry where the ministry is identifying a small number of key
staff, about 12 or 15, to undergo a fairly intensive, short-term
training programme for themselves in how to organise the administration
of their particular ministry. That is proceeding with patchy success
in terms of identifying people and in terms of being able to carry
through a programme. I think there is a third part to your question
which is the distinction between institutional development and
institutional building. Has the Government got the right structure,
the right number of ministries, the right division of responsibilities?
This is part of the civil service reform agenda that we were discussing
a little bit earlier. At the moment there are 32 ministries. The
Government acknowledges that that in part reflects the political
process, but they would expect there to be rationalisation and
reduction in the number of ministries. I do not know if the Committee
have a view on this but I thought it quite impressive that at
the Implementation Group meeting that all of the ministers who
spoke referred to some of their colleagues who were also involved
in taking forward a particular programme. I think it has been
quite encouraging that the Committee, as well as donors and ministers
from the UK, had a core script line to take from government and
it is quite an impressive, positive signal of capacity.
Chairman
65. All ministries singing in tune is a good
basis?
(Mr Austin) Either that or they have had a very good
lobbying firm telling them how to pester us all effectively.
Alistair Burt
66. Whilst this must be done in parallel and
one can understand it, have you had sessions about whether or
not there are sufficient basic tools and equipment that need to
be there before some of the capacity building and work with individuals
can be done? Have others mentioned this or are you quite content
that it has been looked at and is working perfectly well?
(Mr Austin) In the ministries that we are most involved
with—the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction, the Ministry
of Finance and the Central Bank—it is something we have
been supporting in parallel. I am less familiar with the situation
in other line ministries and certainly in the provinces. I think
it is part of the Government's game plan and it needs to be something
that donors look at, a combination of support for basic refurbishment
of buildings which would generate some local employment in the
economy around the country, at the same time as looking to the
development of capacity and skills of Afghans. Both of them are
going to take a long time. The implication of your comment that
the physical bit of it needs to come first is right and I know
this is something that the Government will report back on at the
Development Forum, probably with a pitch for further assistance
for the government rebuilding and refurbishment programme.
67. You have mentioned the capacity building
project in the Ministry of Finance a couple of times. Could you
let the Committee know what your intentions are for that project
and what you believe it is likely to achieve?
(Mr Austin) It is a team of consultants that we are
financing (we plan at the moment) for a period of three years.
They have been operating since July. They are working very much
in conjunction with teams of advisers from the World Bank and
IMF. There is also a USA ID financed team about to start. So we
are a small part of this overall effort. For that reason the terms
of reference brief for the UK finance team was deliberately cast
very wide to supporting Customs reform, to determining the payroll,
to helping the Government sort out its own financing and accounting
systems of procurement. We wanted the consultancy team to be as
flexible as possible to identify and support design work in whatever
areas the Afghans identified as priority, but also to fill gaps
that the World Bank and IMF advisers could fill. The main achievement
so far being is to help the Government define the payroll and
create the supporting documentation needed to justify the reimbursement
of civil service salaries through the ATRF. A second major achievement
has been planning for restructuring Customs' revenues and the
next stage will be to roll those forward. My sense at the moment
is that UK support will focus more on support of civil service
reform as an extension of the defining of the payroll because
that was the first priority that the Vice President and Finance
Minister discussed with the Secretary of State at the end of last
month.
Chairman
68. If I could make a mischievous observation,
not a question. For those who met them, they are more than a team
of consultants. It was with some interest I noted how far New
Labour has travelled in that the consultants who are employed
are the Adam Smith Institute. I am sure Tony Worthington and others
met with some glee the fact that the virtues of Adam Smith's economic
theories were now being given by the UK Government to the Transitional
Authority in Afghanistan and they were clearly doing an extremely
good job. It is just a footnote which I think is worth recording
in the annals of development history that the Adam Smith Institute
is now being employed by DFID.
(Mr Austin) They were of course selected as the result
of competitive tendering.
Alistair Burt
69. Moving swiftly on from the mischief of the
Chairman, I am thinking about quick impact projects. Is there
an understandable pressure to focus on quick impact projects and
to be doing something quickly rather than concentrating on the
much more necessary long-term projects?
(Mr Austin) I think it was a necessary and desirable
focus in the first few months of this year that DFID and the other
donors and NGOs financed a series of relatively modest (in their
own right) activities wherever they could be done around the country.
We supported the first wave of activities very much in the Kabul
area. Subsequently we have been able to finance activities more
widely and to deliberately do things outside the country. That
is part of helping to underpin the authority of the central government
by showing that benefits are being brought to local communities.
The challenge that we want to support the Government with now
is to take forward these activities and up-scale the coverage
and make the interventions more strategic. The Government has
devised a national solidarity programme which at the moment has
got some World Bank finance. This is another one of its six priority
programmes in the national development framework for the rest
of this year and 2003, and this programme is looking at providing
cash assistance and "in kind" assistance at a village
and community level, in a similar way to quick impact projects,
but in a way that responds to communities' needs rather than the
supply of the implementing agency and which allows the communities
to take choices about what it wants to do first. These are very
much at the formative stage and one of my colleagues is going
to Afghanistan later this week for discussions with the Ministry
of Rural Reconstruction who is leading this programme, and others,
about how this will be implemented. We have started small and
a little bit ad hoc but the Government is looking to make
this strategic and widespread.
70. I suppose it does help you build up the
confidence that you need in order to extract some extra information
which might help you with achievement of longer-term projects.
That confidence is absolutely crucial and do you think quick wins
can play a disproportionate part in achieving that confidence?
(Mr Austin) I think you are right.
Mr Walter
71. I would like to move on to an area of what
is happening in the reconstruction of Afghanistan impacting directly
here in Britain, which is in drugs. The UN crop survey, which
was published last month, showed that Afghanistan is set to resume
its place as the source of 75 per cent of the world's heroin and
90 per cent of Britain's supply. Their estimate was that 3,400
tonnes of opium will be produced in Afghanistan this year, even
higher than when the Taliban banned it. In fact, under the Taliban
it is estimated that it fell to 185 tonnes in 2001, so there was
a 20-fold increase in opium production. The Prime Minister proposed
to eradicate the opium poppy harvests as part of the war against
Afghanistan. What is the division of responsibility between DFID
and the FCO in terms of the UK's lead in addressing the problem
of drugs production? What plans have you now got to try and halt
that following the failure of eradication projects so far? Given
the enormous gains from poppy production compared with other crops,
how realistic do you think alternative crops are?
(Mr Phillips) There are a number of questions there.
On statistics it is sometimes very difficult to get a grip on
it. As we understand it, this year's crop, ie the 2002 planting
season, which came out at 74,000 hectares, was not as big as the
largest ones under the Taliban, which was 90,583 in 1999 and 82,000
in 2000 and, of course, under the Taliban is when drugs production
really took root. In the first three years after the Taliban took
control drugs production doubled, so that is where the problem
came from. Then one had that strange year when the Taliban imposed
a ban on growing things but they did not actually do much about
the stocks and the laboratory facilities, so they were still making
money higher up the chain as it were. Last year the Afghan government
estimates that about 25 per cent of the crop was eradicated in
the eradication programme, so that was a fairly substantial success.
The amount of heroin destroyed there was £5 billion at UK
street prices, so it made quite a significant impact. We are working
on a ten-year approach here to try and eliminate drug production
in Afghanistan and these things do take time, as we know from
other countries like Thailand. Our goal is 70 per cent reduction
by 2008 and 100 per cent elimination by 2013. We know that is
a very ambitious and difficult target and it is going to depend
on a number of things, including reconstruction, building up law
enforcement capability, institution building and tackling drug
abuse at the Afghanistan end itself. We are going to face a particular
problem in the coming season. I do not think reconstruction has
yet reached a level where one can be confident that there are
a lot of alternative livelihoods available to a significant number
of Afghan farmers. We very much support the tough line that President
Karzai is taking on the need to tackle the drugs problem vigorously
and we are looking at options at the moment on how to help the
Afghan Government cope with the coming planting season. That thinking
is still in the fairly early stages. In terms of how it is co-ordinated
within Whitehall, there is an across-Whitehall group that meets
very regularly to consider this. There is extremely strong central
interest from the Cabinet Office and Number 10 and I think all
government departments are working together on a joint strategy
because clearly the reconstruction front and the various other
aspects have to lock together if we are going to get anywhere.
72. So what you are saying is that you have
not found a solution, you are working on the various ways of trying
to deal with this. You have mentioned law enforcement, alternative
crops and so on. I would put it to you that the damage done in
the West by this production—and it is quite clear that the
production has increased quite significantly in the last year
or so—is so significant that one should be putting as much
vigour into destroying the poppy crop in Afghanistan as was put
into getting rid of the Taliban and seeking out Al-Qaeda.
(Mr Austin) Can I answer this question first because
there was a previous one about alternative crops and DFID's role
and perhaps that can lead in to the wider discussion of eradication.
The strategy that the UK is leading on with the Afghans looks
at a combination of improving the security environment and that
means restructuring the army and the police, border guards and
customs officials so that law and order and interdiction activities
can proceed. That means providing the right kind of environment
where the incentive for people to grow poppy is reduced, although
I do not think anybody is pretending that alternative livelihoods
either in the agriculture sector or in the non-farming sector
are going to provide the same kinds of returns as opium. Our assumption
is that the Afghan people in poppy growing areas would much rather
do something legal and predictable than something high risk and
potentially with a higher return. It will take a long time to
create environments where people can access credit. They can run
small business, they can get themselves a job and earn a living,
provide for their families in a way other than doing opium. If
I may answer your specific question about alternative crops, I
do not think experience elsewhere has shown that crop substitution
is really going to work in Afghanistan. The main reason is that
returns to a farmer for opium are much higher than they are for
any other crop and Afghan farmers are predominantly subsistence
farmers, so there is a desire to create conditions where people
will grow vegetables and grow wheat or grow grapes and look at
those as a better thing than poppy, but there needs to be non-farm
options as well. DFID's role in this HMG strategy is very much
focused on the livelihood reconstruction effort through the building
capacity of the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development,
understanding where vulnerable people are and what the damage
has been to their coping strategies—I know this has been
covered by various pieces of evidence the Committee has had for
this hearing—and devising a strategy for tackling those.
So that is the reconstruction effort in the round. I think the
points that you were beginning to raise about eradication and
so on are ones for Tom to pick up on.
(Mr Phillips) Just on this question of whether or
not production is increasing, as I pointed out, the figures from
the 2002 season were less than in the two peak years of the Taliban,
1999 and 2000, so it is not a one-way flight path upwards as it
were. Are we putting in sufficient vigour? I think the answer
is yes. If you think of what it took to get opium poppy production
in Thailand down to four per cent or less, it was a 30-year programme
or something like this and we are trying to focus now on the possibility
of achieving that kind of result in a ten-year period. So we know
we have a lot to do and we know it is going to require a very
cross-sector approach. There is a full range of activities under
the various headings that I gave you that we are seeking to work
under. For instance, we are working with the Germans on the law
enforcement front. The Germans are the lead nation on police reform.
We are working with them on anti-drugs training for the police
as part of their plans for setting up a police academy. We are
helping to develop with the Americans and the Germans a central
intelligence unit in the Ministry of the Interior. We are hoping
to establish a regional drugs control unit for model one in Kandahar
and we are working with UNDCP to develop capacity building support
for the National Security Council and UNDCP, in turn, are working
with the Afghan Ministry of Justice to develop drug control legislation.
So I think a very positive part of all this is that the Afghan
government is taking a very clear and consistent line. Working
with them on how to tackle this is proving very positive.
Ann Clwyd
73. We met ministers who thought that they had
staked their own personal reputation on the alternatives for farmers
and they have been left feeling a bit stupid because the money
had not been there to provide the alternatives. One minister actually
said, "I'm never going to do it again because I have lost
face". In addition, he said that children had been sold by
some poor farmers into bonded labour, that they were so poor they
had no alternative but to sell their children. I wonder if you
have looked into those two issues, particularly the sale of children.
(Mr Phillips) The children one I did not know about,
that is the first I have heard of it. On the issue of last year's
eradication efforts, I have heard complaints that the compensation
did not come through on time and that alternative livelihoods
were not there in the immediate wake. On the compensation front,
I think there were some cases where there had been delay and,
as I understand it, there is a procedure going on in Kabul at
the moment to look back at that and pay it. I do not know exactly
where that stands. On the immediate provision of alternative livelihoods,
I think it always was extremely difficult which was why the idea
was cash compensation for eradication last year. The notion that
you can pluck a poppy out of the ground and immediately have something
there to replace it that very season was a very tall order.
74. Is Mr Austin aware of the sale of children?
(Mr Austin) I was not aware of that issue. We were
aware of the issue of debt but thinking of that in a financial
sense and this is part of the constraint against people stopping
growing poppy, because they have got hard pressures against them
making them do it. On the timelag on livelihoods point and so
on, it is part of the challenge—sorry, I keep talking about
challenges in Afghanistan but it is a very challenging environment
to work in. There were very high expectations raised by the relative
smoothness and rapidity of the political process and the expectation
that external finance would follow the external military support
for the country and then everything would improve very, very quickly.
I think there is a message for the development community and an
issue that the Afghan Government is conscious of, that is of needing
to explain more thoroughly and positively what is changing and
what is happening. In terms of livelihoods in poppy growing areas,
the Minister for Reconstruction and Rural Development is very
keen that livelihoods, benefits and activities happen in all the
vulnerable areas of Afghanistan and are not seen perversely to
reward those who are growing poppy. It will be a while before
things move to the point where ministers can say very robustly,
"Destroy this crop or we'll come and destroy it for you and,
by the way, the Government is bringing in these alternative ways
of surviving that you can see all around you." That is not
there yet. We will need to investigate the sale of labour issue.
Chris McCafferty
75. You mentioned the training of a modern police
force as being an important part of the fight against drugs, but
the development of an effective judiciary is equally important.
I wonder if you could comment on that.
(Mr Phillips) I agree. All these issues are out there
now to be looked at. On the judiciary issue, the Italians are
the lead nation on that in the way these sectors were consigned.
I think they have had one conference in Rome back in September/October
and they have been a little bit stalled to date while waiting
for the formation of a judicial commission in Kabul. A judicial
commission has now been appointed and the Italians' plans are
to hold a second conference in Rome on the 19 and 20 December
which we hope will carry forward the judicial sector work fairly
substantially. We are looking for an adviser to go and help—which
the Global Conflict Prevention Pool will fund—in this sector
because we agree entirely that getting the detail right is important.
In fact, there are quite a lot of quite good laws out there from
the 1960s and 1970s. I think a lot of it is working out what is
already there and putting it together. There are also issues of
reconstruction, rebuilding courts, the training of judges and
all those physical infrastructure issues out there as well.
76. Does Sharia law have an effect on the judiciary
system in Afghanistan?
(Mr Phillips) The 1964 constitution is the one operating
in the country at the moment except for the provision regarding
the King and that is a constitution which says that, first, there
is the constitution, then there is the secular law base, and when
you cannot find an answer in any of those you resort to Hanafi
Sharia law. I think what has happened in the country is sometimes
difficult to get at, but my own sense is that with the break down
of infrastructure in the country over the last 20 years what is
actually happening in some villages and locations round there
is local law is operating, so you turn to your village elders
and there is probably quite a Sharia input into that. The formal
legal position at the moment is that the 1964 constitution holds,
then secular law, then Sharia. This touches on the whole issue
of what sort of new constitution is the country going to come
up with which is clearly going to be a very, very important exercise
and it is now starting to get underway.
Mr Walter
77. Can I move on to some policy questions and
maybe others on the longer term and joined-up government. This
is probably a question for DFID. What is being done to ensure
that the aims and objectives of the Transitional Administration
and the donors are integrated? Should the Transitional Administration
be the driving force on policy? What are you in DFID doing to
take the lead in that and to give the Afghan people a role in
taking the lead in policy formation? What are you doing to encourage
the development of civil society and to make sure that women are
involved in this process right across?
(Mr Austin) To answer the headline question, we very
much agree that the Government should be in the lead in formulating
policy and setting direction, and that is what we see the national
development framework as providing, both for priorities between
now and the next fiscal year that starts in March and beyond then.
That is the framework within which all external assistance in
future should be set, including emergency support. The next consolidated
appeal by the UN agencies for Afghanistan for its emergency needs
will be launched early next month and it has been deliberately
delayed so that it can be discussed with the Afghan Government
and set within the framework of the national development plan.
The Government announced to donors that the Implementation Group,
which the Cabinet decided on, would allocate 45 per cent of its
total available resources, including external ones, to what it
describes as "human social capital", which includes
emergency aid, 35 per cent to physical infrastructure, and the
balance to what might be broadly termed "governance"
but including the private sector framework. So there is a role
for us between now and the Development Forum in persuading our
donor colleagues to have the same view and to keep exchanging
information and suggestions with them about how best to direct
our resources, in a way that works with the grain of this framework
that the Government have set, recognising that different donors,
both bilateral and multilateral, will have either slightly different
mechanisms that they wish to favour or a range of sectors that
they would wish to be involved with. The Government is keen for
all donors to be focused and selective, although I find in my
own experience that if one says, "We will be involved with
economic management but we will not be involved with health",
that you very quickly come up against the problem of, for example,
should you be involved with Civil Service reform that includes
the Health Service. We need to have a detailed dialogue between
ourselves and the Afghans about what our areas of engagement will
be within the national development framework. Developing the voice
of the Afghan people is equally important. It is wrapped up in
the discussion we have just been having about the constitutional
process which will follow the Afghanistan model of consultation
around the country and we need to make sure that our support is
available in a way that allows that process to happen without
giving the impression of us trying to direct it in any particular
way. DFID has already provided some modest support for women's
groups. The Secretary of State met some representatives of them
when she was there at the end of last month through the UNIFEM
programme and I am not sure if there was direct assistance through
an NGO as well. The Government is very keen for the voice of civil
society to be developed. It is very keen for Afghan civil society
to be participating in formulation of the development plan and
the implementation of it and in the process of holding government
to account that the Development Forum will be. An issue for us
will be to look at coming back to transaction costs, what is the
most effective and efficient way for us as DFID to support further
development of civil society voices, including women's voices.
Is it direct allocations to NGOs that are looking to build women's
groups in Afghanistan, is it money that is channelled through
the Ministry for Women's Affairs, is it through donor colleagues,
possibly with part of the Afghan authority or with multi-laterals?
We are at the process of mulling all those things over and formulating
our own strategy for the next two to three years.
78. Do you think we are getting to a situation
where the Afghan people feel they have ownership of this process
and that it is not simply a bunch of outsiders and they are saying,
"Thank you very much for giving us this and that", and
the whole rounded policy is something that is an Afghan policy?
(Mr Austin) The impression I get from people in ministries
in Kabul is that, yes, I think they feel that their firm line
taken at the Implementation Group and subsequently is having the
desired effect of making donors think about the way they do business.
UN agencies at the Implementation Group said, "We need to
look at a different way of doing our business in Afghanistan."
I suspect—and this may sound arrogant—that the people
in Afghanistan do not really care. They would be much more interested
in what is happening in their local village or community. The
elders that I met in Shomali Plains and in Kandahar were interested
in a very local perspective, and were either sceptical or relaxed
about whether the Government would provide the assistance or whether
it would be an NGO or some external force. The main message that
I heard was, "We are very relieved that the war was over.
We wish it would rain. We would like a little bit of help to get
on with our own lives. Give us an irrigation system and, by the
way, do not give us any more food aid."
Ann Clwyd
79. Can I ask you about the refugees. Obviously
we can see the state of the country. We saw the Shomali Valley
which has just been razed to the ground where nearly 4,000 refugees
had returned and only about two-thirds are being supported, the
others are looking after themselves. Is the rate of return of
refugees from neighbouring countries sustainable in the condition
of Afghanistan as it is now? Is there pressure being put by certain
countries on those refugees to return faster than the country
can deal with them? How does the refugee return affect the humanitarian
situation as it is now?
(Mr Austin) Is the rate of return sustainable? It
is a bit hard to judge just at the moment. It is higher and faster
than had previously been anticipated so it is creating more pressures
in the places where refugees are returning to, whether it is their
home area or some other part of Afghanistan. I do not think that
is an insuperable challenge, it is just underlining the need for
an accelerated and larger-scale process of the reconstruction
effort generally. The refugees are one large and important constituency
amongst several that need to be reintegrated into the economy
and into society. There are former combatants or people in militias
who will become part of the former militia as part of the Army
restructuring. There are people currently planting and producing
poppies who, hopefully, will be persuaded not to do that. There
are people displaced within Afghanistan who are returning home
and, as the Minister of Finance said at the Implementation Group,
there may well be people currently on the public service payroll
who will need to be retrained as part of the reform process. All
of those different constituencies need to be catered for in the
process. I am not aware of any pressure from neighbouring countries
to export their refugees back into Afghanistan with indecent haste
in a way that moved the problem from the neighbouring country
to Afghanistan in such a way that the people are worse off when
they get back there. Individuals will judge for themselves whether
they want to make the move completely or whether they want to
do it in stages. There are a couple of people in our office in
Kabul who are probably amongst the relatively privileged Afghan
exiles who decided to return to Afghanistan, but not all of their
family members have done so yet because the first influx of people
who have got a job there are also looking to refurbish the family
home or establish a bit of a base before the others come back.
I imagine other refugees will be having a similar approach. I
think there was a third question but I am afraid I have lost sight
of it.
|
