Examination of Witness(Questions 120-138)
MR RAJA
JARRAH
TUESDAY 26 NOVEMBER 2002
120. Will this fill a gap?
(Mr Jarrah) More recent figures show that the disbursement
rates for the trust fund are not lagging as far behind as we thought
at the time of that report.
121. Perhaps you can update us on it.
(Mr Jarrah) I think the issue is more to do with whether,
in the long term, the level of pledges is sufficient. I do accept
the argument that in Tokyo where there had been very little needs
analysis done and negotiations were done on imperfect information,
the pledges that were made were the best available at the time
but I hope that the signals given to this Committee last week
by Mr Austin that these are up for renegotiation next year will
be a sign of a readiness to increase those pledges.
122. Do you think next year that perhaps all
funding should be channelled through the ARTF and that the UN,
NGOs and TA could bid for funds from the ARTF? Is that something
CARE would support?
(Mr Jarrah) Yes, it is something that CARE would support.
It is a compromise solution between giving the government full
sovereignty of funds to which it has a right. At the same time,
it creates a relatively low risk mechanism for donors to contribute
to. So, for the time being, I think that the ARTF would be a good
compromise.
Ann Clwyd
123. You have said in your memo that over half
a million Afghans carry arms and that the security forces are
inadequate. Would you like to expand on that.
(Mr Jarrah) Afghanistan is a country where disputes
between people, whether they are politically motivated or over
civilian or financial issues, are traditionally resolved by force
of arms or by threat of use of arms and that is a reality that
we have to accept as being part of the operating reality in Afghanistan.
With the presence of western forces also carrying arms in that
country, I think it is very important that we demonstrate that
there are certain uses of arms that are considered to be legitimate
and certain uses of arms that are redundant in the 21st century
and I think that blurring of the role of the military further
confuses any messages that we are trying to give to Afghan society
that the use of arms is an acceptable way to behave.
124. Do you think that enough is being done
on disarmament and demobilisation?
(Mr Jarrah) No, I do not think so but it is a huge
job. I know that negotiations and plans are being prepared behind
the scenes but, in terms of what you see on the ground, not much
has been done.
125. Can you describe the obstacles to doing
that more speedily.
(Mr Jarrah) It is not something that is actually part
of CARE's experience, so I cannot really speak on behalf of my
agency. As an agency, we have not come up against any operating
difficulties that are due to the level of arms in the civilian
population. It is simply that we predict will be a difficulty
as we try to expand our activities across the whole country. We
avoid insecure areas and that is partly why we have not had any
serious security incidents in the past few months.
126. Is support for regional power holders by
the Americans an obstacle to security?
(Mr Jarrah) Not in our experience, although I can
understand the argument why it would be.
127. What about ISAF? Everybody told us in Afghanistan
and have told us subsequently that ISAF ought to be expanded and
some people of course argue that the national security force could
play that role. What is your view?
(Mr Jarrah) We believe that ISAF does need to be expanded.
We cannot see any way in the foreseeable future that security
across the country can be guaranteed without an expansion of ISAF.
The signs from all the decision-makers around ISAF are that they
are not intending to do that or be prepared to look at it seriously,
but we continue to believe that that is the best way forward.
The problems with insecurity in Afghanistan are as much to do
with banditry and are a symptom of the high level of ownership
of arms in a poor country. So, political agendas aside, there
does need to be a widespread imposition of law and order in the
country somehow and we think ISAF is the best way to do that.
128. Do you think that the expansion of the
national security force could actually give the warlords more
power?
(Mr Jarrah) Potentially so. I am not a military strategist,
so I do not feel qualified to answer that. It is clear that eventually
a national security force is the only long-term sustainable way
of maintaining law and order in Afghanistan and without doubt
power brokers currently in the country will want to have their
stake in that, but I am not qualified to make a more sophisticated
analysis than that.
Hugh Bayley
129. The number of internally displaced people
and refugees to their homes and villages is much higher than people
expected.
(Mr Jarrah) Yes.
130. Is that a good thing or are the numbers
swamping the ability of home communities to receive them? Perhaps
"swamping" is the wrong word.
(Mr Jarrah) The word "swamping" is not the
word that I am having difficulty with, it is the expression "good
thing". To the extent that people have returned of their
own freewill, then it is not for us to judge whether what they
have done is right or wrong. However, observing objectively, it
has swamped the ability of communities to absorb returnees. It
has been on the basis, I think, of false expectations for the
majority of the families that have returned; they were expecting
greater support for resettlement once they had arrived there than
is actually the case. In terms of the scale of the humanitarian
problem, then it is not a good thing that there are that many
people in relation to the resources available to absorb them.
That does beg the question as to what the conditions were like
in the places that they left and we understand that the climate
in many of the host nations from which these people have returned
is becoming daily more hostile and it is a moot point as to whether
or not they are better off suffering at home or suffering in exile.
131. Can you explain a little more the sort
of things that are happening in the refugee camps outside Afghanistan
or in the communities in which people are living.
(Mr Jarrah) I cannot report on the refugee camps outside
Afghanistan because CARE is no longer present there on any great
scale but, in the Shomali Valley, for example, where we are engaged
in agricultural rehabilitation and resettlement and reconstruction
work, there are simply not enough resources available for the
rehabilitation of shelter and housing for people returning. There
is not enough opportunities in the agricultural sector for people
to find gainful employment with the degradation of the infrastructure
and the transport and irrigation structure. We are currently planning
a programme of urban income generation in recognition of the fact
that most of the people who come back with agricultural expectations
may end up looking for alternatives in cities and there are no
alternatives in cities for them at the moment. So, a big thrust
of our future programme in Afghanistan will be to try to regenerate
or create alternative employment opportunities in urban areas.
132. The three members of the Committee who
went to the Shomali Valley told us that there was enough support
for only two-thirds of the refugees who had returned and there
was a proportion for whom there was not provision, as you have
just confirmed. What do those people do? Do they move into towns?
Do they go back to the refugee camps from where they have come?
What is your experience?
(Mr Jarrah) My colleague who will be responding later
for BAAG has more detailed information that will answer your question.
It is a combination of going to the cities and returning from
whence they came. For example, households will return to Afghanistan
and then perhaps send some members back. What we are seeing in
terms of livelihood strategies of families that return is often
a mixed strategy where individual members of a household will
go in different directions so that they can maximise their opportunities
for one of them striking lucky.
133. A year ago as a Committee we went to the
North-West frontier province of Pakistan and we visited a number
of refugee camps. At the two extremes, we met a camp that had
been there for 20 years on the outskirts of Peshawar where people
seemed to be pretty well integrated into the local economy and
community. At the other extreme, we saw a camp which had been
constructed in the previous couple of months where you had very
new arrivers and that camp was a good long way from any urban
centre, so there was less opportunity for people to integrate
into the local community. In terms of those returning, who is
returning? Is it possible to discern that there is a difference,
that it is, for instance, the relatively more recent refugees
who are returning, and how does that fit in with your concern
that there may be pressures from the host communities? On whom
are the pressures to return greatest?
(Mr Jarrah) I think you will get a much better answer
on that from my colleague later on. I could hazard a few generalities
at this stage, but I think it would be better for you to get a
detailed answer later.
134. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees stresses
the talents and skills that refugees have which they can contribute
to reconstruction. What is your view of the talent and skills
of people who come back and, if they are not being used as widely
as they could be, what more could be done to make use of the skills
of people?
(Mr Jarrah) We had some successful experience of reconstruction
activities using the talents and skills of returned people and
part of the activities that we are involved in is skills training
for particular areas that we require for reconstruction. There
is potential for a great deal more of that and I think that, were
more resources available to a larger number of actors, the use
of returnees for massive job creation programmes that provide
the infrastructure that needs to be reconstructed is a good strategy
for the short-term way ahead.
135. Are there any resentments from the non-refugees
to the returnees? Are they seen as people "who did not go
through the hard times with us back at home"? Are they people
who have become culturally different? Is there a problem there?
(Mr Jarrah) I am not aware of any cases of that, but
I can find out more information and let you know. That has not
been reported to me.5
Chairman
136. In your judgment, how does funding for
Afghanistan compare with funding for other national reconstruction
projects, particularly post-conflict?
(Mr Jarrah) It is far smaller. The figure of $40 or
$60 per head compared to $250 or higher than that in previous
post-conflict situations has already been circulated and I know
that there are some technical issues about how that figure is
calculated and that is not really the point of issue. The fact
that there is such a difference in order of magnitude, whether
or not you agree on the details of the calculation, is the point
that has to be put across. I have heard a critique of those figures
that says that the purchasing power in Afghanistan is much greater
than it is in other places and therefore the value of that $40
or £60 is not comparable to a similar amount in Bosnia or
Timor or elsewhere. The majority of the costs for the intervention
efforts have not been locally incurred and I think the appeal
to the fact that things are cheaper in Afghanistan is not very
strong argument to explain away the order of magnitude difference
between the sources made available to Afghanistan and to other
places.
5 Ev 58.
137. In Afghanistan, you have the transitional
authority which is dependent entirely for its funding on the international
community. You then have a huge UN family of organisations which
seem to be as well co-ordinated as humanly possible. Then you
have a large number of NGOs. Are the NGOs plugged in, in terms
of command and control and co-ordination, to the UN family or
plugged in to the transitional authority? Who do you go to when
you want to talk about how more effective you can be or what the
marriage value of various NGOs can be working together? How do
you see the machinery of government? How does that work so far
as you are concerned?
(Mr Jarrah) It is getting better. It has not been
as good as we had hoped. There were hopes early on in the process
that the co-ordinating mechanism through ACBAR, which is the network
of Afghan NGOs, would be more effective as a platform for liaison
with the government and the UN. That has not turned out to be
the case. We are not quite sure why. I think the events of recent
weeks where we have been discussing with the Ministry of Planning
through the Swiss Peace initiative some guidelines for the way
ahead will improve the situation dramatically. NGOs are an opinionated
lot and it has not always been easy to find the avenue to make
those opinions felt.
138. Is there anything that you would like to
add? If there anything that you feel our questions have not drawn
out that you would particularly like the Committee to take on
board?
(Mr Jarrah) There is one further point—I think
I alluded to it earlier but I would just like to emphasise it—that
NGOs see their long-term role being the strengthening of civil
society in the places in which they work. For understandable reasons,
NGOs so far in Afghanistan have been used mainly in a service
delivery role and I can see that continuing for the immediate
future, but I would like to emphasise that NGOs do not see their
role as being solely that nor are we there simply to build the
capacity of actors who currently cannot rise to their responsibilities.
NGOs do have a long-term future in Afghanistan and it looks very
different from the role that they are fulfilling at the moment.
The most important thing that they are doing now is to ensure
that there remains a space within Afghan society for Afghan organisations
to build up a vibrant society that can have a voice with government
and international agencies.
Chairman: Thank you. That is a good point
and one well worth making.
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