Examination of Witness(Questions 115-119)
MR RAJA
JARRAH
TUESDAY 26 NOVEMBER 2002
Chairman
115. Mr Jarrah, good morning and thank you very
much for coming to give evidence today. We wish to be reasonably
brisk as we have a galaxy of talent with us today, which we are
going to deal with in half-hour chunks. We will aim to go to 10.55
and, at that point, we will pause and if there is anything you
feel is important which our questioning has not drawn out, that
will then give you some time to address us. So, rather than giving
an opening statement, perhaps you might like to give a closing
statement. You have given us a written submission in which you
suggest that there is a need for much higher levels of funding
over the coming years and which emphasises the need for both funds
for humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Those of us who went
to Afghanistan were constantly being told firstly that the pledges
from Tokyo were insufficient for the needs and secondly that a
great deal of the assumption about Tokyo pledges was that they
would be for reconstruction, but effectively a lot of it had been
used for humanitarian purposes, not least a far faster return
of refugees back into the country than had been expected. Have
you done any mathematics as to the amount of money there is and
what the shortfall is likely to be? How do you see the mechanics
of this? Do you see this better being done by having a humanitarian
part and a reconstruction part? How do you think one could improve
the mechanisms?
(Mr Jarrah) Your question captures in a nutshell the
concerns we feel on this question of funding because our understanding,
along with most other observers, was that the Tokyo money was
for reconstruction and that humanitarian needs would be met on
a separate basis and, as you have also pointed out, the humanitarian
needs are far in excess of anybody's expectations at the time.
We have not done any arithmetic on the cost of reconstruction
of Afghanistan and I shall not repeat here some of the figures
that have been put down in our written evidence as to the history
of expenditure so far. The answer that we would like to see is
a distinction between the reconstruction part and the humanitarian
part. There are between four and six million people in Afghanistan
who are still very vulnerable and in need of humanitarian aid,
both in rural areas and in urban areas, and it is invidious really
to play off the reconstruction needs against the humanitarian
ones. With winter coming, there is need for food, there is need
for winter fuel and water supplies are also very precarious in
many areas. Those needs do not go away and they do not annul the
need for longer term reconstruction. So, we would hope that, in
any renegotiation of funding commitment, which I understand will
be happening in the early part of next year, there is a clear
distinction between the humanitarian part and the reconstruction
part.
Mr Battle
116. Can I ask how relationships are working
out with different agencies and NGOs. There was talk of a need
for co-ordination early on. The words are right but has it happened?
(Mr Jarrah) It has happened certainly at an operational
level between agencies working in Afghanistan. There is a useful
and working dialogue. I think one of the issues we face is that
most of the NGOs working in Afghanistan, the international ones
particularly, are operational agencies and trying to get co-ordination
between them is a little like herding cats. They are not talking
shop animals; they prefer to be active. It is not easy to get
co-ordination at policy level between NGOs in a situation such
as Afghanistan. There have also been reports in the past of a
tension between the government authority, the transitional authority,
and NGOs, partly because of the perception of the skewed funding
towards the NGOs and away from the Afghan authorities. In recent
weeks, that has improved greatly. There have been a number of
initiatives, most significantly the one by Swiss Peace which has
created that dialogue between government and NGOs to the point
that we feel that we are on the same page now and there has been
a declaration of commitment on both sides for greater transparency
and greater understanding of where each other stands.
117. Is there a clear setting out of objectives
and priorities that is agreed with the transitional administration?
(Mr Jarrah) That particular committee came up with
the four major areas where there was an agreement to work together
to achieve understanding. In summary, these are: working on a
legislative framework for NGOs that would allow an enabling environment
for NGOs to work in a transparent and accountable way; reporting
mechanisms to the government so that the government has a watching
brief over the NGOs that is informed rather than based on hearsay
and suspicion; a clearer understanding by the government of the
role of NGOs in reconstruction because at the moment we seem to
be gap filling, but that is not really the long-term role of NGOs,
NGOs are an actor in development of their own right and are not
simply an implementation agency for international donors; and
finally the role of NGOs in building the capacity of government.
Again, that is not our long-term mandate but, in the situation
of Afghanistan, we clearly have a lot to contribute in terms of
passing on some of our skills and experience to the key operational
wings of government.
118. It is said that some of the revenues going
into civil service salaries are for people who do not actually
exist. Are you tackling that whole structure?
(Mr Jarrah) I have no information on that. In our
experience, some of the civil servants who are being maintained
in post have no other resources to work with. So, while the human
being may exist, the material with which they can work in terms
of staff and financial resources are not there.
Mr Colman
119. On page 5[4]
of the evidence you have given us, you state that at present the
Afghan Government's modest operating budget of $460 million this
year remains unfunded by more than 50 per cent and disbursements
to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund remain at less than 20
per cent of the requested levels. Is this shortfall connected
to a reluctance that it draws down concessional loans and, if
so, is this reluctance well-founded?
(Mr Jarrah) I think it is partly a misunderstanding
but, at the time of the Tokyo pledges, it was not fully understood
by all actors, including the Afghan authorities, that some of
those pledges represented loans rather than grants. I understand
that recently Mr Karzai has declared a willingness to look at
concessional loans as way of increasing access to international
funding.
4 See www.careinternational.org.uk/news/whatdo_care_think/afghanistan/afghanistan_policy_brief.pdf Back
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