Select Committee on International Development Minutes of Evidence


Examination of Witness(Questions 115-119)

MR RAJA JARRAH

TUESDAY 26 NOVEMBER 2002

Chairman

  115. Mr Jarrah, good morning and thank you very much for coming to give evidence today. We wish to be reasonably brisk as we have a galaxy of talent with us today, which we are going to deal with in half-hour chunks. We will aim to go to 10.55 and, at that point, we will pause and if there is anything you feel is important which our questioning has not drawn out, that will then give you some time to address us. So, rather than giving an opening statement, perhaps you might like to give a closing statement. You have given us a written submission in which you suggest that there is a need for much higher levels of funding over the coming years and which emphasises the need for both funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Those of us who went to Afghanistan were constantly being told firstly that the pledges from Tokyo were insufficient for the needs and secondly that a great deal of the assumption about Tokyo pledges was that they would be for reconstruction, but effectively a lot of it had been used for humanitarian purposes, not least a far faster return of refugees back into the country than had been expected. Have you done any mathematics as to the amount of money there is and what the shortfall is likely to be? How do you see the mechanics of this? Do you see this better being done by having a humanitarian part and a reconstruction part? How do you think one could improve the mechanisms?
  (Mr Jarrah) Your question captures in a nutshell the concerns we feel on this question of funding because our understanding, along with most other observers, was that the Tokyo money was for reconstruction and that humanitarian needs would be met on a separate basis and, as you have also pointed out, the humanitarian needs are far in excess of anybody's expectations at the time. We have not done any arithmetic on the cost of reconstruction of Afghanistan and I shall not repeat here some of the figures that have been put down in our written evidence as to the history of expenditure so far. The answer that we would like to see is a distinction between the reconstruction part and the humanitarian part. There are between four and six million people in Afghanistan who are still very vulnerable and in need of humanitarian aid, both in rural areas and in urban areas, and it is invidious really to play off the reconstruction needs against the humanitarian ones. With winter coming, there is need for food, there is need for winter fuel and water supplies are also very precarious in many areas. Those needs do not go away and they do not annul the need for longer term reconstruction. So, we would hope that, in any renegotiation of funding commitment, which I understand will be happening in the early part of next year, there is a clear distinction between the humanitarian part and the reconstruction part.

Mr Battle

  116. Can I ask how relationships are working out with different agencies and NGOs. There was talk of a need for co-ordination early on. The words are right but has it happened?
  (Mr Jarrah) It has happened certainly at an operational level between agencies working in Afghanistan. There is a useful and working dialogue. I think one of the issues we face is that most of the NGOs working in Afghanistan, the international ones particularly, are operational agencies and trying to get co-ordination between them is a little like herding cats. They are not talking shop animals; they prefer to be active. It is not easy to get co-ordination at policy level between NGOs in a situation such as Afghanistan. There have also been reports in the past of a tension between the government authority, the transitional authority, and NGOs, partly because of the perception of the skewed funding towards the NGOs and away from the Afghan authorities. In recent weeks, that has improved greatly. There have been a number of initiatives, most significantly the one by Swiss Peace which has created that dialogue between government and NGOs to the point that we feel that we are on the same page now and there has been a declaration of commitment on both sides for greater transparency and greater understanding of where each other stands.

  117. Is there a clear setting out of objectives and priorities that is agreed with the transitional administration?
  (Mr Jarrah) That particular committee came up with the four major areas where there was an agreement to work together to achieve understanding. In summary, these are: working on a legislative framework for NGOs that would allow an enabling environment for NGOs to work in a transparent and accountable way; reporting mechanisms to the government so that the government has a watching brief over the NGOs that is informed rather than based on hearsay and suspicion; a clearer understanding by the government of the role of NGOs in reconstruction because at the moment we seem to be gap filling, but that is not really the long-term role of NGOs, NGOs are an actor in development of their own right and are not simply an implementation agency for international donors; and finally the role of NGOs in building the capacity of government. Again, that is not our long-term mandate but, in the situation of Afghanistan, we clearly have a lot to contribute in terms of passing on some of our skills and experience to the key operational wings of government.

  118. It is said that some of the revenues going into civil service salaries are for people who do not actually exist. Are you tackling that whole structure?
  (Mr Jarrah) I have no information on that. In our experience, some of the civil servants who are being maintained in post have no other resources to work with. So, while the human being may exist, the material with which they can work in terms of staff and financial resources are not there.

Mr Colman

  119. On page 5[4] of the evidence you have given us, you state that at present the Afghan Government's modest operating budget of $460 million this year remains unfunded by more than 50 per cent and disbursements to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund remain at less than 20 per cent of the requested levels. Is this shortfall connected to a reluctance that it draws down concessional loans and, if so, is this reluctance well-founded?

  (Mr Jarrah) I think it is partly a misunderstanding but, at the time of the Tokyo pledges, it was not fully understood by all actors, including the Afghan authorities, that some of those pledges represented loans rather than grants. I understand that recently Mr Karzai has declared a willingness to look at concessional loans as way of increasing access to international funding.


4   See www.careinternational.org.uk/news/whatdo_care_think/afghanistan/afghanistan_policy_brief.pdf Back


 
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